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ABSTRACT
FEAR, FRUSTRATION AND THE WILL TO OVERCOME:
a social history of Poliomyelitis in Western Australia.

This thesis investigates community responses to Poliomyelitis, and
the impact of the disease on those who experienced it, particularly
during the epidemics that occurred in Western Australia between
1938 and 1956. The research sources are W.A. Health Department
records, held mostly at the Battye Library, records held by
Australian Archives and Royal Perth Hospital, newspaper reports,
comparative studies from several states in Australia and overseas,
oral history interviews, biographies and personal records.
The history of polio has several layers and the presence or the
disease in the community evoked varied and ambiguous reactions,
summarised here as fear, frustration and the will to overcome. I
have examined the discussion the virus generated amongst
members of the public, researchers, health professionals and polio
survivors, in order to draw conclusions about the relationship
between disease and western society.
Polio evoked greater level of fear amongst all members of the
community, compared with other infectious diseases which had a
far higher mortality rate. The behaviour of the polio virus
challenged theories of infection current during the first half of the
twentieth century. Health and scientific professionals, and the
general public, were frustrated by a lack of accurate knowledge
concerning the disease. Uncertainty led to the implementation of
a variety of preventative measures, some of which, such as
quarantine, were unpopular while others, such as nasal clips, were
ineffective. Research aimed at developing a vaccine to conquer the
virus was maintained but scientific and medical professionals
disagreed amongst themselves, while members of the general public
questioned their capabilities and offered their own homespun
solutions. At the same time polio survivors were often noted for
their determined efforts to recover from the effects of paralysis.
Epidemics of polio in Australia, which were most severe between
1937 and 1956, peaked in 1951. Once the employment of Salk
vaccine, discovered in 1952, removed the threat of polio, interest in
the disease declined in western societies while survivors continued
to live as if their had no disability. Considering the impact it
made made on the community at the time there has been little
ongoing discussion of polio. However the memory of polio is being
revived at present, particularly amongst polio survivors, due to the
after effects of the virus itself. A condition known as "Post-Polio
Syndrome" (PPS) has been identified, and research into this field
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continues. Alarm at the current drop in the rate of immunisation
in Australia, and the reappearance of 'conquered' diseases such as
whooping cough, has also acted as a reminder of the social havoc
epidemics of polio and other dangerous infectious diseases once
created. Although the this thesis refers to PPS, the primary
interest is in the responses of the community and individuals
during the polio era, and their memory of that period.
***
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CHAPTER 1: History, memory and polio

Many people have a Polio story to tell and mine is part of this
thesis. I am a survivor of the first major polio epidemic to occur in
Western Australia. Just before Christmas 1948, aged two and a
half, I had become feverish and complained of pains in my right
knee. I My parents took me to the doctor in the country town near
our farm but he dismissed their concerns, subjected them to the
humiliation of a lecture on spoiling their child, and sent them on
their way. An epidemic of polio had raged in Western Australia
since January 1948 and, although there had been only two
notifications from our district, 2 by this stage of the year over three
hundred cases had been reported and almost twenty five people
had died. As summer came on the epidemic revived. After the
school year ended on December 2 the number of notifications rose
and did not decline until the end of the month .3

My infection

occurred in the thick of the new wave, and under the
circumstances one could have expected even a country doctor to be
alert to the symptoms of poliomyelitis in a child, but it was not so.
Reports of misdiagnosis and insensitive treatment by doctors have
proved to be surprisingly common amongst polio survivors.4
The next day, at a farm further out, our extended family gathered
for a Christmas celebration.

I continued to be listless and

I Letter, Dr C Christie to RMO, PMH, 21 January 1949, and PMH Records for
patient A32220, in possession of Author.
2 Reportofthe Public Health.Department 1948, (1949), Government Printer: Perth,
p. 51. BL, 614.09WES.
3 Public Health 1948, (1949). p. 63, BL, 614.09WES.
4 Six of the twelve people interviewed for this thesis reported erroneous diagnosis
in the early stages. See Chapter 9 below.
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miserable, and sat on my uncle's knee most of the day. Before

many days had passed my right leg was half an inch shorter than
my left, and due to lost muscle function, I threw it out as I walked.
On 8 January 1949, my parents returned to the doctor who
diagnosed poliomyelitis - it was visible by then. 5 I was referred to
Princess Margaret Hospital (PMH), for physiotherapy and
orthopaedic care administered under the direction of Dr R.
McKellar Hall. I remained in Ward Two of PMH for seven months.
Even though my rtght leg was not gravely affected, there followed
months and years of treatment involving physiotherapy, the use of
various sorts of calipers, and at least two operations, the last of
which occurred in 1961. Once I began work, in 1962, I lived a
"normal" life, and certainly did not regard myself as disabled, even
though I had never played sport, and there were some things I
could not easily do.

It was many years before I began to

understand how deeply my life had been affected by the months of
hospitalisation and years of adjustment to polio.
The memory of my polio experience was severely jolted in 1988
when the news of Post Polio Syndrome began to break in
Australia. 6 In the late 1970s and early 1980s individuals who had
suffered from polio, particularly during the period 1930-1960,
began to report a variety of symptoms such as loss of muscle
function, unaccustomed fatigue and pain. A condition now known
as "Post-Polio Syndrome" (PPS) or the "Late Effects of Polio" (LEP)
5 Letter, Dr C Christie to RMO, PMH, 21 January 1949, PMH Records for patient
A32220, copy in possession of the author.
6 Egan, C. "Polio comes back to haunt", WeekendAustmltan, 12-13 November
1988, p.10.

CHAPTER I: History, memory and polio

13

was identified. Many who presented with PPS found that doctors
knew little or nothing of polio and, at first, did not take their
symptoms seriously. But the weight of evidence for PPS mounted
and research into this field continues. 7

Many polio survivors

found the coming of PPS revived painful memories of their original
experience. a and aroused fears concerning their future.

I was one

of these. For others the identification of PPS brought welcome
relief9 because it named something they knew to be part of their
life, but which doctors, and friends, did not know about or would
not take seriously.
In Australia alarm at the drop in the lmmunisation rate has acted
as a social reminder of the havoc epidemic polio, and other
diseases, once created. A campaign to promote the vaccination of
children has begun, aimed mostly at diseases such as whooping
cough.ID But, as far as polio is concerned, the emergence of PPS
has been of far greater importance.

Because of PPS polio is now

back on the personal, historical and public health agendas of the

7 Halstead, L.S. and Grimby, G. ( 1995). Post PolloSyndrome, Hanley and Belfus,
Inc. Philadelphia, is a comprehensive series of essays on the subject of PPS. See
also Leboeuf, C. ( 1991). The Late Effects of Pollo: informatf.on for healthprovtders,
Commonwealth Department of Community Services and Health, Australian
Polio Network, ( 1991 ). Pollo Papers 1991, Citadel Press, Hawthorn, and the
Proceedings of the Australian Conferences on Post Polio, Adelaide 1992, Merroo
NSW,1996.
8 Halstead, L.S. and Griinby, G. (1995). PostPoltoSyndrome, pp.199-214, Sass,
E.J. ( 1996).PoUo's Legacy: an oml history. University Press of America. Oral
Histocy Interview J. p.93, and K, p.93.
9 Interview C.
IOWA, 8 April, 1995, p.49; WeekendAustraltan, 3-4 Februacy 1996, Schedule
aims to arrest 'scandalous' immunisation levels, p. 7.

CHAPTER I: History, memory and polio
community. I I New demands in

14

the field of after care have been

highlighted and a new response is required from medical and
clinical practitioners.

Post-Polio Networks have formed in

Australia and New Zealand, and in other parts of the world, to
gather information and provide practical and non-material forms
of support for polio survivors.
The memory jolt brought about by Post Polio Syndrome, has
affected many people very deeply. It is as though an earthquake
has broken the surface of the historical landscape, throwing up
things that had hitherto laid buried or forgotten.

As the oral

testimonies used for this thesis show, polio survivors have been
caused to revisit memories of their personal and professional past,
and that of the community in which they lived. The silence is
being broken, new light is being cast on these experiences and it is
possible to ask fresh questions that will allow us to reframe the
received understanding of this period. Histories which deal with
life in Australia during this era pay little or no attention to

polio.12 But polio has begun to be discussed again as it has re

emerged due to PPS. A parallel can be found with the experience of
many who lived through the Second World War but did not speak
11 Bearup, C. ( 1991). The outcomes of the Poliomyelitis Epidemics in South
Austm.Ua: 1912-1960, unpublished Honours Thesis, Flinders University, p.18.
Bearup surveyed 124 members of the Post-Polio Support Group of South
Australia. Many stated "their story had not been told and that the greatly
reduced incidence of the disease had erased knowledge of their experience from
the public's mind".
12 Stannage, C.T. (ed.), ( 1981). A New History oJWestemAustralta, Nedlands:
University of Western Australia Press, makes no reference to polio while G Bolton
makes a small reference to it in connection with Sister Elizabeth Kenny and
Dame Jean Macnamara in Crowley, F. (ed.), ( 1974). A New History qfAustralia,
Melbourne: William Heinemann, p.481. A brief article appears in the more recent
work by Gilbert, A, and Inglis, K. (eds.), ( 1987). Australians: a historical atlas,
Broadway: Fairfax Syme and Weldon Associates, pp. 172-3.
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of their memories until legitimacy for doing so was given, fifty
years later, through Australia's year of remembrance in 1995. 13
The physical effects of polio have not been especially debilitating
for me and I have been able to do most things in my life. But in
my middle years I found that the social and psychological effects
emerged to reveal enduring scars. In 1991 after twenty years of
struggling to maintain close relationships, I was referred to a
psychologist familiar with attachment theories, especially those
represented by the work of John Bowlby. 14 My difficulties were
attributed to the initial long period of separation from my family,
endured at a particularly vulnerable time of life. In the 1940s
there was little hospital visiting allowed and the attitude to child
care was hard and unfeeling. In my case access was difficult - I
was one hundred and fifty eight miles away from home where there
was a farm to run and five other children to care for. It was like
being abandoned but the wounds created by this experience
remained "out of sight". Being given the tools to understand this
aspect of my past and de-code the experience allowed a revelation
to occur. I was given a lens through which I began to re-read the
whole of my life up to that point. And I have had to think about
the future in new ways. Others have had similar experiences but
in our culture it is not something that is readily accepted or
discussed. It is evident that there is some reluctance to allow the
memories of childhood deprivation to be accepted into our
13 Dartan-Smith, K, and Hamilton, P, (eds.), (1994). Memory and History in
Twentieth Century Austmlla, Melbourne: Oxford University Press, p.139.

14 Explanation is given in C hapter 9 below.
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This thesis investigates memory and history in connection with the
impact of polio on individuals and the community in Australia,
particularly in Western Australia from 1938-1956. From 1881
until 1956 (the 'polio era') several Western countries, including
Australia, were affected by an increasing number of polio
epidemics. Although the polio virus has made little impact on the
Australian community since the late 1950s the effects of this
disease continue to shape the identities of its survivors, and others
who for different reasons knew it at close range. Polio has not
been a disease to reckon with in Australia since the mid 1950s, few
cases were reported in Australia after 1966, and none since 1986. 1 6
However, the virus continues to be active in Africa, India, South
East Asia and China [Figure 11, 1 7 where steps are being taken to
eradicate it. 1 8
It is difficult to imagine the impact a polio epidemic made on the
community though some draw parallels with the AIDS epidemic. 1 9
Until vaccination commenced perplexed research scientists and
15

The original reaction of the medical profession to Bowlby and Robertson's
work was one of disbelief, and later feminist writers have attacked some of their
presuppositions. In Australia the treatment given to the recent "Stolen
Generation" report, and the slow emergence of the details surrounding the
"Leaving of Liverpool" are signs of the difficulty we have confronting issues of
childhood deprivation.
1 6 WA, 8 April, 1995, Polio a risk:Lawrence, p.49.
1 7 World Health Organisation, Global reported incidence of poliomyelitis, used
with permission. In 1996 there were 3,755 polio cases reported, mostly from
Africa, India, South East Asia and China. None were reported in Australia,
North America or South America.
1 8 WA. 20 Januruy 1997, p.24. 120 million Indian children were vaccinated in
the second round of an attempt to eradicate polio by the year 2000.
19 Rogers, N. ( 1992). Dirt and Disease:poUo before FDR, Rutgers University Press:
New Jersey, p.3.
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health and medical professionals were obliged to recognise and
respond to the growing threat the polio virus posed to the
community. At first children were the main ones to suffer from the
paralysing effects of the virus, but during the more recent
epidemics a growing proportion of young adults suffered infection
and residual paralysis. Those who survived, learned to live with
the result. Family members and carers experienced quarantine,
and sometimes ostracism, when someone close to them became
infected.

During an epidemic quarantine officers and council

workers had extra duties to perform, school and kindergarten
teachers had their classes cancelled, swimming bath operators
were unable to conduct their businesses, and journalists had to
weigh the social cost of a sensational story against the potential
effect it might have on the level of fear and hysteria abroad in the
community.
Memory and history

This research has been influenced by work which has reflected on
the relationship between memory and history. 2 0 For some memory
is 'the life of history' as the tree is to its bark, for others the
relationship is more ambiguous, even antithetica1. 2 1 The lack of
formal sources in some fields, such as indigenous history, and the
continued expansion of historical methodologies, has provided
2 0 Dartan-Smith, K. and Hamilton, P. (eds.), (1994). Memory and History, and
Samuel, R. and Thompson, P. (eds.), (1990). The Myths We Live By. Routledge,
London. Both contain numerous essays by writers who have explored new ways
of making the connection between memory- and history-.
2 1 Dartan-Smith, K. and Hamilton, P. (eds.), (1994). Memory and History, pp.91 1.
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impetus for a re-evaluation of the place of memory, or perhaps we

should say experience, and its relationship with history. 2 2 In the
last two decades history has been 'nourished' by memory through
the development of new questions arising from new methodologies.
The continued acceptance and sophistication of oral history, the
growth of interest in indigenous oral traditions, the collective
remembering of nations, and of groups such as holocaust survivors
and war veterans, the gendered nature of memory, and the
influence of post-structuralism have all contributed to this
development. The results include a deeper appreciation of the
links between place and identity.2 3 Expanded perspectives on ways
the past is remembered have been paralleled by new
understandings of ways in which the past is forgotten. 2 4

An

'official' or single, abstracted understanding of a subject is now
hardly possible, if it ever was.
The revisiting of memory means that it is necessary to take a more
flexible, or fluid, approach to history.

Parallel narratives are

acknowledged by some writers, and counter stories are accepted
alongside, or even within, a narrative.2 5 Judith Binney, 2 6 Carolyn
Steedman, 2 7 and Mark Baker, 2 8 are examples of writers who are
22

Benjamin, W. ( 1 992). Illuminations, Fontana: London, p.83. Benjamin
regarded the decline in storytelling as a sign that experience had been devalued.
2 3 The work of Peter Reid for example.
2 4 Darian-Smith, K, and Hamilton, P. (eds.), ( 1994). Memory and History, see
Paula Hamilton's discussion, pp. 12- 13.
2 5 The Australian "lest we forget" approach to the ANZAC tradition is a counter
narrative when placed alongside the call for the elimination of the "black arm
band" view of indigenous history which requires institutionalised forgetfulness.
2 6 Binney, J. ( 1997). Redemption Songs: a life of the nineteenth century Maori
Leader Te Koott Ariklmngi Te Turiki, Melbourne University Press: Carlton.
27 Steedman, C. ( 1982). The Tidy House: little girls writing, Virago: London.
2 8 Baker, M.R. ( 1997). A Journey Through Memory: The Fiftieth Gate, Flamingo.
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involved in exploring the connections between history and memory
in new ways, and from different perspectives.

With respect to the negotiations that take place in society over
memory and history Paula Hamilton has written ... since all memory ls subject to structures of power in any
society, we need a great deal more investigation into the
processes by which some memories become erased, some
emerge in the public arena, and some remain relatively
privatised. 2 9
The most readily noticeable memory gaps in Australian history
have been in connection with indigenous history, the place of
women, and the experience of war veterans and prisoners of war.
It is evident from this research that there has been a gap in the
public memory of the polio era in Australia. Despite the popular
appeal of Alan Marshall's I Can Jump Puddles, published in 1955
and made into a television series in the 1970s, polio has not
figured in popular discourse since the late 1950s. While the the
success of the immunisation campaign, which was trumpeted as a
conquest of the disease, can account for this there is also evidence
polio survivors were inducted into a culture that encouraged them
to deny their disability, and its effect on their life. Consequently
the perceptions and stories of many who survived infection, or in
some way encountered the ravages of the disease at close range,
have been overlooked, marginalised or forgotten. Those survivors
who did gatn attention were often high profile figures, such Alan
2 9 Dartan-Smith, K. and Hamilton, P. (eds.). ( 1994). Memory and History, p.20.

20
Marshall and Marjorie Lawrence, who were seen to triumph
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heroically over their loss. 3 0

They shared the limelight with

international heroes such as President Roosevelt and Jonas Salle
about whom much has been wrttten. 3 1
There are many voices to be heard in recounting the history of
polio in Western Australia, but up to the present time the official
history has been provided by the Public Health Department, in the
Annual Reports, which are thorough and detailed. Designed to
satisfy the accountability provisions of the Public Health
Department they contain medical and epidemiological information
rather than material of a personal or social kind.
Archival materials from the Public Health Department illuminate
these reports, and offer other voices and perspectives not included
in the annual reports. Australian Government Archives provide
access to national policy decisions which affected the whole of
Australia and, as in the case of the 1 954 royal tour, details
affecting to Western Australia in particular. 3 2

Royal Perth

Hospital Archives reveal something of effect polio epidemics had on
the life of the chief public hospital in Perth. The ongoing debate
about polio amongst health and medical professionals is found in
the medical and public health journals. Unpublished material is
available that refers to polio as part of hospital, public health or
30

Marshall, A. (1955). I Can Jump Puddles, Hawthorn: F W Cheshire, Lawrence,
M. (1949). Interrupted Melody, New York.
3 1 See Chapter 3 below.
3 2 The ABC TV Social History Documentary, "TIME FRAME - Pollo Days", March
1997, dealt with polio and the royal tour.
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physiotherapy histortes. 33

Newspaper reports during the polio era offer a number of
perspectives, often supporting the official line, as represented by
the Public Health Department, or through the columns such as
"The Diary of a Doctor" . 34

Newspapers were also the means

whereby some of those articulate enough to express themselves via
letters to the Editor had their views published. Parliamentary
papers record the urgent questions and answers of politicians
concerned about their constituencies.
Julie Marshall's short history of Princess Margaret Hospital refers
briefly to the first major epidemic in 1948. 35 And gradually more
individuals, other than the more high profile figures, have felt
moved to voice their polio sto:ry. A volume by Vivienne Overheu,
(1984). It Helps To Be Stubborn , Perth, and a volume of stories self
published by the Post-Polio Network, (1990). The Polio Experience:

personal stories , Perth, provide this form of personal perspective. A
rapidly growing amount of similar material is available for other
parts of Australia, New Zealand and the U nited States of
33 An unpublished manuscript compiled by Lissiman, M.C. and Mackay. J.H.
( 1959). Poltnmyelltts: a general study of the disease. is kept in the Curtin
University Librruy. Written for physiotherapy students, the manuscript offers a
brief factual outline of the history of polio in Western Australia. Other
unpublished sources are Martyr. P. (1994). The Professtonal Development of
Rehabtlttation tn Australta, 1870- 1 98 1 , University of Western Australia: PhD
Thesis, History, Martyr, P. ( 1996). A History of the Vtctorta Hospttal (Infecttnus
Diseases) to the Royal Perth (Rehabllttattnn) Hospttal, 1893-1993, Perth, Graham
Taylor, S. (1996). Public Health tn Western Australta tn the Post War Years: Draft
Report. Unpublished Manuscript, Perth: Public Health Department.
3 4 The Diary of a Doctor, "Whooping Cough 'More Serious' Than Paralysis",
Western Mall. 9 September 1937, p.5.
35 Marshall, J. ( 1996). Starting Wtth Threepence: the story of Princess Margaret
Hospttal for Chtldren. Fremantle: Fremantie Arts Centre Press, Ch.4.
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America. 36

In this thesis the voice of those who have been directly affected by
polio and lived this history has been gained through testimonies
given in twelve interviews which have been transcribed. Two were
conducted with families in which a member had polio, and ten
with polio survivors themselves. All interviewees live in Western
Australia, though one had polio in New South Wales and one in
Tasmania. Six are male and six are female. One had polio in
1937 /38, two in the late 1940s, and the remainder between 1951
and 1956, the peak of the polio era in Australia.
Post Polio Networks have held conferences in Australia and New
Zealand since 1991. Proceedings from these events provide another
source of medical and scientiflc data in relation to PPS . and a
wealth of other material covering the personal concerns of polio
survivors.
As a participant observer in this history my own memories are
another source for this narrative.

There are advantages and

disadvantages in being so closely involved in an investigation of
this nature and I have sought to find and appropriate balance in
the discussion that follows.
The history of Poliomyelitis must, of necessity, be examined within
36 Recent examples are, Butterworth, K.P. (ed.), (1994). Mind Over Muscle:

suroiving polio in New Zealand,

Dunmore: Palmerston North; Sass. E.J. with
Gottfried, G. and Sorem, A. (1996). Polio 's Legacy: an oral history, Lanham:
University Press of America.
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the framework of scientific and medical developments that

occurred following its emergence as an epidemic disease during the
1880s.3 7 The subsequent attempts to understand the disease, the
search for a vaccine, the immunisation campaigns, and the
broader currents of social and political influence that provide the
context for these developments, have been integral to the
discussion of polio and western society in this century.
Until recently the dominance of medical and scientific interests
has resulted in a history in which social and personal stories,
outside those associated with figures such as Jonas Salk and FDR,
have played a lesser part.

The increased attention paid by

historians to medical and public health topics has contributed to a
growing body of social rather than medical histories of disease, and
the emergence of PPS has ensured polio, and polio survivors, a
place on this agenda.

While medical and scientific histories

cannot be ignored, this thesis is a social history with at least two
aims in view. To examine community reaction to polio and in the
process allow a greater variety of voices to be heard on the subject,
and to contribute to the reframing of our understanding of the
relationship between polio and society.
Little has been published of the history of the polio epidemics in
Western Australia and so far no social history of polio in Western
Australia has been attempted. A brief outline, based mostly on the
annual reports of the Public Health Department, has been given in
chapter seven of the book by Dudley Snow, (1981).The Progress of
3 7 For a lucid summary see Rogers, N. ( 1992). Dirt and Disease, pp. 165-190.
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Public Health in Western Australia 1 829-1 9 77, Perth. The title of
Snow's book suggests that it covers all of Public Health in Western
Australia, but it does so only in outline, concentrating for the
most part on the events he himself was involved in while serving
the Public Health Department 1950-1973. Educated in England,
Snow joined the Perth office of the Western Australian Public
Health Department in 1950 after two years in the North West with
the Royal Flying Doctor Service. Formerly a Major in the British
Army, Snow brought the skills, discipline and language of that
profession to his work. His language in connection with polio was
strongly militaristic, something common in other places and
perpetuated by the newspapers of the day which often used
headlines such as "Polio Fight Goes On". 38 Snow titled Chapter 7
of his book, 'The Conquest of Poliomyelitis" and wrote Few diseases are capable of evoking as much human emotion
as polio... Its conquest throughout the world since 1956 has
therefore been one of the most gratifying accomplishments . . .
The history of the disease in Western Australia is a fairly
accurate reflection of its epidemiology elsewhere, but its
eradication in this part of the world presented special
problems. 39
He does not make personal references in his account of the
epidemic and records the conquest of polio as a triumph. With the
words "in due course the vaccine was pronounced extremely
effective in preventing polio," 40 Snow passes over any reference to
38 Daily News, 11 February 1956, p.6. Militaristic language may have arisen in
connection with polio because the period in which the virus was most active in
its epidemic form included World Wars I and II.
3 9 Snow, D.J.R. ( 198 1). The Progress ofPubltc Health in WestemAustralia 1 8291 977, p.66.
40 Snow, D.J.R. (198 1).Progress, p.68.
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the difficult history that preceded that point, especially in

connection with the search for a vaccine.

While avoiding the

medical difficulties Snow does not hesitate to point out the
logistical problems that had to be overcome in Western Australia
where the programme "had all the components of a military
campaign - an objective, a plan, logistics and reconnaissance, and
even propaganda" . 4 1 An easy frame of reference for a former Major,
but one that completely neglected the personal, human element of
the story.
Snow's efficiency resulted in the Public Health Department
conquering not just the virus, but fears about the safety of the
vaccine. Throughout Australia Salk vaccine was provided to all
members of the public who volunteered to receive it. In Western
Australia an immunisation acceptance rate of 97% was recorded
and in the decade 1956-66 over two million doses of Salk were
administered throughout the state. The triumph, which is deeply
interconnected with his own, 42 is trumpeted by Snow No other vaccination programme has ever been attended by
such remarkable results. No other public health measure in
the history of Western Australian public health could have
been more successful.43
Although the introduction of Sabin oral vaccine, in 1966, made
the task of supplying vast areas much easier, Snow, whose own
4 1 Snow, D.J.R. (1981). Progress, p. 70.
42 Snow was promoted to the position of Director of Epidemiology in the Public
Health Department. Informally some referred to him as "Mr Polio", conversation,
Dr Richard Lugg, October 1994.
43 Snow, D.J.R. (1981). Progress, p.76.
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contribution to the campaign against polio was significant,
modestly asserts that to "Salk vaccine alone must go the credit for
the conquest of poliomyelitis in this state".
In this thesis I place the voice of official histocy, as represented by
the Annual Reports of the Public Health Department, and Snow's
The Progress of Public Health in Western Australia 1 829- 1 9 77, in a

broader perspective gained through access to the additional
sources outlined above, including the memories of polio survivors.
I

aim

to link an aspect of the histocy of disease with social histocy

and place the fruits of Dudley Snow's excellent epidemiology in a
broader social and personal context made possible through this
research. At the same time I have placed the West Australian
experience of polio in a national and international perspective.
This thesis is a narrative social histocy that began with the whole
of Australia in view. The abundance of material available led me
to narrow the main focus to Western Australia. The title, Fear,
Frustration and The Will to Overcome , emerged from the research.

Over several decades, polio was described as a disease that was
universally feared. Lack of information about the disease, and
misunderstandings over its means of transmission fed this fear.
The implementation of protection policies that emerged from this
lack of understanding were as frustrating to those subjected to
them as to they were to those who had to administer them. The
will to overcome the ravages of epidemic polio is as noticeable
amongst medical and health experts, as the remarkable
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determination to overcome their disabilities is amongst polio
survivors. The implementation of the immunisation campaign,

and the high level of public response to it, is another indication
that the defeat of polio was something all members of the
community were fiercely resolved to accomplish.
Explanation of the chapters of the thesis

Chapter one of introduces the thesis of history memory and polio
and discusses memory and history. Chapter two details the virus
at the heart of the story and provides an overview of the social
meanings attached to polio in history. Chapter three provides an
international context for the polio story in Australia through a
review of literature associated with the history of polio in the
United States of America, Canada, New Zealand and Britain.
Chapter four discusses the early history of polio in Australia and
Western Australia, examines the outbreak which occurred in
Western Australia in 1938 and provides a context for the three
major epidemics, 1948, 1954 and 1956. Chapter five discusses the
first polio epidemic which occurred in Western Australia in 1948
and which sorely tested the resources of the Public Health
Department. Chapter six discusses the second West Australian
polio epidemic which reached a peak of hysteria on the eve of the
1954 royal visit to the state. Chapter seven discusses the last, and
in some ways the most severe of the Western Australian polio
epidemics, which occurred while preparations were being made for
the mass immunisation programme that commenced in mid 1956.
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Chapter eight discusses the immunisation programme. Chapter
nine discusses the experiences of polio survivors and their families,
and the impact of PPS. Chapter ten draws together the argument,
discusses the understanding of the relationship between polio and
society that emerged from this research, makes some observations
concerning memory and history, indicates where further research
could be undertaken, and concludes the thesis.
***
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Few diseases are capable of evoking as much human emotion as polio.
Dudley Snow, Government Epidemiologist, Public Health Department, Perth. I

The virus at the heart of the story

Poliomyelitis, the name that was eventually given to the virus at
the heart of this investigation, was created from a combination of
Greek and Latin words (n:011.wo = grey, µeu11.oo = marrow, itis =
Latin for inflammation) that reflected its behaviour in attacking
the grey matter of the spinal cord.2 Poliomyelitis was originally
regarded as exclusively a children's disease, was not considered
infectious, and did not come to prominence in its paralytic form
until the middle of the nineteenth century.

The Englishman

Michael Underwood first coined the name Debility of the Lower

Extremities in 1789. From the middle of the nineteenth century
until about 1930 polio was most commonly referred to either as

Acute Anterior Poliomyelitis or Ir!fantile Paralysis . 3 Until the first
decade of the twentieth century medical practitioners and
scientists in Australia, and throughout the world, observed that
children were sometimes paralysed but did not know a virus was
the cause.

I Snow, D.R.J. ( 1981). Progress, p.66.
2 M ore detail is available in Paul, J. R. ( 1971). The History of Poliomyelitis, New
Haven and London: Yale University Press, and Wyatt, H.V. ( 1993). in Kiple, K. F.
(ed.), Cambri.dg e World History ofHuman Disease, Cambridge University Press,
pp.942-950.
3 Paul, J.R. (1971). History, p.5; Wyatt, H.V. (1 993) in Kiple, K. F. (ed. ),
Cambridge, p.942.
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The first recorded epidemic of polio, which occurred in Sweden in
1881, 4 signified a change both in the behaviour and perception of
polio. From early this century it came to be regarded as dangerous
and contagious and, as epidemics of paralytic polio began to occur
more frequently, was made a notifiable disease. Particularly during
the 1 920s and 1 930s, the virus was observed to affect people of all
ages, not just children. Worse still the most severe paralysis was
evident amongst those in their early twenties. Partly because of
this, and partly for convenience, from the late 1 930s the term
Infantile Paralysis was superseded by Poliomyelitis, or Polio.
A standard definition for polio used by medical professionals and
clinicians during the 1 940s and 50s, was:
Poliomyelitis is a common, acute viral disease characterised
clinically by a brief febrile (fever) illness with sore throat,
headache, vomiting, and often with stiffness of the neck and
back. In many cases lower neuron paralysis develops in the
early days of illness.5
Anyone with first-hand experience of polio would agree with John
Paul that this clinical description "falls far short of the usual
picture which this disease conjures up in the minds of most
people". 6

The base for the activity of the polio virus in human beings is the
4 Paul, ( 1971). History, p.72; Burnet, Sir M. and White, D.O. ( 1940 and 1972).
Natuml History ofInfectious Disease, Cambridge University Press, p.9 1. Burnet
and W hite nominate 1887, and although the year is subject of discussion in
Scandinavia, the first epidemics occurred in the 1880s.
5 Paul, ( 1971). History, p. 1.
6 Paul, ( 1971). History, p. l .

--
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intestine and once lodged there it behaves in the following manner.

An incubation period of two to five days, during which the virus
multiplies, is followed by an attempt to breach the body's defences.
If the immune response succeeds in repelling the virus it departs
after a few weeks leaving its host with a level of immunity, having
experienced a brief febrile illness, or perhaps having manifested no
symptoms at all. The Swedish epidemiologist Wickman named this
subclinical form the mino r illness, or abortive po lio myelitis , 7 and
prior to the 1880s most children in western societies would have
been affected by it. The majo r illness, or " true polio", B is caused if
the virus is able to breach the immune system, and travel via the
blood stream to the central nervous system where it may attack
the grey matter of the spinal cord, the motor neurons, or the brain
stem. 9

The resulting inflammation may damage or totally destroy

motor cells which, unlike cells in to other parts of the body,
cannot regenerate. The result is permanent paralysis, or possibly
death.
There are three ways in which a person may be affected by 'true
polio' depending upon what part of the central nervous system the
virus has attacked, and the severity of the damage it has caused. I o
It is also possible for a person to be affected by a combination of
these forms. In the first case a person may suffer only damage to
7 Paul, ( 1971). History, pp.2-3.
8 Paul, ( 1971). History, p.3.
9 Wyatt, H.V. 1993) in Kiple, K. F. (ed.), Cambridge, p.942.
1 O Killalea, A. ( 1995). The Great Scourge: the Tasmanian Infantile Paralysis
Epidemic 1937-1938, Tasmanian Historical Research Association, pp. 4-5,
provides a helpful summary as does Lebouf, C. ( 199 1). The Late Effects ofPolio:
tnformation for h ealth providers, Commonwealth Department of Community
Services and Health, pp. 12- 15.
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some motor cells, the result of which is a temporary paralysis and
loss of strength. Damaged cells may recover their function or be

compensated for by adjacent healthy cells. In this case a person,
who may at first experience quite debilitating paralysis, may
recover the use of affected muscles after some months of therapy.
In the secondly scenario, where the motor cells are completely
destroyed, severe paralysis follows with permanent crippling, or
possibly even death. The third, and worst form of paralytic polio
infection, known as "bulbar", affects the brain stem and may cause
paralysis in the soft palate and the pharynx. A large proportion of
bulbar patients do not survive principally because of difficulty in
clearing the throat secretions. Where the respiratory system is
also affected, death is virtually inevitable.

Paralysis of the

respiratory muscles is a separate factor, not necessarily connected
to bulbar cases. All three forms may include respiratory paralysis
and survival depends on the degree of damage caused. Severe
respiratory paralysis requires the patient be placed in a tank
respirator or "iron lung" as it was commonly known. While a
proportion of respiratory patients were too severely paralysed to
survive, and others required permanent support and had to live in
the iron lung for at least part of the day, most were able to regain
respiratory independence and resume normal life.
Polio in history

Poliomyelitis is thought to have existed widely in the ancient
world, primarily in its endemic form, 1 1 as it still does in numerous
1 1 Paul, { 197 1 ). History, pp. 10-16.
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most children would have suffered a silent infection of the polio
virus by the time they were three or perhaps five years old 1 3 and, if
their body resisted the paralytic effect, would have been rendered at
least partially immune. On this basis a minority of children are
thought to have contracted paralytic polio, which was known in
ancient times. Biblical and Homeric literature refers to lameness
and withered limbs in children, leaving open the the possibility
that the cause was polio. 1 4 An Egyptian stele, dating from the
eighteenth dynasty ( 1 580- 1 350 BCE) and now in the Carlsberg
Glyptothek, Copenhagen, 1 5 portrays a carved figure of a priest with
a deformed leg which is "so characteristic of the after-effects of
poliomyelitis that the diagnosis is practically assured " . 1 6

While the clinical recognition of polio took place during the
nineteenth century, at that time it was not known what sort of
microbial agent was responsible for it, or if it was contagious. The
clarity of the 1 950s definition was made possible by fifty years of
painstaking research commenced by Ivar Wickman and continued
by others following the first epidemics. Karl Landsteiner of Vienna
and his assistant Erwin Popperl 7 changed the direction of polio
research with their announcement of the discovery of the virus in
1 908. So well did Landsteiner and Popper prove their case that by
1 9 1 2 their viral concept of polio was readily accepted and research
12

See [Figure l ].
13 Burnet and White, (1972). Natural History, p.95.
1 4 Paul, (1971). History, p.10.
1 5 Wyatt, H.V. 1993) in Kiple, K. F. (ed.), Cambridge, p.947.
1 6 Paul, (1971). History, p. 12. A photo of the Egyptian stele appears on p.13.
1 7 Paul, (1971). History, pp.98-100.
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had begun to build on the understanding of an organism that was
contagious and infectious, with the potential to cause epidemics.

In 1931 the Australians Burnet and Macnamara, who both earned
substantial reputations in the field, positively established that the
virus had more than one strain. I s Eventually three strains were
proven and named, Type I, Brunhilde, after a chimpanzee, Type II,
Leon, after a person and Type III, Lansing, after a town in the state
of Michigan in the United States of America. 1 9

The ironic featu re of polio is that the rise of its new and more
dangerous form of epidemic activity took place in countries that
simultaneously enjoyed some advancement in their standard of
health and welfare. At the same time there was a parallel decline
in the infection and the mortality rates associated with a variety of
other diseases such as whooping cough and diphtheria.

The change in the behaviou r of polio has been explained in the
following way.2 0 While the virus was endemic in society most
children experienced it in the subclinical fo rm and became
immune, much as they would if they had suffered from mumps or
measles. As some societies improved their standards of community
health and hygiene and infant mortality declined, a greater number
of children lived beyond the age of five years without achieving the
1 8 Fenner, F. ( ed.), ( 1990). History ofMicrobiology ln Australta, Curtin: Brolga
Press, p.378, and Paul, (1971). History, p. l . Burnett was the only medical
virologist working in Australia at that time .
1 9 Parry, W. ( 1969). Communicable Diseases, Hodder and Stoughton, London,
p. 135, Wyatt, H.V. 1993) in Kiple, K. F. (ed.), Cambridge, p.942.
2 0 Burnet and White, (1972). Natuml History, pp.90-95.

CHAPTER 2: Polio and its themes

immunity from the silent infection of polio.

36

As this cohort of

children aged a greater proportion of older children existed who
were vulnerable to the virus. As young adults this group were
found to be particularly susceptible to paralysis.
For a generation after the first polio epidemic other outbreaks,
which notably affected young children, were recorded at intervals
in countries such as Scandinavia, Canada, the United States of
America, Australia and New Zealand. 2 1 The first epidemics were
reported in the United States in 1893 and 1894, Canada in 1910,
New Zealand in 1914 and 1916, Britain in 1911, and Australia in
1897. 2 2 All the above countries recorded an escalation of the
intensity and severity of epidemic activity from the 1920s until
incidence decreased dramatically following the introduction of
immunisation with Salk vaccine in 1956.
Polio in Australia

The first outbreak of polio in Australia large enough to arouse the
interest of public authorities occurred at Port Lincoln, South
Australia in 1897, when fourteen cases were reported out of a

21

Burnet and White, (1972). Natural Htstnry, p.92.
22 Paul, (1971). History, pp.79-80. Vermont in 1894 had 132 cases and was a
substantial epidemic; Rutty, (1995). Poliomyelitis in Canada, p.44; Ross. J. C ..
( 1993). New Zealand, pp.15-16; Gould, T. ( 1995), A Summer Plague: polio and its
surotvors, Yale University Press:New Haven and London, p. 1 6; Fisher. P.J. ( 1967).
The Polio Story, Heinemann, London, p.112; Buxton, A.J.G. ( 1977). Poliomyelitis
ln South Australia 1 937-1956, Honours Dissertation, University of Adelaide, p.8 .
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During the next decade several larger

outbreaks were recorded. In 1905 twenty five cases were reported
in Sydney, thirty-four at Stanmore, NSW, and one hundred and
eight in Brisbane.2 4 In 1 908 there were one hundred and fifty-five
cases in Victorta. 2 5
Polio was made a "notifiable disease" in Tasmania in 1 9 1 1 ,
Queensland, New South Wales and Western Australia in 1 9 1 2, 2 6
Victoria in 1 9 1 6, and South Australia in 1 922.2 7

While the

number of polio notifications in each state has been recorded in
the Commonwealth Year Book from 1929 , the actual number of
cases that occurred remains beyond reach, because many

B uxton, ( 1977). Poliomyelitis in South. Australia, p. 8. The date, derived here
from the Parliamentary Papers of South Australia, is often given as 1 895 in other
sources, who probably base their dates on C umpston, J.H.L. (ed. Lewis, M.J.).
( 1989). Health and Disease in Austm.lia: a history, Commonwealth Government
Printer: Canberra, p.326. The confusion may be with the first recorded death
from Poliomyelitis which occurred in South Australia in 1895.
2 4 Gilbert, A and Inglis, K. (eds.). ( 1987). Austm.lians: a historical atlas, Broadway,
Fairfax Syme and Weldon Associates, pp. 1 72-3, Article on Polio. The date for
these outbreaks is given as 1904.
2 5 Public Health 1948, ( 1 949). Appendix XV, page 58, BL, 614.09 WES; Stephens,
H. D. ( 1908 ). Summary ofan Epidemic of 135 Cases ofAcute Anterior Poliomyelitis
Occurring in Victoria in 1908, Melbourne, Stillwell and Co; McKenzie, W. ( 1 9 10).
The Treatment ofInfantile Paralysis: a study ofmuscular action and muscle
regeneration, Melbourne: Stillwell and Co. C umpston, J.H.L. (ed. Lewis, M.J. ).
( 1989). Health and Disease in Australia, p.326, gives different dates for these
figures.
2 6 Order in Council, 28 May 1912, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120 / 4, 595 / 45, p.2 1 ; Letter
CPH to Local Health Authorities, 25 November 19 1 6, BL, ACC 1003, AN
120/4,626/ 1925, p. l .
2 7 C umpston, J.H.L. (ed . Lewis, M.J. ). ( 1989). Health and Disease ln Australia,
p.326.
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subclinical infections will have escaped notice. 28

38

The official

record reveals [Figures 2 and 3) that in the period 1929-1966 there
were 27,986 notifications of polio nationwide. 29 The worst periods

of infection were 1937-38 (4,555), 3 0 1945-46 (2,449), and 1949-56
(15,965) .

In contrast the virus appears to have been almost

entirely dormant between 1939 and 194 4 when only 384
notifications were received, although it is possible that figures were
not accurately recorded due to the stringencies of the war effort.

During the worst single year, 1951, 4, 735 notifications were

received, mostly from New South Wales (1, 52 6), South Australia
(1,456), and Queensland (1,030).3 1

After an initial flurry in 1938

epidemics of polio occurred in Western Australia in 1948 (311),

1954 (434), and 1956 (401), full discussion of which appears below

in Chapters 4-9.
All Australian states recorded a dramatic decline in the incidence
of polio following the introduction of mass immunisation with
28 Buxton. ( 1977). Poliomyelitis, p. 84. Buxton's figures are drawn from the

Commonwealth Year Book, but do not tally exactly. The figure of 70,000 cases,

said to have occurred between 1936 and 196 1. in Jones. R.F. ( 1 99 1) Post Polio
syndrome: what can we do? MJA Vol. 155, Sep. 16, is based on an "estimate" that
relies on work by Charlotte Leboeuf, ( 1990). The late effects ofPolio:informatton for
health care p roviders, Commonwealth Department of Communi1y Services and
Health, Canberra, p. 14. Leboeuf appears to ignore the reported figures and
calculates on the basis of the number of deaths multiplied by five or ten, a basis
that I believe does not allow for variations in the mortali1y rates that occurred
during epidemics. Wyatt, H.V. 1993) in Kiple, K. F. (ed.), Cambridge, p.942 states
"In the past, cases of abortive polio and those with paralysis who later recovered
were often included in statistics as polio cases. Today, only case with paralysis
or paresis after 3 months are recorded as paralytic polio".
2 9 Australian Health Information Service, ( 1965). Health in Australia: the polio
story, p. 10, [Figure 21 Commonwealth Year book, 1929- 1966, [Figure 3].
3 O Buxton, ( 1977). Poliomyelitis, p. 63, notes that after 1937 the incidence in
polio in Australia made it a national problem.
3 1 Buxton, ( 1977). Poliomyelitis, p. 62. A high rate of polio incidence in South
Australia 1949-56 resulted in 4589 cases. 28% of the national total. In the
period 1948- 1956 Western Australia recorded 1475 cases.
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Salk vaccine in 1956 [Figures 2 and 3], but in 1961-62 an alarming
upsurge occurred in several states. A similar pattern was noticed
in New Zealand and America at this time. The states worst
affected, (NSW, 378 cases, and Queensland, 179 cases) were
studied in detail. 32 It was concluded that three doses of Salk
vaccine protected between 77% and 87% of the population, but
some were still at risk. It was recommended that four, or even five
doses of Salk be given to ensure adequate protection, and the use
of Sabin "live" or attenuated vaccine began to be considered.
Sabin, unlike Salk which was a "killed" vaccine, had the potential
for helping to protect people against an epidemic that had already
commenced.

Disease and society

32 Boughton, C.R. , Fine, R.D. and B urgess, P. ( 1 963). "Poliomyelitis Epidemic in

NSW. 196 1 -62: clinical experiences in the management of 196 patients", MJA.
2,20, 16 November, pp. 820-833. and Patrick, P.R. ( 1963). "Poliomyelitis in a
Vaccinated Community: the 196 1 -2 Q ueensland epidemic", MJA. 2,20, 16
November, pp. 838-84 1 . Type 1 polio vir us was largely responsible for 196 cases
studied in NSW. Twenty six had received one or more injections of Salk vaccine,
and sixteen, one of whom died, had had three injections. There were 20 deaths,
of which 1 7 had not been immunised. Ten pregnant women were all severely
paralysed, and one of them died. Those aged 10-20 were relatively immune to
polio, while majority of cases (52% ) occ urred in the 0- 10 age range. The was a
high incidence in the 20-35 year age group, in which men outnumbered women
three to one. There was a high proportion of severe paralysis and respiratory
paralysis. The results for Queensland were similar in many respects. There was
low incidence in the 1 0- 19 age group, the majority of cases (62% ) were aged 0-9.
and there was a high incidence in the 20-34 age bracket. Forty six cases of polio
occurred in vaccinated people, seven of whom became severely paralysed. Twenty
two of the vaccinated cases were identified as Type III virus. There were seven
deaths, all in s ubjects who had not been immunised.
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The concepts of disease and health have a long history with many
nuances. 3 3

The relationship between disease and society is

expressed through theories of public health, and the policies and
practices that emanate from them. Sylvia Tesh suggests that four
different theories, each connected with a different socio-political
view of society, were used to explain disease during the nineteenth
century; supernatural causation, miasma, contagion and personal
behaviour. 3 4 Three of these have found a place in the twentieth
century in the form of environmental health (miasma), germ theory
(contagion), lifestyle (personal behaviour). 3 5 Supernatural theory,
which offers religious rationale for the cause of disease, no longer
has currency in the field of medical science, although it was
popular prior to the Enlightenment. 3 6 Despite this it still forms a
point of reference for many outside the medical profession who, for
example, evoke sin in relation to the AIDS epidemic. And the
religious impulse appears to be alive in the growing number of
people who seek relief or a cure for their condition through the
many forms of alternative "New Age" spiritual or holistic therapies
available.

Many polio survivors record religious thoughts and

feelings in relation to their infection and its after effects, and use
religious paradigms to make sense of their life. 3 7
3 3 Wiener, P. (ed.), ( 1973). Dictionary oJThe History ofIdeas: studies of selected
pivotal ldeas, New York: Scribners Sons. Volume 2. pp.395-407, " Health and

Disease".
3 4 Tesh, S.N. (1988). Hidden Arguments: political ideology and disease prevention
policy, New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, p.9.
3 5 Tesh, (1988). Hidden A rguments, pp.33-57.
3 6 Tesh, (1988). Hldden Arguments, p.17.
3 7 Woods Smith, D. (1994). Power and Spirituality in Polio survivors: a study
based on Rogers' science.Nursing &lence Quarterly. 8:3, pp.133-139.
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Epidemic polio arose in a period when major changes were taking
place in the understanding of disease and public health. The
dominance of miasma based sanitation and quarantine policies
was being challenged by new understandings of contagion based on
discoveries made by microbiologists such as Joseph Lister, Robert
Koch, and Louis Pasteur. 3 8 Public health practices began to swing
toward new methods of diagnosis, prevention and cure. But in
relation to polio continuing uncertainties concerning the cause
and transmission of the virus led health authorities to implement
methods of control, based on both miasma and germ theories,
without being certain of their efficacy. Public health in nineteenth
centu:ry Western Australia reflects the transition outlined above. 39
The basis of miasma was the ancient Greek notion of a link
between climate, the corruption of air, and disease. Epidemics
were thought to have been C?Lused by miasmata or pollution. 40
From the time of Hippocrates "corrupted air" was "fumigated" by
means of bonfires in the streets and, later, through firing cannons
and the personal use of sweet or strongly smelling applications.
38

Duffy, J. ( 1993). in Kiple, K.F. (ed.), Cambridge World Htstory of Human
Disease, Cambridge University Press. p.204.
39 Snow, D.J.R. ( 1 98 1). Progress, pp.3 1 -32. In 1842, thirteen years after the
foundation of the colony, an Act provided for the establishment of public
slaughter-houses and prohibited unlicensed slaughtering of animals within
town boundaries. In 1876 the 187 1 Municipal Act was repealed and replaced
with another which extended the powers of local authorities over matters
affecting the environment, sanitation and housing. The Vaccination Act
followed in 1878 and in 1886 the first Health Act was proclaimed which
legislated for the control of infectious diseases, sanitation and other matters.
These powers were extended in 1898 and in 19 1 1 when a new Act came into
being which forms the basis for current practice.
40 Wiener, P. (ed.), ( 1973). Dictionary, Vol 2, p.397.
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sanitation movement that sprang from it produced significant

gains in nineteenth century public health. 4 1 Greater efforts were
made to clean streets, dig deeper graves for the dead, ventilate
rooms, and control the odours from cesspools, sewers and
privies.42 One application of miasma theory can be seen in the

approach taken to the polio in New York in 1 9 1 6 . Naomi Rogers
has described this as a "dirt and disease" approach in which flies,
and those parts of town inhabited by the less affluent, often
migrant and black communities, were demonised. 43
As the bacteriological revolution advanced, health officials became
preoccupied with new insights concerning contagion and the
control of disease. 44

While the practice of developing good

drainage and sanitation continued into the twentieth century,
interest extended to the bacterial contamination of food and
water.4 5 Germ theory steadily shifted the emphasis towards the
use of diagnostic techniques, vaccines and antitoxins. The new
science seemed capable of providing the "real" explanation of all
disease. 4 6 Tesh wrote -

The germ theory is virtually synonymous with science. It

4 1 Duffy, J. ( 1993). in Kiple, K.F. (ed.}, Cambridge, p.204.
42 Tesh, ( 1988). HiddenArguments, p.27.
4 3 Rogers, N. ( 1992). DirtAnd Dt.sease, p. l . During the same period the WA Public

Health Department was concerned about the threat flies posed, see McCormick,
H. ( 1 9 1 7). The Fly and The Baby, Papers Read at Meetings of the Certified Health
Inspectors'Association ofWestemAustm.Ua, Perth, pp.64-69.
44 Duffy, J. ( 1 993). in Kiple, K.F. (ed.}, Cambridge, p.204.
4 5 Graham Taylor, S. ( 1996). Public Health in WA in the Post War Years: Drqft
Report, Unpublished Manuscript, Perth, pp.2-.3.
4 6 Rogers, ( 1992). DirtAnd Dt.sease, p.3; and Graham Taylor, S. ( 1996). Public
Health in WA, p.3.
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evokes images of white coats, sophisticated laboratories,
dedicated researchers, and the relentless search for truth.
Our society awards considerable prestige to people who
investigate disease causality from the perspective of germ
theory. Because their attention is fixed on empirical
phenomena, they are "real scientists".4 7

Germ theory spawned the potent symbol of the scientific
laboratory, and the elitism that grew from the belief that disease
was a technical phenomenon that could only be properly
understood by scientific experts.
D uring the polio era a variety of control methods were
implemented: articles of clothing were removed from their infected
owners to be fumigated, washed and sometimes burned.48
Survivors record having clothes and personal effects confiscated
because they were regarded as having "wogs" on them. 49 At the
same time prac tices suc h as handshaking or kissing were
discouraged, 5 0 and pamphlets were issued providing information
regarding the scalding of milk, the preparation of fruit and
vegetables, and the consumption ice-cream prepared outside the
home. 5 I
Quarantine restrictions in connec tion w ith polio were first
introduced in Western Australia in 1937, on the recommendation
of the consultative committee of doctors, specifically established by
the Public Health Department to advise on matters related to the
4 7 Tesh, ( 1988). Hidden Arguments, p.38.
48 Tesh, (1988). Hidden Arguments, pp. 1 1 - 1 2.

4 9 Interview I, p.39.
50 Wagin Argus , 21 March, 1932. p.2. and Western Mail, 12 August, 1937 p.25.
5 1 Pamphlet, BL. ACC 1003, AN 1 20/4, 944 / 1948, p. 1 2.
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The conditions required visitors who arrived from
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dtsease.52

nominated points of departure to be quarantined for twenty one
days, or face penalties of up to £50. Quarantine restrictions were
a manifestation of an increased awareness of the dangers of polio
which, in 1 937, resulted in its status being upgraded from that of
"notifiable" to that of "dangerous infectious disease", following the
outbreak of large epidemics of polio in Victoria and Tasmania. 53
The change gave the CPH temporary access to the special powers of
the Health Act. 5 4
Quarantine restrictions were again imposed in Western Australia
at the end of 1 947 when South Australia and New Zealand were
affected by polio epidemics. 55

All travellers from those ports,

including those who had only passed through South Australia, had
to be isolated. Any sickness that subsequently occurred in the
host house had to be reported to the Public Health Department.
Vigorous public debate was provoked when a group of 2 50 boys,
who had passed through Adelaide on a tour the eastern states with
the Young Australia League, (YAL) were quarantined on their
return to Perth. 56
The application of quarantine restrictions to all members of a
community proved economically and administratively impossible.
52 Letter, 18 November 1937, and reply, 16 December 1937 BL, ACC 1003, AN
120 /4, 626/ 1925, pp.188, 189, 196 and 200.

53 Minute paper, Executive Council, 9 September 1937, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/ 4,
626/ 1925, p.35.

5 4 Health Act 19 1 1, Part ix - Infectious diseases, By-law 249,6, p. 189.
55 WA, 1 January 1948, p 5.
56 WA, 1 January 1948, p. 5; 22 January 1948 , p. 9.
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The restriction of the movements of children who had had polio
contacts, but not adults, resulted in the Public Health Department
being criticised for its perceived lack of capacity to understand the
disease and respond with effective control measures. For many
years the behaviour of the virus was so little understood that, for
the sake of being seen to respond to the crisis, health officials had
to draw on every preventative measure they knew, despite being
unsure of its efficacy.
Understanding the means of transmission

Although polio was identified as a virus in 1908, and germ theory
had returned to popularity during the era of the epidemics,
understanding the means of transmission of polio was a slow
process that relied on ongoing research in many parts of the world.
As early as 1912 Swedish experiments identified the polio virus in
intestinal excreta5 7 but the weight of opinion, as expressed by
American leaders in the field such as Simon Flexner of the
Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research, fell on entry through
the exposed nerves of the nasal tracts as a result of the
transference of oral/ nasal droplets. This view dominated research
until the 1950s5 8 and in the late 1930s resulted in the
development of dangerous prophylactic nasal sprays, 59 the use of
57

Paul, J.R. (1971). History, p. 130. Discovered by C. Kling following an epidemic

in Stockholm in 1911.
58

Smith, F.B. (1990). The Victorian Poliomyelitis epidemic 1937-1938, in
Caldwell, J. (ed. ), (Vol. II, Ch. 53). What we Know about Health Transition: the
cultural, social and behavioural determinates qf"health, The Proceedings of an
International Workshop, May 1989, Canberra,p.873.
59 Gould, T. (1995), A Summer Plague, p.69; Wilson, J.R. (1963). Margin of Safety:
the story ofpoliomyelitis vaccine, Collins: London, p.49.
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Other agents, such as milk, were long suspected of being
instrumental in the spread of disease. 6 1 This fear was revived in

regard to polio, much to the sorrow of dairymen and the

manufacturers of ice cream. 62

Between 1 938 and 1 940 the Australian, Macfarlane Burnet
obtained results which suggested that infection by polio occurred
via the pharynx and the intestine, and that "polio virus would

multiply in human foetal intestinal and buccal tissue" . 6 3
Difficulties in obtaining sufficient tissue, and lack of confidence in
his techniques, caused Burnet to stop short of the discovery, made
a decade later by the American Enders, which enabled Salk to
create a polio vaccine. 6 4
There is evidence that some researchers were reluctant to draw
conclusions regarding the transmission of polio from the
knowledge that the virus was present in the intestine and the
faeces. During a polio epidemic in Victoria in 1 946 a meeting of
the Melbourne Paediatric Society discussed the pathology and
6 0 Smith,
61

F.B. ( 1990). in Caldwell, J. (ed. ), (Vol. II. Ch. 53), p.868
Higgs, F. ( 19 17). The Importance of a Pure Milk Supply, Papers Read at

Meetings ofthe Certifled Health Inspector's Association ofWe stem Australia, Perth:

Health Department.
62 Paul, ( 1971). History, pp. 178- 18 1. In Australia, Dame Jean Macnamara,
amongst others, helped keep this suspicion alive. See below, Chapters 4 and 5.
6 3 Fenner, F. (ed.), ( 1990). History ofMicrobiology in Australia, Brolga Press,
Curtin, pp.378-9. This discovery came about because a closed season on rhesus
monkeys led to the use of cynomolgus monkeys from Singapore, which were
susceptible to a new procedure.
6 4 Fenner. (ed. ), ( 1990). Microbiology, p.379. One result of the personal and
political struggles that accompanied the history of polio is that Enders, Weller
and Robbins, not Jonas Salk, received the Nobel Prize in 1954.
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pathogenesis of poliomyelitis. Dr Reginald Webster observed that . . . the epidemiological significance of the facts established
with regard to the constant presence of the virus in the
faeces of subjects of poliomyelitis and many of their contacts
was far reaching and profound. . . Faeces, sewage and flies
seemed strong links in a chain of infection. . . This
. . . suggested strongly that poliomyelitis should be regarded at
least provisionally as one of the excremental infective
diseases, even as dysentery and typhoid fever. 65
Some of those present opposed Webster's views and the meeting
did not discuss the means by which infected faecal particles could
be transmitted.

The links in Webster's "chain of infection"

remained obscure, even at this late stage.
Although preference for the view that transmission occurred
through the olfactory system was waning, interest continued to
circle around the droplet theory, the importance of flies, and
questions of the cleanliness of milk and water. At this stage no
instructions were issued recommending intensive hand hygiene as
a method of controlling the spread of polio, and although both the
1 937 and 1 946 Victorian epidemics had begun in winter, when
there were fewer flies to effect the spread of the disease, 66 the
meaning of this clue seems to have gone unnoticed.
Hesitance over the faecal contamination theory is evident in more
modern writing. John Paul, who recognises that the "commonest
mode of spread is by contact with an already infected person" stops
65 Melbourne Paediatric Society, Poliomyelitis, Pathology and Pathogenesis,
( 1946). Medical Journal ofAustralia, Vol. 1 , No 18, p.638 .
66 Melbourne Paediatric Society,MJA, ( 1946). Vol. 1, No 18, p.638.
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short of naming faecal contamination as a key component, even
though doubt is no longer necessary. 67 Jane Smith remains coy
with her statement . . . nobody has ever completely settled the question of how
polio is spread, though the best evidence suggests that the
virus is excreted in the stool and passed through hand-to
hand or hand-to-mouth contact. 6 8
An even stronger sense of uncertainty can be found in the recent
work by Sass who writes "the means by which the polio virus
reaches the central neivous system ls not definitely known" . 69
Health Professionals working in Western Australian hospitals and
the Public Health Department during the 1950s were not so
reluctant to consider the faecal contamination theory, or express
its implications in new methods of polio control. At the point
where the long awaited 1954 royal tour of Western Australia was in
doubt because the state was in the grip of a polio epidemic the
Public Health Department highlighted the faecal contamination
theory, explained it to the public, and indicated what measures
where necessary to circumvent transmission of the disease. 7 0 All
children, in particular, were now expected to avoid sharing cups
and towels, and to wash their hands before eating food, and after
using the toilet.

67 Paul, (1971). History, p.2.
6 8 Smith, J.S. ( 1990). Patenting the Sun, p.36.
69 Sass, E.J. (1996). Polio 's Legacy, p.2. Sass has consulted Taber,

C.L. (1970).
Taber's Cyclopedic Medical Dictionary, Philadelphia: Davis Company.
7 0 DN, 2 March 1954, p.2.
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The circumstances of having to endure a severe epidemic at a time
when large crowds would gather for the royal tour gave Western

Australia a unique opportunity to test this theory.

On the

assumption that faecal particle transmission was the crucial link
in the chain leading to polio infection the Public Health
Department emphasised intensive personal and hand hygiene and
proposed several measures governing crowd control. The plan was
successful. During a six day period huge crowds assembled to see
the royal couple but notifications of polio began to decrease from
the date the tour commenced and did not rise again after the two
week incubation period had passed.

In 1948 [Figure 7), the

opposite reaction had been observed after school holidays and the
holding of People's Day and Children's Day at the Royal Show. 7 1
Snow hastened to publicise his findings in the Medical Jo urnal qf
Australia.

The fact that the gathering of large crowds over a this

period was not followed by an increased number of notifications,
he said
...suggests that the spread of poliomyelitis is attributable to
the transference of infected faecal particles rather than to
the droplet mechanism, and that the control measures
which were based largely on hand hygiene, were justifl.ed. 72
Snow's boldness in accepting and applying the faecal
contamination theory contrasts with others, and his views may
have had influence in Western Australia if not elsewhere. Olga
Wignall, whose daughter attended Leederville school, not far from
7 1 Public Health 1 948, ( 1949). Appendix .XV, p.63. BL, 6 14.09 WES.
72 Snow, D.J.R. ( 1955). Crowds and Poliomyelitis: with special reference

to a
recent epidemic in Western Australia, MJA. Vol. I, No. l . p.5. Snow, ( 1955).
Crowds, p.5.
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Princess Margaret Hospital (PMH), describes the effect of visits
from the Director who came to lecture the parents and pupils on
hygiene.
His frankness on personal matters had some women
blushing and leaving the venue. When he addressed parents
on the Three F's: flies, fingers and food, his graphic
descriptions made a few people flee, never to retum.73
In view of the protracted nature of the faecal contamination
debate, and an apparent lack of knowledge or acceptance of Dudley
Snow's findings, it is difficult to avoid F.B Smith's conclusion that
the subject was repugnant to the manners and sensibilities of the
researchers.7 4
The quest for a vaccine

The quest for an effective vaccine commenced in earnest following
the realisation that polio was caused by a virus.

Attempts to

stimulate immunity were inspired by the use of successful
prophylactic and convalescent sera already developed for such
diseases as diphtheria, pneumonia, meningitis and typhoid. 75
Convalescent serum therapy was first recommend by the French
scientist Netter. Experiments with serum were conducted in New
York and Boston during the 1916 epidemic and were continued
along both convalescent and prophylactic lines. 76 Doubts about
73 Wignall, 0. ( 1 993). Heliflre 's Homechlld, Leeder, p.66. Faecal contamination

was popularly known as the 'dirty finger' theory.
74 Smith, F.B. ( 1 990). in Caldwell, J. (ed.), (Vol. II, Ch. 53), p.875.

75 Rogers, N. ( 1 992). Dtrt and Disease. p.96.
76 Paul, ( 1 971 ). History, pp. 190-3.
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the efficacy of serum caused it to be abandoned during the early
1930s. Paul considers the experiments were based on correct
principles but the dosage used was too small and there was
insufficient knowledge of polio available to direct the research. 7 7

The subsequent history of the polio vaccine is marked by two
things. The debate over whether to pursue the use of live or killed
vaccine, and the risks that were taken in the rush to be the first to
produce an effective prophylactic. Between 1935 and 1955 three
ill-fated trials were conducted before Salk vaccine was declared
safe. The first was conducted by Dr Maurice Brodie, of Montreal,
and the second by his competitor, Dr John Kolmer of Philadelphia.
In 1935 Brodie successfully immunised a total of twenty monkeys
with a form of the virus rendered non-infective using formalin. His
knowledge that Kolmer was working on a similar project caused
B rodie to rush into experimentation with humans but, although
he had come close to the solution, he failed the safety test, was
severely criticised, and his vaccine was never used again. 7 8

A severe polio epidemic in Philadelphia during 1932 provoked
Kolmer to engage in a search fo r an effective vaccine.

He

experimented with a live but slightly attenuated virus which was
tested on forty two monkeys, followed by a number of children and
adults, including himself.

A larger trial resulted in cases of

vaccine related polio, some of them fatal, which occurred in
localities where the virus was dormant.
77
78

Kolmer's results,

Paul, (1971). History, p.199. It is possible the sera, too, were variable.
Paul, (1971). History, pp.254-256.
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published in 1935, were severely criticised on grounds of safety, 79
and his vaccine was withdrawn.
Fear of polio and the horror of paralysis was so strong that
experimentation with human subjects was discontinued for over a
decade.

After World War II a new form of blood serum was

developed known as gamma globulin which was created by
concentrating blood serum that contained polio antibodies.so The
public was still justifiably nervous about human trials. But in
addition to this gamma globulin gave only six weeks protection
and there was difficulty in obtaining sufficient supplies of blood
that contained polio antibodies.s 1
Jonas Salk eventually developed his vaccine in the early 1950s, but
before it could be released to the public, he and his sponsors fell
victim to the same pressures that had brought down Brodie and
Kolmer. The infamous "Cutter" incident has become a landmark
in

polio history.

During an American trial of Salk vaccine held in 1954, live virus
was found to be present in vaccine manufactured by the Cutter
Laboratories of Berkeley, California.

The vaccine was hurriedly

withdrawn but the error resulted in the infection of 204 children,
of whom three quarters became paralysed and eleven died. s 2
79 Paul, (1971). History, pp.256-258.
80 Rogers, N. ( 1992). Dtrtand Disease. p.178.
8 1 Paul, ( 1971). History, pp.198-9; 384-394.
8 2 Paul. (1971). History, p. 437; Gould, (1995). A Summer Plague, pp.153-157.
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confidence in the use of Salk vaccine. In Australia the Public
Health Committee of the NH&MRC reversed an earlier decision to
import American Salk vaccine, 83 recommending local production
according to standards set by the Commonwealth Department of
Health. 84 Safety considerations were supported by the knowledge
that Canada had used locally manufactured Salk vaccine without
any sign of a mishap, and a similar story had emerged with respect
to Denmark and South Africa.

From America Sir Macfarlane

Burnet, Director of Melboume's Walter and Eliza Hall Institute,
stated that Australian Salk would be manufactured correctly and
properly tested. 85 And in Western Australia the CPH gave the
assurance that the vaccine would be tested "even more rigidly"
than in Canada and the USA. 86

Weird and wonderful ideas

The persistent lack of an effective antidote and reliable knowledge
83 Minutes, NH& MRC, May 1955, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 411/ 55, pp.58-62.
84 Report, May 1955, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120 / 4, 411/55, p.80; Letter, Health

Department to BMA, 25 October 1955. BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/ 4, 1242/ 55. pp.2628;
85 WA, 5 April 1956, p.10. Further detail concerning vaccine manufacture
appears in Chapter 8 below.
86 WA. 1 March 1956, p.2.
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concerning the causes of the disease and its behaviour stimulated

a wide variety of theories from medical and lay sources alike.

A

similar phenomenon, which seems to have arisen for the same
reason - lack of accurate knowledge - is evident in Australia during
the 1919 influenza pandemic. 8 7 Typical of the many offerings made
during the polio era is this, from a letter written to the
Commissioner of Public Health (CPH) in 1938.
I have been reading with great interest the article on
Infantile Paralysis. Will you allow me to give my humble
opinion on this matter. When I came to this country twelve
months ago, I was struck by so many children running the
streets without any shoes. I am convinced that this is
mainly the cause of this disease in children, when you think
of the microbes, which are about in every country, and must
inevitably get on their feet, many, I should imagine go to bed
with these microbes still on their feet, with the result that
they get into their body. I have come from England where
the children are shod, except in the very, very poor parts of
London and very few of them without shoes, there are very
few cases of Infantile paralysis in England.SB
The CPH appealed to the authority of science in his firm, direct
reply
... regarding your theory I must point out to you that
scientists have been investigating this disease for many
years, and there is no evidence whatever that the virus of the
disease occurs on the ground, nor is it likely that infections
of this kind would do so.89
87 McQueen, H. The 'Spanish' Influenza Pandemic in Australia, 1912-1919, in
Roe, J. (ed.), (1976). SocialPolicy lnAustralia: someperspectives 1 901 -1975 ,
Cassell, Stanmore, p.139; Taska, L, The Masked disease:Oral History, Memory
and the Influenza Pandemic 1918-19, in Darian-Smith. K. and Hamilton, P.
(eds.). (1994), Memory and History, p.83.
88 Letter AH to CPH, 9 March 1938, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/ 4, 626 / 1925, pp.28789.
89 Letter CPH to AH, 10 March 1938, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120 / 4, 626/ 1925, p.291.
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Manifestations of a similar interest in popular science and

medicine are to be found elsewhere. Naomi Rogers reports that
during the 1916 polio epidemic in New York doctors in the
American Department of Health received over two hundred letters
containing suggestions from the public. Simon Flexner, director of
the Rockefeller Institute laboratories did not reply to them, and
filed then under "Crank Letters and Fantastic Theories" .9 0 Medical
experts were in despair over the suggestions they received. Haven
Emerson, commissioner of the New York Health Department wrote
"one hardly knows whether to laugh at the fantasies or weep over
the ignorance and superstition exhibited" .9 1

An elitist approach

to scientific and medical knowledge existed and those with a
professional interest in public health were embarrassed by these
expressions of interest. But the lay public, which for centuries has
had opinions about the aetiologies of diseases, was unashamed
and readily proffered its views. Some suggestions were ridiculous
but others were surprisingly close to the mark. 9 2
In Western Australia, between 1938 and 1956, many such letters
were published in the Press, and received by the Public Health
Department whose officers carefully wrote replies.9 3

Officialdom

was polite, but sometimes irritated and embarrassed by this mail
and no reference is made to it in the Annual Reports. Though
neglected by the official record these suggestions are part of the
9 0 Rogers,

N. ( 1992). Dirt and Disease. p. 108.

1 Rogers, N. ( 1992). Dirt and Disease. pp. 108-9.
9 2 Gould, T. ( 1995). A Summer Plague. pp.20 ff.
9 3 The Victorian Epidemic of 1937-38 also witness the public expression of ideas
concerning the causes and cures for polio. See Smith, F.B. in Caldwell, J. (ed.),
9

( 1990). Vol. II, Ch. 53, pp.869-870.
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counter narrative to the official histocy. It is obvious that there is
a link between the medical establishment's outlook on "weird and
wonderful ideas" and its opposition to the more serious forms of
quackecy that are evident during these years. 9 4 There may also be
a link between this and its fierce resistance to Sister Elizabeth
Kenny whose alternative methods for the treatment for paralytic
polio were judged to have little or no basis in scientific or clinical
fact. 9 5 Kenny, a notable self-publicist who had a film made about
her work, was unable to achieve recognition for herself within the
official histocy of polio in Australia. A recent work investigating
her was inspired partly by the fact that she has shared the same
silence that has surrounded the disease. 96
Fear, frustration and the will to overcome

For the first half of the twentieth centucy people in many countries
of the world, including Australia, are said to have lived in great
fear of paralytic polio. Far greater numbers suffered and died from
diseases such as diphtheria, whooping cough, heart disease and
9 4 Louise, M. ( 1956). Protection From Polio and Animal Research, Adelaide; Gibbs,
F.J. ( 1952). Poliomyelitis and Kindred Diseases of Chemical Origin, Self Published;
de Lout, D.W. ( 1956). Jew Mass Poison American Children, Circular, and
Correspondence, Jewish Board of Deputies to Prime Minister Menzies; C.E.Cook
to PM, Australian Archives, A 1658 / l , 259 / 1 / 17, Propaganda Against
Immunisation.
9 5 Willis, E. ( 1979). Sister Kenny and the Evolution of the Occupational Division
of Labour in Health Care, The Austmltan and New Zealand Journal of Sociology,
Vol 15, No 3, pp.30-38, especially pp. 32-34. See also Martyr. P. ( 1994). The
Professtonal Development ofRehabilitatton tnAustmlia, 1870-1981, University of
Western Australia: PhD Thesis, History, Chapter 5 and Martyr, P. ( 1997). "A
Small Price to Pay For Peace: the Elizabeth Kenny Controversy Re-examined",
Austmltan Historlcal Studtes, Volume 28,Number 108, Melbourne, pp.47-65.
9 6 Wilson, J. R. ( 1995). Through Kenny's E yes: an explomtton of Sister Elizabeth
Kenny's views about nursing, Townsville, Royal College of Nursing, p.4.
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cancer, but it is evident that polio evoked fear among medical
professionals and members of the public alike.9 7
The early listing of polio as an infectious disease indicates the
West Australian Health authorities were alert to the threat it
posed and it is evident that fear of the virus did not suddenly
erupt. In 1916, the year in which severe epidemics occurred in New

York and New Zealand, Everitt Atkinson, the CPH for Western
Australia, wrote to Local Health Authorities and said It is quite possible that within the next year or two the
infection may make its appearance in the State in epidemic
form, and in order to guard against this, it will be necessary
for Local Authorities to carry out the well recognised
measures of disinfection and isolation in connection with
every case of Infantile Paralysis that is notified to them.98
The dramatic, unpredictable and largely inexplicable increase in
the number and intensity of polio epidemics in Australia produced
a high level of fear in the community. Paralysis guaranteed a life
of physical difficulty and, almost inevitably, economic hardship.
Concern was felt for the limited prospects that awaited a child who
became paralysed. In 1910 William (Colin) McKenzie, M.D., (later
Sir), wrote Because of its early onset, [ polio] becomes at once a matter
of great economic importance, since a lame member of the
community is worth less in the struggle for existence than
9 7 Greenland, W. ( 1 990). lnfantUe Paralysis (Polfomyelltis) tn New South Wales,
1930-1940: a study ofperceptions and reactt.ons, unpublished Honours Thesis,
University of New South Wales, pp.2 and 1 1 . Greenland accepts the view that
polio was more feared than most, arguing that the fear was fueled by ignorance,
a sense of helplessness, and fear of disability.
98 Circular Letter, 25 November 1 9 1 6 , CPH to Local Health Authorities, BL, ACC
1 003, AN 120/ 4, 626 / 1 925, p. l .
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The image of a severely paralysed child kept the fear of polio alive
even after it was realised that adults were also affected by the
virus. One root of this fear was the fate of being "worth less in the
struggle for existence".

The horror of being crippled was also

associated with not being able to earn a proper living and having
to rely on the State for support, perhaps for the rest of one's life.
In the late 1930s Dr Laurence Macdonald encapsulated the feelings
of many when he wrote
While it is true that as a fatal disease Poliomyelitis is of
small account when compared with many of the other ills of
childhood, the summation of its effects over a period of years
has produced a large body of permanent cripples, the bulk of
whom throughout life are dependent on the State for
support. I oo
Any form of disability raised doubts about the prospect of physical
and economic survival. A link can be made between this and the
theory of eugenics which, during the 1920s and 30s, prevented the
development of a positive image of disability, and spurred those
who were disabled to prove they suffered no moral or intellectual

McKenzie, W. ( 19 10). The TreatmentofInfantile Paralysis, p. 10. At some points
Australian culture resisted the idea of "economic wastage" due to disability, and
the idea of anyone becoming "a burden on the state". For discussion of this see
Greenland, W. ( 1990). Irifantile Paralysis, pp. 26, 47-48, 60, and Atkinson, A.,
( 1996). The Role ofthe Colonial Government in the Introduction ofChinese Labour to
Western Australia in the Nineteenth Century, Unpublished paper, Edith Cowan
University, p. 17. Chinese labourers who were recruited for the labour force, but
who were found likely to become "burdens on the state" through requiring
admission to colonial institutions as patients, paupers or prisoners.were
returned to their homeland.
1 00 Macdonald, L. ( 1930). The Treatment of Poliomyelitis, MJA, Vol. I, No. 19,
p.797.
99
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impairment. I o 1

Medical authorities considered media practices helped foster fear of
polio. During the 1948 epidemic in Western Australia the number
of reported polio cases was published each day in the newspaper
and on Saturday the weekly result was summarised, rather like a
war-time casualty list. 1 02 The Commissioner complained Infantile paralysis receives far more attention from the Press
than its relative incidence merits. Every new case is counted
and reported with such details as may be gleaned for the
purpose. This is true of no other notifiable disease,
although several of these occur in much greater numbers
over longer periods and cause. .. much greater damage.... 103
Very powerful imagery was used to represent polio, as reflected in
the series of cartoons produced in Western Australian newspapers
in 1948, I 04 and the recourse to military metaphors such as "the
war against polio". The more xenophobic members of the public
stigmatised visitors from infected areas as polluters, whether from
interstate or within the state, called for children entering the state
to be tested, and for travellers to be banned. I o5

In Western

Australia fear of polio reached an hysterical pitch prior to the royal
visit in 1954, 1 06 but began to subside once mass immunisation
commenced in 1956.
I O I Morris, J. (1993 ). Pride Against Prejudice: transforming attitudes to disability,
Women's Press: London, p.51.
I 02 WA, 9 June 1948, p.5, is a typical example.
103 DN, 23 Januaiy 1948, p.2.
I 04 See below, Chapter 5.
I 0 5 Letter, 3 September 1937, and reply, 4 September 1937, BL, ACC 1003, AN
120/4, 626/ 1925, pp.158-9.
1 06 Report of the Commissioner ofPublic Health for the year 1954, (1956).
Appendix VIII, p.60, BL, 614.09 WES.
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Fear of polio was not confined to Australia.
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Christopher J. Rutty

has written of Canada that "most people knew a polio victim, but
nobody wanted to become one". 10 7 American Jane S. Smith has
written, "to many people, there were far worse things than dying of
paralytic polio. You could get the disease and live". 1 o s Susan
Sontag has written The most terrifying illnesses are those perceived not just as
lethal, but as dehumanising, literally so. . . Polio's effects
could be horrifying - it withered the body - but it did not
mark or rot the flesh: it was not repulsive. Further, polio
affected the body only, not the face. The relatively
appropriate, unmetaphorical reaction to polio owes much to
the privileged status of the face, so determining of our
evaluation of physical beauty and of physical ruin. I 09
While it is possible to accept that Sontag's view that diseases
affecting the face are particularly repulsive, her outlook is difficult
to reconcile with the fear and stigmatisation of polio, and other
forms of disability, that was experienced in Australia and
elsewhere.

The visual image of a child's body, crippled from

paralytic polio, became the source of powerful feelings of fear,
shame and embarrassment, both for those who suffered in this way
and for those who had to live close to them. 1 1 o

Alan Marshall

identifies the presence of stigmatisation in his experience, but
Rutty, C. J. ( 1995). PolwmyeUti.s in Canada, p.12.
108 Smith, J .S. ( 1990). Patenting theS un, p.37.
10 9 Sontag, S. ( 1991). Illness as Metaphor: AIDS and lts metaphors,
Harmondsworth: Penguin, pp.124, 125.
1 1 0 Greenland, W. (1990). Infantile Pam.lysls, p 52. In 1928 Sydney Rotarians
conductlng a survey of the needs of crippled children found that. because of their
own shame, many parents concealed by their children at home to protect them
from ridicule. And p.61 "Fear of disability was a significant component in the
overall fear of infantile paralysis".
1 07
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rejects it for himself.
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In childhood a useless leg does not bring with it a sense of
shame; it is only when one learns to interpret the glance of
people unable to hide their feelings that one experiences a
desire to avoid them... Suffering because of being crippled is
not for you in your childhood; it is reserved for those men
and women who look at you. 1 1 1
Although Marshall plays down his experience, the feeling of shame
and embarrassment a child affected by paralytic polio may learn
from adult observers added one more dimension to the struggle
already being faced; life with a dysfunctional body in the context of
a society that expected all its members to be capable of able-bodied
performance.

The parents of a boy, who had polio in Western

Australia 1951, reported Our friends sort of dropped off a bit.. . and it was a stigma
on the family. Grandma was extremely distressed but she
was very upset to think that this dreadful thing had
happened to her son's child... but in those days if anyone
had any kind of a slight disability or anything wrong it was a
major no-no, you didn't tell your friends, you didn't do
anything. 1 1 2
The distress caused by stigmatisation is here linked to the loss of
the ideal of a "perfect body" capable full economic and physical
performance. A woman who had polio as a child in 1954 testifies
her parents and siblings never discussed the subject. And when
she told her friends at school they maintained a stony silence.
. . .I captained the basketball team in Sixth Grade and in the
first year I was really having trouble, I couldn't quite keep up
1 1 1 Marshall, A. ( 1955 ). Puddles, p. 7 1 . p.73.
1 1 2 Interview A. p.3.

CHAPTER 2: Polio and its themes

62

with the physical demands of the sport just at that time . ..
so I dropped out and I told them it was because I had polio
and... they treated me like a leper. I was really shocked by
that and they never mentioned it agatn. 1 1 3

The impact of such stigmatising experiences took decades to
resolve, that is, if the polio survivor, or the family had the will to
face the emotional issues involved and could find support for
embarking on such a project.
Those parents whose children survived to live with profound
paralysis were spared the pain of bereavement, but had to consider
what physical social supports would be available for their offspring
once they were no longer present to give assistance. Adequate
after- care required special support which demanded extra
resources. Provided their case was genuine and they were unable
to meet the costs themselves polio survivors enjoyed the benefit of
ongoing support, which govemment and community sources in
Western Australia supplied. 1 1 4

For example the Public Health

Department supported a request to provide a new wheel chair for a
male survivor who ... has shown great fortitude and determination in attempting
to overcome his severe handicap .
He is studying
accountancy and has made considerable progress. The
provision of a wheel chair would assist him to overcome
1 1 3 Interview C. p.29.
1 1 4 See File 'Poliomyelitis, Supply of equipment for post polio cases'. BL, ACC
1003, AN 120/4, 1945 /59 1003, AN 120/4, 1945 /59. The file contains over 240
pages of correspondence, mostly related to the most severe cases requiring after
care. An Almoner at PMH assessed cases for their ability to pay. In 195 1, H .C.
Smith, a farmer from Ballaying in Western Australia, was deemed "Financially
ineligible for further O.P. [Out Patient) treatment" because his income was too
high. Assessment report and Continuation card in the possession of the author.
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practical problems which now obstruct his efforts. The cost
would be in the vicinity of £70 and funds are available. I 1 5

This particular survivor, who was severely paralysed, was
enterprising and inventive. He designed a trolley that converted
into a wheel chair which the Splint Department manufactured for
him and other survivors to use. The design was passed on to the
Children's Hospital in Victoria. 1 1 6 The rapport the Public Health
Department developed With him was linked With his independence
as well as his "great fortitude and determination" - in other words
his heroism.
The culture of denial

The effectiveness of the vaccination campaigns is only one reason
for the lack of public discussion of polio. Evidence suggests that a
strong culture of minimising or denying the effects of polio has
existed, as it had done for other forms of disability, and that this
is part of the strong desire to overcome the effects of the disease,
even to the point of living as though no physical or other deficits
have been created. In his autobiography, I Can Jump Puddles ,
Alan Marshall wrote The word "crippled", to me, suggested a condition that could
be applied to some people, but not myself. But, since I so
often heard people refer to me as crippled, I was forced to
concede that I must fit this description, yet retained a
conviction that though being crippled was obviously a
1 1 5 Letter CPH to Minister for Health, 27 February 1964, BL, ACC 1003, AN
120/4, 1945/59, p.240.
1 1 6 File 'Supply of equipment for post polio cases', BL, ACC 1003, AN 120 /4,
1945/ 59, pp.25-29.
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distressing state for some people, with me it didn't matter.
The crippled child is not conscious of the handicap implied
by his useless legs. They are often inconvenient or annoying
but he is confident that they will never prevent him doing
what he wants to do or being whatever he wishes to be. If he
considers them a handicap it is because he has been told
they are. 1 1 7

At the time of writing his biography Marshall remembered that, as
a child, being a cripple was not something that was part of his
self-concept. 1 1 8 He gives further examples of his refusal to take
notice of his condition and considers that such a perception does
not come from within the afflicted one, but from people who
categorise in this way. 1 1 9 While there is no reason to doubt his
childhood experience, it is clear that his outlook includes his
reflection on this subject as an adult.
Evidence also suggests that the attitude of some members of the
medical profession encouraged those with a disability to overcome
their deficits and become part of the mainstream of life. West
Australian orthopedic surgeon, the late Sir George Bedbrook, wrote
in the Foreword of pol io survivor Vivienne O verheu ' s
autobiography
Throughout the narrative, it is her ability that shines out
rather than her disability and this, indeed, is the goal that
1 17

Marshall, A. ( 1955). Puddles , p.7 1 .

1 8 His disease was polio. but a similar attitude can be detected in connection
with other forms of disability where it was believed the effects had to be
1

overcome, minimised or denied to ensure social and personal success to the
survivor. See for example Humphries, S. and Gordon, P. ( 1992). Out Of Sight: the
expertence ofdtsabllity 1 900- 1 950, Northcote House.Plymouth, p.42 "For David
Swift the ultimate aim was to his disability altogether and to make himself
appear exactly the same as other children."
1 1 9 Marshall, A. ( 1955). Puddles, pp. 99- 100, p. 195 .
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After being paralysed by polio in 1954 the author battled with the
consequences to live a full life which included marriage, children,
and duties as a farmer's wife. The title of her book, It Helps To Be
Stubborn, was chosen because of the particular brand of

determination - the "cussedness" - the which gave her the will to
fight .

Susan Sontag refers to the German philosopher

Schopenhauer when she wrote "The will exhibits itself as organised body"... Recovery from a
disease depends on the will assuming "dictatorial power in
order to subsume the rebellious forces" of that body. 1 2 1
A heroic style in the face of difficulties, strong willed behaviour,
stubbornness, denial and, often, an outstanding level of
achievement, is found amongst polio survivors. "Throw off your
pessimism, and determine to help yourself', 1 22 was the advice of
Dr John Colebatch who had polio at 24 years of age and a year
later was shown with a frame he invented which made him mobile
at home.

The evidence suggests that once a person became

paralysed the prevailing social and medical culture trained them to
overcome their difficulties, an attitude that often led to what could
be described as overcompensation.

Many drove themselves to

reach the same level of achievement as those living without a
disability.

The following report on the 1981 West Australian

People's Marathon provides a case in point. Although the official
Overheu, V. (1984). It Help s to Be Sf11bbom! St George Books: Perth, p.5.
Sontag, S. (1991). Metaphor, pp.44-45.
1 22 DN, 13 April 1954, p. l .
1 20
121
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maximum time allowed for the race was five hours the time keeper
left the timing gates open a few minutes longer to allow the last
competitor, polio survivor Tony Parnell, to cross the line. Parnell ... whose rtght leg is completely withered with virtually no
muscle structure, ... uses it purely as support while he drives
With his good leg. A magnificent effort... he took up running
because his doctor told him he couldn't do it, and he decided
otherwise. 1 2 3
The biographies of polio survivors frequently chart the course of
one who exercised rigid discipline in order to restore lost
capacities. If regained these capacities can be retained, at first,
because polio is not a degenerative disease.

Many survivors

describe themselves as having "had" polio, and have difficulty
acknowledging the legacy of special needs the disease created.
Indeed, some have gone out of their way to ignore them.
After surveying several biographies, Mary Westbrook summarised
the experience of polio survivors as governed by "ignore your
distress:hard work and cheerful acceptance will overcome polio" . 1 2 4
Denial and hard work was the salve applied to wasted muscles and
twisted lives. "Use it or lose it" was the programme instilled into
many polio survivors, and by this means they built up their
strength, overcame the effects of their affliction and moved into
the mainstream of life. 1 2 5 Unfortunately in the long term this has
proved to be the reverse of the strategy needed to care for and
1 23

Western Australian Marathon Club, Newsletter, Spring 198 l , p. 12.
Westbrook, M. ( 1996). Early Memories of Polio-Survivors: Memories Versus
the Official Myths, Proceedings. International Post-Polio Conference, NSW, p.5-6.
1 2 5 Scheer, J. and Luborsky, M.L. (1991). Post-Polio Sequelae: the cultural
context of polio biographies, Orthop aedics, Vol. 14, No 1 1. pp. 1178-9.
1 24
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preserve weakened muscles and twisted bodies. For some suIVivors

the dividend is now being paid in significant psychological
distress, 1 26 and the curtailment of activity at an earlier age than
might otherwise have been the case. As understanding of Post
Polio Syndrome develops polio survivors are learning they must
"conserve or lose it", a program that involves them in a complete
reorientation in life. Conservation means having to recognise and
face their own special needs, refusing to deny or minimise their
difficulties, and letting go of the pretense that they can perform as
people without a disability.

This is the challenge facing polio

suIVivors in the 1990s.
FDR: icon of polio's social meaning

The American President Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FOR) has been
a primary icon of

two social meanings which have become

attached to polio; the will to overcome the effects of polio and the
culture of denial. FOR masked the effects of his affliction and
neutralised the negative public image of his paralysis in order to
gain the Presidency of the United States of America, which he
succeeded in doing in 1932, 1936, 1940 and 1944. 1 2 7 Recently
North American based historians, using a variety of methodologies,
have begun to expand and reinterpret the understanding of the

1 2 6 Conrady, L.J., Wish, J.R., Agre, J.C., Rodriguez, A.A. , Sperling, K.B., (1989).
Psychologic Characteristics of Polio Survivors: a preliminary report. Archive of
Physical Medical RehabUttatton, Vol. 70, p.462.
1 2 7 Gallagher, H.G.(1994). FDR's Splendtd Deceptton, Vandamere Press, Arlington,
gives the full account of FDR's survival of polio, the development of Warm
Springs. the March of the Dimes, and his Presidency of the USA.
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experience of polio in the United States.

1 28
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At the same time

published and unpublished research from Canada, New Zealand
and Australia is providing the ingredients for the development of
an international perspective on the polio era. 1 29 The process of
reappraising the effect polio had on the lives of individuals and
communities in twentieth centu:iy is under way.
***

1 28 Rogers, N. ( 1992). Dfrt and Dlsease, Smith, J.S. ( 1990). Patenting the Sun, and
Gallagher, H.G. (1994). Splendid.Decep tion, are authors in this category.
1 29 Gould, T. ( 1 995). A Summer Plague, writes with England and the USA in
view, Rutty, C. J. ( 1 995). Do something/ Do Anything/ Poliomyelitis in Canada 19271962, Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Toronto, Canada, argues
that the American perspective was not the only one, and an unpublished thesis
by Ross, J.C. (1993). A History ofPolio in New Zealand, MA, University of
Canterbury, provides a thorough account of polio epidemics in that country.
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Figure 2 : Cases o f polio notified in Australia 1 93 1 - 1 96 3 , Health in
Australia, ( 1 96 3 ) The Polio Story: Australian Health Information
and Research Service . p. 1 0
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192 9-19 66,
Figure 3: Cas es of polio noti fied in Aus trali a:
Commonwealth Year Book, 1929-1966.
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The polio virus knew no political or social boundaries.

Our

understanding of the epidemics in Western Australia can therefore
be enriched by insights from work on polio in other contexts. This
chapter provides an international perspective for this thesis
through reviewing key items of literature related to the
historiography of poliomyelitis. As such it stands as a framing
chapter for the West Australian experience which makes up the
bulk of this work.

Medical and scientific writings have had a

prominent place in this historiography, along with histories of
significant figures such as Jonas Salk and FDR.

Increased

attention paid by historians to medical and public health topics
has lead to a growing body of social histories of disease, while the
emergence of PPS, and the willingness of polio survivors to record
their stories, is ensuring that polio has a place on this agenda.
The medical history cannot be ignored but the particular aim here
is to discuss works that investigate polio from a social and
historical point of view.
A standard work in this field is A History qf Poliomyelitis, a natural
history of the disease by the late John R. Paul. The author gamed
medical qualifications early in this century and was intimately
involved as a participant in the medical history of the polio era.
He became a founding member of the Yale Poliomyelitis Study Unit
( originally known as the Yale Poliomyelitis Commission), a
research unit set up in 1931, 1 served on the Immunisation
1 Paul, J.R. (1971). History, p.200.
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Committee of the NFIP, conducted significant epidemiological
research himself, 2 and knew personally many of the scientists and
medical professionals who searched to understand the disease and
find an effective vaccine. As a participant observer Paul is credited
with telling the history of the political and scientific infighting
with some degree of objectivity.3

In A History of Poliomyelitis he

states his aim is to document, rather than interpret, this history
and reveal for the reader the successes, frustrations and blind
alleys of the polio research.
Paul stays within his professional field and and does not make
formal use of perspectives such as those that would be provided,
for example, by environmental or social sciences. 4 He frames his
history within comparative medical knowledge dating from earliest
times, but concentrates on the the history of the modern period.
Paul acknowledges that, due to variations in the "goals,
philosophies" and the "cultural settings" in which research has
taken place, the medical approach to polio has changed
immeasurably since the nineteenth century.

Polio has been

reinterpreted as the result of new medical and scientific forms of
analysis that have been developed, particularly during twentieth
century, and Paul expects this process of reinterpretation to
continue.
Paul's natural, medical history nevertheless offers some social and
psychological insights.

He contrasts the stoical outlook of the

2 Paul, J.R. (1971). History, p.360.
3 Gould, T. (1995). A Summer Plague. p.326.
4 Paul, J.R. (1971). History, p.xv.
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nineteenth centucy - which regarded paralysis during infancy as

inevitable for some children - with a more contemporary
understanding that viewed with "dismay" the "fearful handicap" it
was for a child to endure the "crippling deformity" brought about
by polio.5 While he recognises these changes in perspective, Paul
does not dwell on the social bases for them, and locates himself
within the sphere of twentieth centucy medicine.
Paul characterises the quest for a vaccine as a cause which
intensified and assumed pseudo-religious overtones, largely due to
the influence of the NFIP. It was a "crusade" which "conquered"
polio - a vecy "militaristic" style of language which others have also
used, and is explored elsewhere in this thesis.6

The crusade

against polio, Paul asserts, "has been described as one of the
greatest technical and humanistic triumphs of our age". Paul
describes the attitude to polio in twentieth-centucy America as
changing from the passivity of the past to a new activism which
aimed to "stamp out this pestilence and alleviate the suffering and
tragedy it inflicted".7 I consider that the new activism can be
interpreted as the medical profession's version of "the will to
overcome" polio and its effects.
The emotive descriptions Paul used at times in relation to polio s
5 Paul. J.R. (1971). History, p.xv.
6 See below Chapters 4-8.
7 Paul. J.R. (1971). History, p.xv.
8 Paul. J.R. (1971 ). History, p. l . This is also evident from the reflection he offers
in connection with the standard clinical definition for polio in use during the
1940s and 1950s, when he asserted that this description "falls far short of the
usual picture which this disease conjures up in the minds of most people".
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reveal that he himself was caught up in the culture surrounding

the disease, but he also recognised the need for detachment. Paul
is able to acknowledge that while the vaccination programme
turned out to be a success, it was not the "victorious conquest"
that many hoped for. He wrote ... the temptation to write this account as a complete success
story has been almost irresistible. The events during the
first half of the twentieth century which led up to the
eventual conquest of poliomyelitis and the almost
unbelievable decline in epidemics as a result of vaccination
have the makings of a dramatic story with a triumphant
ending... 9
After he has dealt with the history of the western world's
relationship with polio, particularly as it affected the United States
of America, a significant proportion of the last five chapters of his
book is devoted to the problems of the vaccine, especially
unfavourable reactions and the controversies that attended
them. 10 Paul argues that the story of polio is not over, it will
continue to grow and change as new challenges, revelations and
insights emerge, if not in the western world, in countries where the
improvements in public health are provoking the appearance of
epidemics, as first happened in Sweden in the 1880s.

He

concludes
The existence of such a precarious and unresolved situation
is the reason why this history cannot claim to be a
completely triumphant success story. The road will lead up
hill for many years to come. I 1
9 Paul. J.R. (1971). History, p.xiv.
10 Paul. J.R. (197 1). History, p.468.
1 1 Paul. J.R. (197 1 ). History, p.469.
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Subsequent history has shown Paul was correct, and somewhat
prophetic, when he identified the potential for an ongoing and
changing medical interpretation of the relationship between the
polio virus and society. In 1971, when his book was published,
falling rates of immunisation in western countries had not yet
become a pressing concern, and Post Polio Syndrome had yet to be
identified. And while there are ongoing possibilities for medical
reinterpretation of this disease, there are similar possibilities for
an evolving historical interpretation of the relationship between
polio and human communities on a world wide basis.
Naomi Rogers offers a sophisticated social and cultural medical
history of poliomyelitis that investigates the epidemic which
occurred in New York
survivor. 1 2

in

1916, five years before FDR became a polio

Rogers, who relies on Saul Benison, I 3 is conversant

with the scientific, medical and public health history of polio,
investigates the social responses to the disease, and the social
meanings given to it, but does not include detailed discussion of
individual cases. The key point of her argument is that, prior to
FDR, the image of polio in the United States of America . . . was associated with the poorest, dirtiest children, not
affluent adults in the prime of life, and with immigrants in

I 2 Rogers, N. (1992). Dirt and Disease:polto before FDR, Rutgers University Press:
New Brunswick, NJ.
1 3 Saul Saul Benison, also a participant observer in the medical process, who
has written a number of works which include "The History of Polio Research in
the United States: Appraisals and Lessons", in Gerald Holton, (ed), (1972). The
Twentieth Century &fences: Studies in the Biography ofIdeas, New York: WW
Norton, and "Poliomyelitis and the Rockefeller Institute: Social Effects and
Institutional Response", Journal of History of Medicine and Allied &iences, (1974).
Vol. 29, pp.74-5.
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slums, not Yankees from long established

families. 1 4
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The social meaning of polio's association with the first set of
images, and the shift to the second set of associations is central
to her argument. She also draws attention to the complexities and
ironies of polio history which she shows are fundamental to
understanding the disease.
Rogers argues that the ideology of germ theory, which regained
popularity from the 1 890s, did not limit infectious diseases to
divisions of race or class: germs affected the poor, the wealthy,
ethnic minorities and the middle-class majority alike. Nineteenth
century understandings which linked moral behaviour and
infection were challenged by this ideology, but laboratory
researchers who relied on germ theory failed to solve the riddle of
polio, while health officials and the general public shared the
assumption that "infection depended on the class, ethnicity and
personal habits of individuals" . 1 5

There were "tensions between

old and new medical theories and practices," 1 6 the transition to
the "new public health" based on germ theory was incomplete, 1 7
and the efficacy of modem science was debated by experts and the
public alike. Rogers shows how, faced with an epidemic, health
officials and the general public continued to be interested in germ
theory but found it less compelling than earlier theories of public
health. She writes 1 4 Rogers, N. ( 1992). Dtrt and. Dlsease, p. l .

1 5 Rogers, N . ( 1992). Dtrt and. Dlsease, p.29.
1 6 Rogers, N. ( 1 992). Dirt and Disease, p.3.

1 7 Rogers, N. ( 1992). Dirt and Disease, p.32.

l
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Officials sought to make germs as fearful as filth but, unlike
garbage and overflowing sewers, germs were not readily
visible. I S
Unable to interpret or control polio the authorities, who
maintained a lingering reliance on the filth theory, resorted to
traditional practices which included the more visible methods of
control - quarantine, fumigation and disinfection, 1 9 which
coincidentally furthered the social agenda of the New York health
department. 2 0 A scapegoat was found, not in science, but in the
slum dwelling immigrant families of New York. It was claimed that
the socially irresponsible immigrants whose careless sanitary
practices contrasted with official public health endeavours, and
the practices of the more hygienic American middle-classes,
resulted in the spread of polio. Health officials were sufficiently
wedded to this view for emerging clinical evidence to be ignored or
overlooked while the perceived perpetrators were stigmatised.
When polio infections occurred in the well-to-do areas flies, the
favourite target of public health officials, were identified as the
agent of transmission of the disease, though this meant that they
would have had to travel in only one direction. Rogers writes An anti-fly campaign that portrayed flies as carrying the
disease from working-class to middle-class was especially
powerful and successful. 2 1
During the 1916 polio epidemic in New York the dirt and disease
18

Rogers, N. ( 1992). Dirt and Disease, p. 16.
1 9 Rogers, N. ( 1992). Dirt and Disease, p.46.
2 0 Rogers, N. ( 1992). Dirt and Disease, p.19.
2 1 Rogers, N. ( 1 992). Dirt and Disease, p.5.
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was given a social meaning in relation to polio which was readily
supported and which did not change until after Franklin Delano
Roosevelt, the adult scion of a white, wealthy, ruling family,
became a polio survivor in 1921. Between 1930 and the 1950s his
affliction and influence helped give polio a new social meaning as a
different set of associations was born. Polio was removed from the
slums to the middle-class, or to all classes; and from being the
disease solely of children to one that also affected adults. A legacy
of these associations is retained by those Americans who lived
through this era
... a smiling freckled girl on crutches on a March of Dimes
can; swimming pools closed in the summer; a nurse leaning
over a child in an iron lung; rows of children with arms
outstretched waiting for their polio vaccine shot; and
President Roosevelt seated by a radio microphone, crippled
yet strong, America's first handicapped president who refused
to allow the press to report his wheelchair, leg braces, or
inability to walk. 2 2
One of the ironies of polio history is that the disease came to be
associated with cleanliness rather than dirt; 2 3 with rural
communities and suburbs rather than slum districts, though in
1916 American health officials and researchers did not interpret
the evidence in this way. "Classless" germ theory did not dislodge
belief in the link between dirt, disorder and disease, and the group
that had the highest level of immunity through endemic exposure
to the virus continued to be targeted, while those who were most
22
23

Rogers, N. ( 1 992). Dirt and Disease, p. 1 .
Cumpston, J.H.L. (ed. Lewis, M.J.). ( 1989). Health and Disease i nAustralia,
p.328. The editor notes - "Poliomyelitis is the only eptdemtc disease (sexually
transmitted diseases excepted) the incidence of which increased in Western
countries in the twentieth century".
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vulnerable were not thought to be at risk. The social significance

of diagnosis is made clear when, in the manner of Sylvia Tesh, 2 4
Rogers asserts that ... explanations of the workings of disease have underlying
social and political ideologies, sometimes only made explicit
in times of urgency, such as an epidemic. It continues to
hold a powerful intellectual and practical appeal : it
combines morality and science; it helps to distinguish rich
from poor, native-born from immigrant, the ignorant and
careless from the informed and responsible.2 5
Rogers argues her case through five chapters that cover polio in
the USA, 1900-1920, the new public health, the new science of
disease, the public response to polio and the rise of epidemiology.
She concludes with an Epilogue which lucidly summarises the
developments in polio histozy from FDR to the present.

FDR's connection with polio has been fundamental to the history
of the disease since 1921.

His severe paralysis at age 39, with

what had so far been considered a children's disease, was the
ingredient which ultimately resulted in a change of perception
about polio.

FDR's own process of rehabilitation led him to

dedicate his efforts to raise funds for research into the provision of
a vaccine. He was a key figure in the formation of the National
Foundation for Infantile Paralysis (NFIP) and the "March of the
2 4 Tesh, S.N. ( 1988).

Hidden Arguments: politlcal ideology and disease prevention
policy, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick.
2 5 Rogers, N. ( 1992). Dirt and Dtsease, p.7.
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fruit in the Salk vaccine. Because of him polio in the twentieth
century was characterised as an 'American' disease.
FDR emerged as the triumphant political and social figure of this
era - and he did so by denying or covering over his paralysis from
polio. At the same time the success of the American way of life in
general, and the free enterprise system in particular, was
underlined by the achievements of American science under the
patronage generated by his interest.26
In connection with the historiography of polio, and the projected
image of people with disabilities, FDR's role is ambiguous. Some
believe his true greatness lay in the fact that he had polio, but the
erection of the most recent memorial to him in Washington drew a
crowd of protesters because it continued the deception and
maintained the secrecy of his disability. 2 7 A bas-relief by Leonard
Baskin depicts FDR standing alone without any external support,
something he was unable to do, 28 while another figure has him
sitting on a chair that is not obviously a wheel chair.2 0

2 6 Brandt, A.M. (1978). "Polio, Politics and Duplicity: ethical aspects in the

development of Salk vaccine", Intemational Joumal oJHealth Seroices, 8, p.265.

2 7 Wilson, P. "Memorial Blind to FDR's Greatness", WA, 1-2 March 1997, p.12.
28 Gallagh er, H.G.(1994). Splendid Deception, pp.210- 212.
2 9 The Economist, 26 April 1997, p.41.
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Hugh Gallagher asserts that it has become customary for many
biographers to continue the "splendid deception" FOR himself
created in connection with his disability by giving it perfunctory
treatment. Gallagher's own view, born of personal experience as a
polio survivor is

A visible paralytic handicap affects every relationship, alters
the attitudes of others, and challenges one's self-esteem. It
requires minute-by-minute monitoring and control to an
extent quite unperceived and unimaginable by the able
bodied. This condition of being handicapped generates a
range of emotions, whether expressed or not, that must be
dealt with, not just at the outset, but continuing
throughout the rest of the patient's life. 30
Gallagher argues that FDR's experience, and the discipline learned
in seven years of rehabilitation, was fundamental to his success as
the President of the United States of America because his suffering
humanised him and made him more appealing to members of the
public who were enduring the stringencies of Depression and War.
And Gallagher presents FDR's successes as having an essential
connection with his status as a polio survivor whose iron will and
rigorous self education, evident during seven years of

30 Gallagher, H.G.(1994). Splendid. Deception, pp.xi-xii.
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rehabilitation, contributed many things to his Presidency of the
USA. Others, including members of the Roosevelt family, dispute
this interpretation of FDR's life. 31 But, as the memorial to him
testifies, there is no doubt that the able-bodied image he projected
won out over his disabled image, and this is significant for the
social histocy of polio. It is not that FDR hid the fact that he was
a polio survivor - he maintained a high profile as president of the
NFIP, aimed to make people as aware of polio as they were of TB,
and his nickname "Dr Roosevelt", earned for his rehabilitative
work at Warm Springs, was progressively changed to "Dr
Depression" and "Dr Win The War" . At the same time elaborate
strategies were used to eliminate the image of his disability,
something that would have been impossible in the TV age of live
reporting.

The media colluded with FOR to preserve and

perpetuate the representation he cultivated of himself. Amongst
the collection of over thirty thousand surviving photographs of
FOR, only two picture him in a wheelchair.

It is this that

Gallagher sought to rectify when he selected one of them for the
cover of his book, FDR's Splendid Deception.

31 Gould, T. ( 1995). A Summer Plague, Ch. 2. Gould follows Merritt B Low, MD,

who argues that personality affects the disease.
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Gallagher's history does not advance the understanding of polio as
a disease but it contributes to the discussion concerning the social
and personal responses to it current in America between 1920 and
1945.

FDR defied his polio and his experience provides a

paramount example of the will to overcome the physical results of
paralysis, and the psychological impact of the belief that disabled
people were morally and intellectually inferior.

Gallagher's

biography also provides ample material in connection with the
effects of the disease on society. FDR, who is often quoted for his
1933 statement "we have nothing to fear but fear itself', came from
a family which feared polio deeply and used its position of privilege
and power to flee from New York during the 1916 epidemic. 32

FDR is also an example, perhaps the example, of the culture of
denial that accompanied polio, at the public, personal, and
particularly the emotional level. Gallagher indicates that there is
no evidence that FDR ever spoke of the deep feelings his affliction
must have aroused in him, and that his handicapped condition

32 Gallagher, H.G. (1994). Splendid Deception, p.13.
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was never spoken about in the family, 33 even though every

member's life was affected by the special arrangements made for
coping with it, and the experience forged the type of relationship
he had with his wife Eleanor for the rest of his life. At a time
when there was no concept of "mainstreaming" for disabled people
FDR succeeded in convincing everyone that the effects of polio
were unimportant and need not be taken into consideration on
moral, intellectual or physical grounds. He demonstrated that
paralysis did not prevent him succeeding in high office or taking
his place on the world stage during the Second World War.

FDR succeeded for a quarter of a century but, as the history of his
last years reveals, his defiance came at a price. PPS had not been
identified in 1 945 and we cannot attribute his end to its effects,
although recently some have attempted to suggest there was a
link. 34 The crushing pressure of his combined role as President
and Commander in Chief during the Second World War was
enough to wear down the fittest of all. In the last stages of the
33 Gallagher, H.G. (1994). Splendid Deception, p. 1 5. "There is no record of his ever
having discussed it with anyone". Original emphasis.
34 Sass, E.J. Polio's Legacy, p. 15. Sass follows Speier, J.L., Owen, R.R. , Knapp.
M., and Canine, J.K., (1 987). Occurrence of post-polio sequelae in an epidemic
population. In Halstead,L.S. and Weichers, D.D. (eds) Research and the clinical
aspects ofpolfomyelltis, White Plains. March of the Dimes. pp.39-48.
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War Winston Churchill was so fatigued he had himself carried up
and down stairs. 35 FDR found his physical strength undermined
when he most needed it and while Eleanor wrote, cruelly, that he
had succumbed to "invalidism", and Gallagher argues that in the
end polio beat him, 3 5 any weakness in FDR need not be seen as
unusual, even if PPS could be shown to be present. Despite his
determination, in the long run FDR the polio survivor was
conquered by hard work.

John Rowan Wilson was one of the first to investigate the history
of the search for a suitable polio vaccine, 3 1 which he characterises
as a "race" between different individuals and organisations that
was fraught by competing social and political agendas. Wilson
focusses on the role of key individuals and organisations in the
USA, notably Basil O'Connor, Jonas Salk, Albert Sabin, the NFIP,
the Press and the Government . He is critical of the the laissezfaire attitude of the US Government in connection with public
health policies and the role played by the press in offering
3 5 Gallagher, H.G. (1994). Splendid. Deception, p.177. In the last stages of the War

Winston Churchill was so fatigued he had himself carried up and down stairs.
3 6 Gallagher, H.G. (1994). Splendid. Decepti.on, p.191.
3 7 Wilson, J.R. (1963). Margin Q[Safety:the story ofpoliomyelitis vaccine, Collins:
London.
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sensationalistic reporting of "breakthroughs" in the polio war. 38

Wilson, who writes in a journalistic style, is particularly critical of
the concentration of so much power and influence in the hands of
the determined O'Connor, and of the way in which the NFIP
" became a law unto itself'. O'Connor's promotional and fund
raising agendas competed with the research needs of the scientists
in an unhealthy and dangerous way and the NFIP became "trapped
within its own image of dynamic optimism" .39 Wilson argues that
from this position it could not afford to be slow, unpopular or
unsuccessful, but the interests of public safety demanded that
scientists engaged in time-consuming vaccine research were
thorough and cautious. The weakness of Government controls
over experimental vaccine trials conducted in the USA in 1954
contributed to the "Cutter"40 incident in which, Wilson argues, the
NFIP with government connivance assumed a role that was
inappropriate for a private body. It directed national policies and
priorities in polio research and, when O'Connor placed an order for
nine million dollars worth of polio vaccine, took a step that was
38 Wilson, J.R. ( 1963). Margin of Safety, p.54.
39 Wilson, J .R. ( 1963). Margin of Safety, p.85.
40 Wilson, J.R. ( 1963). Margin of Safety, p.93. Because the trials were
experimental, the vaccine did not have to be licensed by the Government
Laboratory of Biologies Control. Once the trials were conducted, all vaccine had
to be licensed; too late for some.
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more correctly a Government responsibility.4 1

A later interpretation of these events can be found

in

an article by

Allan M. Brandt which investigates the history of the development
of Salk vaccine in the light of a number of ethical decisions that
were made in the process, particularly in connection with
preliminary tests using human subjects, and the mass trial
itself.42 Brandt highlights three key areas of ethical concern: the
need to "define the risk-benefit" and the terms of consent in the
use of human subjects, whether mentally defective children (who
were used in early trials), or healthy "parent volunteered
youngsters" ; the fact that in a competitive situation the
"obligation of pharmaceutical companies to manufacture safe
products cannot be assumed"; and the necessity for government to
"provide a central direction" in the quest for scientific advance.43

Other more recent examinations of the development of polio

4 1 Wilson, J.R. (1963). Margin of Safety, p.64.
42 Brandt, A. M. (1978). Polio, Politics and Duplicity: ethical aspects in the

development of Salk vaccine, Intematfonal Joumal of Health Serofces , 8. The use
of intellectually disabled children is discussed in Wilson, Margin of Safety,
pp.148-9, and 153-55.
43 Brandt, A. M. (1978). Polio, Politics and Duplicity, p.268.
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Jane S. Smith. 46 Smith's reflection of her research experience is
that "a buried fear is hard to resurrect". 4 7 The quest for a polio
vaccine was, she says "one of those vast public events that
everyone remembers, but no-one wants to know about" - 48 Her own
experience as a Polio Pioneer, a volunteer in the Salk trials, led her
to research the memory gap that has developed concerning polio.
She writes a new history of the discovery of the vaccine from the
point of view of a participant observer and beneficiary in the
immunisation process. Hers is a lucid account that commences
with FDR and recounts the development of and introduction of
Salk vaccine. Smith tends to support the "hero of our times" view
of Jonas Salk and sees him as having helped create, post 1955, the
"healthiest generation in history". a group of people who know
nothing of epidemic diseases. 49

44 Klein, A. ( 1972). Trial by Fury: The Pollo Vaccine Controversy. New York:
Charles Scribners and Sons.
45 Carter. R. ( 1966). Breakthrough: the saga ofJonas Salk, Trident Press: New
York.
46 Smith, J.S. ( 1990). Patenting the Sun: polio and the Salk vaccine, New York:
William Morrow and Co.
4 7 Smith, J.S. ( 1990). Patenting the Sun, p.19.
48 Smith, J.S. ( 1990). Patenting the Sun, p.24.
4 9 Smith. J .S. ( 1990). Patenting the Sun, p.390.
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A Summer Plague, by journalist, editor and author Tony Gould
reflects in its title something of the negative representation of
polio common durtng the era of the epidemics. 50 Gould's narrative
is not as technical as Paul's scientific and medical history, but it
surpasses it in its endeavour to weave together the several strands
to polio history. He writes -

The history of epidemic poliomyelitis has several aspects scientific, clinical, political and experiential - and my aim,
in the first half of this book has been to weave together
these various strands, which have in the past been treated
separately, if at all.5 1
In taking an integrative approach, his particular concern is that in
their readiness to record the scientific and political aspects of this
history, a number of historians have completely or largely side
stepped the experience of polio survivors. Gould also acknowledges
the predominance of American influence in this history, the
practice of using of military metaphor, and celebrated the success
of science when he writes -

The 'conquest of polio' was an American - perhaps the
50 See also Rutty, C. J. (1996). Do Something!... Do Anything! Poliomyelitis in

Canada 1 927-1 962, and Killalea, A. (1995).The Great Scourge.
5 1 Gould, T. (1995). A Summer Plague. p.xiii.
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American - success story for the Fifties (the decade of
conformism and the Cold War) and Salk, the bespectacled
doctor in a white coat holding a test tube up to the light,
became and instant celebrity. 52
Gould offsets the American influence by making use of British
source material, and in this way provides another level of
integration. His narrative is made up of two parts; the first is
dedicated to the history of polio and the polio epidemics, the
second to the history of polio survivors. Gould does not focus
primarily on one epidemic, as does Naomi Rogers, nor on one
figure, as does Hugh Gallagher. He gives "added resonance" by
frequent use of the oral testimony of polio survivors, and material
that has not been included by other authors. He has produced a
work which is not of the technical stature of John Paul's book, nor
as rich in its analysis as Dirt and Disease . yet is comprehensive,
readable, and gives more space to the recording of personal
experience. Also a participant observer Gould survived polio in
1959 and, though not at this stage affected by it himself, was
roused to write this book when the impact of PPS began to make
itself felt. Gould's personal experience reflects the relationship

52 Gould, T. ( 1995). A Summer Plague. p.xii.
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between polio and society that many knew in the 1950s, and the
relationship that has emerged since the advent of PPS. He writes -

When I set out to write this book l knew very little about
paralytic polio, even though I'd had it myself... what I
discovered in the process of researching and writing this
book was that I, too, had been so busy 'mainstreaming' and
'denying' my disability over the years that I had
simultaneously both overvalued and undervalued it. I had
overvalued it in the sense of regarding my experience of polio
as somehow unique... and undervalued it by not allowing
that it had made any substantial difference to my way of life
and thinking... I don't any longer... however impressive a
recovery you make, you don't 'conquer' or 'overcome' polio in
any meaningful sense, you merely adapt to the limitations it
imposes and - if you're fortunate - discover resources within
yourself you might not otherwise have found.53
Gould himself was subject to the cult of denial that surrounded
polio - he treated it as something he 'had' - did not learn anything
more about it, and invested effort in 'mainstreaming' himself. The
insight that you don't 'conquer' or 'overcome' polio is an
understanding that did not develop until the 1980s and 1990s, in
the wake of PPS. Gould, who from the start located himself in this
history, came to see the need to relocate himself in a similar, but
more enlightened place. He believes there are advantages in being
53 Gould, T. ( 1995). A Summer Plague. pp.xv-xvi.
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a polio survivor if it is possible to see past the old habits of 'denial'
and the will to 'overcome' and live a life in which the effects of
polio are understood and properly integrated into the personal and
social context.

In his PhD thesis, a narrative history of polio in Canada 192 71962, Christopher J. Rutty has sought to integrate the Canadian
experience of the disease within current historiography and show
how the American "scientific and publicity war on polio" influenced
the response, particularly of the government, north of the border. 5 4
Rutty asserts that Canada was harder hit by polio than the USA 55
and as the impact of the epidemics was felt there

Pressures mounted on physicians, scientists, voluntary
health agencies and governments to do something, anything,
to minimize polio's high personal and financial costs. 5 5
"Do something, do anything" becomes Rutty's motif to encapsulate
the Canadian struggle with polio.

5 4 Rutty, C. J. ( 1995). Do something! Do Anything!Poliomyelitis in Canada 1 92 71 962 ,

Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Toronto, Canada, p. 16.

55 Rutty. C.J. ( 1995). Poliomyelitis tn Canada 1 92 7- 1 962, p . 10. Evidence is cited

from a WHO report on the incidence of polio.
56 Rutty. C.J. ( 1995). Poliomyelitis in Canada 1 92 7- 1 962, p.3.
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Rutty argues that in the prosecution of the campaign against polio
a fundamental difference between Canada and its southern
neighbour was the degree of government intervention in public
health matters that occurred.

This response, which grew

aggressively and strongly between 1927 and 1953, the worst of the
Canadian polio era

... was built upon a distinctive tradition of close institutional
and personal links between leaders in local, provincial, and
federal health departments, the medical profession, and
public health education, research and the centralised and
non-commercial production of preventative health products
at the University of Toronto's Connaught Medical Research
Laboratories and the intimately associated School of
Hygiene.5 7
Despite the advantage of these "close institutional and personal
links" Canadian progress in the war against the polio virus was as
slow as in other parts of the world. The difference was that the
Canadian polio campaign was not plagued by the unfortunate
c onsequences

of

competition

betw een

pharmaceutical

manufacturers, as in the USA. The reason for this was that the

5 7 Rutty, C.J. ( 1 995). Pollomyelltts ln Canada 192 7-1962, p.4.
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University of Toronto based Connaught Medical Research
Laboratories, which had the capacity to conduct research and
produce vaccine, was the national serum institute for the
government.

In Australia a similar role was played by the

Commonwealth Serum Laboratories (CSL).

Connaught received

funding from the NFIP to conduct polio research and a vaccine
trial. The facilities of Connaught were a significant tool for the
Canadian government which, in response to a rising expectation of
greater federal involvement in public health, used them to wage
war against polio and other diseases. Connaught was integral to
the Canadian public health system in which it "facilitated and
reinforced strong national public health links" , 58 through links
with key leaders at provincial and federal levels. During the polio
campaign the Canadian government was able to impose national
standards for the production, distribution and evaluation of polio
vaccine.

Compared with the United States of America the governments of
Canada and Australia appear to have exercised a higher level of
centralised control in matters of public health. This was possible
58 Rutty, C.J. ( 1995). PoliomyeUtis in Canada 1 927-1 962, p.4.
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intervention in public life, something which strengthened during
the Second World War. During the campaign against polio there
was an advantage in having uniform decision making with respect
to the manufacture and distribution of polio vaccine.

A collection of first hand stories of polio survivors who live in New
Zealand is available. 59 And Jean C Ross, has written a narrative
social history of polio in New Zealand from 1914 to 1961, with a
post-script concerning PPS. 5 0 Ross's research provides valuable
material for contextualising the history of polio in Australia. She
charts the changes in the understanding of the disease, the shifts
in public health administration that resulted, and the reaction of
the public to these developments.

Ross concludes that the

changes, which sometimes amounted to a complete about face in
public health policy, were accepted by a bewildered public, which
eventually had its fears calmed concerning the disease and the
disabled survivors it created. As a result of developments during

59 Butterworth, K.P. (ed.), ( 1994). Mind over Mus cle: s urvivingpolio in New

Zealand,

Palmerston North: the Dunmore Press Ltd.
Ross, Jean C. ( 1993). A History of Polio in New Zealand, unpublished MA
thesis, University of Canterbury.
60
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these years health services in general were improved while New
Zealand polio patients were offered free treatment. Ross argues
that radical changes in the management of paralysis patients, and
a greater use of physiotherapy techniques, were the result a high
level of acceptance of Sister Kenny's methods.5 1

An outline of the early history of poliomyelitis in Australia is
available in J. H. L. Cumpston's volume, edited by M.J. Lewis,
(1989). Health and Disease in Australia: a history, Canberra:
Australian Government Printing Service.

Cumpston's book,

written in 1928 during the first phase of his distinguished career
as Director-General of Health for the Commonwealth of Australia,
was not published until Lewis undertook the editing of it sixty
years later. Under the heading "Anterior Poliomyelitis" Cumpston
states that the first recorded incidence of polio in Australia was in
1895,5 2 and that up to 1914 there was no consistent recording of
further incidence. Cases of Land:ry's paralysis, a disease that may
have been confused with polio, were not uncommon during the
1880s. References to early outbreaks are indicated, and useful
6 I Ross, J . C. ( 1993 ). A History of Polio in New 7.ealand, p. l 02.
6 2 C umpston, J.H.L. (ed. Lewis, M.J. ). ( 1989). Health and Disease in Austmlia: a
history: Canberra: Commonwealth Government Printer, p.326.
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tables are given which record the incidence of polio in all states,
1911-1926, and the seasonal distribution of cases.

Frank Fenner's history of microbiology in Australia briefly records
the Australian medical response to the polio virus since 1930,
along with accounts of more recent developmentS. 63 Details are
also given of the key people and institutions that were engaged in
polio research and the production of vaccine in Australia,
including Dr P. L. Bazeley, Dr (later Sir) F.M. Burnet, the
Commonwealth Serum Laboratories, the Walter and Eliza Hall
Institute, Melbourne, the John Curtin School of Medical Research,
Canberra, and the Fairfield Hospital, Melbourne.

The Commonwealth Serum Laboratories played a significant part
in

the Australian response to polio. Its history by A.H. Brogan, 64

dedicates a chapter specifically to the details of polio vaccine
development in Australia. 65 Brogan's history is based on a variety
of sources as well as medical and institutional archives. His work
63 Fenner, F. (ed.), (1990). History of Microbiology inAustm.lia , Curtin: Brolga
Press, pp.378-9, 504-5.
64 Brogan, A.H. (1990). Committed to Saving Lives: a history of the Co mrrwnwealth
Serum Labomtorles , South Yarra: Hyland House.
65 Brogan, A.H. (1990). Committed to Saving Lives , Ch 12. Poliomyelitis Vaccine:
the last major triumph?
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provides technical information and gives and impression of the

internal politics of the CSL, which are a significant sub-text to the
polio story in Australia, and the type of interstate rivalry that
occurred over the introduction of polio vaccine.55

Brogan's chapter on polio vaccine is followed by another devoted to
Dr P.L. (Val) Bazeley. In the late 1940s Bazeley achieved acclaim
for his work on the development of penicillin and, in October 1952,
left to join Jonas Salk at the U niversity of Pittsburgh. 67
Somewhat a celebrity, Bazeley returned to Australia in 1955 to
supervise the manufacture of polio vaccine at the CSL. He arrived
just before news of the Cutter incident broke. Despite the setback,
Bazeley's expertise and demanding style of leadership enabled the
project to go ahead and between 1956 and 1960 the CSL produced
17,670,000 doses of Salk vaccine. 68 Problems developed, during
1960-61, over the safety and supply of Salk and, after prolonged
debate, Sabin vaccine was introduced in 1966. A controversial
figure who ultimately did not flt the "public service mould" of the
CSL, Bazeley eventually left to Australia to work in America.
66 Brogan. A.H. (1990). Committed to Saving Lives, p.116.
6 7 Brogan, A.H. ( 1990). Committed to Saving Lives, p.115.
68 Brogan, A.H. (1990). Committed to Saving Lives, p.122.
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The historical atlas produced as part of the Bicentennial
Australian history project contains a small entry on polio69 which
does more to suggest that further work needs to be done than
provide the reader with a comprehensive grasp of polio in Australia
the twentieth century.

A brief historical outline of the polio

incidence in Australia from the early 1900s is supported by charts,
serial spot maps, and photographs, and brief mention is made of
the work of Sister Kenny. Epidemics in South Australia (1947-48)
and Western Australia (1948 and 1954) are analysed briefly, but no
mention is made of the 1956 epidemic in Western Australia, or the
major epidemic that occurred in South Australia between 1949 and
1951.
Investigations of the work of Sister Elizabeth Kenny (1880-1952)
provide another source of polio historiography in Australia. 7 0
Apart from her own books and pamphlets, 7 1 there is a growing
body of published and unpublished material available which
explores different aspects of her part in the polio story. 7 2 John
69 Gilbert, A.O. and Inglis, K.S. (general eds.), ( 1987). Australians: a historical
atlas, Broadway, NSW: Fairfax, Syme and Weldon Associates, pp. 172-173.
70 A discussion of Sister Kenny's work is found below at p.188ff
7 1 Kenny, E. (1955). My Battle and My victory: history qfthe dis covery qf
poltomyelltis as a systemic disease, London: Robert Hale Limited, and Kenny, E.
and Ostenso, M. ( 1943 / 1980). And They Shall Walk, New York: Amo Press. A full
bibliography of sources related to Sister Kenny can be found in Wilson, J.R.
(1995 ). Through Kenny 's Eyes: an exploration ofSister EliZabeth Kenny 's views
about Nursing , Royal College of Nursing: Townsville Regional Group, especially
Appendices D,E,F,H.
7 2 Unpublished works which include material on Sister Kenny and polio include
Martyr, P. ( 1994). The Prqfessional Development of Rehabilitation inAustralfa, 18701981 , University of Western Australia: PhD Thesis, History, see especially Chapter
5. See also Martyr, P. ( 1 997). ..A Small Price to Pay For Peace: the Elizabeth Kenny
Controversy Re-examined", Australian Historical Studies, Volume 28,Number
108, Melbourne, pp.47-65.
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began his research to explore ..the discourse

generated by and about" Sister Kenny.

His purpose was to

"uncover some of the ideas, attitudes and beliefs about nursing
that helped influence Sister Kenny's extraordinary career". 74
Coincidentally he provides valuable historical background in
connection with Sister Kenny whose career suffered both from
professional ostracism in Australia, and the same historical
silence that has attended the history of polio. Sister Kenny did
not visit Western Australia and was working overseas by the time
the first major epidemic struck in 1948. Some of her rehabilitation
methods, which were introduced to the state by the Orthopaedic
Surgeon R. D. McKellar Hall, raised the ire of Dame Jean
Macnamara who in 1948 conducted an investigation of on polio
rehabilitation in W .A. on behalf of the Public Health
Department. 7 5

An important early study of polio in Melbourne was produced

in

response to the severe epidemic that occurred in Victorian during
1937-38.

Hilda W. Bull, a Medical Officer of the Victorian

Department of Health, conducted clinical and epidemiological
research to produce a report, later published by Melbourne City
Council. 7 6

Apart from the medical results reported, many of its

73 Wilson, J .R. (1995). Through Kenny's Eyes: an exploration ofSister Elizabeth
Kenny's views about Nursing, Royal College of Nursing: Townsville Regional Group
74 Wilson, J.R. (1995). Through Kenny's Eyes, p.vii.
7 5 McKellar Hall, R.D. (1983). Reflections, p.47. See Chapter 4 below.
7 6 Bull, H. M. ( 1939). Poliomyelitis in the City ofMelbourne, Melbourne City
Council.
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conclusions shed insight into the social context of the epidemic.

The epidemic, which occurred at a time when Victoria was
relatively free from other diseases, began during a cold, dry winter,
challenging the theory of the 'summer plague'. Both factors were
surprising, though not without precedent. New Zealand, which
recorded 656 cases of polio in 1936-37, was seen as the source of
the infection Victoria. 1 1 An improbable conclusion 78 but one that
was allowed to stand at the time and which continued to be used
between the two countries and, as we shall see, between the
Australian states. Data from earlier epidemics in Victoria shows a
higher incidence in the slums.7 9 Bull challenged the concept that
children from the upper-classes were most vulnerable to polio and
argued that in Melbourne, as had also been found in Canada -

The inner suburbs, containing a large proportion of people
liVing under conditions of overcrowding and economic stress
actually had the highest incidence. so
7 7 B ull, H. M. ( 1939). Poliomyelitis tn the City of Melbourne, p.7.
78 Ross, Jean C. ( 1993). Pollo in New Zealand, p.54. When in February 1938 the

Maunganui arrived from Australia at Invercargill, it carried the body of a boy who
died of polio. Normal q uarantine procedures had been observed, but it was
charged that polio was being brought to NZ from Australia.
7 9 Poliomyelitis in Melbourne, Medical Journal ofAustralia, ( 1940). 1 , 23, June 8,
pp.809-8 12, MJA, ( 19 18). Scientific, 1 . 14, April 6, pp.292-294, F.B. Smith,
( 1990). 'The Victorian Poliomyelitis epidemic 1937- 1938', pp.87 1 -2 .
8 0 B ull, H.M. ( 1939). Poltomyelttls in the City of Melbourne, p.30.

CHAPTER 3: Literature review

102

All but four per cent of those infected during this epidemic were
under fourteen years of age. It was notable that a high proportion
of cases were traceable through direct contact to either an abortive
or paralytic case of polio. The City responded to the distress polio
caused, especially to low income to families. Breadwinners were
often affected by informal social sanctions, even though
quarantine restrictions were not applied, while the expenses of
after-care were an added drain.

Various forms of relief were

arranged to assist families affected by these and other concerns. s 1
Due to the severity of the epidemic, for the first time the
administration closed schools and classes where infection
occurred, though no consensus could be reached on the efficacy of
this policy.s 2 F.B. Smith has offered a more detailed historical
interpretation of this epidemic which places the clinical and
epidemiological data in a political light. 83

In relation to the

science and politics connected with gaining a deeper understanding
of the transmission of polio, and the treatment given to Sister
8 1 Bull, H.M. ( 1939). Poliomyelitis in the City of Melbourne, p.31.
82 Bull, H.M. (1939). Poliomyelitis in the City ofMelbourne, p.39.
83 Smith, F.B. ( 1990). The Victorian Poliomyelitis epidemic 1937-1938, in
Caldwell, J. (ed), (Vol. II, Ch. 53). What we Know about Health Transition: the
cultural, social and behavioural detenntnates of health, The Proceedings of an
International Workshop, May 1989, Canberra, p.866-881.
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Elizabeth Kenny, Smith argues that -

... neutral, objective epidemiology and therapeutic regimes
may sometimes be, as they were in Australia during the polio
years of the 1930s, 1940s and early 1950s, the continuance
of politics by other meanS.84
Smith shows that during the 1930s, and
epidemic

in

in

connection with this

particular, Australian researchers, who came close to

understanding the correct means of polio virus transmission, were
prevented from making the breakthrough by lack of resources, their
subordination to orthodox American views, and a failure to pursue
the logical consequences of the data on hand. 85

It was the

unusual circumstances of the 1954 royal tour to Western Australia
that gave Dudley Snow the opportunity to prove the faecal
contamination theocy.86

The Great Scourge: the Tasmanian Irifantile Paralysis Epidemic 1 93738, by Anne Killalea, is based on her Master of Humanities thesis
of the same title.87 Killalea has written a narrative social histocy
84 Smith, F.B. (1990). in Caldwell, J. (ed), (Vol. II, Ch. 53), p.879.
85 Smith. F.B. (1990). in Caldwell, J. (ed), (Vol. II. Ch. 53). p.873.
86 Snow, D.J.R. (1955). Crowds and Poliomyelitis: with special reference to a
recent epidemic in Western Australia, MJA, Vol. I. No. l. See above, Chapter 2.

8 7 Killalea, A. ( 1992). The Great &ourge: the Tasmanian Infantile Pamlysis
Epidemic 1 937-1 938, Master of Humanities Thesis, University of Tasmania.
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of one of the worst epidemics ever recorded in the world. The polio
virus was peculiarly infective in Tasmania during this epidemic,
and produced case rate of 421 per 100, 000, more than three times
that recorded during the same period in Victoria, where an
epidemic occurred concurrently, and more than seven times that of
any epidemic in Western Australia. 88 Killalea shows that, despite
magnitude of the Tasmanian epidemic, and a plentiful supply of
historical and personal material, the epidemic attracted no
mainland attention at the time, and little more since. Her theme
illuminates the sort of

relationship that sometimes prevails

between the remote Australian states and their more populous
neighbours.

The Great Scourge explores the response to the epidemic, the

experience of those affected by it, and the aftermath. Killalea,
utilises a wide range of source material, medical, historical,
photographic and personal. She writes with a view to seeing how
"personal accounts affect historical understandings" and it is
through this perspective that she illuminates the impact this

88 Killalea, A. ( 1995). The Great &ourge, p. 136. The worst recorded epidemic
occurred in Iceland in 1924 when the rate of infection was 480 per 100,000.
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epidemic had on the small population of Tasmania. No extensive
published research is so far available for other Australian states
but unpublished work is available for South Australia and New

South Wales.s g

The

aim

of this chapter has been to provide an international frame

of reference for this thesis through a review of key items of
literature related to the historiography of poliomyelitis.

John

Paul's history has disclosed the long quest to understand the virus
and create a suitable vaccine.

John Rowan Wilson has shown

what difficulties arose in that search, due to lack of centralised
control of the manufacture of vaccine in America. Rutty's work on
Canada and the Connaught Laboratories shows an alternative
response to this difficulty which more closely matches the
Australian situation, as demonstrated by Brogan in his work on
the CSL and Bazeley's contribution.

The medical history by

Cumpston and Fenner provides basic information related to the
8 9 Buxton, A.J.C. (1977). Poliomyelitis in South Australia 1 937-1 956,
unpublished honours thesis, University of Adelaide, is an administrative history
which examines the preparedness of South Australia for the onslaught of the
polio virus, and the ways in which the government and the community
responded to the epidemics. Cecille Bearup, (1991). a retired occupational
therapist who studied at Roosevelt's Warm Springs, USA, wrote her honours
thesis, The Outcomes of the Poliomyelitis Epidemics in South. Australia 1 91 2-1 960,
with the Late Effects of Polio, or Post-Polio Syndrome, in view. It is a social
history which examines the long-term effects of polio on those who were affected
by the virus. Wendy Greenland, (1990). lrifantile Paralysis (Poliomyelitis) in New
South Wales, 1930-1940: a study ofperceptions and reactions, honours thesis,
University of New South Wales, analyses why polio was perceived by the medical
profession, the public and social commentators of all kinds to be the most feared
of all diseases. Greenland argues that the fear was based on Ignorance, the lack
of a cure, and the horror of paralysis. Outside the work on Sister Kenny, there is
no historical research I am aware of that has been attempted in connection with
the epidemics of polio in Queensland.
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The social

meaning of polio in the American and British contexts is brought
out in different ways by Rogers, Gallagher, Gould and Jane S
S mith .

The classless nature of the disease, the fear and denial

that attended its presence in the community, the centrality of FOR
to the process of finding a cure, his role in the denial that
characterises the history of polio, and the making of polio heroes,
are illustrated by these authors.

And as indicated above,

Australian and New Zealand perspectives are offered by Jean Ross
(New Zealand) , F.B. Smith and Hilda Bull (Victoria), Anne Killalea
(Tasmania) and John Robert Wilson (Sister Kenny) .
The themes explored in the literature reviewed here are pertinent to
the West Australian experience.

The long quest for a vaccine,

marked by confusion over the nature of the disease and the
consequences for implementing control measures, and the conflict
over health control in industrial democracies all feature in the
story of polio in Western Australia. And the fear and denial that
polio aroused were felt just as strongly here. The published history
of polio in Western Australia, and the sources used for this thesis,
have been outlined in Chapter 1 above.

The following chapters

discuss the history of polio in Western Australia in detail.

***
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CHAPTER 4: A fortunate experience: polio in Western
Australia 19 13- 1947.
Western Australia has been extremely fortunate in its experience of this disease
by comparison with other States. 1

Polio in WA prior to 19 13

Western Australia was seriously affected by polio for eighteen
years, from 1938 to 1956, a much shorter period than was suffered
in

other states. Serious incidence of polio was recorded in South

Australia between 1897 and 1 963, 2 in New South Wales,
Queensland and Victoria between 1903 and 1963, and in Tasmania
between 1 930 and 1960. 3 The low incidence of polio in Western
Australia between 1913, when the Public Health Department
commenced keeping records, and 1938, when the first major
outbreak occurred, was the consistent pattern for the state.
There is no consolidated source of information on the incidence of
polio

in

Western Australia prior to 1913, 4 but hospital Admission

and Discharge registers which are available for Perth Public
Hospital (later Royal Perth Hospital, RPH) indicate the diagnosis
for each patient. Determining the number of polio cases admitted
l Public Health 1 939-44, ( 1944). Report, p.6. BL, 6 14.09 WES.

2 Buxton, A.J.G. (1977). Poliomyelitis, p.82.

3 Cumpston, J.H.L. (ed. Lewis, M.J.). ( 1989). Health and Disease in Australia, p.
326, and Figure 3.
4 A table of the reported polio incidence in all states of Australia 19 1 1 - 1926
[Figure 41 can be found in Cumpston, J.H.L. (ed. Lewis, M.J.). ( 1989). Health and
Disease in Australia, p. 326. The only entry for WA prior to 19 16 records eight
cases in 1913. Cumpston's figures vary a little from those found in Figure 4 and
referred to in the letter CPH to S. Dove, 26 April 1935, BL, ACC 1003,
120/ 4,626, 1925, p. 128.
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to hospital prior to 1 900, or even 1 9 1 0 , is complicated by two
factors. Diagnoses were recorded in a column that could contain
only a few words, and a variety of descriptions were used for what
could possibly have been Infantile Paralysis. It is possible that the
diagnosis of polio was not yet sufficiently defined for doctors to use
it, and there is evidence that, in Western Australia, polio was not
considered a threat to the community. For example between 1899
and 1 909 Acute Anterior Poliomyelitis, or Infantile Paralysis, was
not included on the list of diseases that were considered to be
dangerous, malignant, infectious or contagious.5
Hospital registers reveal that between 1 876 and 1894 there were no
cases of children admitted to Perth Public Hospital (PPH) with
poliomyelitis. During this period approximately thirty patients
were admitted with "paralysis" which was regarded as a "nervous
disease" a category that included apoplexy, tetanus, hemiplegia
and chorea. 6 Of this number the youngest was a fifteen year old
male admitted on 1 8 October 1 876, who was hospitalised for only
five days. If he had polio it seems unlikely that his was a serious
case. The remainder of those listed were aged between twenty four
and seventy eight years of age and it seems unlikely that many, or
any, of these were cases of poliomyelitis.

5 Definitions of Diseases, Central Board of Health, 27 June 1899, p.10; Letter,
Undersecretary to Mayor of Coolgardie, 31 July 1909, p.2, BL, ACC 1003, AN
120 / 4 595 / 45. Malignant, lrifectf.ous or Contagious Diseases were - Smallpox,
Asiatic Cholera, Plague, Yellow Fever, Typhus Fever, Leprosy. The list Dangerous
Infectious Diseases added to the above Scarlet Fever, Typhoid Fever, Diphtheria,
Diptheritic Group.
6 Admission and Discharge Registers, Perth Public Hospital, Book 1, 1876-1886;
Book 2 1887-1897, Royal Perth Hospital Museum.
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The first case of Anterior Poliomyelitis to be diagnosed and

recorded as such was a thirty four year old male who was admitted
to PPH in June 1895. 7 It is not clear whether he had recently
contracted polio, or whether he was admitted for after-care, but
seventy four days later he was discharged in a "relieved" condition.
Between 1895 and 1912 sixteen cases of polio, including the one
above, are listed in the hospital registers and of these twelve were
children, s and four were adults. 9 The worst incidence occurred in
1904 when three children were admitted with polio.

On their

discharge the condition of twelve of these patients was described as
"relieved", two as "unrelieved", and two as "status quo". During
this period numerous cases of "paralysis" are listed along with
"diphtheritic paralysis" or "post-diphtheric paralysis", "infantile
atrophy", "bulbar paralysis" and "myelitis"- a description which is
reserved for older patients. In 1904 a forty two year old male died
of bulbar paralysis and respiratory failure, 1 o which is not described
as polio related, but the link would seems plausible. And in 1905
a diagnosis of "febrile attack" is noted in a twelve year old female,
which seems suspiciously like a non-paralytic polio infection. I I If
these hospital registers are any guide to the state-wide incidence of
polio in Western Australia up to 1912, the disease affected
individual lives but posed no threat to the community.

An

7 Register, Book 2. 1887- 1897, RPH; 1895, entry 226.
8 Nine were aged between eleven months and three years, the remaining three
were five, six and nine years of age respectively.
9 Registers, Books 2- 14, 1887- 19 12, RPH. Two adults were aged 34, one 42 and
the other 60.
10 Register, Book 6, 1903-1905, RPH; 1904, entry 862.
1 1 Register, Book 6, 1903- 1905, RPH; 1904, entry 1321.
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outbreak of polio was reported in Kalgoorlie in 1 909, but there

appears to be no corroborating evidence to support this cla1m. 1 2
While polio may not have presented any danger to the Western
Australian community at this time, other infectious diseases
certainly did. The Central Board of Health (CBH, later the Public
Health Department), established under the Health Act 1 886-191 1 ,
had to manage outbreaks of influenza, leprosy, typhoid, diphtheria
and small pox. 1 3 The CBH circulated information to Local Boards
of Health regarding the characteristics of infectious diseases and
methods of controlling them. 1 4 Local Boards, which were required
to report any incidence of these diseases, in turn issued directions
to the public concerning their responsibilities when infection
occurred, and the treatment of infected persons. 1 5 As a result of a
smallpox epidemic in 1 893 the Victoria Hospital, a small, primitive
infectious diseases hospital was established in bushland west of
the suburb of Subiaco. 1 6
It was typhoid that most sorely tested the Central Board of
Health's resources, as a result of the gold rushes of the 1 890s. The
rapid increase of population accompanied by poor living conditions
1 2 Note, 5 February 1 932, BL, ACC 1003, AN 1 20/4, 626/ 1925, p.48. "There was
an epidemic in Kalgoorlie in 1 909 but I cannot help you about those patients."
The Kalgoorlie newspapers for 1908-9 gave no evidence of an outbreak.
1 3 Snow, D.J.R. (198 1 ). Progress, pp.57-65.
1 4 Circular Letter, JHL Cumpston, Secretary, Central Board of Health to
Secretary, Local board of Health, BL, ACC 1 003, AN 1 20 /4, 988 / 1 9 10, p. l .
1 5 Notice regarding Infectious Diseases, Guildford Municipality, Local Board of
Health; Davyhurst-Mulwarrie Local Board of Health, Notice re Typhoid Fever, BL,
ACC 1003, AN 1 20 /4, 16 19/ 1 908, unnumbered pages.
1 6 Bolton, G.C. and Joske, P. (1 982). History ofRoyal Perth Hospital,Perth, Royal
Perth Hospital, p.57-58; Snow, D.J.R. (198 1 ). Progress, p.62; Martyr, P. (1 996). A
History of the Victoria Hospital {Infectious Diseases) to the Royal Perth
(Rehabilitatton) Hospital, 1893-1993, unpublished manuscript: Perth.
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led to an outbreak of typhoid fever which commenced in 1894 .
Hundreds of typhoid cases boosted admissions to the PPH, 1 7
without accounting for the thousands from the gold fields who
died before reaching hospital or were nursed locally. The mortality
rate from typhoid rose from 73 in 1894 to 325 in 1895, and 400 in
1897 and 1898.

A decade later in 1904 , after the goldflelds

achieved a secure water supply, the number of annual cases
declined to below three figures. 18 For a decade the state grappled
with typhoid and in the process had witnessed what Snow named
"one of the most protracted and notorious epidemics in the history
of public health" . 19
Polio in WA 19 13- 1947

Despite low incidence of polio in Western Australia up to 1912, the
newly formed Public Health Department took the step of extending
the list of notifiable diseased to include Acute Infantile Paralysis. 20
In doing so it noted that there had been epidemic outbreaks of
polio in Australia, America, England and Europe. Yet it was to be
36 years before the state would face its first real test from polio. A

maximum of nineteen cases were recorded in 1916 and 192 5,
followed by sixteen in 1940 and 1943 , matched by zero in 1917 and
1 7 Register, Book 2, 1887- 1897, RPH; total admissions rose from 8 12 in 1896 to
1534 in 1897, Bolton, G.C. and Joske, P. (1982). RPH, p.58 . Between June 1896
and June 1898 there were 1387 typhoid admissions, of which 10% died.
1 8 Snow, D.J.R. (198 1). Progress, p. 160.
1 9 Snow, D.J.R. (198 1). Progress, p.4. A full account of the "two fevers" is to be
found in a fine social history, Whittington, V. (1988). Gold and Typhoid: two
fevers, University of Western Australia Press, Nedlands.
2 0 Memo CPH to Undersecretary, 7 May 1912, p. 18; Order in Council, 28 May
1912, Proclamation 31 September 19 12, p. 2 1, BL, ACC 1003, AN, 120/4, 595/45.
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and was regarded by some as the first "epidemic" but it was really
only an initial flurry of activity.

Western Australia remained

relatively free of the polio from 1 9 1 3 to 1 947, when an average of
seven cases per year were recorded [Figure 5]. 22

In

the

corresponding period the low incidence of polio in Western
Australia to 1947 is exceeded only by the Northern Territory and
the Australian Capital Territory. 23
During the 1 9 30s Tasmania, Victoria and New South Wales
suffered severely from polio and from then on the disease claimed a
significant place on the public health agendas of all Australia
states. New South Wales had 240 cases

in

1 929, and 1 06 and

382 in 1 931 and 1 932 respectively. Victoria recorded 2 76 cases in
1 931 and Queensland 284 in 1 932. But by far the worst years were
1 937 and 1938 when Victoria recorded 2 1 76 cases, Tasmania 1 006,
New South Wales 757 cases, South Australia 389, and Queensland
281 [Figure 3). 2 4 Against this Western Australia's fifteen cases in
1 937, followed by forty eight in 1 938, hardly rated a mention even
though it was the worst total so far. The most severe outbreaks of
polio in Australia were still to come in the 1 950s, when Western
Australia also suffered signiflcan t epidemics.
Increased activity of the polio virus

in

Australia is paralleled in

2 1 CPH to S. Dove, 26 April 1 935, BL, ACC 1 003, 1 20 / 4,626, 1 925,p. 1 28.
22 Public Health 1948, (1 949). Appendix XV, p.6, BL, 6 1 4.09 WES.
23 See Figure 3.
2 4 Commonwealth Year Book, 1 929- 1966, see also Buxton, A.J.G. ( 1 977).
Poliomyelitis, p.84

CHAPTER 4: A fortunate experience: 1 9 1 3- 1 947

1 13

New Zealand which had several polio epidemics in the period 1916

to 1956. In 1916 there were 1018 cases, 192 5, 1,159 cases, and
1937, 816 cases. In 1946 and 1947 rates of polio infection were
higher than normal and in 1948 another epidemic occurred, which
extended into 1949, with 963 and 355 cases respectively. What
must have seemed like an interminable epidemic occurred between
1952 and 1956 when, apart from a respite in 1954 when 43 cases
occurred, the remaining years recorded totals of 890, 403, 703 and
897 respectively. 2 5 And in 1961, five years after immunisation
commenced, there was a wonying increase to 214 cases, a feature
shared with several states in Australia.
The remoteness of Western Australia may have some bearing on a
pattern, discernible later, in which polio epidemics occurred after
those in New Zealand and the eastern states. 2 6 There was no lack
of vigilance on the part of the authorities, despite the delayed
appearance of polio in Western Australia. Preparations were made
at an early stage, even though health experts did not know how to
predict the occurrence of an epidemic and were unsure what
measures to adopt to prevent or control an outbreak. In 1916,
when New York and New Zealand were experiencing severe
epidemics, the Public Health Department noted the occurrence,
advised its Local Government authorities accordingly and
"requested their observance of the ordinary conditions of

New Zealand, Appendix 2, Table 1 , pp. 108- 1 09.
2 6 For example, in 1937-38, 1 94 7-48 and 1 952-54, see Public Health 1948,
( 1 949), Appendix :XV, p.58, BL, 6 1 4.09 WES; Ross, ( 1993). New Zealand, Appendix
4, p. 1 14; Killalea, A. ( 1992). The Great Scourge, p. 70. The first case of polio in the
Tasmanian epidemic of 1 937-38 occurred on 5 November 1 937.
2 5 Ross. Jean C. ( 1 993).
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notiflcation".
A year later the Town Clerk of Boulder, in

CHAPTER

response to a reported case of polio, wrote to the Commissioner
seeking information.28 In 1926, one year after the second epidemic
in New Zealand, the Commissioner wrote to the doctor in the
wheat-belt town of Bruce Rock expressing his concern that, of the
dozen cases notified in the state that year, three had come from
his district. 29

From this period onwards the Public Health

Department was in contact with its corresponding bodies in other
states to share and seek information concerning the threat posed
by polio.30
During the 1930s polio began to be discussed more widely in
Western Australia. It is possible that this resulted from reports of
epidemics

in

the eastern states, New Zealand, and other countries

overseas. In 1932 the Commissioner received a letter written by a
man who lived at the Old Men's Home in Claremont, who said I suffered from this disease when a child of three, and am
now forty six years of age. If you think I could be of any use
to you, I am willing to come forward at any time.3 1
2 7 Circular Letter, CPH to LHA. 25 November 19 16, BL. ACC 1003, AN 120 / 4,
626/ 1925, p. l .
2 8 Town Clerk, Boulder to CPH. 1 1 October 19 1 7, BL, ACC 1003, AN 1 20 /4,
626/ 1925, p.3.
29 CPH to Dr Bean, 27 May 1926. BL. ACC 1003, AN 120/4. 626/ 1925, p.2 1.
30 For example, Department of Public Health, Hobart. to P ublic Health
Department, WA, 3 1 April 193 1 . BL. ACC 1003, AN 120 /4, 626/ 1925 p. 32. "I
have to request you to be good enough to furnish me with the following data
regarding Anterior Poliomyelitis in your State: 1 ) The number of cases reported
since 1925. 2) What steps have been taken for treatment of early cases, and in
the after-care of paralysed cases. 3) Who is responsible for the expendit ure
involved in so far as item (2) is concerned? 4) What steps, if any, are taken to
provide for the teaching of children. and vocational training of ad ults? See also
pages 36, 6 1 and 62 for further examples.
3 1 Letter to CPH. 1 8 Februazy 1932. BL. ACC 1003, AN 120 /4, 626/ 1925, p.84.
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On the basis of his evidence he had polio in 1898. There is no
evidence that he was in the state at that time of his infection but
one reason he lived at the Old Men's Home, at age forty six, could
have been that he suffered from serious paralysis. It is possible
that he was a pensioner.

At this time there were in the state

eleven males and six females who had applied for pensions due to
incapacitation from polio. 3 2

Early attempts to create a prophylactic using blood from polio
infected people aroused public interest and there were others who
joined the man above in offering themselves, or their blood for
serum.3 3 In 1937 one such donor wrote -

Some years ago I read that a serum to combat Infantile
paralysis could be prepared from the blood of a person who
had recovered from the disease. As it now seems to be
prevalent in other parts of Australia I thought there might be
a demand for such blood. I suffered from this disease in
1904 and although my left leg is practically useless am
otherwise recovered. I would be prepared to give as much
blood as I could spare if it is of any use to the Department.3 4
Stocks of this type of serum were kept by the Public Health
Department, 3 5 but it was of limited usefulness, it being "powerless
to check the development of the disease". 3 6 Serum was usually
3 2 Undated List, BL ACC 1003, AN 120 / 4, 626/ 1925, p.58.
33 Note, 10 February 1932, BL ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 626/ 1925, p.57.
34 Letter HCP to CPH, 22 July 1937, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 626/ 1925, p. 144.
35 Telegram, Director General of Health, to CPH, 27 January 1932, p.36;
Secretary, Central Board of Health Adelaide to CPH, 5 February 1932, p.44, BL,
ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 1 106/ 1933.
3 6 Australian Archives, CRS 1928 / 1, 8012, Section 2. Zwar, D. ( 1984) The Dame:
the life and times ofDame Jean Macnamam, medial pfoneer, South Melbourne:
Macmillan, pp. 18-20. F. M Burnet considered that after 193 1 no one should
have used serum, but Macnamara continued its use until 1937.
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in the hope that paralysis would not develop.

By then the

patient's own body was producing antibodies and the serum added
little further protection.
In the early 1930s the favoured understanding was that the polio
virus gained entry through the nose and mouth, 3 7 by means of oral
and nasal droplets.3 8 Concentration on this point of entry led to
the development, in the late 1930s, of nasal sprays - some of which
were quite dangerous - and even a nasal peg. 3 9 Negative reaction
to the use of these sprays, and difficulties in encouraging the use
of the nasal peg eventually led to them being abandoned.
Personal contact was also suspect, and in particular its effect on
children was feared. In 1932 the editor of the Wagin Argus , a
country newspaper, published this warning DON'T KISS ME
Now that infantile paralysis has raised its ugly head in
Australia, the "don't kiss me" campaign has started.
Everybody seems to want to kiss every baby. No doubt the
rosebud mouth is a tempting target, but it is a filthy and
disgusting practice for the Twentieth Century, and rough on
the baby! Every babe should wear a bib labelled "Don't Kiss
Me! " 40
37

Paul, J.R. (1971). History, p.246, Smith, F.B. (1990). in Caldwell, J. (ed.), (Vol.
II, Ch. 53), p.867.
38 Burnet, F.M. (1935) MJA. 21 September, Vol 2, No.12, p.390.
3 9 Paul, J.R. (1971). History , p.316; Smith, F.B. (1990). in Caldwell, J. (ed), (Vol.
II, Ch. 53), p.868; Greenland, W. ( 1990). Infantile Paralysis, p.20; Helms, K.
(1937). "Poliomyelitis" MJA, 2,8, 21 August, pp.328-9; Buxton, A.J.G. (1977).
Poliomyelitis, p.26. Despite lack of official endorsement of nasal sprays in South
Australia, during 1937-38 the Hindmarsh Council promoted their use. In
February 1938 the sprays were officially declared to be useless.
40 Wagin Argus, 21 March, 1932, p.2.
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This attitude was not confined to country people but was strongly
promoted by the medical profession. In 1937, when the Victorian
epidemic was gaining momentum, Dr Featonby, the head of the
Department of Public Health, said that the key question

in

regard

to polio infection was whether or not a person had developed
immunity. He then warned . . . that kissing was medically a most dangerous custom. It
was the commonest method of spreading the disease which
found entrance through the nose and throat.41
A great deal of ignorance prevailed concerning polio, but such
knowledge as was available was passed on to the public. In 1932,
when the first case of polio known in the coastal town of Bunbury
was notified, the following description of the disease accompanied
the report in the WaginArgus .
The only symptoms are fever, irritability, headache, stiffness
of the neck, vomitting, twitching of muscles, constipation
and sometimes convulsions. These are generally followed in
a few days (if death does not occur in the early stages) by
paralysis of one or more limbs or groups of muscles. Some
cases have been known without any paralysis whatever
occurring.42
Whether or not this information was provided by the Public Health
Department, it would have done little to still the fear of polio that
was developing in the community.

41 Westem Matl, 12 August 1937, p.25.
42 Argus, 1 0 November 1 932, p.2.
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Western Australia, especially those who worked among children,
were becoming alarmed at the prospect of a polio outbreak. In
January 1932 the Honorary Staff at the Children's Hospital, (later
known as Princess Margaret Hospital for Children), met to discuss
the subject. It was unanimously agreed to convey their concern to
the Commissioner in the following resolutions:
1. That in the opinion of the Honorary Staff and epidemic of
Poliomyelitis is an alarming possibility, and that steps be
taken immediately to prepare for such.
2. That the Honorary Staff is anxious to discover for its
guidance what machinery exists for combatting such an
epidemic.
3. That a copy of the above resolutions be sent to the
Commissioner for Public Health, and that he be informed
that the Honorary Staff would greatly appreciate the
courtesy of his attendance at a further special meeting, to be
held in the Board Room of the Children's Hospital on
Wednesday 27th January at 8.30pm.43
From the late 1920s serious consideration was also given to
upgrading the poor facilities of the Infectious Diseases Branch of
RPH.44 A new facility was agreed upon and a conference of all
Municipal Councils and Road Boards in the metropolitan area was
called in 1933 to discuss the joint funding of the project. The
43 R.D. McKellar Hall to CPH, 20 January 1932, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120 / 4,
626/ 1925, p.35.
44 Bolton, G.C. and Joske, P. ( 1982). RPH, pp. 12 1 - 124; RPH Board Minute 28
June 1928, p.4 and 26 July 1928, p.2. At one stage a new facility was planned, to
be located in the outer suburb of Kwinana, and it was intended to offer polio
after-care based on the principles of Sister Elizabeth Kenny. The proposal came
to nothing, and IDB was upgraded. The full account of these developments is to
be found in Martyr, P. ( 1996). A History of the Victoria Hospital ffnfectious Diseases)
to the Royal Perth (Rehabilttn.tion) Hospital, 1893-1 993, unpublished manuscript:
Perth.
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That the Government be requested to submit to the local
authorities, at the earliest date possible, a basis upon which
the local government bodies interested may in conjunction
with the Government, make the earliest possible provision
for an up-to-date and central hospital for the treatment of
infectious diseases. 4 5
There were continuing difficulties between the Public Health
Department and Local Authorities with respect to achieving
funding for the venture, 4 6 but a redeveloped Infectious Diseases
Hospital was ready for occupation early in 1 939, at a total cost of
£52, 175. 47 When planning this development the Public Health
Department sought information from Victoria with the intention of
emulating the Fairfield Infectious Diseases Hospital, Melbourne. 4 8

Another feature of the 1 930s was that the work of Sister Elizabeth
Kenny captured the interest of both the medical profession and the

public. 4 9 The Kenny method included giving psychological support
to the polio patient and treating the group of muscles affected by
paralysis with a combination of hot packs, massage, active

4 5 Letter, Town Clerk, Fremantle to CPH, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4 626/ 1933,
pp. I , 4, 6 and 7.
4 6 WA. 10 Februruy 1938, p. 18; 12 April 1938, p. 12; 10 May 1938,p. 12; 13 May
1938, p.2 1
4 7 Martyr, P. ( 1996). A History of the Victoria Hospital, unpublished manuscript.
4 8 Under Secretruy to Scholes, 9 December 1933, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4,
626 / 1925, p. 4.
4 9 Greenland, W. ( 1990). Infantile Paralysis, p.5 1. During the 1930s Sister Kenny
and Lord Nuffleld were both responsible for stimulating greater awareness of the
needs of disabled children.
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exercises and hydrotherapy, during the acute stage of infection. so

In contrast orthodox medical treatment immobilised the patient in
splints or plaster casts for up to six months. and treated pain with
massage and analgesics.

While some were receptive to her

methods, and she was able to commence clinics in Townsville,
Brisbane and Sydney, the medical establishment ultimately
resisted her innovations.

Controversy frustrated her work in

Australia during the 1930s. It was overseas, particularly in the
United States of America, that her methods

achieved most

recognition in the 1940s. 5 1
Three investigations of Sister Kenny's methods were conducted in
Australia during the late 1930s and the reports were published in
the Medi cal Journal of Australia (MJA). 5 2 Public awareness aroused
by this was sustained through media reports which broadcast her
international successes and discussed her techniques. Many were
searching in hope for methods which would alleviate the effects of
polio paralysis, and there was an openness, particularly amongst
members of the public, to anything that seemed as though it would
help. But the medical establishment did not approve, though
50 Wilson, J.R. ( 1 995). Through Kenny's Eyes: an explomtlon ofSister Elizabeth
Kenny 's views about Nursing, Royal College of Nursing: Townsville Regional
Group, especially Appendix B, p l 36. See also Martyr, P. ( 1994). The Professional
Developmentof Rehabilitation in AustmUa, 1870-1981 , University of Western
Australia: PhD Thesis, Histocy, Chapter 5 .
51 Zwar, D . ( 1984). The Dame, p p . 84-87. Dame Jean Macnamara was vecy
critical of Sister Kenny, and competed with her for project funds. The two
women advocated opposite methods of treatment for polio. Macnamara
published her views on the treatment of polio, The Care of the Paralyses of
Poliomyelitis, ( 1946). MJA, 2, 17, 26 October, pp.577-580.
52 Medical Journal ofAustmlia, (MJA), ( 1937). The treatment of Paralysis at the
Elizabeth Kenny Clinic, Royal North Shore Hospital, Sydney, 2, 20, November 13,
pp. 888-894; MJA, ( 1939). Report on an investigation of twenty three cases of
poliomyelitis in which the "Kenny system" was used, W R Forster and E E Price,
1 . 8, Februruy 25, pp.32 1 -325 .
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The Queensland Government held a two-year-long Royal
Commission into Sister Kenny's methods, the findings of which
were published in full in the first edition of the MJA for 1938. 5 3
The Commission, did not recommend the Kenny method at all especially during the acute or early stages of paralysis.

The

findings, which were reported in the press, included the statement
that The belief held by many people in the possibility of a cure
and in the reality of improvement by the Kenny method, in
spite of facts to the contracy, is attributable to Miss Kenny's
strong personality. Her own conviction of technical
competence, and of the improvement in patients treated by
her all combined to inspire the patients and relatives with
greater hope, and especially with unshakeable loyalty to Miss
Kenny. 5 4
Some ambivalence towards Sister Kenny is evident in other
quarters. The Federal Health Minister, Sir Earle Page, himself a
medical practitioner, declared that he could only find one point of
controversy between Sister Kenny and the doctors. The the real
value of her work lay in her personal enthusiasm, and the
confidence she inspired in her patients.5 5 Sister Kenny's methods,
and her professional credibility, were soundly called into question
by a medical establishment that was unable to accept the core of
her work, which involved respecting and nurturing the whole
53

MJA, ( 1938). Report of the Queensland Royal Commission on modem
methods for the treatment of poliomyelitis, I , 5, 29 January, pp.187-224; WA, 6
January, 1938, p.15.
5 4 WA, 6 January, 1938, p. 15, and MJA, (1938). I , 5, January 29, p. 219.
55 WA, 19 January 1938, p.21.
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person.
The report drew an indignant response from Sister Kenny who, in
threatening an early conclusion to a project she was then engaged
in in Melbourne said
So many stumbling blocks have been placed in my way . . . I
intended to stay longer. . . but misrepresentations by the
Brisbane Commission- and certain obstacles here have
changed my plans. 56
After a conference with Government officials, Kenny reversed her
decision and continued her work in Melbourne, and the Victorian
Minister for Health, also a medical practitioner, declared that most
of the profession "were eager that Sister Kenny's treatment should
be investigated here". 57

Elizabeth Kenny did not visit Western

Australia, but the Public Health Department apprised itself of her
views and declared that "her treatment [ did] not materially differ
from that of doctors and hospitals everywhere" . 58 From this it
seems those with polio could feel confident of the treatment they
would receive from their doctors, regardless of Sister Kenny.
Nevertheless, her techniques did have an effect on orthopaedic
practices in Western Australia.
In 1936 R.D. McKellar Hall, the orthopaedic surgeon in charge at
the Children's Hospital, accepted an invitation of the Minister for
56 WA, 6 January, 1938, p. 15.
5 7 WA, 7 January, 1938, p.20.
58 Memo,Undersecretary to Angus and Robertson. 27 August 1937, request for a

copy of Kenny, E. Infantile Paralysis and Cerebral Dtplegta; Letter, 10 March 1938;
Letter, 27 January 1938; BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 626/ 1925, pp. 15 1,290 and
3 1 7.
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Health to attended a conference in Canberra to investigate the

problems of dealing with the after-care of polio survivors, and
those crippled by other means. 59 The controversy surrounding
Kenny's work was one of the reasons the Director General of
Health convened the gathering. McKellar Hall records the tensions
evident between Kenny some of his professional colleagues,
particularly Harold Crawford, a leading orthopaedic surgeon from
Brisbane. McKellar Hall visited a Kenny Clinic in Sydney where,
after witnessing a demonstration by Sister Kenny he said
I relearned an important lesson and found I was on Sister
Kenny's side. A very old method of treatment was reinforced
in my mind, the use of common-sense. 60
On his return McKellar Hall implemented some methods based on
her technique.
At the end of 1938, when there was an unusually large number of
polio after-care cases to attend to, the Public Health Department
sought a person with massage skills to do what it termed
"reconstruction work with post-polio sufferers,"61 but no mention
is made of Sister Kenny.
A decade later when Kenny's protagonist, Dame Jean Macnamara,
visited Western Australia she brought down a report that was
severely critical of what she saw. The facilities in the state were a
"slow but effective factory which turns the potential cripple from
59 McKellar Hall, R.D. ( 1 983). Reflections, pp.39-46.
60 McKellar Hall, R.D. ( 1983). Reflections, p.43.
6 1 WA, 8 April 1938, p. 18; WM. 14 April 1938, p.5 1 .
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Apart from any

inadequacies that existed in Western Australia's polio after care
system at that time, an added factor was that she disapproved of
the more active methods of rehabilitation that were being applied,
derived from Kenny's techniques.63
Awareness of the dangers posed by polio increased in Western
Australia as a result of the epidemics in the eastern states during
1937-1938. It is significant that, in September 1937, the Public
Health Department had Acute Anterior Poliomyelitis declared a
"dangerous infectious disease within the meaning of section 204 of
the Health Act 1911-1935. 64 Compared with its earlier status as a
"notifiable disease" this change gave the Commissioner the right to
invoke emergency powers in time of need.

The change had to be

announced each time the Department believed an emergency
existed which called for access to the special powers of the Health
Act.

When invoked these powers temporarily authorised the

Executive Director of the Public Health Department to perform
duties he did not have, but were normally vested in Local
Authorities.

Options include powers of entry, inspection, the

isolation of infected persons, houses and places, and "the removal
and curative treatment of the sick". 65
Differences of opinion over polio were evident among doctors
6 2 Report, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120 / 4, 1 190/ 1948, pp. 22-23. This report is
discussed below, p. 182ff.

6 3 McKellar Hall, R.D. ( 1983). Reflections, p.47.
64 Minute, Executive Council, 9 September 1937, BL. ACC 1003, AN 120/4.
595 /45, p.90.
65 Health Act 1 9 1 1, Part ix - Infectious diseases, By-law 249,6, p. 189.
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Some treated polio infection in the same way

as soldiers at war had treated death - you'll get it if it's coming to
you - while others endeavoured to play down the horror and risks
or paralysis.

The author of the weekly column "The Diary of a

Doctor" wrote
It is right and proper that we take whatever precautions are
necessary . . . but there is much accentuation of infantile
paralysis as a horror disease . . . its results are not nearly so
disastrous or crippling as many other quite common diseases
of children. Rheumatic fever, for instance leaves more
permanent damage and crippling in its train than infantile
paralysis ever did. Even whooping cough is more serious. 66
The press in Western Australia were accused of fueling the growing
fear of polio , but it is difficult to see how it could have censored
news of epidemics from other states. Travellers, telephones and
letters would have conveyed the news and rendered the secrecy
counterproduc tive .

The progress of epidemics elsewhere ,

particularly the severe occurrences in Victoria and Tasmania in
1 937, received regular, and sometimes sensational coverage in the
papers. 6 7
Public concern over polio is evident at this time , however it may
have arisen. The Australian Natives' Association (ANA) requested
the Minister for Health , the Honourable S .W. Munsie, to order
that people entering the state, by any means, should be subjected
to a medical examination. Such a step had been recommended
and taken by other states when their neighbours were infected by
6 6 WM, 9 September 1937, p.5.
6 7 WM, 7 October 1 937, p.2; 2 1 October 1937, p.59; 28 October 1937, p.59; 4
November 1937, p.60; 1 1 November 1937,p.59; 18 November 1937, p.72.
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polio.68 The ANA was particularly concerned that children should

be examined, and asked what steps the government would take in
the event of an escalation in the Victorian epidemic.

The

Minister's reply confirmed the difficulties being experienced by his
department and, by expressing the view that the authorities did
not know what factors led to an epidemic of polio, left room for
any existing fear of an approaching epidemic to continue
unabated. He wrote I can assure you that such steps as can feasibly be taken to
limit or prevent the possibility of spread to this State, will be
taken. It must be recognised, however, that sporadic cases
of Infantile Paralysis do occur and such have actually
occurred in this State, and exactly what the factors are
which influence the appearance of the same disease in
epidemic form are not known.69
The ANA were joined in their concern by the Fremantle branch of
the Australian Labor Party, which framed an even stronger
resolution recommending that, while an epidemic was in progress
elsewhere, children under sixteen should be prohibited from
entering Western Australia. 10 In reply the Commissioner pointed
out that his Department had appointed a consultative committee
of doctors which recommended visitors from Victoria be
6 8 WM, 26 August 1937, p.23. In view of the Victorian polio epidemic, a Bill was
introduced to prohibit the entxy into NSW, by sea, land or air, of any child of
sixteen or younger who was known to have had contact with polio. These
restrictions did not apply to adults, see Greenland, W. ( 1990). Infantile Paralysis,
pp. 3, 38 and 44. And Buxton, A.J.G. (1977). Poliomyelitis, pp.20-2 1 and 30
states that in 1937-38 the South Australian Education Department cancelled
interstate trips for schoolchildren between SA and Victoria and applied
quarantine restrictions, and the Northern Territory imposed quarantine
restrictions against SA.
69 Letter, 3 September 1937, and reply, 4 September 1937, BL, ACC 1003, AN
120/ 4, 626/ 1925, pp. 158-9.
7 0 Letter, ALP to Munsie, 18 November 1937, p. 189, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120 / 4,
626/ 1925.
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He aimed to show that the Public Health

Department was exercising more rtgour in this matter than other
states when he said that "Infantile Paralysis is not one of those
diseases for which Interstate and International quarantine has
previously applied". 7 1
In addition to concern expressed by organisations, it is evident
that members of the community were fearful of the consequences
of contact with polio.

A man from Kalgoorlie who intended to

holiday in Melbourne wrote to the Commissioner seeking advice,
afraid that his trip would result in twenty one days of quarantine
on his return. 7 2 The Commissioner was to receive many similar
letters in the the years to come.
In Western Australia a significant expression of the fear of polio
and the frustration that attended it can be seen in the controversy
that developed over quarantine restrictions. The controversy also
may have fostered this fear because it exposed the uncertain state
of knowledge about polio.

And it also brought into focus the

question of how extensive the powers of the Public Health
Department were, and how fully it was prepared to exercise them.
From this time onwards many Western Australians, in fear of their
children and looking for someone to blame, came to believe that
the Department ought to have been far more assertive than it was
in the face of the threat from polio.
7 1 Memo CPH to Munsie, 16 December 1937, p.196, and Letter, Munsie to ALP, 23
December 1937, p. 200, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120 / 4, 626 / 1925, p.s 188,189, 196 and
200.
7 2 Letter to CPH, 28 August 1937, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120 /4, 626/1925, p. 152.
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The first and, in some ways, one of the most colourful examples of
this fear and the associated controversy is found in correspondence
between the citizens of Noggerup, a hamlet in the apple growing
district of the south west of the state, and the Commissioner. In
December 1937, when Tasmania and Victoria were in the grip of a
serious epidemic of polio, the citizens of Noggerup received news
that a family from Victoria was to visit their town. A public
meeting was held which delegated three members to write to the
West Australian

and the Commissioner to express their views on

the matter. They wrote In view of the fact that the residents of this town became
aware a few days ago, that a family from Victoria, including
three children, was soon to be resident here, a public
meeting was held on December 2 to discuss the position, and
a motion was carried that this meeting viewed with alarm
the likelihood of people, particularly with children, coming
to Noggerup from Victoria, and requests the Health
Authorities to take action to safeguard the health of
residents.
Strong indignation was expressed, especially when the
following facts were made known : 1) Communication with Dr Atkinson showed that there was
no Government quarantine of such children - the only
quarantine being for three weeks in their own home - in this
case a house not 40 yards from the State School Building.
2) The District Medical Officer, Dr Collins, of Donnybrook,
says that he has no control except in the actual township of
Donnybrook, about 25 miles away.
3) The Education Department states that there are no
regulations framed to cover the admission or exclusion of
such children from the School.
It would seem, then, by the above facts, that the
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Government is offering practically no protection whatever to
West Australians from this dreaded disease. Dr Atkinson
states that there is no cause for alarm. Why then were tours
of schoolchildren to the Eastern States cancelled? These
children would spend only a few days in Victoria, yet this
was considered sufficiently dangerous to warrant the
cancellation of those tours. New South Wales, apparently,
is aware of the danger as children from Victoria are refused
admittance there.
Again, who is to enforce this 2 1 days quarantine in country
districts.isolated, as we are at Noggerup from any any
medical or Government authority, also, may we ask, is every
person in the house affected by the quarantine restrictions,
and what penalties do those who fail to observe the
quarantine orders incur?
At various times we have read of different Governments
enacting laws to prohibit the entry into their State of plants,
animals, etc. from other States where disease was prevalent,
yet apparently the life and health of our children are of so
little importance to the Government that practically nothing
is being done.
Does the Government intend to wait until the disease gets a
hold here, or is it prepared to take preventive measures now
before it is too late?
Several months ago, Victorians were being told, as we are
now, that "there is no cause for alarm" and what is the
position in that State now?
We have been deputed by the public meeting, held at this
place, to put our views before you and also to communicate
with the Commissioner for Public Health and the Education
Department and we trust that you will give this matter every
publicity.73

The Commissioner responded firmly and in detail. He said other
states had taken as strong action as Western Australia and

Tasmania which imposed quarantine restrictions on children

73 Copy, with covering letter to CPH. 3 December 1937, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/ 4,
626/ 1925, pp. 179- 183:WM, 1 6 December 1 937, p.59.
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those from Victoria who

were known polio contacts would have been in quarantine before
arrival in the State. All care was taken with new arrivals, and the
best possible supervision was given by Health Inspectors. The
Commissioner reminded his correspondents that, thanks to the
action of his Department, Western Australia had a polio advisory
committee of doctors whose advice resulted in the gazetting of
appropriate regulations, breach of which incurred a penalty of up
to £50. In reply to the suggestion that children be dealt with at
the border in a similar way to plants and animals, the
Commissioner pointed out that this would involve the division of
families, and in no part of the world had such a strategy been
employed.

In any case, he said, South Australia had kept its

borders open and was not yet suffering from the disease. The
Commissioner assured his correspondents that Public Health
Department was exercising all vigilance and school teachers, and
citizens like themselves, were encouraged to add their support in a
difficult situation. 7 5
The citizens of Noggerup were not really satisfied and compared the
response with measures taken by the Department of Agriculture
when a neighbour's apple orchard was infested with Codlin Moth.
In addition to receiving strict instructions regarding the disposal of
fruit the a Departmental Officer practically lived on site to
supervise the work. They wrote 7 4 The CPH's assertion was incorrect, as footnote 64 above indicates. See also

Killalea, A. ( 1995 ). The Great Scourge, pp.26 ff. Tasmania added quarantine
restrictions to existing policy of issuing certificates to children to permit them to
travel from one region of the state to another.
75 Letter, 9 December 1937, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 626 / 1925, pp. 184-5.
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If, as you assert, the quarantining of arrivals from Victoria is
beyond the resources of your Department, surely the
alternative is to prohibit the entry of such persons into the
State... we notice that the Fremantle Branch of the
Australian Labour Party also has this subject under
consideration and we are glad to think we are not alone in
this matter. 7 6
At the political level in Australia there is little difference between
the quarantine issues that apply to diseases affecting humans,
fruit, and other foodstuffs. 77

Ironically early in 1938, as the

number of polio cases began to increase, Noggerup district
experienced another outbreak of Codlin Moth.7 8
In addition to offers of blood for serum, members of the public
volunteered good advice and bizarre forms of help during the polio
years. The suggestion of a possible connection between bare feet
and polio infection, referred to in Chapter 2 above, was raised
during the 1938 polio scare. The first of many to come, such offers
of popular insight signify a continuing level of community
involvement in the quest for a solution to the problem of polio.
But some gestures were not based on altruistic motives. A resident
of South Africa wrote to the Commissioner:
I would suggest that your investigations follow the isolation
in Raw Cows Milk of the bacillus of this disease. It has
been definitely established in several health-progressive
countries that children who have not been vaccinated
7 6 Letter, 13 December 1937, BL. ACC 1003, AN 120/ 4, 626/1925, pp.193-5.
77 Controversy over quarantine restrtctions occurred in Australia during the
Spanish Influenza epidemic of 1918-19. McQueen, H. The 'Spanish' Influenza
Pandemic in Australia, 1912-1919, in Roe, J. (ed) (1976) Social Policy In Australia,
pp.131-147.
7 8 WA. 8 February 1938, p.5.
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(bovine extract) and who refrain from imbibing raw cow's
milk (bovine extract) are immune, or do not contract this
disease. "Boil your milk" would be the housewife's slogan
against this disease and also TB.

CHAPTER

He then concluded with
Should you test this statement and verify it my fee can be
met by reserving me an assisted passage for my young family
of six as immigrants under your scheme. 79
The Health Department did not respond as requested to the offer of
this information, but the possible link between milk and the polio
virus continued to attract attention.
In the late 1930s the Australian Government received assistance
from the British philanthropist, Lord Nuffleld, 80 whose company
manufactured iron lungs. In 1938 Nuffleld offered to donate a
respirator to every hospital in the British Empire "which might
reasonably make use of it".8 1

One hundred and fifty two

respirators were installed in Australian hospitals, 82

of which

79 Letter, 12 December 1937, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/ 4, 626/ 1925, p.244.
80 In 1935, Nuffield donated £50,000 to the Commonwealth Government to

help crippled children, see. Buxton, A.J.G. (1977). Poliomyelitis, p.66. and
Greenland, W. (1990). Infantile Paralysis, p.10.
8 1 Cablegram, Acting High Commissioner, London, to Prime Minister, 13
December, 1938, AA (ACT), 1928/ l , 802/21. Poliomyelitis, Lord Nuffield, gift of
Iron Lungs, Applications.
82 Letter, Cumpston to High Commissioner, London, 3 January 1938,
AA, 1928 / 1, 802 /21, Poliomyelitis, Lorcl Nuffield , gift of Iron Lungs, Applications.
Qld received 35, NSW 71, Victoria 14, SA 24 , and ACT 1.
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Western Australia received eleven. 83
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The 'epidemic' of 1938

Forty seven cases of polio were notified in Western Australia in
1938, double the maximum annual figure reported since records
have been kept. This itself was noteworthy but the rise in the
number of notifications began slowly and may not have attracted
much attention if it were not for the fact that forty four of them
were reported in the first five months of the year. After May the
number of notifications declined, as was expected during colder
weather, and the few remaining cases occurred sporadically
throughout the rest of the year. 84
Late in November 1937 the Tasmanian Health Department
contacted Commissioner Cook to ask if there was any outbreak of
polio in Western Australia. The Commissioner replied that there
was no unusual prevalence noticeable, only the usual sporadic
cases which, at that stage, numbered about ten for the year. 85 A
month later, on Christmas eve, a boy from the semi-rural district
of Caversham was reported to have a severe case of respiratory
paralysis.

In retrospect this was regarded as the first of the

83 See file ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 1940, especially pp. 52, 99, 123, 128, 147. 166 and
ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 5 1 78 /57 pp.7-35, 85-87. During the next two decades the
number was increased. In 1956, when the IDB received a large number of bulbar
cases. the Public Works Department manufactured a version of the iron lung to
meet the need.
84 The occurrence of the disease in summer led, in the future, to extensive
investigation of the links between climate and the virulence of the disease.
85 Telegrams. 25 November 1 937, BL. ACC 1 003. AN 120/4, 626/ 1925, pp. 174175.
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unusually large number or cases that marked the first half of

1938.8 6 In January the Public Health Department obtained two
respirators from Victoria, a provision which was to serve them well
in the future when treatment of those who experienced respiratory
paralysis was required. 8 7
The Commissioner resisted the notion that a n epidemic was under
way, an attitude later reflected in the annual report for 1938 which
stated that the cases "were so widely scattered and so unassociated
with one another as to suggest only a sporadic incidence rather
than a spreading epidemic" . 8 8 The outbreak could hardly be termed
an epidemic but such a balanced view, taken after the event, does
not reflect the feelings of the population at the time. In 1937 the
epidemics in Victoria and Tasmania had raised the awareness of
the potential dangers, a feeling that strengthened as the summer
months approached.
From the moment quarantine restrictions were imposed in
December 1937, they became the subject of controversy. This was
the first time they had been imposed in Western Australia in
relation to polio and, although they were applied to children under
sixteen years of age who came from polio infected areas, they
affected all travellers. Interstate visitors were warned of the new
conditions8 9 and letters were written to boarding schools advising

86

WM. 6 January 1938, p.55.
WM, 13 January 1938, p.55.
88 Public Health 1948, (1949), Appendix XV, p.59, BL. 614.09 WES.
8 9 WA, 13 May 1938, p.19.
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of the need to quarantine any students from

135

interstate. 9 0

In

January 1938, perhaps to show that he did mean business, the
Commissioner vowed to prosecute a visiting parent, with two
children under seventeen, who had been caught disregarding
quarantine restrictions. 9 1
By January 1938 the community must have felt prospect of a polio
epidemic had increased.

The boy from Caversham had been

admitted to hospital, a fourteen year old girl was being treated for
respiratory problems, and rumours were circulating wildly. Under
the heading "Alarmist rumours refuted" the West Australian
reported that, after a meeting of the consultative committee of
doctors, the Commissioner had stated All sorts of rumours were going about, according to reports
made by doctors at the committee, that there were numbers
of cases of infantile paralysis in this State. These rumours
were without foundation.9 2
The Commissioner stated that the few cases which had occurred
were the same sporadic type of infections that were reported in
most years.

He affirmed the use of quarantine restrictions

governing arrivals from interstate, and reported that the committee
of doctors recommended restrictions on the movement and
congregation of children "even within the state" . 9 3 He said The visits of groups of country children to the city were

9 o Letter, CPH to Lord Abbot of New Norcia, 8 February, 1938, NNA O 14 1 .
9 1 WA, 15 January 1938, p.2 1 .
9 2 WA, 7 January 1938, p.20.
9 3 The attitude of the WA Ed ucation Department to school clos ure was
equivocal, but eventually some were closed after cases of polio occ urred.

1 36
4: A fortunate experience: 1 9 1 3- 1 947
particularly discouraged, as country children were usually
more susceptible to infantile paralysis than city children. 9 4

CHAPTER

When a man from the wheat belt town of Morowa telegrammed the
advice that he was leaving for Perth with one hundred children
who were due to have a holiday at South Beach, Fremantle, the
Commissioner replied firmly Strongly urge you not to bring country children who [ are]
more susceptible [to] infantile paralysis to Metropolitan area
STOP. This definitely not in [the] best interest of [the]
State. 9 5
Whether or not it was true that country children had a lower
immunity to polio, the evidence suggests that, from the outset, the
Public Health Department took a clear line on the congregation
and movement of children during a polio scare. While quarantine
restrictions had the effect of placing inter-state relations under the
microscope the ban on the congregation of children directed the
focus to intra-state relations.

The fact that adults were not

subject to the same restrictions became a source of tension and
frustration within the community, and between the community
and the Public Health Department.
School teachers were also affected by quarantine regulations. The
committee of doctors recommended that, on their return, teachers
on holiday in the eastern states should submit to twenty one days
of voluntary quarantine, less the number of days spent in
9 4 WA, 7 January 1938, p.20.
9 5 Telegram, CPH to M orawa, 4 January

626/ 1925.

1938, p.2 15, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4,
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travelling home from their last port of call.

The

Education

Department reported that forty two West Australian teachers were
known to have intended taking holidays in the east.

The

Department, which characteristically administered, with some
muscle, policies proposed by Public Health, concurred with the
recommendation and warned that teachers who did not return
home in time to fulfil their quarantine obligations before school
commenced would be banned from the classroom, and and incur
loss of pay. 9 6
It seemed anomalous that, while under quarantine, teachers were
banned from the classroom but were otherwise unrestricted in
their movements. Whereas in the case of smallpox all travellers
were quarantined and released after vaccination, adults were
thought to be less susceptible to "infantile paralysis', and so could
move about, and there was no prophylactic vaccine that was
regarded as sufficiently strong or trustworthy. The Commissioner
expressed views which would return to haunt him in the future
when he said
Total quarantine for infantile paralysis would mean the
complete disorganisation of business interests, as adults as
well as children would have to be kept in quarantine for
three weeks. As adults in the main are not susceptible to
the disease, their quarantine would not be veiy justiflable. 9 7
Public criticism of quarantine restrictions continued with local
government bodies joining the fray. The District Road Board of
9 6 WA,
97 WA,

15 January 1938 , p.21; WA, 18 January 1938, p.13.
18 January 1938 , p.13.
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Cue, which was responsible for station country surrounding a
remote and now almost defunct mining town, forwarded to the
suburban Nedlands Road Board a recommendation that
A strong protest be forwarded to the Commissioner for Public
Health against the allowing of children from those Eastern
States where infantile paralysis is prevalent to land in this
State and to travel to various parts before being isolated,
and this board considers that such isolation should be made
at the port of entry, and strongly urges that this procedure
be adopted, a copy of this protest be sent to all road boards
in the State with a request for their support. 98
Nedlands Road Board joined their country colleagues and, with
only minor amendments, supported the recommendation.
In the press the Commissioner defended the approach being taken
by his Department, again citing the fact that its policies were
developed after consultation with the consultative committee. He
pointed out that Western Australia had adopted stronger
provisions than those which, in Victoria, had proven beneficial in
slowing the spread of polio. For the benefit of those who thought
that everyone entering the state should be quarantined at the
point of entry, he indicated that such measures usually only
applied where the disease in question was unknown to the
country, and all of Australia was familiar with polio . And in
connection with the cry to quarantine only children at the point of
entry, he said it was a measure which would ultimately only help
the spread of the disease, and would have been impractical. It
would
9 8 WA, 2 Februaiy 1938, p.9 .
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. . . necessitate for this State huge establishments at
Kalgoorlie, Albany and Fremantle, where three trains and at
least three boats a week would be constantly landing
families from whom children under a certain age would have
to be separated and quarantined. . . In each centre there
would be very shortly a colony of children. . . living under the
most suitable conditions for spread of the disease ... 99
All visitors were informed of their responsibilities before they left
their point of entry into Western Australia. Where polio did occur
in a visiting family the preferred method was to isolate the child in
the host home in the hope of containing the disease.

The

Commissioner indicated the policy was a success and reported
that, by the end of January, the monitoring of the many adults
and children who had re-entered Western Australia during a peak
holiday period revealed that no cases of polio had been imported
into the state. 1 00
Shipping companies working the interstate routes were requested
to keep children under 16 on board while their vessels were berthed
in West Australian ports. When in January 1938 some passengers
from the Kantmbla, which arrived at Albany from the eastern
states, defied orders and took their children ashore the Minister for
Health threatened tougher action against these and any similar
perpetrators. I o 1 The purser claimed that the shipping company
had not been advised of the new regulations prior to arrival at
port. A doctor on board challenged the assumptions behind the
99 WA, 28 January 1938, p.11.
1 00 WA, 28 January 1938, p.11.
1 01 WA, 10 January 1938, p.23; 11 January 1938, p. 14; 12 January, 1938, p.7;
WM, 20 January 1938, p. 54.
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precautions declaring them to be "futile" in view of the fact that
"you will probably get it eventually ... they can't stop it from
spreading unless the winter beats it". 1 02 The doctor illustrated his
point by referring to the fact that Victoria had now eased its strict
quarantine regulations, but these had been revoked because the

Victorian epidemic was now in decline. He added that in his view,
as far as Western Australia was concerned, the distance from
elsewhere was sufficient safeguard. As far as the Public Health
Department was concerned, the distance from elsewhere was an
important reason why it sought to restrict the traffic of those most
vulnerable to the disease. Differences over polio amongst doctors
and health officials was not uncommon and, when aired publicly
in this way, did little to inspire confidence.
Meanwhile in Western Australia interest in polio was kept alive by
regular announcements in the press of more cases at home and
abroad. One such, headed "Man's Death in Adelaide," 1 03 would
have helped keep any existing fear alive and provoked readers to
ask the question of whether polio did only affect children, and who
was at risk from its paralysing power.
Despite the fact that draconian powers were given to the Public
Health Department under the Health Act 1911, 1 04 its preferred
method of operating was to exercise the power of persuasion. The
Commissioner postured in the press and threatened to prosecute
parents who broke the restrictions, and occasionally did so.
1 02 WA, 12 Januruy 1938, p.7.
l 03 WA. 5 Februruy 1938, p.20.
104 Health Act 19 1 1, Part ix - Infectious diseases, By-law 249.6, p. 1 89.
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Reports were released to show that Health Inspectors did in fact
monitor the behaviour of families living under quarantine
restrictions. 1 05

The attitude of the Department was clear and

consistent on this point but, in some cases, its administration of
policy was handled ineffectively.
The Commissioner complained when the Young Australia League
(YAL) ignored his advice that its plan to take a party of thirty eight
boys on tour of the eastern states did not meet with the approval
of the consultative committee. The Director of the YAL responded
to the criticism by declaring "there has been no defiance of any
health regulations by the League" and indicated that medical
experts in New South Wales had given an assurance that there was
no risk to the boys in Sydney.

"When doctors differ, who will

decide?" l 06 he asked and alleged that the "more emphatic opinion"
of the health authorities was not conveyed until after the boys had
left for Sydney. There may have been some laxity on the part of
the Public Health Department, or it may be that Simons, the
Director of the YAL was particularly pigheaded. But it was not the
last time the Commissioner and the YAL would clash over a
proposed tour during a polio scare.
From the public point of view policies related to the isolation of
children were not implemented consistently, either between the
different Australian states or within states, despite the fact that
the topic was frequently discussed by health experts. Research by
1 05 WA. 15 January 1938, p.2 1.
1 06 WA, 3 January 1938, p. 13.
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the National Health and Medical Research Council suggested that
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isolation could at least slow the progress of an epidemic, and so it
advocated that any child who experienced a minor febrile illness
should be segregated until a diagnosis had been achieved. Similar
treatment of paralysis victims, however, was considered
unnecessruy because the risk of infection was thought to have
passed. 1 0 7
Belief in the efficacy of isolation was one reason for the policy of
quarantine practiced during the 1938 epidemic. Discussions were
to continue during future epidemics in Western Australia and, as
in other parts of the country, strong views were held on both sides
of the argument. While interstate visitors were subjected to the
precautions of quarantine and residents of rural Western Australia
were discouraged from bringing children to Perth, some country
centres acted as if they would like to blockade themselves against
intrusion from outside.
During the summer months of 1938 the Commissioner responded
to alarmist rumours in order to put the record straight.

He

reported that there been eleven cases during February, six in the
metropolitan area and five from widely scattered areas in the
country. 1 0 8 The next day stated that since 1 January a total of
twenty one cases had been reported. 1 09 While not a large figure
this represented a considerable increase on the yearly average to
date, and was three higher than nineteen, the maximum annual
1 0 7 WA, 3 Januaxy 1 938, p.1 3.
1 0 8 WA, 3 March, 1 938, p.19.
1 09 WA, 4 March, 1 938, p.23.

1 43
4 : A fortunate experience: 1 9 1 3 - 1 947
figure recorded since 19 1 3 . The Commissioner was at pains to
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point out that the mild nature of the disease being experienced
could have meant that some cases would have been overlooked,
were it not for the constant vigilance and attention to detail of the
medical profession. There may not have been the hundreds of
cases that some people imagined, and the medical profession may
have been doing its job well. But it is also possible that the alarm
present in the community was based on knowledge of cases that
people were unwilling to report.
When infections did occur the Public Health Department took
action, particularly in relation to schools, a tactic which, while it
showed decisiveness and strength, may have served to underline
perceptions of the gravity of the situation.

In March the Mt

Hawthorn, Rosalie and Claremont Practicing Schools were closed,
as was St Brigtd's Convent, West Perth, and the country schools of
Kellerberrin and Mingenew. 1 1 0

In the weeks following more

schools and kindergartens were dealt with in the same way. 1 1 1
The Commissioner pointed out that this action was futile if
parents allowed their children to attend public gatherings before
the period of quarantine was completed. The Churches of Western
Australia respected the policy of discouraging the movement and
congregation of children and teenagers and cancelled their annual
Easter Camps that year. 1 1 2
WM, 3 March, 1 938, p.57; 10 March 1938, p. 1 8; 1 7 March 1938, p.54.
Buxton, A.J.G. ( 1977). Poli.omyelitis, pp. 28-29. South Australia had implemented
school closures and the cancellation of functions where children would mingle
in 1937.
1 1 1 WA, 18 March, p.25; 3 1 March, 1 938, p. 15; 5 April, 12.
1 1 2 WA. 18 March, 1 938, p.25.
1 1O
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By 24 March twenty eight cases had been reported of which just
over half, fifteen, were from the country. In April a 24 year old
patient from the far flung rural district of Newdegate was brought
to the Infectious Diseases Hospital, where he developed respiratory
paralysis and died. 1 1 3 By mid April the outbreak had peaked and
near the end of the month the Commissioner announced that no
case had been reported for seventeen days. He was also able to
report that the epidemics in other states had abated. 1 1 4 On 12
May the consultative committee recommended the lifting of the
quarantine restrictions affecting children who arrived from New
Zealand and the eastern states of Australia. 1 1 5 The matter, which
had been under consideration since April, was brought forward as
the result of a letter to the Commissioner from the Committee
from Associated Shipping Companies who were seeking to be
relieved of the burden of dealing with quarantine restrictions. 1 1 6
In Western Australia during the 1938 there was a genuine fear of
contamination from polio introduced from overseas, other
Australian states, and between city and country. Some clearly
wanted the Health Department to insist on stronger quarantine
laws, especially in connection with children entering the state.
Local authorities did not support the policy of the Public Health
Department and lobbied to bring about a change. A minority of
doctors also did not support the line taken by the Public Health
1 1 3 WM, 24 March, 1938, p. 57;
1 1 4 WA. 22 April 1938, p.22.
1 1 5 WM, 19 May 1938, p .56.
1 1 6 WA,

13 May 1938, p. 19.

14 April 1938, p.5 1 ; Argus, 3 1 March 1938, p.3.
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Department, 1 1 7 revealing divisions amongst the members of the

medical profession over how to deal with polio. Their insistence
that a more open policy would suffice revealed that, at this stage,
health experts were actually at a loss over what to do about polio.
During the polio outbreak of 1938 the Public Health Department
experienced some difficulty in achieving its goals of providing a
sense of safety and confidence with respect to polio. A decade
later, when the first real epidemic occurred the resources of the
Department were tested far more sorely, by the polio virus, the
press, and members of the community.

***

1 1 7 WA, 12 January 1938, p.7. A doctor, a passenger on the K.antmbla, said
quarantine was "futile" because "you would probably get it eventually".
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Figure 4: Annual reported incidence of poliomyelitis 1911-1926 .
Source, Cumpston, J.H.L. (ed. Lewis, M.J. ). (1989). Health and
Disease tnAustralta, p. 326.

Year

1 91 1
1 91 2
1 91 3
1 91 4
1 91 5
1 91 6
1 91 7
1 91 8
1 91 9
1 920
1 921
1 922
1 923
1 924
1 925
1 926

NSW
47
79
63
31 1
16
50
8
45
1 84
33
1 04
1 08
50
78

Vic

Qld

76
32
303
2
5
27
23
7
12
1 39
31

5*
38*
6*
332*
27*
3 7*
1 3*
1 1 9*
1 7*
35*
25*
1 *
1 12
39
42

SA

WA
8

-

47
17

-

13
2

19
2
4
2
8
1

-

8
3
19
13

Tas

3
4*

-

3*
3*
1 4*
5*
1*
1 *
1 *
3
3
1
3

147

CHAPTER 4: A fortunate experience: 19 1 3 - 1947

Figure 5: Annual reported incidence of polio in Western Australia
1913-1948, Public Health 1 948, (1949 ) . Appendix XV, p.58, BL,
614.09 WES.
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CHAPTER 5: Fear and Frustration: the 1948 epidemic.

148

Western Australia experienced its first major epidemic of polio
during 1948.

Throughout the year several factors combined to

make it a very unpleasant and frustrating experience for the whole
of the community.

The fear of polio was exacerbated by

uncertainty concerning the disease and its transmission .
Frustrated by a lack of experience and resources the Public Health
Department bumbled through, seeking help wherever it would be
found.

The protection measures it implemented, especially

quarantine restrictions, were distrusted and resisted, while
criticism and alternative suggestions flowed freely, especially in the
press.
Two cartoonists, Saw and Davies, made visual comment on the
polio epidemic, in the Dally News

and the Sunday Times

respectively, and went so far as to represent polio itself in their
work.

Saw, who pilloried the introduction of quarantine

restrictions, suggested that, thanks to the Public Health
Department, Western Australia was suffering from a bad case of
Governmental paralysis.
The fear and frustration that accompanied the 1948 polio epidemic
were eloquently represented by the story, published in the Dally
News late

in

January, of Roger Groom, a fourteen-year-old Vee

Jay yachting champion, photographed at home working on his
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boat. I Roger, who was favoured to

win

the upcoming W.A. junior

sailing championship, was unable to compete because he was

in

quarantine. Earlier in the month Roger had broken his Young
Australia League (YAL) tour to the eastern states and travelled to
Sydney where he won a sailing competition.
home called at Adelaide, which was

in

His return flight

the grip of a polio epidemic,

and Roger was put into quarantine.

The Public Health

Department had imposed quarantine restrictions to prevent the
spread of polio from South Australia. The irony is that, on his
outward journey, Roger visited Adelaide before he travelled to
Sydney, where he raced during what would have been the
incubation period, had he contracted polio.
Late in January 1948 the first case of polio was reported for the
year, followed by five more reports

in

March. Many epidemics were

known to decline once summer was over but during autumn this
outbreak increased in intensity, while the weather remained
unusually warm. Further cases were reported in April and May.
The winter months of June, July and August together produced
155 cases - half of the total for the entire year. 2 A total of sixty
seven cases in July was the worst month-to-date total so far
recorded in Western Australia. The epidemic appeared to die away
in September but revived during November and December [Figure
6].

1 DN, 30 January 1 948, p.8.
2 Public Health 1948, ( 1949), Appendix .XV, p.62, BL, 6 1 4 .09 WES.
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The final total of 3 1 1 cases (a rate of 62 cases per 1 0 0 , 000
population) consisted of 1 8 1 from the metropolitan area and 1 30
from the country. 3 The youngest person to contract polio in this
epidemic was four months old, and the eldest fifty-one years of age.
Approximately 40% of those affected suffered some residual
paralysis. The twenty-five deaths that occurred represented a
mortality rate of approximately 8% , which was considered "normal"
except for one thing - among young adults and particular groups of
adults the death rate was significantly higher.4 Within the 20-29
age group the rate was 30.6% while it was 47% for country males
in the same age bracket.

Mortality was also high amongst

pregnant women. Five of the nine pregnant women who contracted
polio died, compared with only three deaths amongst fifty-four
non-pregnant women of child-bearing age. 5
The 1 948 epidemic presented the Public Health Department with
its first major opportunity to analyse and evaluate the incidence
and the effects of the disease in Western Australia.
Comprehensive epidemiological work was undertaken by Dudley
Snow whose findings became part of the Annual Report for that
year. 6

It is not clear how Snow managed to investigate the

epidemiology of polio on this occasion, as he did not officially join
3 Public Health 1948, (1949). Appendix XV, p.65, BL, 614.09 WES. In 1945
Western Australia had a population of 492,018. of which 233,000 lived in urban
areas and approximately 25,000 were of Aboriginal descent. See, Hetherington, P.
"Introduction: Western Australia in the Commonwealth, 1939-1945", in Gregory,
J. (ed) (1997). On the Homefront: Westem Austmlla and World War II, University of
Western Australia Press: Nedlands, p.3.
4 Public Health 1948, ( 1949), p. 12, BL, 6 14.09 WES.
5 Public Health 1948, ( 1949), p.67, BL, 6 14.09 WES.
6 Public Health 1948, (1949), p. 12, and Appendix XV, BL. 6 1 4.09 WES.

CHAPTER 5: Fear and frustration

151

the Perth Office of the Department until almost three years later. 7
The Public Health Department used a method devised by John
Snow (1813-1859), a name sake of its own Dr Snow, created serial
spot-maps of the metropolitan area, a device which provided a
visual history of the progress of the epidemic. The serial spot map
of the first 150 cases reported in 1948 revealed a greater incidence
in suburbs north of the Swan river [Figure 6). The Annual Report
also included a full list of the localities affected by polio. The large
number of towns and suburbs recorded clearly suggest that polio
was a classless disease, affecting people from all walks of life.
S everal features of the 1948 epidemic were considered to be
stgniflcant.8 There was little traceable link between cases, so that
except for a few instances, no history of contact could be
identified. The epidemic continued into the winter months and
was at its worst when it would normally have been expected to
decline. Western Australia had an unseasonably dry winter in
1948, a feature which reinforced the interest already being taken in
the link between weather patterns and the activity of the virus.
The spread of infection increased during the Royal Show and
school holidays [ Figure 8 ), suggesting that contact between
different groups of children had been a factor in the dissemination
7 Snow, D.J.R. ( 198 1 ). Progress, p.xi. During his career in the Public Health
Department, Snow rose to the position of Deputy Commissioner of Public Health,
a role he filled from 1963 until his retirement in 1973. WA, 1 1 February 1948, p.8.
Snow, with Dr E.G. Saint, arrived from England in February to work as a P ublic
Health Department Doctor with the Royal Flying Doctor Service in the north
west of Western Australia.
8 Public Health 1948, ( 1949). p. 12, BL, 6 14.09 WES.
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of the disease.
There were epidemics of polio in several countries of the world in
1947 and 1 948. A severe epidemic which involved almost ten
thousand cases occurred in England. 9

New Zealand, which

experienced a severe epidemic in 1948, reported significant
increases in new cases of polio during 1946 and 1947. I O New
Zealand schools remained closed from the beginning of 1948 until
Easter, and the authorities sought assistance with after-care from
the Kenny Institute of the USA which dispatched two technicians
and a supply of "electrically operated centrifugal apparatus" not
previously used in that country. I I In 1948 a large outbreak of
polio occurred in North Carolina, USA. I 2
Large epidemics of polio occurred in eastern Australian in 1945-47,
particularly New South Wales, Victoria , Q ueensland, and
Tasmania. 13 The incidence declined markedly in 1948 but in that
year South Australia, Western Australia's nearest neighbour,
reported ninety-eight cases, which represented the peak of a three
year upward trend. Between 1938 and 1948 there were relatively
few cases of polio in Western Australia, and in 1946 and 1947
there were only two cases each year. It must have seemed that an
epidemic might not strike but, as had happened in 1938, it was
9 Public Health 1 948, ( 1949). Appendix XV, p.59, BL, 6 1 4.09 WES .
I O Ross, J . ( 1993), New Zealand, Table I . pp. 108- 1 09.
11 WA. 28 January 1948, p.3.
1 2 S unday Times , 18 July 1948, p.4.
13 Public Health 1 948, ( 1 949). Appendix XV, p.58, BL, 6 14.09 WES.
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after the decline of epidemics in the eastern states that cases
began to be reported in Western Australia.

The link was

circumstantial, not proven. 1 4
On 30 December 1947 the Health Department gazetted quarantine
regulations, measures that were consistent with those adopted in
1938. 1 5

Children who arrived by land, sea o r air from South

Australia and New Zealand had to remain in isolation for twenty
one days. All such arrivals, and any sickness that subsequently
occurred in the host house were to be reported to the Public Health
Department. All who passed through South Australia on their
journey to Western Australia would be subject to quarantine.
Quarantine restrictions did not affect arrivals from S ingapore, a
busy international port which had regular shipping links with
Western Australia. In April the West Australian carried news of
the death from polio of an Australian, the wife of a newspaper
executive working for the Straits Times, Singapore. 1 6

When

challenged on the matter the Public Health Department gave the
assurance that any cases of polio on board would become evident
on the journey to Fremantle, where the normal quarantine
procedures would suffice. I 7 In any case, it did not consider there
was an epidemic of polio in S ingapore. 1 8 On this occasion the fear
1 4 Public Health 1948, ( 1 949). Appendix XV, p.60, BL, 614.09 WES.
1 5 WA,

16

1 January 1948, p.5.

ST, 25 April 1948, p. 12.

l 7 DN, 6 January 1948, p. l

1 8 DN, 19 April 1948, p.8; 3 June 1948, p.2; 2 1 June 1948 p.2.
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of Asia ran second to the fear of polio in neighbouring Australian
states.
The father of a family

in

quarantine was reported to have broken

the ban. 19 Parents who breached the restrictions were threatened
with prosecution and

in

mid-January, in the second of such cases

to occur in that district, a Kalgoorlie woman was fined £5 for
failing to keep her child isolated for the entire statutory period. 2 0
As the number of cases rose the Commissioner, Dr C.E. Cook,
requested Local Health Authorities to advise him of any breaches
of quarantine so that orders could be issued to parents whose
children were infected. 2 1
Quarantine restrictions were a major source of frustration in the
community during 1948. From the outset of the epidemic there
was controversy over the question of contact and isolation. The
Daily News responded to the imposition of quarantine regulations

with a leading article accompanied by the first of a series of
cartoons by artist Lew Saw, 2 2 who offered graphic commentary on
the Public Health Department's handling of the epidemic.

19 DN, 9 January 1948, p.4.

2 0 WA . 16 January 1948,
2 1 Memo, CPH to LHA, 31

p. 10.
May 1948, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 944 / 1948, p.5.
22 Lew Saw, whose family lived at Armadale, an outer suburb of Perth.was
employed as an artist by the Daily News where he also functioned as a
cartoonist. Saw was successful with this form and eventually left Australia to
cartoon in Canada. He was followed at the Daily News by Paul Rigby. In 1948
the WestAustrallan did not employ an artist. This information provided to the
author by Bruce Wroth and Peter Ewing. I am grateful to Pamela Hodge and
Brian Shoesmith for their disc ussions of the iconography of these cartoons.
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Australian newspapers have employed the comic art of cartoons to
make political and editorial comment since at least 1850.2 3
Always a popular feature of the papers, cartoons used images that
drew upon a wide diversity of themes not restricted to Australian
culture.2 4

The work of each artist was idiosyncratic, but

nevertheless reflected the cartoonist's perception of an issue that
currently affected the community.
The first of the eight cartoons to be examined in this chapter, and
the accompanying article, were in support of quarantine
restrictions.

The cartoon, captioned "There's No Room For

Argument" [ Figure 9], 2 5 visually expressed the question posed in
the article which was A mother has to travel to South Australia and must take her
child. She is frightened of Infantile Paralysis - yet irked by
the prospect of quarantine regulations. What should she
know, what should she do?2 6
The picture shows a well-to-do mother, labelled "quarantine
dodger", with her son, dressed in clothes resembling a private
school uniform, labelled "juvenile traveller" , confronted by a
doctor, who represents the authority of the Public Health
Department. Behind the doctor is a bed and theatre floodlight,
2 3 Coleman, P. • Tanner, L. ( 1967). Cartoons ofAustralian History, Thomas Nelson

and Sons Ltd: Melbourne, p. 7.
Gordon, I. ( 1986). Stop Laughing Th.is ls Serious: the comic artfonn and
Australian ldentlty 1880-1960, unpublished BA Honours Thesis, University of
Sydney, p.85.
25 DN, 17 January 1948, p.2. Cartoons in Figures 8- 12. 14- 16 provided courtesy
the WestAustralian, reproduction permit PF 428D. Cartoons in Figures 13 and
20 courtesy the Sunday Times, verbal permission 28 August 1996.
2 6 DN, 17 January 1948, p.2.
24
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and a nurse who is discreetly at work beside a box respirator,
popularly known as the "iron lung". The mother protests, "You
can't expect me to keep him cramped up at home for 3 weeks!", to
which the doctor replies, "We do: home was never like this". 2 7
The iron lung, feared icon of polio's crippling power, represents
scientific and technological advancement, hopefully the saviour of
many. But it was also symbolic of the horrific fate that lay in wait
for some who became infected and then paralysed. The message
was that the new regulations would prevent having to face the
living death of paralysis, or perhaps even death itself.
In similar fashion to 1938, questions were raised concerning the
policy of quarantine restrictions that applied to children but not to
adults. A letter expressing this opinion was published on the same
page as the cartoon and the accompanying article. This was the
last time cartoon commentary favoured the Public Health
Department. From this time onwards it was pilloried, particularly
by the Daily News and the Sunday Times, for its imposition of
quarantine, and for using the policy of persuasion.
Community resistance to the quarantine restrictions was aroused
by two events that occurred in quick succession during January.
The published opinions of Commissioner Cook on the subject, and
the way in which a party of YAL boys were dealt with who returned
home from a visit to the eastern states.
2 7 DN. 17 January 1948 , p.2 .
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Fear of polio in other parts of Australia had, once again, not been
sufficient to cause the YAL to abandon its plan to take a party of
250 West Australian boys on tour. They travelled through South
Australia to arrive, on January 6, in Melbourne where they were
housed at the showgrounds.2 8

The new quarantine restrictions

were applied to them on their return but the Commissioner decided
that, since the party had visited South Australia on its outward
journey and would not pass through it on their return, the boys
could count their quarantine from the date of departure from
Adelaide. This plan would require them to be isolated for only a
few days when they reached home.2 9 It was a compromise policy
intended to minimise the inconvenience to the boys and their
families.

In mid-January- there were reported to be 146 children in isolation.
The return of the YAL boys in the third week of January
exacerbated an accommodation crisis and the Commissioner
appealed to the public for offers of help with the provision of
rooms.30 A number of the YAL boys were housed in the former
Cathedral Hall, located opposite Royal Perth Hospital, which was
in the process of being converted to a TB clinic. Poor washing
facilities and a complete lack of electricity gave the press another
opportunity to highlight the practical problems created by the
WA, 6 January 1948, p.4.
WA, 1 January 1948, p.5; 22 January 1948, p.9.
30 WA, 24 January 1948, p.4.
28
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quarantine restrictions. 3 1
Near to the time the YAL boys were due home, and perhaps to stifle
developing criticism, the Daily News published an article in which
the Commissioner provided a full account of the reasons for the
introduction of quarantine. The explanation revealed the limits of
the policy and exposed the Commissioner and his Department to
doubt and criticism.

In the event that cases of polio were

discovered in a neighbouring state, the Commissioner listed the
reasons why quarantine restrictions would have limited success
a) The probability that infection had already crossed the
border in a carrier before cases cases began to appear in the
adjoining state.
b) The possibility that the epidemic in the adjoining state
[ was] simply the outcome of some environmental change
operating upon a virus [in that state] . . .
c) In actual fact, blanket quarantine [was] impossible. The
demands of commerce and other dictates of self-interest
would require special exceptions or the prohibition would be
defeated by clandestine migration. 3 2
The statement was designed "to allay public fear" but the CPH did
did not improve his standing with the public, and the case for
imposing restrictions was weakened significantly.

If experts

believed polio was probably already present in Western Australia,
people must have wondered why the restrictions had been imposed
in the first place.
3 1 DN, 26 January 1948, p.4.
3 2 DN, 23 January 1948, p.2.
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The Commissioner blamed the press for arousing fear, and
attempted to play down the dangers of polio, indicating that people
should demonstrate more confidence in his department. He said Infantile paralysis receives far more attention from the Press
than its relative incidence merits. Eveiy new case is counted
and reported with such details as may be gleaned for the
purpose. This is true of no other notifiable disease,
although several of these occur in much greater numbers
over longer periods and cause.. . much greater damage . . .
Panic, or lack of confidence, are bad psychological
ingredients in a community during epidemic times and the
health authority must decide whether the public's interest
does not demand some attempted control even where
epidemiological expectation of success is small. 3 3
The Commissioner may have believed that he was providing
inspirational leadership but by highlighting the dangers of giving
in to panic, and lack of confidence, he reflected unfavourably on
his readers, and his words returned to haunt him.
The next day Saw pilloried the situation in a cartoon, captioned
"Paperchase" [Figure 10], 3 4 which depicted a man, labelled "health
regulations", perched in the branches of a tree with a bag of
quarantine regulations on his arm.

The man dropped pages

labelled "bans, rules, restrictions and orders" onto the ground
below while two men, "the public" and "the press", chase each
other around in circles over them. While a policeman tries to
intervene the man in the tree says "We're not sure that all this is
really necessaiy, but it saves a panic".
3 3 DN,
3 4 DN,

23 January 1948, p.2.
24 January 1948, p.2.
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The implementation of the quarantine restrictions was followed by
the issue of a series of announcements and pamphlets which
detailed the nature of polio and recommended the precautions
necessary to avoid infection.3 5

But Saw believed the public

questioned their worth.
A few days later "Quarantine Victim" , an articulate schoolboy,
challenged the views expressed by the Commissioner in a letter to
the press. He asked why the needs of commerce were allowed to
endanger public health, how quarantining 400 children seived to
allay public fear, and why no-one seemed to mind "taking it out on
the kids?" 3 6 The Commissioner did not comment publicly on the
letter which, though written by a sixteen year-old, had a rather
adult tone.
The Daily News regaled the public with stories that showed the
effect of the restrictions on children and young people who were
quarantined. It was at this point that the story of Roger Groom
appeared. 3 7
Another Saw cartoon [ Figure 1 0] appeared. 3 8 Obviously drawn
with Roger Groom's story in mind it was captioned "Are We getting
3 5 Pamphlet, B/L ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 944/ 1948, p.3; Pamphlet, B/L ACC 1003,
AN 120 /4, 944/ 1948, p. 12.
3 6 DN, 28 January 1948, p.2.
3 7 DN, 30 January 1948, p.8.
3 8 DN, 31 January 1948, p.2.
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Anywhere?" The picture is of a doctor's su rgery in which a boy,
gagged and with hands and feet tied, sits on a couch. A doctor,
"Health Department", prepares a huge injection from bottles
labelled " restrictions" and "regulations" . Nearby stands a box of
"adhesive (red) tape." The doctor says "Of course this treatment
won't prevent infantile paralysis" .

Standing nearby the boy's

father, with a worried look on his face, replies "Hmm, it seems to
be causing paralysis of a sort". 3 9

The community were feeling the effect of the restrictions and saw
the policy as illogical. A week later Mary Ferber, a journalist who
was known for her controversial style, wrote a forceful leading
article headed "Let's call the whole thing off' in which she used
words of the Commissioner himself to damn the use of quarantine
restrictions. 4 0

The next cartoon to appear [ Figure 12 ] unfavourably compared the
quarantine policies of Western Australia with the polio policies of
the eastern states. 4 1 The scene is the entrance to a picture theatre
where a large poster advertises "Now Showing, WA Public Health
Department Treatment for Paralysis - Epidemic Isolation." A boy,
gagged and with hands and feet tied, lies on the ground next to a
coil of rope with the caption "thousands of feet of red tape used in
the making" . Standing over the boy is a doctor, made to look like
3 9 DN, 31 January 1948, p.2.

4 0 DN, 7 February 1948, p.2.
4 1 DN, 13 February 1948, p.2.
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a quack, who appears to be hypnotising him. On the footpath
near the poster stand three figures representing the states of New
South Wales, Victoria and Tasmania, who say to each other "We
seemed to have achieved the same result with far less drastic
methods" .

Commissioner Cook could hardly fail to realise that, despite the
fear of polio, the quarantine restrictions affecting interstate travel
were highly unpopular, and medical experts, as represented by his
department, were being cast in a bad light. In mid-January he had
declared that the restrictions would not be continued "a minute
longer than necessary", and on 20 February they were lifted. 42
As the epidemic progressed there was a growing realisation
amongst health professionals and members of the public that
children were not the only group to be affected by the disease.
Adults were in contact with polio, though it was believed they were
less likely to suffer from its effects, and both children and adults
were potential carriers. With this in mind, many people came to
believe that the quarantine restrictions were an ineffectual safety
measure.
The belief that the movement should be restricted of known adult
polio contacts, or potential carriers, was highlighted in a letter to
Commissioner Cook from the wife of a farmer. She was dismayed
to discover that a shearer, who had been on her property for eight
42 WA. 13 January 1948, p.6; 13 February 1948, p.8 .
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days, had immediately beforehand lived for two days in a
Fremantle house from which a child with polio had been removed.
The shearer was known to the Fremantle Health Inspector as a
polio contact. She believed his freedom of movement compromised
her own careful policy of keeping her six month old baby away from
crowds. The question she and many like her asked was - "why all
contacts cannot be isolated for three weeks prior to associating
with the general public?"4 3 The answer was that the authorities
thought society would not have been able to function under those
circumstances. In any case uncertainty remained about how the
disease was transmitted. And at this stage adults were thought to
be less susceptible than children.
While itinerant workers did not find their activities restricted,
others were forced to be more conscientious. An embarrassed
clergyman, whose six-year-old son was suspected of having polio,
cancelled church services and ceased visits to the local school
while his family were in quarantine at home. 44
A pamphlet issued by the Public Health Department conveyed the
assurance that "more than half of the diagnosed cases obtain
complete recovery," and, "most get back partial and reasonable use
of paralysed muscles" - outcomes that would be aided by early
recognition and appropriate attention. 4 5 No mention was made of
4 3 Letter, 27 July 1948, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 944 /48, unnumbered page.
44 WA, 3 July 1948, p.2.
4 5 Pamphlet, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/ 4, 944/ 1948, p.3.
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the possibility of death.
Further publications provided additional information regarding the
scalding of milk, the peeling of uncooked fruit and vegetables, and
the consumption of food, including ice-cream, that was prepared
outside the home. 46

The consumption of foodstuffs prepared

ou tside the home was discouraged because of the risks of
contamination through handling, rather than the lack of
pasteurisation. But this assumed that the dairy products used at
home had been pasteurised and were less likely to be contaminated
through human contact.
Ice cream manufacturers reacted to

their product being

stigmatised in this way. Later in the year, when the second wave
of the epidemic was under way, and no doubt sales of ice-cream for
end of year parties were suffering, the management of Peters' Ice
Cream (WA) Ltd defended its product in the press.
In the manufacture of Peters' ice cream, the mix is
pasteurised in accordance with the most modem methods of
pasteurisation known as nflash pasteurisation,n to ensure
the purity of the product. It is manufactured under the
supervision of a bachelor of science on the staff of this
company, under the most hygienic conditions and subject to
Government inspection. We claim with confidence that
Peters' ice cream could not be a possible source of infection.
We further understand that in recent references in British
medical journals it has been stated that ice cream, when
pasteurised by modem methods, could not be responsible for
the spread of infantile paralysis. The granting of space for
publishing this letter in your newspaper would be
appreciated as ice cream has, in our opinion, completely
without justification, been singled out from all other foods
46 Pamphlet, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/ 4, 944 / 1948, p.12 .
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Health experts were still searching for clues to the conditions that
allowed the polio virus to thrive and spread. All possible links
were considered in an effort to gather information and to build up
a complete epidemiological profile of polio. A pamphlet issued by
the CPH requested that Health Inspectors note whether or not
children had previously had measles, mumps, chicken pox or other
viral diseases, and if there had been close contact with animals,
particularly those that had been sick.48
Attempts were made to allay the fears associated with polio,
particularly in respect to the effects of paralysis and the threat to
life. Another pamphlet contained the defensive reassurance that
"your child has more chance of being crippled by a motor car than
by infantile paralysis". 49 Similar comparisons were made on other
occasions.

In September it was reported that there had been

seventeen deaths from polio so far that year, whereas the annual
numbers of deaths from heart disease and cancer in Western
Australia were 646 and 324 respectively. 5 0 But people continued
to find the risk of death or life-long paralysis from polio ,
particularly amongst children, especially fearful.
During 1948 the warm Autumn weather extended well into May
4 7 WA,

l O November 1948, p.2.

48 Letter, 14 June 1948, p.10, and Memorandum for Health Inspectors, BL. ACC
1003, AN 120/ 4, 944/ 1948, unnumbered page.

49 Pamphlet, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120 / 4, 944/ 1948 , p.12.
5 0 DN, 7 September 1948, p.4.
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and from this time the number of polio cases began to rise. Seven
cases, from diverse parts of the Metropolitan area, were reported in
the third week of the month compared to one in the preceding
three weeks. The Assistant CPH tried to suggest there was no need
for alarm, believing the activity of the virus would subside when
the cooler weather came. 5 1 But the weather remained warm and
the trend continued. A boy from Nedlands died within twenty-four
hours of showing first symptoms, and when three cases were
reported amongst children from two schools in nearby Claremont
the question of school closure was discussed.5 2

The Deputy

Premier, the Ministers of Education and Health, the Director of
Education and the CPH met and concluded that no good purpose
would be served by the closure of schools because while they
remained open it was easier to supervise the children. The warm
weather continued and the epidemic intensified. In June several
schools and a kindergarten were closed, and four suburban
theatres discontinued Saturday matinees for children until the
position improved. 5 3
The persistent, but erroneous, belief that the nose and mouth were
the major entry portals for the virus meant that steps were to
taken to combat air- borne and food-borne infection. 5 4
Information concerning the spread of the disease was prepared, as
follows, for publication in the press.
51

WA, 2 1 May 1948, p.2.
WA, 25 May 1948, p.5.
5 3 WA, 2 June 1948, p. l .
5 4 WA, 26 May 1 948, p.4; 27 May 1948, p.4; DN, 26 May 1948, p. l .
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Carriers of poliomyelitis virus are likely to broadcast
infection by sneezing, coughing, or even talking. Food may
easily be contaminated if it is within the range of the spray.
At the present time it is very important that all persons who
handle food should take every care that they do not
contaminate it with salivary spray.
Food may also be infected by the buying public whenever it is
exposed for sale. The attention of all storekeepers is invited
to the necessity for protecting foodstuffs. Articles of food
should not be exposed on shop counters. 5 5
Newspapers began to provide details of reported cases on a daily
basis, with a summary each Saturday morning, rather like a list of
war casualties. Items regarding polio were featured regularly, and
it is clear that, whether by design of the health authority or by
desire of the press, some attempts were made to play down the
seriousness of the situation. In mid-June it was reported that Health Department considers that 43% . . . of the . . . cases of
Infantile Paralysis that have occurred in this State since
January 1 will make a complete recovery. 5 6
This report was followed by another of the visit of Dr T.W. Stubbs
Brown, a polio expert from Brisbane. During a stopover in Perth
Stubbs Brown was invited to inspect patients at the Infectious
Diseases Branch, and speak at a meeting of the local branch of the
British Medical Association. Stubbs Brown gave the assurance
that, in his view, the disease was occurring in a "relatively mild
form". He said 55 Press release, 27 July 1948, BL, ACC 1003, AN 1 20/4, 944/ 1 948, unnumbered

page.
5 6 WA, 15 June 1 948, p.4. The rate of residual paralysis in 1 948 was 40%.
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The cases that have been occurring in WA since the middle
of January have been scattered as regards time and
location . . . Therefore it would be unreasonable to consider
the disease to be of epidemic proportions, especially when
compared with past epidemics in the Eastern States of
Australia. 5 7

Stubbs Brown was of the opinion that the practice of closing
schools had little effect on the spread of the disease. His view was
that epidemics usually occurred in the summer months when
children were on vacation, a signal that it was in the
fraternisation of children from different groups that infection most
frequently occurred.

Such divisions in expert opinion were not confined to polio but,
during the first serious epidemic experienced in Western Australia,
they exacerbated the degree of confusion felt in the community as
people endeavoured to negotiate their way through the threats,
restrictions and mixed messages they were receiving. Letters from
the public, which sought advice or expressed concern at actions
being taken , became a common item in the newspapers.

For

example the Daily News published an "Opinion" column headed
"Infantile Paralysis: the people are asking about it" in which were
reproduced five of the many it had received. 5 8 There was suspicion
that information concerning polio was being suppressed, a lack of
confidence in the policies designed to control spread of the virus,
and a request for specific direction . A month later a follow-up
selection of similar opinions was presented in the same column.
57

WA, 19 June 1948, p.2.
5 June 1948, p.2.

5 8 DN,
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Questions were raised about when "concrete action" would be
taken to combat the epidemic and why, since adults were also
susceptible, theatres and dance halls were not closed, and what to
do about flies and food. O .W. of North Perth, almost certainly
Olga Wignall who is quoted in Chapter 2 above, wrote Flies, food and fingers are all- important factors in our
health, and in the present paralysis outbreak medical
authorities emphasise this again and again. But we are told
that the cost is too great for a campaign against paralysis in
the form of extensive disinfecting. Is not a pennyworth of
prevention worth a pound of cure? Is any cost too great in
order to protect our children?
We should also have placards in every school illustrating the
close relationship between of flies, food, and fingers, and
why hygiene rules must be obseived. 5 9
Later research was to show that O .W. had solved the polio
infection puzzle. But the authorities remained impervious. The

Daily News reported Commissioner Cook declined to comment on
the letters, and the Minister of Health declined to read them.
On the eve of a two day conference of Health Inspectors that was
held in July, the state president of the British Medical Association
stated that he expected the outbreak of polio to decline shortly. 60
The notification papers for the Conference did not list polio as a
subj ect to be discussed, but the Commissioner gave a
comprehensive account of the steps being taken to control the

59 DN, 6 July 1948, p.2.
60 DN, 7 July 1948, p.4.
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disease. 6 1
The West Australian reported on the conference under the by-line
"Dr Cook Says Most Persons Resistant To Disease".

The

Commissioner illustrated that many people were resistant to polio,
pointing out that cases were rare amongst nurses and doctors, and
non-existent amongst health inspectors whose duties in
quarantining and spraying exposed them to serious risks.
The problem of "carriers", people in whom the virus was present,
and who could spread it but showed no signs of polio, was a source
of anxiety.

The Commissioner pointed out that there was no

medical means to identify them, so nothing could be done about
their presence in the community. He openly admitted that the
policy of quarantining children was of doubtful value - a
concession to convention, he said, and "not worth a tinkers
cuss" . 62 Having undermined the policies of his Department in this
way, the Commissioner included in his speech the reassurance
that "from figures published of other outbreaks... it would seem
that fairly soon we will pass again into the daylight".63
The Daily News put the Commissioner's talk in an entirely
different perspective, a disparity which would not have assisted in
clearing up confusion. Under the by-line "WA has low resistance
6 1 Notice, undated, but for Conference to be held 8-9 July 1948, BL, ACC 1003,
AN 1 20/4, 944 / 1948, unnumbered page.
6 2 WA. 9 July 1948, p.5.
63 WA, 9 July 1948, p.5.
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to paralysis" it was reported that he had stated that people in
Western Australia had not had the opportunity to build up
resistance to the polio virus, which meant that an outbreak in the
state would probably result in more infections per capita than had
occurred in the USA. 64 On the basis of American experience there
would be at least 100 cases in Western Australia, and to date 110
had already been reported. 65

At this stage, the figures were the

worst on record, but as yet the ratios of paralysis and death per
rate of attack were not particularly alarming.
While the two newspapers took entirely different lines, it appears
that the CPH was following the wisdom of his advisors and, like
Stubbs Brown, may have been making another attempt to pour oil
on troubled waters. Some weeks later another advisor, Dame Jean
Macnamara, may have been pointing to a trend to play down or
minimise the significance of the epidemic when she made the
observation that "mild" did not mean "unimportant".66
Unfortunately for everyone July became the worst month of the
epidemic.with sixty cases recorded, including several tragedies. A
young man from Bruce Rock, and young Perth mother with her
new born child, died. 6 7 A week later another pregnant mother,
already in an iron lung, was expected to suffer the same fate.68
64 Twenty cases per 100,000 was the rate in the USA he quoted.
65 DN, 8 July 1948, p.5.
66 Report, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 1190/ 1948, p.23.
6 7 ST, 11 July 1948, p. l .
68 ST, 1 1 July 1948, p. l.

CHAPTER 5: Fear and frustration

1 72

A month later the number of cases began to decrease, providing
welcome relief and raising hopes that the epidemic had run its
course. By now the Public Health Department was more cautious
and, though suggesting the worst of the outbreak might be over,
advised against the relaxation of precautions. When questioned
on the subject the Commissioner wisely refused to predict the level
of attack that might occur in the approaching summer. 6 9
Flies were suspected of being one of the major agents in the spread
of polio and those who allowed flies to congregate and breed were
prosecuted. In one such case, reported under the by-line "Court
told of polio Menace", the Subiaco Health Inspector was reported
as stating that "the fight against infantile paralysis was directed
mainly against flies, which were thought to be germ carriers".10
Suspicion of flies was applied particularly to places where children
gathered and were required to use unsewered toilet facilities. Five
reported cases of polio in South Perth, home of the Zoological
Gardens, gave the local Road Board an opportunity to advise the
State Gardens Board that it believed the presence of twelve
unsewered earth closets at the Zoo represented a risk to children.
The Road Board siezed the moment and recommended the Zoo be
closed until sewerage connections could be made. 1 1 In 1954 the
6 9 WA, 4 August 1948, p 2; 19 August 1948, p.2.
7 0 DN, 5 October 1948, p.5.
7 1 WA. 24 June 1948, p.5.

CHAPTER 5: Fear and frustration

1 73

Como state school, located in the same local government area, was
used for a comprehensive study of the relationship between the
spread of polio and the use of sewered toilet facilities. 1 2
Spraying with DDT was regarded as an effective fly control
measure. A method widely used in Western Australia was to
regularly spray all school buses, school premises and public
transport vehicles with a solution of 5% DDT powder mixed with a
solution of kerosene and water. Spraying the schools involved a
significant logistical exercise, since the municipal area covered by
Perth City Council alone included twenty State schools and twelve
kindergartens. The twenty-three denominational schools within
the bounds of the Council engaged contractors to fumigate their
premises once per month, 73 while public transport was treated
daily.
A later generation would have demonstrated in the street at such a
use of the chemical, but at the time DDT was highly regarded. The
Public Health Department knew of the dangers of handling DDT
and issued instructions accordingly. The method employed, which
was of questionable value, must have been very inconvenient for
the Tramways and Ferries Department and their patrons. The
Department was fastidious in its requirements. The Assistant
Commissioner, Dr A.N. Kingsbury, wrote:

72 The results of the survey are discussed
73 WA, 12 August 1948, p.2.

below at p.237f.
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With reference to the frequency of spraying of trams during
the present outbreak of Poliomyelitis, I have to invite your
attention to the fact that the film of DDT left after spraying
will quickly be removed by the clothes and boots of
passengers. For this reason it is desirable that the daily
spraying of trams be carried out. 7 4

CHAPTER 5: Fear and frustration

The member of the public who, tongue in cheek, suggested that
men and women should smoke on public transport because
tobacco smoke, particularly from pipes, provided resistance to the
polio virus, may have had an equally useful solution to the
problem. The correspondent may also have known that during the
outbreak of "Spanish" Influenza in Australia 1912-1919, similar
suggestions were made and some travellers who were quarantined
were subjected to fumigation by smoke.7 5
Members of the public self confidently offered their views on the
possible cause of polio to Commissioner Cook. Some ideas were
food based, others were hygiene related, and some included a
degree of class consciousness. A woman wrote May I suggest that a possible factor in the spread of Infantile
Paralysis is the banana. Not particularly the fruit itself, but
the skin.
During the war years when bananas were scarce or
unprocurable Infantile Paralysis was at a low incidence. As
soon as the banana trade increased so did the disease.
Can it also be a co-incidence that very often the disease
appears in the homes of professional people who may be
considered able to afford a regular supply of bananas in the
daily budget?
74

Would it be too costly an experiment to prohibit the

Memo, 7 July 1948, Assistant CPH to Manager, Tramways and Ferries
Department. BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 944/ 1948, unnumbered page.
7 5 McQueen, H. "The Spanish Influenza Pandemic", in Roe, J. (ed), ( 1976). p. 135.
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importation of bananas for a given period, say three months,
and tell the public why it is being done? Since no one knows
very much about the disease my suggestion may not be so far
from the truth, and is worth trying. Who knows from whence
the simple remedy may appear? Perhaps this is it. 7 6

The Commissioner's office was curt in reply, 77 but a mother from
the country offered another view which the Department took more
seriously.
I should like to give you my opinion on this terrible disease,
that we have with us in WA and its causes. (Infantile
Paralysis). My idea is the cause comes from the (Pig) which
are subjected to (Paralysis) as the pig has a germ which
attacks the nervous system muscles and sinews, which is
detrimental to human life, and should be carefully watched,
for Paralysis in the flesh, at butchers shops. And again
(Margartne) is made from Hog fats, (lard) and it finds its way
into pastry and cake's shops, perhaps a few hints in our WA
paper of this note might do some good for the public to read.
If you should think flt, I could give a lot more things on this
subject, if you would care to have them. 78
The connection with margarine was ignored, but the link between
animals and paralysis struck a cord with the Public Health
Department, which forwarded the letter to the Minister for Health
with a note.
[this] letter raises an interesting point. In addition to the
pig, other animals are liable to illnesses of which paralysis
may be a feature, horses, sheep, dogs, etc. As far as our
present knowledge goes, there is no connection between any
of these diseases and poliomyelitis in the human. There
could be no justification for the banning of pork or
7 6 Letter, BM to CPH, 29 June 1948, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120 / 4, 944/ 1948, no

page number.
77 Letter, CPH to BM, 9 July 1948, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120 / 4, 944/ 1948, no page
number. "Receipt is acknowledged of your communication of 29th ultimo,
regarding Infantile Paralysis".
78 Letter, ES to Premier, 25 June 1948 ,BL, ACC 1003, AN 120 /4, 944/ 1948 , no
page number.
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Cows featured again in letter from a woman who had lived in the
south west of the state where cattle sometimes fed on the native
zamia palms. She wrote Some years ago I lived in Greenbushes WA and saw cows
crippled on hind quarters from eating native palms. I
thought perhaps their milk might have something to do with
the Infantile trouble. These cows ate Palms on new country
where a fire went through. It was pitiful to see them
tryini! to get up when they lay down. Thought this might
help.so
In reply the Commissioner politely pointed out the flaw in the
argument. Once more scientific reasoning triumphed over popular
logic.
I have to acknowledge with thanks the receipt of your
letter. . . containing your interesting su�estion. I was
unaware of zamia poisoning among cattle b-ut it seems very
unlikely that the poison, excreted in milk, could cause
poliomyelitis. The disease occurs in so many countries
where the zamia palm does not grow and at present there is
so much good pasture available for our cattle here. B I
The possible link between ice cream and polio, a hardy annual, was
raised in a novel way by another contributor.
I am writing with reference to Ice cream being a possible
cause of infection (Paralysis).
I think the method of serving is at fault, as every time an Ice
79 Letter, CPH to Minister, 14 July 1948, BL. ACC 1003, AN 120/ 4, 944/ 1948, no
page number.
80 Letter, JS to CPH. 7 September 1948, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120 /4, 944/ 1948, no
page number.
8 1 Letter, CPH to JS, l O September 1948, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120 /4, 944/ 1948,
no page number.
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cream is served the servers are placed in a basin of water.
This water at times is veiy dirty, almost as thick as Ice cream
and being similar to milk this exposed (milk-water) is open
to flies and dust.
I thought this might be inquired into and if this water was
sent to an analyst it might give some results.8 2

Lay members of the public were not the only ones who took an
interest in finding a solution to polio.

A veterinarian from a

countiy town offered his views regarding the effect of mould, based
on his observation of sickness in animals.
This terrible disease of the Humans, Infantile Paralysis, is
veiy similar to a disease that flourished in this state l 0-15
years ago in the horse. Fine, strong animals would be
stricken down without warning, never to rise again, except
with the aid of slings. Veiy few recovered, and if left down
would die in 24-36 hours. This complaint is caused by a
mould in the hay. It had a bluish tinge, sometimes in great
quantities and at other times just veiy light traces ....
There is a possibility that this disease is being introduced
from a mould or fu ngus in some breakfast cereals - some of
the prepared varieties that have been treated in the factories.
A check on the household on this subject should be veiy
important. Large families which use a packet in a day of so
would be alright. But the family which only used them
occasionally may have them opened for weeks or months.
These preparations are never cooked by the householder, but
are eaten with cold milk, or at the best warmed a little.
Infantile Paralysis first started in the USA. So did breakfast
foods. Americans are great users of cereals. There is a
possibility that this little message might bring to light
something worthwhile....
Furthermore, I had a packet of cereal opened in the house
for about 3 months. There was a trace of mould on them so
I fed them to a pair of Turkeys last week and both died with
paralysis in four days. 8 3
82

Letter. unsigned, 10 September 1948, BL. ACC 1003, AN 120/4. 944/ 1948, no
page number.
8 3 Letter, HJB, 9 September 1948, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 944/ 1948, no page
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As the polio epidemics continued, so did the flow of suggestions
such as these. Everyone thought that they had a special insight to
bring, and made their views known to the Public Health
Department in the hope that theirs might be the idea that would
finally led to the defeat of the polio menace.
Picture theatre managers were particularly troubled by the
Department's discouragement qf gatherings involving children.
The Motion Picture Industry Public Relations Council of WA
sought, and was granted, a meeting with the Minister and the
Commissioner of Public Health. 84 At the meeting, the Industry
representatives stressed that their establishments were very well
looked after and were sprayed regularly with DDT. They were at a
loss to understand why the official line seemed to target their
venues when people were allowed to congregate freely for live
theatre shows and church services. In discussion the Minister
wisely declined to single out motion picture theatres from other
venues but stressed that it was generally good practice for members
of the public to avoid large gatherings of people. The Minister
indicated to the deputation that he had endeavoured to minimise
"scare" publicity and hoped that, with the decline of the epidemic,
community fears would also subside.

The delegation, which

84 Letter, 9 July 1948, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 944/ 1948, unnumbered page.
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revealed that it considered TB a greater threat than polio, 8 5 in
tum offered to assist the Minister by showing slides regarding the
destruction of flies, and by publicising similar material affecting
the health and well-being of the community.

Picture theatres

would would thus be a partner with the Minister in the provision
of health education for the public, goodwill would be restored, and
above all the present boycott would be reversed. The meeting
concluded happily, although the Minister may have said more than
intended when he "thanked the Council for its kind offer re
propaganda". 86
The prevailing perception was that the Public Health Department
was inconsistent in its attitude to quarantine, travelling, and the
congregation of crowds. These matters remained contentious, and
a temporary decline in the number of reported infections during
August, September and October did not mean the community
relaxed. As the time for the school holidays approached, a group
of teachers from Albany wrote to say that, since they had contact
with children through their work, perhaps they should not move
around during the holidays, and also suggested the date of the
August school holidays might be changed. 8 7 The CPH wrote to the
8 5 Porter, R.M. and Boag, T.C. (Undated). The Australian Tuberculosis Campaign

1 948-1976, The Sir Robert Menzies Memorial Foundation. It is notable that
during these months considerable media coverage was also given to the presence
of TB in the community. In 1948, 325 cases of Pulmonary Tuberculosis were
reported in Western Australia, from which 157 deaths resulted. Although the
death rate from TB was declining in WA, the number of reported cases in 1948
was the highest for twelve years. That same year the Tuberculosis Act ( 1948) was
passed, an initiative of the Federal Government which linked the Commonwealth
and the States in a campaign that succeeded in controlling the disease.
86 Report, 20 July 1 948, BL. ACC 1 003, AN 120 / 4, 944 / 1948, unnumbered page.
8 7 Letter, 27 July 1 948, BL, ACC 1 003, AN 120/4, 944 / 1948, unnumbered page.
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Education Department with the request that it consider a change
of dates but, after discussion, the normal programme was
upheld.88
Spring normally brought a round of picnics, carnivals, inter-school
sports and Agricultural Shows and people wanted to plan their
traditional pastimes. The Commissioner was frequently consulted
regarding the wisdom of travelling between towns, taking holidays
away from home, holding sports days, annual picnics and end of
year celebrations. The advice of the Public Health Department was
to curtail such activities, but it did not ban them outright.
A typical example is the case of the Midland Railway Company
Employees' Picnic Committee.

The Committee, having sought

advice from Commissioner Cook, initially decided to shelve their
plan for an annual picnic at Gingin, a small town north of
Perth. 89

Four weeks later fresh advice was sought from the

Commissioner. The number of reported polio cases was in decline
and the committee believed the decision to abandon their function
had been influenced by a conservative minority from Gingin itself
who did not want an influx of strangers in their district. The
committee had since found that ... quite a number of Gingin residents travel daily to Perth per
bus and also it is estimated that approximately 60% of the
persons residing in that district will attend the Royal Show

88 Letter, 2 August 1948, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120 /4, 944/ 1 948, unnumbered
page.
89 Letter, 3 1 August 1948, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120 /4, 944/ 1948, unnumbered
page.

18 1
which is held about two weeks prior to the date for which
the Picnic had been arranged . . . also a large motor racing
exhibition is to be conducted . . . only eight miles north of
Gingin. 9 o
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The people equivocated, and so did the Public Health Department.
Despite its promotion of the policy of avoiding crowds and large
gatherings of people, there is no evidence of any direct attempt to
have the Royal Agricultural Society (RAS) abandon the holding of
the 1 948 Royal Show, and Children's Day was not banned. The
Department predicted the Show would result in a rise in the
number of cases of polio, and later recorded the result Poliomyelitis infections during the last few days have shown
a tendency towards increase compared to those of recent
weeks. This increase was not unexpected as it was
anticipated that the new and extensive contacts between
unprotected persons and carriers associated with mass
attendances at the Royal Show would have this result. It is
not necessary for the victims themselves to have attended
the Show, but the increase in the number and the wide
dispersal of healthy carriers occasioned by this mass
migration, will have exposed these persons to the risk of
infection even though they themselves have remained in
areas hitherto unaffected. 9 1
The RAS appears to have been beyond reproach.

There is no

evidence of correspondence on the matter, and no mention of the
subject is to be found in the minutes of the Society. 92

90 Letter, 27 September 1948, BL. ACC 1003, AN 120 / 4, 944/ 1948, unnumbered
page.
9 1 Memo, 22 October 1948, BL. ACC 1003, AN 120 / 4, 944/ 1948, unnumbered
page; Public Health 1948, ( 1949). Appendix XV, p.62, BL, 614.09 WES.
92 Information provided by Mr W. Gable. See also Public Health 1948, ( 1949).
Appendix XV, p.63, BL. 6 14.09 WES.
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The Public Health Department was more assertive with other
groups and used the adverse outcome following the Royal Show to
support its case.

In November the Commissioner wrote to all

Church leaders to urge that In view of the continued incidence of Poliomy elitis
throughout the State, it is considered inadvisable for
Christmas parties or festivities to be conducted of a nature
which might bring into association children of different
Sunday Scbools or groups.
It is regretted that the cancelling of these functions will
deprive many children of an enjoyable Christmas festivity
but you will, I am sure, appreciate the importance of co
operation with this Department in its endeavour to reduce
the incidence of the epidemic.9 3
This was also the season for inter-school sports and the Assistant
Commissioner wrote to the Education Department to say that Following the Royal Show in Perth there has been a
considerable increase in Poliomyelitis incidence. It is
considered that, until further notice, all School Sports
meetings should be cancelled. 9 4
This was a sensible and necessary measure to suggest, but it
extended only to the holding of inter-school sports carnivals, not
to sports days involving children from within a school.9 5
Comment included a light-hearted cartoon by Saw [ Figure 12 1
captioned "They want to get IN. " 9 6

A crowd of children were

9 3 Memo, 10 November 1948, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 944/ 1 948, unnumbered
page.
9 4 Memo, 28 October 1948, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120 /4, 944/ 1 948, unnumbered

page.
9 5 WA, 3 November 1 948, p.2.
9 6 DN, 3 November 1 948, p.2. Original emphasis.
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depicted waiting to get into a state school, barred by gates boarded
up with signs which read "ban on inter-school sports".

Under the by-line "Let's get right into this polio battle", Mary
Ferber, who advocated stronger actions by the Health Department,
began her "Common sense" column with "I took my children to the
Royal Show this year - because nobody told me not to". Due to the
course the epidemic had taken she believed the public would now
be receptive to strong action in relation to swimming carnivals and
inter-school sports days, and called upon the Health Department
to state clearly what should be done.

In her opinion "all that

parents want to know is what to do, and I think Dr Kingsbury has
only to say what should be done for general obedience" .9 7
A Doctor from the leafy, comfortable suburb of West Perth
responded. The Health Department had always indicated, publicly
and to all who asked, that the congregation of large numbers of
people from different areas would expose them to the risk of polio
infection.98 He obviously felt that everything necessary had been
said on the subject.
Once again the activities of the YAL which, unlike the Scouts,
resisted quarantine regulations, aroused controversy and exposed
the Health Department to further criticism. A proposed Spring
tour of the Eastern Wheatbelt and Goldflelds by a YAL concert
9 7 DN, 6 November 1948, p.2.
9 8 DN, 11 November 1948, p.2.
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party evoked a fierce response from residents of the towns on the
itinerary.99 The Commissioner, in reply, restated the Department's
position
. . .I have to inform you that this Department is unable to
prohibit the proposed tour of the YAL Concert Party but the
League has been advised strongly to postpone the tour. 1 00
Vigo rous cor respondence was exchanged

between

the

Commissioner and the Secretary of the YAL. The Commissioner
wrote "I venture to repeat my telephoned advice that the deferment
of the tour is highly desirable at the present time" . 1 o 1 In a lengthy
reply the YAL assured the Commissioner that it was aware of the
seriousness of the situation, because production of the show to be
taken on tour had begun in May, when the epidemic became more
intense.

The belief that the winter weather would stop the progress of the
disease had led the YAL to continue rehearsals, in the expectation
that the epidemic would have subsided by August, when the tour
was to commence. 1 02 The YAL found showed it had found support
for this plan in the announcements of the Commissioner himself,
coupled with the rate of reported cases which declined in August.
The YAL pleaded willingness to co-operate but pointed out not only
99 Letters from Cunderdin, Kellerberrin, Trayning and Kalgoorlie, in BL. ACC

1003, AN 120/ 4, 944/ 1948.
Letter, 10 August 1948, BL. ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 944/ 1948, unnumbered

1 00

page.

1 0 1 Letter, 30 July 1948, BL. ACC 1003, AN 120 /4, 944/ 1948, unnumbered page.
1 02 Letter, 5 August 1948, BL. ACC 1003, AN 120 / 4, 944/ 1948, unnumbered

page.
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the hours of rehearsal spent in preparation for the tour, but the
"fair amount of money that has also been extended towards
production and advance arrangements, together with publicity." 1 03
The writer weighed the risks to human life, then drew the attention
of the CPH to two more anomalies. Another youth group would
travel over the same route as the YAL to bring entertainment to
the countzy, and a group of forty boys had been permitted to travel
as a football team from Western Australia to Queensland.
Barring a clear veto from the Commissioner, the YAL obviously
considered its tour would go ahead. The League underlined its
willingness to co-operate with an offer to have all the boys in its
party medically examined by a doctor approved by · the Public
Health Department, and promised that all theatres used on the
tour would be sprayed with DDT prior to each performance. In his
penultimate paragraph the YAL Secretary- wrote ... it appears to me that my organisation is being unduly
picked out when one considers the number of people who
will be visiting the goldflelds from the metropolitan area for
the racing carnival at the same time, or a little before our
proposed visit. I 04
In his response the CPH pointed to the difficulties of predicting the
course an epidemic would take, and stated that, since polio
carriers could not be detected, a medical examination of the tour
1 03 Letter, 5 A ug ust 1948, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120 /4, 944/ 1948, unnumbered
page.
1 04 Letter, 5 August 1948, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120 /4, 944/ 1948, unnumbered
page.
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group would serve no purpose. I o5
Correspondence to the Commissioner over the YAL tour is evidence
that some rural people were deeply afraid of their children having
contact with children from the metropolitan area. Although the
number of cases of polio from the country was less than from the
city (130 as compared with 181), on a per capita basis the rate of
infection was far higher. Any natural suspicion country people
had regarding contact with city children was strengthened by the
view, occasionally expressed by Public Health Department officials,
that country children were more susceptible to polio than their city
counterparts.
A report regarding the residents of the south west town of
Bridgetown, not far from Noggerup, showed that, while they were
nervous of children returning home from city boarding schools and
brtngtng polio with them, they were acting to protect themselves.
As a precaution against the intrusion of infantile paralysis,
the Bridgetown Road Board proposes to disinfect all schools
and school buses regularly. It is seeking information as to
the most suitable type of disinfectant. While there has been
no case reported in the district, the Board is worried because
a number of children have been brought home from schools
in Perth . 1 06
A result of the 1948 epidemic in Western Australia was that there
was an urgent need for systematic, on-going after-care for a large
1 0 5 Letter, 6 August 1948, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120 /4, 944/ 1948, unnumbered
page.
106 WA, 14 June 1948, p.5.
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number of polio survivors. Two women doctors from Victorian, Dr
Elizabeth Mccomas and Dame Jean Macnamara visited the state
to investigate and report on Poliomyelitis and Cerebral Palsy in
Western Australia.

The report, which reflected Dame Jean's

capacity to compare the facilities developed in Victoria with what
she found in the West was highly critical and made wide ranging
recommendations.

Dame Jean favoured the immobilisation

method of treating polio and was strongly opposed to active the
methods, including hydrotherapy, introduced by Sister Kenny. 1 07
Examination of a cross-section of patients enabled Dame Jean to
see that some of Sister Kenny's methods were being used in
Western Australia, and she did not approve. 1 0 8 In a covering letter
she wrote
I have been saddened beyond expression by the situation in
Perth, and hope that you will see that these people are cared
for. If I can help in any way from Victoria I will be glad to do
so. 1 0 9
The report began with the observation that, up to this point,
Western Australia had been the most fortunate of the Australian
states. In the period 1925 to January 1948 there had been 207
cases of polio in Western Australia whereas in the same period in
Victoria, for example, there had been 3,800 cases, half of which
had occurred during the 1937-38 epidemic. 1 1 0 The rapid increase
1 07 Willis, E. ( 1979). "Sister Kenny", The Australian and New Zealand Journal of
Sociology, Vol 15, No 3. p. 3 1.
1 08 McKellar Hall, R.D. ( 1983). Reflections, p.47. See Chapter 4 above.
1 09 Letter, 20 August 1948,p.4 1. BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 1 190 / 1948.
1 10 Report, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/ 4, 1 190 / 1948, p. 12.
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in demand for hospital beds, qualified staff and adequate after-care
facilities, now urgently confronting Western Australia, had been
faced earlier by other states, and this was an opportunity to learn
from their experience.
Although health experts in Western Australian had kept
themselves informed regarding developments in other states, the
sadness Dame Jean felt arose from her belief that the situation, as
she found it, was ill-prepared and significantly under-resourced.
In her view these factors doomed many of the surviving children to
life-long suffering. The number of cases was comparatively small
but the lack of suitable staff and facilities caused her to say . . . this epidemic already almost warrants declaring a state of
emergency, if efficient accommodation and personnel cannot
be obtained AT ONCE by other means. 1 1 1
Facilities in Western Australia were inadequate and, in her view,
cripples were being created, not rehabilitated.
The recommendations proposed covered a wide range of subjects;
boiling of milk and water for human consumption, increasing the
temperature for pasteurizing milk used in ice-cream, regulating the
length of time for storing ice-cream, increasing publicity regarding
personal hygiene, ensuring the cleanliness of toilets and the proper
disposal of sewage, spraying for flies, using of the ocean for
swimming instead of swimming pools, and recognising the impact
1 1 1 Report. BL. ACC 1003, AN 120 /4, 1190/ 1948, p.24. Original emphasis.
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of fatigue in the early stages of infection. She also recommended
an increase in the quantity of respirators and suction apparatus
modules available, the installation of Hubbard saline baths,
increasing the number of nursing and physiotherapy staff at the
Infectious Diseases Branch, appointing of a Medical Registrar at
the IDB for the duration of the epidemic, and establishing a splint
making service.
Dame Jean's real concern was that there was no margin of safety
in Western Australia. She called for increased accommodation
which would cater for present after-care patients and also could
provide for the demands future epidemics would impose. 1 12 In her
view, the Commonwealth Government should be requested to make
beds available at the Hollywood Repatriation Hospital.
More time and energy needed to be spent on the after-care of polio
survivors. She wrote At the stage the [ body) temperature falls the majority are
potential cripples only. Many I have seen in Perth have
spent several months already in the slow but effective factory
which turns the potential cripple from poliomyelitis into the
finished cripple. Others mildly affected, in whom complete
recovery- of a life of full efficiency was a certainty if care had
been provided, are not receiving that care and their disability
is becoming permanent and increasing. 1 13
The lessons that had been learned through repeated epidemics in
Victoria, Dame Jean said, were that even mild cases should be
1 1 2 Report, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120 /4, 1 190 / 1948, p. 19.
113 Report, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120 /4, 1 190 / 1948, pp.22-23.
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regarded as important as they could soon be restored to full
health, given the application of the correct treatment at the right
time. 1 1 4 And there needed to be more forward thinking; "plans for
the care of patients should be made in the intervals between
epidemics".
The plans offered by Dame Jean were, on her own admission, not
aimed at providing a maximum level of care but at covering the
present critical situation. She concluded The suggestions I have made may seem expensive - more
than West Australia can afford. I would ask you, Mr Abbott
- can West Australia afford not to do this? Can you afford
to deny the mothers of young families and the young people
their chance to a life of usefulness, to allow the little
children to deform without attempting to cry halt to the
crippling process? l 1 5
The report was forwarded to the Public Health Department with
the note that it also had the imprimatur of the Consultant
Physician of the Alfred Hospital in Melbourne. 1 1 6 Dame Jean also
used the occasion to suggest that Western Australia could add its
weight to that of other state authorities who were seeking to lobby
the Commonwealth for more assistance in combatting polio
through the Federal body for funding medical and scientific
research, the National Health and Medical Research Councn. 1 1 1

1 1 4 Report, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120 / 4, 1190/ 1948, p.23.
1 1 5 Report, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120 / 4, 1190/ 1948, p.30.
1 1 6 Letter, 23 August 1948, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120 / 4, 1190 / 1948,

l l 7 Report, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120 / 4, 1190/ 1948, p.12.

p.40.
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The consultative committee of doctors considered it at a special
meeting, and recommendations for action were made to the
Minister. I I S After due consideration the Premier wrote CAB INET desi res to give eve ry assistance to the
Commissioner of Public Health in his work for the after-care
of sufferers from poliomyelitis and is prepared to consider
any practicable proposals to improve the conditions ... 1 1 9
The Commissioner replied in detail, requesting a full-time splint
maker, the early completion of additions to the After-care Wards at
the IDB, the fo rmation of an Afte r-care Committee of
philanthropic laymen to raise funds for the work, and the addition
of two members to the consultative committee. 1 20

Steps were taken immediately to employ a splint-maker and, on 20
Februaiy 1949, George Clarke arrived from Melbourne to commence
work, first at Royal Perth Hospital, and then in a workshop
provided at Princess Margaret Hospital. 1 2 1 In connection with the
plan to expand the IDB, the opportunity arose to provide an
additional facility. The "Golden Age", a de-licensed hotel owned by
the Swan Brewery Company in Leederville, an easy distance from
Princess Margaret Hospital, was purchased for the sum of £5,500
and renovated for the specific purpose of housing polio after-care
patients. 1 22
1 1 8 Report, 27 September 1948, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 1 190/ 1948, pp.99- 100.
1 November 1948, BL. ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 1 190/ 1948, p. 1 1 7.
120 Memo, 9 December 1948, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 1 190/ 1948, p. 128.
1 2 1 WA, 18 February 1949, p. 2; 23 February 1949, p.5.
1 22 Letters, 5 March 1949; 3 1 March 1949, 1 September 1949, BL, ACC 1003, AN
1 20/4, 322/ 1949,pp. l,8, and 37.
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Another scheme that was put forward to assist with after-care was
to convert a natural hot pool, located on the shore of the Swan
river in Dalkeith, for therapeutic purposes. 1 23

Plans were

discussed for several years but, despite considerable interest being
shown, it proved impossible to negotiate the necessary approvals
and nothing eventuated. The "Hot Pool" was a nocturnal meeting
place for controversial skylarking and it was eventually shut down
completely.
Polio research continued around the world. For more than three
decades polio had been identified as a virus, and now it had been
photographed through an electronic microscope. 1 24 But mystery
still surrounded its means of transmission. The occurrence of five
cases of polio in the suburb of Osborne Park, in September, was
seen by politician and medical practitioner Dr J. Gordon Hislop,
MLC, as providing an opportunity to do research on the subject.
He recommended to the Minister that a three member committee
be set up to manage the project, that the public be invited to
contribute funds to "The Poliomyelitis Research Fund of WA" and
that a young physician be engaged to do the research. 1 2 5
The West Australian supported Dr Hislop's plan with a leading
article which touched on Dame Jean Macnamara's suspicion of
1 23

Letter, 6 December 1948, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 106/1949, p.3.
1 24 ST, 26 September 1948, p.3.
1 25 Letter, 8 September 1948, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/ 4, 1249/ 1948, p. l ; DN, 10
September 1948, p.2.
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unscalded dairy products, expressed in an article in The MJA of
December 1 947. Osborne Park was home to several dairies and the
editorial offered the view that it could be a suburb where a greater
than normal amount of raw milk would be consumed, thus
providing fertile grounds for the investigation. 1 26

Dr Hislop's

suggestion elicited a flurry of responses. Correspondents wrote to
the papers in support and several Rotary clubs agreed to receive
donations. 1 2 7 Later the editor wrote another leading article in
which the virtues of conducting such research in Western
Australia were extolled. The article recognised the potential for
research to yield nothing, or only negative results, and
acknowledged that compared to the USA, or even the state of
Victoria, Western Australia had a lot of ground to make up.
However, it was hoped that ... some factor scarcely apparent in the United States or
Victoria may show up more boldly here with our different
soil, climate and other conditions, including the sparseness
of our population and the wide distribution of the
complaint. We may have a contribution to make, and if we
have it is well worth making. 1 28
Not wishing to create the impression that the Public Health
Department was in any way lacking in its attention to this subject,
the editor hastened to add It should be emphasised that the sponsoring of this appeal
and the giving of donations to it constitute no reflection on
the technical officers of the State Department of Public
1 26 WA. 6 September 1948, p.2.
1 2 7 WA, 8 September 1948, p.5; 1 1
1 28 WA, 1 3 September 1948, p.2.

September 1948, p.4.

19 4
Health. That Department is, no doubt, deeply concerned
and doing what it can, but it is not overstaffed and it has
much to do. 1 29
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The editor's disclaimer was a sensible ploy because the publicity
brought into focus the question of how thoroughly reports of polio
were investigated by the Public Health Department, which felt the
pressure of this attention. When speaking to to a meeting of the
Perth branch of the Liberal Party, the Minister made the point that
"every case of infantile paralysis was closely investigated," and
continued to say that, while experts differed in their opinion on
the cause of the disease, from Dame Jean Macnamara he had
learned ... nothing about precautions that the Health Department
was not aware of and on which it had not taken action...
The Government has done its best to give effect to her
advice. 130
A few days later, Mr Grayden, MLA for Middle-Swan, asked the
Minister whether the government intended to investigate the
matter as suggested. 131 Mr Abbott assured the Parliament that
every case, including those that had occurred at Osborne Park, had
been carefully investigated under the direction of Dr Kingsbury,
who had been especially trained for the role. 13 2

1 29 WA, 13 September 1948, p.2.
13 0 WA, 14 September 1948, p.2.
131 Western Australian Parliamentary Debates, Hansard, ( 1948). Vol. l ,

p. l 080, 15 September 1948, BL, 328 -9412, WES.
13 2 WA, 16 September 1948, p.2; Hansard, (1948). Vol. I , p.1081, 15 September
1948, BL, 328 -9412, WES.
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The Minister visited Osborne Park personally to obtain an
impression of the procedures followed when a report of polio was
made. Shortly afterwards he had to endure more questions in the
House from Mr Grayden who wanted to know how thoroughly the
directions of the Department were followed when a case of polio
was reported. 1 33

The Minister replied that all local authorities

had received instructions to investigate contacts and movements of
infected persons, and that reports were double checked if
necessaiy. 1 34
The public subscribed generously to the research fund and the
Public Health Department approached the Medical School of the
University of Adelaide to see if it would undertake the research. 1 35
Because of the perceived benefit to all, and perhaps in an attempt
to win some points for Western Australia, Premier Ross McLarty
wrote to Prime Minister Chifley to seek Commonwealth
assistance. 1 36 Having sought the advice of the NH&MRC, Ben
Chifley replied that

1 33

. . . owing to the extreme difficulty in purchasing monkeys,
which are essential for the carrying on of research into the
poliomyelitis virus, and that, as this work is being carried
out extensively in other countries where monkeys are
available, it did not propose to undertake any large scale
investigations into the mode of entry and prevention of

Hansard, ( 1948). Vol. l . 28 September 1948, p. 1345, BL, 328 -94 12, WES.
23 September 1948, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 944/ 1948,
unnumbered page; WA. 1 October 1948, p.2.
1 35 Letter. 27 October 1948, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120 /4. 1249 / 1948, p. 1 7; Letter, 4
November 1948, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 1 249/ 1948, unnumbered page. There
was no Medical School at The University of WA at this time. Teaching in the full
M.B, B.S, commenced in 1959. See Alexander, F. (ed). ( 1963). Campus at Crawley.
University of WA Press, pp.400-4 10.
1 36 Letter. 5 November 1948, BL. ACC 1003, AN 120 /4. 1249/ 1948, p.23.
1 34 Memo,
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However, Professor B urnet of the Walter and Eliza Hall
Institute of Medical Research is carrying out extensive
investigations into the mode of entry of other types of
viruses which can be easily cultivated in chick embryos.
The general feeling of the the National Health and Medical
Research Council was that if these researches are successful,
the knowledge gained will be applicable to practically all
virus diseases, which will include Poliomyelitis. 1 3 7
The reply, which reflected the difficulties experienced by Australian
polio researchers and the priorities chosen by the influential
NH&MRC, must have been disheartening for the doctors and the
state government. And it was uncomplimentary to the Western
Australian initiative, revealing it as out of step with the realities
and trends in other places.
Dr Hislop's plan came to nothing. The apparent significance of the
multiple cases of polio in Osborne Park faded from view and efforts
to recruit the services of researchers from South Australia were
unsuccessful. Although nominations were received for the fund
raising committee no meeting ever took place. 1 3 8 Dr Hislop wrote
to the press to close the appeal and suggested that the money
already donated be held in trust to assist long- term paralysis
patients. 1 3 9
As the year came to a close cases of polio once more began to
1 3 7 Letter, 8 December 1948, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/ 4, 1249/ 1948, p.31.

1 3 8 Letters,

23 December 1948, and 27 June 1950, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120 / 4,
1 07/ 1949, p. 1, and unnumbered page.
1 3 9 WA, 15 December 1948, p.2.
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The response to polio varied widely when it came to

congregations of children.

The country town of York banned

children from swimming in the Avon River. Unlike the YAL, the
Boy Scouts' Association abandoned its plan to send 200 boys to
the Pan-Paciflc Jamboree in Victoria, and The Red Cross cancelled
its "gypsy fair" scheduled for Riverside Drive in early December. 1 4 0
Some groups cancelled plans for large gatherings of children, even
from the same school. It was reported that at Pingelly, a town on
the Great Southern Railway A public meeting recently decided that owing to health
warnings issued by the Health Dept it was inadvisable to
hold a Christmas party for the children this year and this
was recommended to the Progress Association. The Pingelly
Parents and Citizens Association has also agreed to abandon
plans for a large school break-up function, but a party will
be held at the school for children under supervision of the
teaching staff. 1 4 1
But other country centres went ahead with their gatherings,
perhaps believing or hoping that their children would be safe
because no-one from outside the district would be present. After
the second wave of the epidemic had run its course the Wagin

Argus

reported on events at Ballaying, also on the Great

Southern, where a one teacher school, currently enjoying its peak
enrolment, had operated for over forty years.
On Saturday evening last, December 18th, the school
children of Ballaying presented their first two act play in the
local Hall. The scene was laid in Cinderella's Palace, after
her marriage to Prince Charming. All the 22 children of the
1 40

WA. 18 November 1948, p.4; 20 November 1948, p.2.

1 4 1 WA, 18 November 1948, p.4; 8 December 1948, p.2.
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Ballaytng School took part in the play, and great credit is
due to the producer (Mr Jack Ward) and to the director (Miss
Brown) as well as to the kiddies for a really excellent
evening's entertainment. The Hall was filled to capacity and
eve:ryone was happy - especially the children who seemed to
enjoy every minute speaking, singing and dancing around the
Maypole. We hope to see more of these clever little artists
when they put on their next show. Several of those present
suggested that they would like to see the Concert put on in
Wagin. 1 42

Perhaps it was thought that being so remote from larger
populations the dreaded disease was unlikely to strike. And in any
case, the children were all from the same school.
For the safety of children the Public Health Department
recommended that Father Christmas not appear in Perth
department stores. The Retail Traders' Association banned Father
Chrtstmas l 4 3

and cancelled any functions which would have

resulted in the gathering of large numbers of children.
Sunday Times artist Davies replied with a cartoon [Figure 14]

which included the first representation of polio. 1 44

Father

Christmas is pictured on a cricket pitch, with bat in hand. He has
just been clean bowled by polio, pictured as a dark, ugly "trickster".
Polio is the spoil sport who has clean bowled a long series of
actMties, listed on the score board, normally enjoyed during the
summer. The trickster cheated many West Australian children and
adults out of familiar pastimes during the summer of 1948.
1 42 Wagin Argus, 23 December, 1948 p. l .
1 4 3 DN, 18 November 1948, p . l.
1 44 WA, 18 November 1948, p.4; ST, 21 November 1948, p.4.
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Although it was the Retail Traders' Association that banned Father
Christmas, the action provoked Mr Marshall, Labor member for the
Murchison, to question the Minister for Health. He asked whether
it was . ..necessary and just to deny city children the right to be
presented to Father Christmas at city emporiums, while
large numbers of children were allowed to congregate at
picture shows etc. 1 4 5
Any uncertainty that existed in the community would not have
been dispelled by the the Minister's reply, which highlighted the
difficulty felt by some. He said Although the Health Department tendered advice on the
precautions to be taken to avoid the spread of poliomyelitis,
it was left to the individual whether he accepted that advice
or not. 1 4 6
An even greater degree of ambiguity is evident in the advice the
Deputy Commissioner gave regarding the holding of swimming
carnivals. The WA Amateur Swimming Association (WAASA) was
advised by Dr Kingsbury that . . . swimming under racing conditions would not be
dangerous ... [but he] warned of the danger of attracting large
crowds. 1 4 7

1 45 WA. 24 November 1948, p.2: Hansard, (1948). Vol. 2, p.2625, BL. 328 -9412,
WES.
1 4 6 WA, 24 November 1948, p.2.
1 4 7 WA, 25 November 1948, p.2.
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In the light of this advice the WAASA intended to hold its
swimming carnivals and reduce the size of the crowd that gathered
by inviting only club supporters to attend. Such advice was the
result of continued uncertainty regarding polio transmission and
the Health Department's wish to persuade the public rather than
enforce its will through legislation.
The frustration felt over polio was summarised in an article titled
"Official Confusion on Polio" .

The Editor of the Sunday Times

wrote at length, noting that there was no official force behind the
requests the Department made of the public. He then detailed the
inconsistencies he saw in its policies.
* Children's Day at the Royal Show was not banned, but
later it was stated that crowds gathered there had caused an
increase in cases [of polio).
* A ban was put on inter school sports, but not until some
had already been held.
* Although swimming in pools is discouraged, the official
mind seems to regard it as safer for competitive sWimmers to
swim in lanes at a carnival.
* Crowds at carnivals are frowned upon, but it seems all
rtght for only club supporters to attend them.
* In winter, people were packed together at football much
closer than at the Royal Show, yet there was no suggestion
that this caused any special flare-up of the disease.
* Cases are occurring at small country towns where there are
not enough people to make a crowd.
* On a per capita basis the estimated incidence in the
metropolitan area is lower than in the country. How does
this square up with the crowd theories of the Health
Department, particularly when children have been crammed
in over-crowded school rooms, and have travelled every day
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The Editor maintained that West Australians were law-abiding
people and would co-operate with even irksome laws if they could
appreciate their underlying logic, but these policies did not appear
to make sense. But it was the public conduct of the Minister for
Health, who attended a Baby Show, that drew the most severe
criticism .
. .. is it any wonder that parents are bewildered when, after
betng told to keep their children away from crowds they find
the Minister for Health opening a Baby Show?l 49
The Minister said he had drawn the attention of the organisers to
the advice of his department in this matter but the only excuse
offered for his attendance was that he had promised to do so a
long time beforehand. 1 5 0
More criticism of departmental policy was aired in the press. As
the Assistant Commissioner, Dr Kingsbury, retired "Just a Mother"
wrote As a mother of two young girls I am amazed at Dr
Kingsbury's advice to the public about poliomyelitis. He
advises us to keep children away from entertainment and
Father Christmas, but he says nothing of closing hotels,
where anyone can drink out of glasses, public conveniences,
race and trotting meetings, speedways and lodge meetings,
where men and women of all ages and health habits rub
shoulders. Cannot these parents infect their children when
they come home? ...I cannot see that swimming in lanes is

1 4 8 ST, 28 November 1948, p.4.
1 4 9 ST, 28 November 1948, p.4.
1 50 DN, 26 November 1948, p.2.
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any reason for having swimming contests if gatherings in
public are dan�erous. Should I take my children to swim in
public-infectea water or keep them at home getting fretful
and begging me to go for a swim as we did last year? l� l

The prerogative trained male experts assumed in the science of
polio prevention was strongly challenged by a woman who, in
describing herself as "Just a Mother", left no doubt where she
thought the real wisdom on the subject could be found.

A frustrated Commissioner rebutted strongly, indicating the
difficulties faced by the department. Responsibility for the final
decision over the congregation of children fell to parents, but the
Commissioner felt they needed the courage to choose.
If parents had not the courage to make a decision about
poliomyelitis precautions unwelcome to their children, that
was no reason for an acrimonious attack on a department
which had given advice that they were not prepared to
accept. . . The Department has consistently advised against
children attending parties and similar places of public
assembly where they will come in contact with adults and
children who are strangers to them... it should be possible
for all organisers of parties to make a decision for themselves
whether o r not the function will be hel d . . . It ls an
indication of a wide-spread incapacity to make a bold
decision or to accept responsibility for an unwelcome
decision that the fate of almost all such parties ls referred to
the department for decision, presumably so that the
responsibility for an unwelcome decision shall rest on other
shoulders and so that the resentment of those who are
disappointed shall be diverted to the department, represented
as a kill-Joy, rather than countered by the plea of public
interest. Failure to conform to the department's advice
during the Royal Show led to a rise in the incidence of the
disease and ... a section of the public complained that the
department should have given specific advice against
attendance at the show. Specific advice against attendance
at Christmas parties ls now stigmatised as unwarranted
1 5 1 WA. 1 December 1948, p.2.
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The department expected parents to be bold in a way that it was
not prepared to be; they were expected to choose to keep their
. children away from large gatherings which it refused to ban. Some
parents saw themselves as bold in choosing to allow their children
to attend some gatherings, such as their end of year Junior and
Leaving Certificate examinations. 1 5 3
Saw, captured the mood in his cartoon "Punch it Home" [Figure
14], 1 54 in which, for the first time, he now ventured to represent
polio as an image. The scene is a boxing ring in which polio, a
masked male pugilist, whose image is reminiscent of the Phantom,
"the ghost who walks", hits out at the 'Health Department' who is
on the ropes, and because his head is trapped is looking away from
his opponent. 1 55 The ropes are reminiscent of the red tape that
features in some of Saw's earlier cartoons. The averted gaze and
the constraint of the head suggests a level of paralysis in the
"Health Department" as it applies the measures currently in use
against polio. Behind his back "Health Department" is holding
one gloved fist, marked "power of enforcement", while with his
naked left hand he holds up in front of polio a large sheet of paper
on which are the headings "Advice, Warnings, etc... ". The public, a
typical 1940s male working man dressed for an outing, who stands
1 5 2 WA. 1 December 1948, p.2 ; ST, 5 December 1948, p.4.
1 5 3 WA, 7 December 1948, p. 16.
1 5 4 DN. 1 December 1948, p.2.
1 5 5 WA, 29 August 1996, 'People' supplement p.3 "The Phantom" first appeared

in 1936.
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as the side of the ring and acts as coach to the "Health
Department", says - ''You might do better if you stopped waving
your left and hit out with your right" .
The chorus against the use of a persuasive style of management
had reached a pitch. Although the public did not know what
specific actions would ensure its safety against polio, Saw believed
it was weary from the lack of assertive behaviour demonstrated by
the authorities.
Criticism continued. "A Concerned Observer", who claimed to be a
trained scientist wrote in support of "Just a Mother". After giving
a brief resume' of the current understanding of the characteristics
and dangers of the polio virus, the author showed that this
knowledge presented some serious challenges to the policies of the
Public Health Department, especially with respect to crowds and
gatherings. He then fixed the leadership firmly in his sights as the
ones responsible for the spread of polio People of integrity in all stations are beginning to feel the
doubts and misgivings so clearly expressed by "Just a
Mother" in her plain admission and plea of bewilderment."
. . . When I repeatedly observe the the filthy conditions of city
streets and railway carriages, when I see the city council
dust cart regularly spreading dust and leaving the streets
unclean, when I find filthy dust blowing at me and into
exposed food on all hands, when I realise that public money
- our money, diverted compulsorily from our provision for
children's needs - is being paid to those who, through inept
direction or personal inefficiency, or both, are "messing
things up, " perhaps I may be pardoned for feeling that the
spread of poliomyelitis - or disease of any kind - is not so
much the problem of individual apathy as of wise
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leadership. 1 56

The Health Department did not allow these criticisms to pass.
After the Sunday Times published an article titled "Official
Confusion on Polio" , the Commissioner went on the

attack,

asserting that any clear-minded person could see that there was no
official confusion in relation to polio, and restated the position.
The Department has... consistently issued the advice that
unnecessary migration and attendance at public assemblies
should be avoided. It is discretionary with the individual or
with his guardian whether this advice, which is never varied,
is accepted or not. 1 5 7
He reiterated his point that, while the Department had never
banned any functions, organisers who cancelled events were
inclined to lay the blame at its feet in an effort to evade personal
responsibility for their decision. The Commissioner made a similar
response through the columns of the Daily News

and, in an

attempted put down, suggested that the letters to the Editor
revealed "a lamentable incapacity to think coherently" . 1 58
The protest did not move the Editor of the Sunday Times , who
replied at length and supported his original position with more
criticism. Children's parties were banned, but the Minister allowed
a Baby Show to go ahead and even graced it with his presence.
Schools, which in the USA and New Zealand had been closed
1 56 WA, 7 December 1948, p.16.
1 5 7 ST, 5 December 1948, p.4.
1 5 8 DN, 6 December 1948, p.2.
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during polio epidemics, remained open in Western Australia. The
unfortunate practice of servicing toilet pans during school hours
was allowed to continue. Quarantine regulations were imposed on
the children of interstate visitors, but movements within the state
were not restricted. The Editor doubted the Department had the
power to enforce its policies, but argued that Parliament should
have been asked to provide them. He concluded We say there is a public lack of confidence in the Health
Department, not only in the field of infantile paralysis, but
in other fields . . . we tell Dr Cook and the Government that
the public is not satisfied . . . with statements that are so
vague and confused that they only serve to bewilder the
people at a time when parents might reasonably expect to be
reassured. 1 59
Earlier in the year the Commissioner had complained of a lack of
co-operation between his Department and local government
authorities over regulations governing infectious diseases. 1 60 The
relationship between state and local authorities, like that between
state and federal bodies, was always prone to some difficulties.
However by the end of the year there was a much broader level of
discontent, mainly noticeable in the Departmental relationships
with the press and members of the public.
The most dramatic commentary came just before Christmas in the
form of a cartoon by Saw titled "Not a Charming Situation" [Figure
16]. 1 61 The central image in the scene is a huge black snake which
159 ST, 5 December 1948, p.4.
160 ST, 18 July 1948, p.4.
1 61 DN, 17 December 1948, p.2.

CHAPTER 5: Fear and frustration

207

is coiled to spell "polio". The snake stands on its tail and looms
large over the "Health Department", represented by a man who is a
snake charmer wearing colonial style dress, a pith helmet and
white suit. Nearby stands a small cane basket with lid ajar. The
snake was once small enough to be contained by the basket but
now it has grown to be a horrific and threatening presence. The
"Health Department" is playing a snake charmer's flute, which
emits "soothing sounds" in the direction of the reptile. Meanwhile
the public, the same 1940s man of the previous cartoon, stands on
the sidelines giving advice.

This time, as he offers the "Health

Department" a double-barrelled shotgun titled "direct action" he
says, "Try this one - it makes noises too".
The cartoonist used an image of primal fear to make his point.
The threat of snakes was well known in country and suburban
Western Australia in the 1940s.

However the snake is Saw's

cartoon is a cobra, an exotic breed, which looms as a threatening
and uncontrolled presence.

In the face of it the "persuasive"

actions of the Public Health Department, cast as an upper-class
colonial figure, are interpreted as ineffectual, and ridiculous. The
public, which in reality has no solution to offer because of the
mystery that still surrounded

polio, nevertheless proposes a

different approach to the problem: "direct action".

When

confronted by the enlarging menace menace of a rampant polio
virus the response of the Western Australian Public Health
Department was seen as lacking in the force some considered the
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crisis required and deserved.
During the latter weeks of November and the first three weeks of
December the number of reported cases of polio began to increase
again. The rise was most noticed after the school year ended on 2
December, when many families began their summer holidays, and
the number of cases did not decline until the fourth week of that
month. 1 62
As Christmas drew near two more deaths brought the total for the
year to twenty-five. Questions were raised about the wisdom of
children having dental operations and tonsillectomies performed.
Heroic stories had already appeared, including one concerning the
progress of an iron lung baby living in the care of his widower
father. 1 63
The year closed with the realisation that the effects of polio were
here to stay. There appeared pictures and stories of people who
had contracted polio and yet battled with their affliction to
triumph in some way. A girl of fifteen, who had been hospitalised
for six months, was driven from the IDB to her school, St Mary's,
West Perth, to receive the "Hamilton History Prize for 1948" . In
addition, she was awarded the Form prize for "her example of
courage and cheerfulness". 1 64 A mother of two from Shenton Park,
1 62 Public Health 1948,

(1949). p.63, BL, 6 14.09 WES.
163 DN, 18 November 1948, p.7.
164 ST, 12 December 1948, p.5.
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who three years previously had been told she would never walk
again was pictured on crutches, her success being credited to the
unorthodox methods of Sister Kenny. 165
A trickle of cases continued from the fourth week of December
until the end of February 1949. By the end of that year a further
fifty-five cases had been added to the 311 that had been reported
during 1948.
The confusion that is evident on the part of the Public Health
Department during the 1948 epidemic is partly due to the
uncertainty that existed over the origins of polio, and the lack of a
proven antidote.

This was also the first occasion when such

demands had been made on the Public Health System in Western
Australia, both during an epidemic and for after-care resources.
Over against these constraints must be placed the advantage that
was gained by the elapse of time between epidemics in the eastern
states and the outbreak of polio in Western Australia. It may have
been possible to learn more from the experience of others,
although at this stage all knowledge gained was inconclusive.
The problem that impacted most on the public was due to the
administrative style adopted by the Public Health Department. If
the application of quarantine regulations was regarded as
165 ST, 19 December 1948, p.5.

CHAPTER 5: Fear and frustration

210

paralysing for the community, 166 the style in which they were
introduced left the public confused and frustrated.
The uncertainty that surrounded polio in the public imagination is
reflected in the ambiguous nature of the three representations of
the disease discussed here: the dark trickster, the phantom
pugilist, and the evil, looming presence of the exotic snake. All
have an element of incomprehensibility about them and they are
beyond control.

Faced with this threat, it is clear that the

cartoonists, and many members of the community were not
satisfied with the performance of the Public Health Department.
Rather than exercise the full measure of the powers available to it
I

through the Western Australian Health Act, 1911, the Department
chose a persuasive approach while members of the community
called for tougher preventative measures. Susan Sontag identified
this as typical of the reaction to a feared disease:
Epidemics of particularly dreaded illnesses always
provoke an outcry against leniency or tolerance - now
identified as laxity, weakness, disorder, corruption:
unhealthiness. Demands are made to subject people to
'tests', to isolate the ill and those that are suspected of
being ill or transmitting illness, and to erect barriers
against the real and imaginary contamination of
foreigners . 16 7
The approach of the Public Health Department was later
1 66 The idea of "governmental paralysis" was used by Saw in another cartoon
[Figure 17] titled "Waiting for something to come down" (DN, 19 November 1948,
p.2). The cartoon was a comment on stalled plans the WA Government had for
developing the coal industry. This was the only occasion on which polio was
used to refer to anything other than the disease itself. See Rogers, N. (1992). Dirt
and Disease, p.13. "Polio was used to symbolise politics, baseball and war".
1 6 7 Sontag, S. (1993). Illness as Metaphor, Ringwood, p.166.
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interpreted as 'humane', 1 68 but at the time many saw

it

as weak.

Press commentary and letters to the editor signalled the
frustration felt in the community. Cartoonist Saw, in particular,
showed that he believed there was another illness to cure - a severe
case of bureaucratic paralysis.
Six years later, when the advent of another epidemic threatened to
curtail a long awaited royal visit to Western Australia, the
Commissioner showed he had regained the strength of his muscles
and initiated a meeting with members of the media. 1 69 His view
was The panic potential of epidemic poliomyelitis is ou trtvalled
by few other diseases. This particular epidemic coinciding as
it did with an historic social occasion, was especially
embarrassing to the authorities concerned. The public is
entitled to to the fullest information during times of an
emergency .. . nevertheless it is extremely difficult to avoid
aggravating panic in presenting the facts. 1 70
The Commissioner aimed to gain the support of the daily
newspapers and the ABC to publicise precautions against polio
and promote confidence in the community. There can be little
doubt that an unstated aim was to minimise the level of criticism
1 68 "Move to curtail draconian disease power '',WA , 24 March 1995, p.2. A plan

was announced to introduce a new Public Health (Infectious Diseases) Bill in

Western Australia which would overhaul the legislative framework for the control
of infectious diseases. Sources were quoted as saying that the Public Health
Department regarded as draconian the powers given it by the 1911 Health Act
( WA Health Act, 1911, sections 14, 15, 248 and 249, pp. 13,189). It was stated
that it is only the "humane attitude of health bureaucrats" which has prevented
the draconian laws being used.
1 69 Greenland, W. (1990). lrifantile Pamlysls, pp. 5-7, shows that in NSW during
the 1930s and 40s attempts were made to suppress the extent of press reporting
about polio as a way of trying to control fear in the community.
1 70 Publlc Health 1 954, (1956). Appendix VII, p.53, BL. 6 14.09 WES.
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his department might have to endure as a result of this epidemic,
which was about to occur in this worst possible circumstances: the
full glare of publicity associated with a royal visit in which the
Queen herself could become the target of the polio virus.
In relation to attempts to suppress the press and control public
criticism of the Public Health Department, and all matters
connected with the epidemics that followed, there is little doubt
that the arm of the Commissioner was significantly strengthened
by the support he received from the Government Epidemiologist,
Dudley Snow, who moved to Perth in 1 950. And, while the public
continued to make some criticisms, particularly in regard to the
continuation of the royal visit, no further cartoons appeared, then
or in 1956, to pillory the Public Health Department as it sought to
control and defeat polio.
***
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Figure 6: Weekly incidence of polio in Western Australia in 1 948,
Public Health 1 948, (1949). Appendix XV, p.62, BL 614.09 WES .
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Figure 7: Serial spot map, first 1 50 cases of polio in the
metropolitan area, 1948, Public Health 1 948, (1949). Appendix XV,
p.60, BL 614.09 WES.
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Figure 8: Incidence of polio in Western Australia followin_g the
school holidays and the Royal Show 1948, Public Health [948,
(1949). Appendix XV, p.63, BL 614.09 WES.
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Figure 10: Dally News, 24 January 1948, p.2 .
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Figure 11: Dally News, 31 January 1948, p.2 .
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Figure 12: Daily News , 1 3 Februa ry 1948, p.2.
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Figure 13: Daily News, 3 November 1948, p.2 .
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Figure 14: Sunday Times , 2 1 November 1 948, p.4.

22 1

CHAPTER 5: Fear and frustration

Figure 15: Daily News , 1 December 1 948, p.2.
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Figure 16: Daily News , 1 7 December 1 948, p.2 .
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Figure 1 7: Daily News , 21 November 1 948, p.2 .
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Memories of the '50's

Turf cigarettes on the dashboard
of the Holden ute my father drove,
Taking us to wave
our personal flags,
at the Queen as she stepped
from her plane
waving her white-gloved hand.
Polio was the word
on the lips of all the people,
and maybe even the germs.
So we saw the Queen from afar
and the white-gloved hand
touched no-one
I saw her come and go
and wondered when the Queen
would appear.
I'd seen no fur-lined robe
or crown with sparkling jewels.
This was only a lady
with a white-gloved hand,
and we waved our flags in the rain.
Beverley Campbelll

Beverley Campbell was five years old at the time of the 1954 Royal
Tour to Western Australia. Her poetic reflection on her mem01y of
the event was provoked by a report, in 1985, on recently released
British Cabinet archival materials. 2 The documents made it clear
that, in 1954, the Cabinet was "obsessed" with the health and
safety of the royal couple, and that Churchill contemplated
cancelling the Western Australian section of the tour because the

1 Beverley Campbell, (1985). Memories ofthe '50's, unpublished poem, used with
permission.
2 "To crown it all", National Times, 18-24 January, 1985, unnumbered page.
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state was gripped by a polio epidemic. 3

22 6

The royal tour and the

polio epidemic are strongly linked in the memory of West
Australians who lived through these events, particularly those who
were children at the time.4
A "white-gloved hand" that waved in the distance and "touched no
one" was all that tens of thousands of eager children saw of the
royal visit. Because of the fear of polio, children in particular had
to keep their distance from the queen, and most only glimpsed her
from the roadside as she passed by in her limousine. A photograph
of a Raewyn Coppin, an eleven year old legacy ward from
Kalgoorlie, who presented a posy to the queen by placing it on
stool several feet from her, where it remained, has become an key
image of the visit.5
Fears for the safety of the queen, whose champion was Prime
Minister Menzies and the Federal Government, rtvaled those held
for the children of Western Australia, whose champion was the
Premier and the State Government. The precautionary measures
were debated at the highest political level

3 Cablegramme, Stephen Holmes to Menzies, 1 7 March 1954, AA, A462 / 4.
825 / 14 /48, no page number. "We would fully understand and so far as proper
support any decision by your Government to either cancel the visit to Western
Australia or to impose restrictions which are thought wise both in the interest of
the Queen's health and in that of the people of Perth and the rest of the state.
for example in changing the details of the programme which the Queen is to
undertake".
4 The ABC 1V Social Histocy documentacy "TIME FRAME - Pollo Days", March
1 997, dealt with the impact of polio on the royal tour. especially as it affected
Western Australia.
5 Women's Weekly. 7 April 1954, Article by Anne Matheson. Royal Tour
Correspondent.
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The belief that the incidence of polio would increase if children
were allowed to congregate was based on evidence gathered
following the 1948 Perth Royal Show. 6 To limit the prospect of
cross infection a childrens' review was cancelled and instead
children were allowed to gather, in groups from their own school,
at special points alongside the route the Queen travelled.7
At the last moment major changes were introduced into the tour
arrangements, promoted by the Prime Minister in response to
pressure from the British Cabinet and the Royal Household. The
changes, which included housing the royal couple on the Gothic,
moored in Fremantle harbour, were aimed to provide a greater level
of safety for the queen during the tour. One result of the increased
travelling this involved for the queen was that there were more
opportunities for children to see her "white gloved hand" waving in
the distance. a
From the beginning the key events of the polio epidemic and the
royal tour were inextricably intertwined. On 2 February, the day
the queen arrived in Australia, it was announced that polio was on
the increase in Perth. 9

February 12, the day chosen for the

Minister for Health's announcement that the epidemic was under
way, was the same day as the invitations were sent out for the
6 Letter, CPH to Undersecretary, Premier's Department, 25 February 1954, BL,
ACC 1003, 120 /4, 228/54, p.40.
7 Greenland, W. ( 1990). Infantile Pamlysts, pp. 6-7. In 1938 authorities had tried
to restrain the press in the belief that too much publicity concerning the risk of
polio infection amongst children would result in parent's boycotting the
Sesqutcentenary celebrations.
8 Oral History Transcript, R.H. Doig, Premier's Department 1926- 1965, BL, OH
2 144, p.357, used with permission.
9 DN, 2 February 1954, p.6.
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Royal Garden Party at Government House. 1 0
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As the tour

progressed in the eastern states, and the epidemic worsened in the
west, sensational publicity in both places exacerbated the level of
fear and hysteria developing in Western Australia. The royal couple
arrived in Western Australia on 2 6 March, a month when 215
cases of polio were recorded, almost half the annual total of 436.
During 1954 hundreds of polio cases were recorded elsewhere

in

Australia, 1 1 but this was the largest epidemic to occur in Western
Australia, and 215 remains the highest monthly total ever to be
recorded in the state. 1 2 Occurring as it did on the eve of the royal
visit, it was a catastrophe.
The 1954 epidemic began slowly in Western Australia. During the
latter months of 1953 there was a steady rise

in

the number of

polio infections; two in October, nine in November and eleven in
December. 1 3 The trend continued and, when sixteen cases were
recorded in January, fears that an epidemic was approaching
strengthened and the Public Health Department began to prepare
for a crisis. 1 4
The question when to declare that an epidemic was under way was
resolved on the basis of the number of cases reported. In the
period 1949 to 1953, when there was a higher incidence of polio in
1 0 WA, 13 February 1954, p. l .
1 1 Fig ure 3. Chapter 2 above. NSW had 562 , Victoria 572, Queensland 140, SA
174 and the ACT 26, the second highest total on record.
1 2 Public Health 1954, ( 1956). Appendix VlII, p.62, BL, 6 1 4.09 WES.
1 3 Public Health 1954 , (1956). Appendix VIII. p. 49. BL. 614.09 WES.
1 4 WA, 10 February 1954. p.2.
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Western Australia than previously, 1 5 the highest monthly total of

seventeen cases, was recorded in October 1 951, [Figure 1 8). 1 6 It
was decided that if twenty cases were reported in February 1954,
the Public Health Department would regard the state as being in
the grtp of a polio epidemic. I 7
No debate on the matter was required because an avalanche of
cases occurred, twenty being reported in the first ten days of the
month. The final figure for February rose to eighty, thirteen more
than in the worst month on record so far, July 1948. 1 8 Snow
realised the gravity of the situation and, in a letter to the Director
General of Health, Canberra, predicted an epidemic worse than
1948. 1 9 At this stage there had been only one death, but two
thirds of the cases involved paralysis and at least three required
treatment with an artificial respirator. 20 Worse was to come.
This epidemic was different from the previous one in 1 948 in
several important respects. It did not continue through the winter
but rapidly reached a peak in March, and died away between April
and August. No paralytic cases were reported in September, or
December, but no month in the year was free of polio infections
15 Memo, CPH to Undersecretary, 25 February 1954, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120 / 4,

228 / 54 p.49. Figures for the period 1949-1953 were - 1949, 61; 1950, 59; 1951,
96; 1952, 39; 1953, 43. By West Australian standards 96 cases was practically an
epidemic. The general rise in incidence was sufficient to maintain pressure on
the resources available for treatment and after-care.
1 6 WA. 22 February 1954, p.2.
1 7 Public Health 1954, ( 1956). Appendix VIII, p.49, BL, 614.09 WES.
1 8 WA, 5 March 1954, p. l . The total of 81 was later corrected to 80.
1 9 Letter, DJR Snow to Director-General of Health, Canberra, 24 February 1954,
BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 270/ 54, unnumbered page.
20 Letter, CPH to Undersecretary. 25 February 1954, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4,
228 / 54 p.39.
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Of the 436 notifications in 1954, 45% were
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[ Figure

20). 2 1

paralytic, 48% were non-paralytic, and the balance, 7%, were
affected by an unknown disease. Ten percent of cases retained a
level of residual disability, significantly less than the 40%

in

1 948.

The four deaths, a mortality rate of less than 1%, was far below
the 8% of the previous epidemic. 2 2 The largest number of cases,
one hundred and four, occurred amongst children under the age of
four, while all those under the age of fourteen accounted for two
hundred and ten cases, almost half the final total of four hundred
and thirty six. 2 3 The overall result was that slightly more children
were affected during the epidemic than older adults.
Snow's analysis of the areas infected in 1 948 compared with 1 954,
as represented by the spot maps, [Figure 18] revealed that the
areas where the disease developed and made progress in 1 954 were
those that had suffered least in 1 948. The pattern demonstrated
something Snow regarded as a fundamental principle of
epidemiology, namely that ... the pattern of any outbreak of infectious disease is
determined by the balance between susceptibility and
immunity. 2 4
The suggested interpretation was that the immunity gained by
those living in the areas affected in 1 948 persisted, providing them
with protection during the epidemic of 1 954, whereas those not
21

Public Health 1954, (1956). Appendix VIII, p.62, BL, 614.09 WES.
22 Public Health 1954, (1956). Appendix VIII, p.65, BL. 614.09 WES.
23 Public Health 1954, (1956). Appendix VIII, p.63, BL, 614.09 WES.
2 4 Public Health 1954, (1956). Appendix VIII, p.64, BL, 614.09 WES.
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affected in 1948 were susceptible in 1954. Snow's convictions

regarding faecal contamination as the crucial element in the cycle
of infection, as outlined in Chapters 2 and 3 above, were reinforced
by these findings. But this interpretation may not have made
sufficient allowance for possibility of a population still being
vulnerable due to a different strain of the polio virus becoming
active.
A close watch was kept on the weather patterns in 19 54, as was
the case in 1948, in an attempt to determine whether there were
any discernible links between meteorological conditions and the
spread of the disease during the outbreak. The results of this
study were inconclusive, as were those of similar research
conducted in the United Kingdom. 25 Once the link between the
transference of faecal particles and the spread of polio gained
currency, it was believed that, in a community where the disease
was present, weather patterns were relevant only in so far as they
influenced patterns of social behaviour which led to there being
closer contact between people.

For example, warmer weather

resulted in the persistence of activities such as swtmmtng, through
which transmission was more likely to occur.
Once the epidemic was confirmed the Public Health Department,
which had the experience of a major epidemic behind it and was
better able to deal with such an outbreak, went into emergency
mode. Additional hospital staff, accommodation and equipment
2 5 Public Health 1954, (1956). Appendix VIII, p.65, BL, 614.09 WES. See also
MJA, July 5, 1952, "Poliomyelitis and Atmospheric Conditions in Certain
Australian Cities".
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were requisitioned and the consultative committee of doctors,

convened in 1938 and 1948, was re-convened. The fifteen-member
body, now named the State Poliomyelitis Advisory Council (SPAC),
met on three occasions during the epidemic to formulate
recommendations to assist the Department with policy initiatives,
some of which related specifically to the conduct of the royal
tour.26
At the direction of the Minister, Mr Nulsen, the Commissioner, Dr
Henzell, implemented a wide variety of measures aimed at
protecting the public and providing maximum medical support.
Press releases advised members of the public of the symptoms of
the disease, and of what actions to take if they were presented with
a case of polio.2 7
The primary assumption behind all steps proposed by the Public
Health Department was that the disease was spread through
personal contact, chiefly involving the transference of faecal
particles. It was known the polio virus could persist

in

the bowel

for a fortnight and be an ongoing source of infection.

The

protective measures recommended were similar to those applied in
cases of typhoid. Suspected agencies of transmission were unclean
hands, polluted water, contaminated food and, to a lesser extent,
flies.28 The theory that oral and nasal droplets were responsible for
the spread of polio was now less favoured, though not entirely
2 6 Public Health 1954, ( 1956). Appendix VIII, p.55, BL, 6 14.09 WES. The SPAC

met on 1 1 February, 4 March, and 8 April.
2 7 WA, 13 February 1954, p. l .
2 8 WA, 22 February 1954, p.2.
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discounted, due to the belief that at the commencement of
infection the virus was briefly present in the throat. Accordingly
unguarded sneezing and spitting in the streets was still being
discouraged.29

Greater acceptance of the faecal contamination theory resulted in
strong emphasis on the need for personal cleanliness, especially
hand hygiene. 30 At first there was some confusion in the public
mind as to what was meant by "faecal contamination" and the
Commissioner had to issue a statement of explanation to dispel
the uncertainty. 3 1 All children, in particular, were now expected
to avoid sharing cups and towels, and to wash their hands before
eating food and after using the toilet. These expectations focussed
attention on the facilities at schools, which were sadly lacking.
Public works undertaken in Western Australia during the 1930s
and 1940s had been limited, due to the stringencies of the
depression, followed by the war effort. Canning Dam, a major
extension to the Metropolitan Water S upply was completed in
1941 , making it possible to service water closets. But as late as
1962 , or even 1965, some suburban dwellings still relied on pan
toilets.32
School maintenance and upgrading also suffered. In the 1950s
many schools had pan-service toilet facilities, a small supply of
29 WA, 22 February 1954, p.2; WA, 6 March 1954, p. l .
3 0 Public Health 1954, (1956). Appendix VIII. p.50, BL, 614.09 WES.
3 1 DN, 2 March 1954, p.2.
32 Information provided by Dr Lindsay Hunter, Edith Cowan University.
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hand basins and taps and, in some cases, little water to spare for

hand washing. A resident from the newly established industrial
area of Kwinana wrote Is it any wonder that the polio total is mounting? If M r
Tonkin would have a look a t the disgraceful toilet and
washing facilities provided for the 190 children at the East
Rockingham school he would act immediately instead of
waiting till the epidemic got worse. There are only two
toilets provided and no wash-basins. Children have to wash
their hands under the tap and then other children go there
immediately and drtnk. 3 3
An anti-fly campaign was introduced, similar to previous years.
Schools, play sheds and wash- rooms were sprayed, and special
arrangements were made for disinfecting rubbish bins and sanitary
pans.3 4 The Perth City Council (PCC) had instituted a "Swat that
Fly" campaign and it was hoped this would play a part in
controlling polio. The PCC vigorously promoted the campaign and,
once the epidemic commenced, suggested it would spray all
government schools and kindergartens in the city with DDT
solution.3 5 The spraying was undertaken, but at first was limited
to those classrooms in which children with polio had been, 3 6 an
illogical practice which may have aroused feelings of stigmatisation
amongst those who had become infected. The secretary of the
Tramways Employees Union called for daily disinfection of public
vehicles, as had occurred in 1948, and used the occasion to call for
a ban on the overloading of buses and trams, especially du ring
WA. 1 1 March 1954, p.8.
1954, ( 1956). Appendix VIII, p.5 1 . BL, 614.09 WES; WA. 26
February 1954, p.6; WA. 4 March 1954, p.4.
3 5 DN, 26 February 1954, p.2.
3 6 DN, 2 March 1954, p.2.
33

3 4 Public Health
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hour . 3 7

Children were still believed to be the most vulnerable to attack,
and the public were warned that fatigue would render those
infected more susceptible to paralysis, as would ear nose and
throat procedures such as tonsillectomies. 3 8 The Public Health
Department

also

recommended

the

postponement

of

immunisations, such as those for diphtheria and whooping cough.
Fear and paranoia are evtden t in the public reaction to this latter
measure. Some people assumed the reason for the ban was that
these prophylactic injections could cause polio in the recipient, an
idea the Medical Officer of the Perth City Council moved rapidly to
debunk. 3 9
The Director of Education announced that schools were to remain
open but all metropolitan swimming classes would be cancelled. 40
A week later the Public Schools' Sports Association announced
that the inter-school swimming carnival planned for 6 March was
cancelled.4 1 Swimming was seen as a high risk activity. Despite

high summer temperatures, the river beaches and public swimming
baths were bereft of swimmers; the population did not risk the
river water, though seaside beaches were still patronised. 42
The presence of polio was seen as pollution and, by association,
3 7 DN.

26 February 1 954, p.2.
1954, (1956). Appendix VIII, pp.50-51, BL. 614.09 WES .
3 9 WA. 19 February 1954, p. 2.
40 WA. 13 February 1 954. p. l .
4 1 WA. 19 February 1954, p. l .
42 DN, 23 February 1954, p.2.
3 8 Public Health
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the epidemic was used to draw attention to the decline in the
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ecological health of the river. "Hi-Jean", who for thirty years had
caught crabs in the the river, drew attention to the contradiction
of stressing hand hygiene to combat faecal contamination, while
continuing to discharge effluent into the Swan. 4 3

Dredging,

banking and the amount of refuse it now contained was regarded
as having rendered this once pleasant water-way unsafe for leisure
activities. A Subiaco correspondent wrote to the Dally News
We're now paying for our past disregard of cleanliness,
judging by the beautiful waterway that was the Swan River.
This priceless heritage is now a suspected source of polio
infection, and we only have ourselves to blame.44
Ground sports also suffered.

In view of the epidemic the

Australian schoolboys' cricket carnival, scheduled for Perth from
11 to 26 March, was cancelled. Fear of infection led the South
Australian and Queensland teams to withdraw from the
competition, leaving only New South Wales to compete against
Western Australia.4 5
The successful management of such an epidemic depended on the
availability of up to date information and backup resources such
as laboratories and other forms of technical assistance. Western
Australia was unable to provide the necessary resources itself and
Snow was forced to communicate with laboratories and research
institutes in other states, and to seek information from overseas.
43

WA, 13 March 1954, p.9.
DN, 23 February 1954, p.4.
4 5 WA. 24 February 1954, p. 17.
44
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The Public Health Department, through the efforts of Snow, who
diligently kept abreast of new developments in the various fields
related to polio research, was kept as well informed as possible.46

And as a direct result of the epidemic the Public Health
Department undertook a six- part research programme which
involved co-operation with laboratories in three other states.
Expert advice for the research programme was provided by Dr
J.A.R. Miles, a leading polio specialist and senior research fellow
from the Adelaide based Institute of Medical and Veterinary
Research Science. 4 7 The Institute provided diagnostic facilities,
not available in Western Australia, making it possible to isolate
and identify the virus responsible for the outbreak. 4 8 Miles, who
had been conducting scientific investigations in the Northern
Territory, was invited to WA for consultations. 49 He visited Perth
late in February and, in addition to speaking with the
Commissioner and Snow, met with the Premier, A.R.G. Hawke,
who was concerned with the effect the outbreak might have on
4 6 File, Poliomyelitis Research, ACC 1003, 120 /4, 700 /54.

4 7 WA, 20 February 1954, p l; DN, 19 February 1954, p. l; Press Statement. 19
February 1954, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120 /4, 228 /54, p.26; Letter, CPH to Director
General of Health, Canberra, 9 February 1954, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120 / 4, 270 /54,
p. l.
48 Public Health 1954, ( 1956). Appendix VIII, p 59, BL, 614.09 WES.
4 9 DN, 23 February 1954, p.2. Miles' research, conducted under the auspices of
the NH&MRC, had been sparked by the realisation that there was an apparently
low incidence of polio amongst Aborigines, even when the virus was active
amongst the white population. Figures for 1951-52 revealed that in Darwin there
were 10 cases, all whites, and 2 deaths, both adults. During the same period the
figures for Alice Springs showed exactly the same result. While this was thought
to be most likely due to natural immunisation through contact with the disease,
it was hoped there might be another explanation. That it may have been due to
"non-specific or para-specific immunisation against some other organism
containing a common antigen with poliomyelitis". See Letter, Miles to SMO,
Darwin, 13 August 1952, AA. A l 658 / 1. 756/1/34; For the figures see Memo,
Secretary, Director General of Health to Dept of Territories, Canberra, 7 May,
1952, AA, A452, 1952/ 179.
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All aspects of the epidemic were

considered, especially the implications of large crowds gathering to
see the queen. 50
Miles brought a ray of hope to a gloomy situation.

During an

interview he highlighted new advances in the quest for a polio
vaccine that were being made by American researchers. The long
term future looked positive, he said, due to the success of Dr
Enders, of Boston, in growing the virus in tissue, eliminating the
need to use monkeys.5 1
Miles' announcement was boosted by even more encouraging news.
It was hoped successful American research would lead to the
production of an effective polio vaccine. Thirty years of searching
for a polio vaccine that would be as effective as the one developed
for smallpox had not born fruit. As recently as 1953 the World
Health Organisation had despaired of attempts to control polio,
but now came news of Jonas Salk's success in growing a vaccine
that was believed to be effective against all three strains of the
virus. Tests commenced in April and were due to be completed in
June 1954.5 2
The good news may have been encouraging, but it was of no
immediate help in Western Australia.

Miles predicted that the

West Australia epidemic would last several months, a point that
was later turned against the government by the Prime Minister.
WA. 24 February 1954, p. l .
5 1 WA. 25 February 1954, p.4.
5 2 WA, 20 February 1954, p.7; WA, 28 April 1954, p. 10.
50

23 9
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The Commissioner was aware of this prediction, and a similar
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opinion expressed by Snow, when he wrote

It is apparent that an epidemic of major dimensions is in
progress in Western Australia. ...
The initial impression .. . is that the type of poliomyelitis
which is prevalent at the present time is probably milder
than the type encountered in 1948. However, it must be
emphasised that this is only an initial impression.
The course, du ration and ultimate dimensions of this
epidemic are impossible to predict with any degree of
certainty. Previous experience, however, would indicate that
the disease is likely to remain at epidemic level for several
months and it would not be surprising if a peak were reached
at the time of, or soon after the Royal Visit.5 3
The Commissioner correctly predicted the peak of the epidemic but
was wrong about the strain of the virus.

Miles returned to

Adelaide with the faecal samples packed in dry ice from which he
was able to determine it was the paralytic variety of the virus,
Brunhilde, that was active in the epidemic.5 4

General epidemiological research was undertaken, under Snow's
direction. An aspect of the research was a notification paper,
devised by the Public Health Department, which aimed to secure
from all general practitioners as much information as possible
regarding those who reported to them with the polio.5 5

The general level of immunity to polio in the adult population was
5 3 Letter,

CPH to Undersecretruy, Premier's Department, 25 February 1954, BL,
ACC 1003, 120/4, 228 /54, p.40.
5 4 WA. 25 Februruy 1954, p. l .
5 5 Public Health 1954, ( 1956). Appendix VIII, p.50, BL, 614.09 WES.
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examined, with the assistance of the WA Red Cross Blood

Transfusion Service, which provided blood for testing, and Dr N.F.
Stanley of the Institute of Epidemiological and Preventative
Medicine associated with the Prince Henry Hospital, Sydney. 5 6
The aspect of research conducted by the Public Health Department
that attracted most public attention was a systematic study aimed
at investigating the immunity that is derived from symptomless
cases of polio, known in medical terms as the serological evidence
of silent immunising infections. 5 7 The research, which had to be
conducted at a school in which several typical cases of polio had
occurred, required the collection of a series of three blood samples,
over a period of nine months, and the fortnightly examination of
faecal samples, taken from the septic tank. 5 8 The health of the
students had to be closely monitored throughout the research, and
it was necessary for the school to have a septic tank system.
One hundred and fifty pupils from the Como Primary School, a
suburb located on the banks of the Swan River near South Perth,
were chosen for the expertment. 5 9 The research, which was later
published in the MJA, 60 suggested that forty-seven per cent of the
56

Public Health 1954, (1956). Appendix VIII. p. 60, BL, 614.09 WES; Letter, CPH
to Director, Blood Transfusion Service, 15 March 1954, BL, ACC 1003, 270 / 54
120/4, pp.19-20; Letter, Snow to Stanley, 27 May 1954, BL, ACC 1003, 270 / 54
120/ 4, pp.30-31.
5 7 Public Health 1954, ( 1956). Appendix VIII, p.59, BL, 614.09 WES.
5 8 Public Health 1954, ( 1956). Appendix VIII, p.59, BL. 614.09 WES.
5 9 WA, 16 March 1954, p. l ; WA, 18 March 1954, p. 8; ST, 21 March 1954, p. 29;
Letter, DJR Snow to JAR Miles, 17 Februru:y 1954, BL, ACC 1003, 120/4, 270 / 54,
pp.22-23.
6 0 Snow, D.J.R., Raad, G.R.A, Woolcott, J.F. , Miles, J.A.R. , Ames, P.G .. Stokes,
L.J. ( 1955). "Immunity to Poliomyelitis: an investigation amongst schoolchildren
at Como in Western Australia" MJA, 24 September, 2, 13, pp.485-488.
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children were immune to polio, but no change was discovered to
have occurred in this proportion during the duration of the
experiment. The epidemic did not result in the development of a
greater or lesser degree of immunity to polio amongst the sample
population.
The services of Dr A.A. Ferris and the Epidemiological Research
Unit of Fairfield Hospital, Melbourne were utilised in an attempt
to isolate the virus from milk, water and sludge. 61 The assistance
of Ferris was sought for an additional problem which was kept
secret due to fear of public reaction. Samples of water taken from
metropolitan beaches revealed an unacceptably high level of faecal
contamination. Snow, who called for the utmost discretion to be
maintained in the matter, proposed that samples be sent for
examination to determine whether or not the polio virus was
present in them. 62 City Beach was one of the areas from which
suspect samples were collected in 1954. Those who were afraid of
swimming in the river, but felt secure in the sea, would have been
dismayed had they known of the suspected risk. 63
A clinical investigation was made, by Dr E.G. Saint at the Clinical
Research Unit, Royal Perth Hospital, of a polio-like syndrome that
61 Public Health 1954, ( 1956). Government Printer, Perth, Appendix VIII, p.60, BL,
6 14.09 WES.

62 Letter, Snow to Ferris, 17 March 1954, BL, ACC 1003, 120/4, 270 /54 pp.20-

2 1.
63 Snow, D.J.R. ( 1981). Progress, pp.88- 1 13. Four years later the vigilance of
Snow in this matter paid dividends when a twelve year old boy was diagnosed
with Typhoid. The case heralded a minor outbreak that resulted in ten
infections, nine of which occurred amongst youths who swam regularly at City
Beach, a popular recreation spot near a then damaged outlet of the metropolitan
sewerage treatment plant. In 1958, on Snow's advice, the acting Minister for
Health, the Hon John Tonkin, MLA, closed the beach to the public.
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Several doctors reported cases in
occurred during the epidemic.
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which bizarre symptoms occurred, such as vomiting, with
associated sensory manifestations resembling paralytic polio, such
as headache, malaise, and sore throat. The polio virus, or some
other virus, was suspected but nothing of this type was detected.
Patient recovery was complete and at least two doctors, who had
the opportunity to monitor such cases for up to four weeks,
detected no signs of muscle weakness. 6 5 This phenomenon had
not been noticed before in WA. It is possible that the level of fear
and anxiety already associated with the outbreak was exacerbated
by the excitement of the approaching royal tour and a form of
psychosomatic or hysterical illness was the result. The matter was
discussed with Miles who reported that similar phenomena had
been discovered in South Australia two years earlier.

The

conclusion of the investigation was that The important impression we have gained is that of the
overwhelming fear and anxiety on the part of the patient
with any mild non-specific fever, and one wonders if early
cases with parethesias are not manifesting mild hysterical
signs.6 6
The splint-shop, established in 1 949, though now without its
founding technician, George Clarke, who had departed under a
cloud, 6 7 undertook the extra duties of making equipment for the
Infectious Diseases Hospital.

This initiative, prompted by the

inability of manufacturers elsewhere to supply materials and
Public Health 1954, ( 1956). Appendix VIII, p.60, BL, 6 14.09 WES.
Letter, CPH to Director, Clinical Research Unit, RPH, 26 Februruy 1954, ACC
1003, 120 /4, 270 /54, p.9.
66 Publtc Health 1 954, ( 1956). Appendix VIII, p. 60, BL, 6 14.09 WES.
6 7 The information in these files is restricted.
64

65
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equipment on time, was said to have led to the improvement of

facilities at the IDH. 68
A swimming pool for the after-care of polio patients was regarded
as an urgent requirement. Discussion of the possibility of using
the Dalkeith Hot Pool was revived, and then abandoned.
Numerous attempts to provide the state with hydro-therapy
facilities finally bore fruit, with the help of a grant of £12,000 from
the Commonwealth, and an appropriate pool was constructed on
site at the IDH.69
Quarantine measures were also applied, but they were not as
stringent as those imposed in 1948, and the subject hardly rated a
mention.

On this occasion patients were isolated for fourteen

days, rather than twenty-one, either at home or in hospital. Close
associates, siblings, or adults in special categories such as
teachers, food handlers etc, suffered from "house and garden"
arrest for a similar period.
The home became a new focus for polio treatment, though it was
felt at first that the public might not accept this innovation. 10
Epidemiological understanding, current at the time, allowed for
home treatment in the case of non-paralytic polio, provided the
family doctor was agreeable and sufficient precautions were taken
6 8 Public Health 1954, ( 1956). Appendix VIII, p.54, BL, 614.09 WES.
69 Public Health 1954, (1956). Appendix VIII, p. 55, BL, 614.09 WES; WA. 19

March 1954, p. l ; Memo, 16 Februruy 1954, BL, ACC 1003, 120 / 4, 106/49, p.71;
Memo, CPH to Principal Architect, 25 Februruy 1954, BL, ACC 1003 120 / 4,
5138 / 54, p. l .
7 0 DN, 18 Februruy 1954, p.3.

2 44
1954
7
1
to prevent further infection.
Similar arrangements had been
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introduced in the past for the treatment of typhoid patients.
The large number of polio infections in 1954, and the high
proportion of non-paralytic cases amongst them, made the
introduction of home care easier and preserved hospital resources
for those which required intensive care. 7 2 The Department formed
the view that home-care was effective: it was readily accepted by
the public, and no evidence was produced to indicate that further
infection resulted from its introduction.
In addition to the research programme, extra medical resources
were organised. A consulting physician, Dr 1.0. Thorburn, was
appointed to work at Public Health Department expense, in
support of general practitioners in need of advice. 7 3 A specialist
panel of orthopaedic surgeons was established, and additional
physiotherapy seIVices were provided. 74
Where possible the medical fraternity were kept up to date by other
means. Early in March two polio specialists, Dr H. McLorinan,
Medical Superintendent f rom Fairfield Hospital, and Dr B.
McCloskey, Director of the Poliomyelitis Division, Victorian Public
Health Department, visited Perth and gave lectures for medical and
(1956). Appendix VIII, p.52, BL, 614.09 WES; Memo to all
medical practitioners, 8 March 1954, BL. ACC 1003, AN 120/4 228/ 54, p.68. The
patient's linen and excrement had to be treated separately.
7 2 Public Health 1 954, (1956), Appendix VIII , pp.52-53, BL, 614.09 WES.
7 3 Memo, CPH to all Medical Practitioners, 8 March 1954, ACC 1003, 120/4.
270/54, p.13.
7 4 Public Health 1954, (1956). Appendix VIII. p. 54, BL, 614.09 WES.
7 1 Public Health 1 954,
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lecturers were hailed by the Public

Health Department as having made a positive contribution to
medical knowledge and public confidence during the epidemic. 76
McLortnan, in an address to Perth Rotary Club, attempted to give a
positive interpretation of the present difficulties by emphasising
that the epidemic would result in an increase in the number of
those who were immune to polio, "crude and cruel" though
nature's methods for achieving this goal seemed to be. 7 7

The

results of the Como experiment did not support his conclusion,
but his view was one that was current at the time. The community
was kept as fully informed as possible regarding the progress of the
epidemic and the symptoms of the disease. The Public Health
Department distributed Information Bulletins to Local Health
Authorities, an information leaflet was prepared · for public
circulation and announcements were made in the press. 7 8
The Public Health Department also embarked on a deliberate
public relations strategy because it did not want a repeat of the the
criticisms it suffered in 1948, least of all at a time when the state
was under the national spotlight because of the royal visit. It
realised that a fine balance had to be kept. The public was entitled
to the truth, but information needed to be given in such a way
that fears would be allayed and co-operation gained. With such
7 5 Memo, CPH to all Medical Practitioners. 8 March 1954, BL. ACC 1003, 120 /4,
270 / 54, p. 14.
76 Public Health 1954, ( 1956). Appendix VIII, p.58, BL, 6 14.09 WES .
7 7 DN. 12 March 1954, p.2.
7 8 Public Health 1954, ( 1956). Appendix VIII. p.50, BL, 6 14.09 WES; Monthly
Health Bulletin, 24 Februruy 1954, CPH to Local Health Authorities, BL, ACC
1003, 120/4, 228 /54, pp.37a-c; For examples of press announcements see, DN.
25 Februruy 1954, p. 10; WA. 5 March 1954, p. 10.

CHAPTER 6: A royal panic: 1 954

246

thoughts in mind, from the outset the Department enlisted the

media in its cause. A conference was called with representatives of
the press and ABC radio at which it was agreed that, in addition to
providing information on speciflc topics, bulletins would be issued
twice weekly, detailing the number of cases reported and the trend
of the epidemic.7 9
Ten days after the first announcement of the epidemic, the Public
Health Department provided the newspapers with a comprehensive
article on polio written by Snow. Published under the heading
"Hand Hygiene is Best Single Safeguard Against Polio", the article
discussed all aspects of disease and made available to the public
the most recent results of medical research. It is clear that Public
Health Department policy in this respect had been strongly
influenced by Snow, who wrote
Perhaps if some of the salient facts about this disease were
more widely known, more people would learn to regard it,
...as one of the several hazards for civilised living. s o
He believed that the provision of adequate information would help
bring reason and calm to a situation that was potentially fraught
with fear.
Snow, who had arrived in Western Australia in 1 948, compared the
fear he saw with that aroused by "pandemic influenza" in 1 9 1 9 .
The reason for the current fear, he said, was obvious; parents
7 9 Public Health 1954,

(1956). Appendix VIIl, p.53, BL, 614.09 WES.

B O WA, 22 February 1954, p.2.
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found the prospect of their children suffering from the effects of
paralysis horrifying. Snow admitted that, during an epidemic, the
risk of infection was high, but reminded his readers that the
chance of serious paralysis was more limited. He wrote The odds, therefore, are approximately 1000 to 1 against
dying, 500 to 1 of serious physical handicap, and 100 to 1
against the possibility of any symptoms at all.8 l
Snow included a detailed histogram for each month of the period

1948-1954 [Figure 19 J and provided a brief overview of the history
of polio. He explained the manner in which it was believed polio
was spread, and the factors which influenced whether or not an
infected person became paralysed.

The article also repeated

information regarding the precautions and preventative measures
recommended by the Public Health Department.
The Public Health Department intended that through such
publicity community confidence would be aroused, children would
be encouraged to exercise "extreme hand cleanliness", and those
who encountered infection, in themselves or others, would be
prompted to seek urgent, appropriate help. 82

Despite being

criticised for releasing so much information, at the end of the
epidemic the Public Health Department regarded the plan as
successful. The Commissioner wrote - "there is much evidence to
show that these intentions met with success, which was of great
benefit to the community as a whole". 83 And the the truth of its
8 1 WA. 22 February 1954, p.2.

82 Public Health 1954, (1956). Appendix VIII, p.54, BL, 6 14.09 WES.
83 Public Health 1954, ( 1956). Appendix VIII, p.54, BL. 614.09 WES.
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view was demonstrated, it said, by the fact that although the virus
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abroad was proven to be the paralytic variety, the incidence of
paralysis and death in the 1954 epidemic was markedly low. 84
Official history, represented by the views of the health experts and
the reports of the Public Health Department, contrasted with
public perceptions of the situation.

As will be seen below,

members of the public were severely critical and felt the amount of
information provided contributed to the level of fear aroused. The
intense criticism was partly the result of the overlap of the
epidemic with the royal visit.
The Public Health Department and the Commissioner were
criticised in Parliament for the way the epidemic was handled. The
criticism drew a strong rebuff from the SPAC, which wrote at
length in protest to the Minister for Health. Details were provided
of the numerous steps the CPH and the Department had taken in
their attempt to control the epidemic and protect the public. 8 5
SPAC suggested that the decline in the incidence of the disease,
and the low incidence of paralysis, was due to community
acceptance of the measures recommended by the Public Health
Department.
Public debate continued. The WA branch of the ALP wrote to the
Minister for Health
84 Public Health 1 954, ( 1956). Appendix VIII, p.54, BL. 6 14.09 WES.
85 Letter, SPAC to Minister for Health, 9 April 1 954, BL, ACC 1003, 120/4.

228/54, pp. 146- 148.
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. . . to request information as to what plans the Department
may have to cope with any future epidemic.8 6
The Commissioner replied in detail, and indicated that the
controversy behind the request been a painful experience for his
Department.

At the end of Februacy, the Daily News, printed the first monthly
bulletin from the Public Health Department under the heading
"Authorities Fear Epidemic Will Worsen".8 7 Alongside the article
appeared another headed "Cancel Royal Review Say Wor ried
Parents".

It reported the results of a snap survey, conducted

amongst "scores of parents" in the city streets. The subject was
the school children's review which, on 1 April, would bring together
between 30, 000 and 60,000 child ren at the Claremont
Showgrounds.

While opinion was equally divided on the subject of what
alternative to provide there was no doubt that most of those
surveyed were in favour of cancelling the review. Samples of
opinion given were

With all due respect to the Queen, I don't think its worth
the risk of possibly permanent paralysis. It wouldn't be so
bad if it was not such a serious illness.
I wouldn't send my children to the showground again at any
time until they provided much be tte r sanitary
conveniences.88
86 Letter, ALP, WA Branch to Minister for Health, 23 June 1954, BL. ACC 1003,

120/4, 228 /54, p.154, and reply pp.155-156.
8 7 DN, 25 Februaiy 1954, p. l 0.
88 DN, 25 Februaiy 1954, p.10.
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Eventually it was decided to cancel the review, but the decision did
not receive unanimous public support because, once the queen
arrived it was realised that people would congregate to see her, and
the risks to health would remain. Even children felt moved to
express their opinion on the subject. A disgruntled schoolboy
wrote
This is my complaint on the Royal visit. What chance has
any schoolboy or girl of seeing the Queen other than for a
fleeting second as Her Majesty drives past on her way to
some official function? It seems that the only people who
are allowed the privilege of seeing the Queen properly are
councillors, their wives and politicians.89
Other writers saw rearrangements as futile and forcefully stated
their view that the entire tour should be cancelled.
Let there be no half measures. If the polio epidemic is a
alarming as I believe, the Royal tour of WA should be called
off immediately. Rearrangement of the itinerary and
reshuffling of c hildren's gatherings is surely a futile
expedient. If its dangerous to have a large assembly of
children at the Showgrounds, how does it become less
dangerous to have them cramming into the city to watch the
royal progress? And why should the Queen and the Duke be
exposed to even the slightest personal risk? I am just as
anxious as the next person to see the Royal couple, but
public health and their safety must come flrst.90
And another wrote Why aren't the health authorities insisting on a complete
cancellation of the Royal visit to this State? Mass
movement, whether of children or adults, means sub89 DN, 6 March 1954, p.4, edition 2.
90 DN, 8 March 1954, p.4.

25 1
standard hygiene, and if our present concepts of the
promulgation of poliomyelitis are correct, such conditions
must lead inevitably to further suffering. 9 1
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In view of the reactions it seems Snow's diligence in providing clear
information for the public may have worked against him. Some
people, who were free of the political pressures the Public Health
Department was under, could see that cancellation of the tour was
a logical outcome of the knowledge at its disposal.
Those who wanted the tour to go ahead with the potential risks
minimised proposed their solutions.

"Prevention Please" from

Subiaco wrote Because of the the polio epidemic , the Education
Department should close all schools for two or three weeks
after the Royal visit to allow a quarantine period . . . . Two or
three weeks of lost schooling now for every child in the State
would be far better than the risk of widely spreading the
disease. 9 2
The problem was, if polio was transmitted during the tour, this
measure would be of no benefit at all.
The effectiveness of the publicity campaign was revealed in other
more positive ways. The emphasis that had been given to hand
hygiene made people pay attention to health standards in general,
and several correspondents brought to notice the need for food
handlers, in particular, to take more care. For example, "Observer"
of Perth wrote 91

92

DN, 10 March 1954, p.4.
DN, 12 March 1954, p.4 .
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I see that schoolchildren are compelled to observe the
"official order" to wash their hands. Why not order the
bakers to wash their hands before handling our bread? They
are continually handling money ( which is germ laden) and
the reins. Cooked meats, too, are disgustingly handled, and
a fork should be the " official order" . If these things were
looked into there may be less polio.9 3
Some doctors believed the best course of action was to cancel the
tour and avoid any further spread of infection, 9 4 but it is evident
that Western Australians were strongly in favour of it going ahead.
Throughout the controversy the Premier and Cabinet, acting on
advice fr om the Public Health Department , consistently
maintamed the view that the risks were minimal provided certain
conditions were observed. 9 5 This is reflected in a letter in which
the Commissioner raised the possibility of discovering whether or
not the queen had acquired immunity to polio from a previously
undetected infection. He wrote -

It would be possible to determine the presence or absence of
the existence of a degree of immunity by a serological
examination of her blood conducted in one of the
established virus laboratories at present in Australia. It
would take from three to four weeks before a report was
obtained. If the examination revealed a high level of
immunity, then the personal risk to Her Majesty would be
negligible and the anxiety on the part of the authorities
would be minimal. If the result, however, is negative, the
measurement of the risk is extremely difficult. On the
whole, however, providing adequate precautions are
taken, we believe this risk to be small.96
93

DN, 12 March 1954, p.4.
WA. 10 March 1954, p.9.
9 5 Oral History Transcript, R.H. Doig, Premier's Department 1 926- 1965, BL, OH
2 144, p.355, used with permission.
96 Letter, CPH to Undersecretary, 25 February 1 954, BL, ACC 1 003, AN 1 20/4,
228 /54 p.4 1. Emphasis added.
94
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There is no evidence that the suggestion was followed through and,
given the attitude of other health and medical experts, it would
not have been regarded as necessary.
The government and the Public Health Department carefully
reviewed the arrangements being made for the royal visit with the
intention of minimising the possibility of more polio cases, and
limiting the exposure of the royal couple to the risk of infection.
From the start the assumption was that the tour would proceed,
but that plans would be modified to minimise the gathering of
crowds of children, while allowing for as many as possible to see
the queen. The itinerary would also be modified to limit physical
contact between the royal couple and the public, and to reduce the
possibility that the queen would become fatigued.
Support for continuing with the tour was drawn from the fact that
there had been outbreaks of polio in Canberra, New South Wales
and Victoria, while little or no alteration had been made to the
plans for the royal visit in those places. In Canberra, where one
might have expected the protective influence of Prime Minister
Menzies to have been felt, hundreds of children fainted at a rally,
many drank from common cups, and parents were outraged to find
that news of the outbreak was not released until after the Queen
had departed.9 7
The performance of the entire Western Australian administration,
9 7 WA, 4 March 1 954, p.4.
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including the Public Health Department, was under close scrutiny
at this time and the State government was caught on the horns of
a dilemma. As a Labor government, serving while the Menzies
Liberal government was in power in Canberra, the administration
may have wished to demonstrate that it was loyal to the
monarchy.

The Hawke Labor government, in keeping with

decisions made by John Curtin at an earlier date, had declared
that it would maintain a principle and would not block any
honours the queen sought to bestow as a result of the tour,
although none of its ministers would accept them.98 Any move
that could have been construed as an attempt weaken ties with the
monarchy would have been very unpopular, and politically unwise.
As the date for the commencement of the tour approached the
newspapers, on a daily basis, featured news of the preparations
being made, which included pictures of Perth women regaled in the
gowns they had had prepared for the ball and garden party. Large
sums of public money were also being invested in the tour. The
Perth City Council alone spent at least £8965, made up of £4775
for the royal ball, £2000 for the civic reception and £1 990 for
decorations for St George's Terrace and Barrack Street. 99
Cancellation of the tour would have incurred substantial material
losses amongst many sections of the community, while all would
have suffered from disappointment and the loss of face. On the
other hand, it was impossible to measure the cost of exposing the
98 DN, 17 March 1954, p. l .
99 WA. 20 March 1954, p. l .
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royal couple, and the members of the public, to the risk of

infection. There was potential for a loss of morale and community
support, as well as for uncontrollable fear.
The fact that members of the public were deeply troubled was
reflected in the unusually large number of requests for help, and
suggestions for controlling polio, that were received by the Public
Health Department during the epidemic. The volume of personal
enquiries was so great that the public was requested to limit its
contact to special hours of the day. 1 00
Letters to the Commissioner containing suggestions regarding the
cause of polio came from lay and educated alike, and included
every possible angle. One correspondent offered

a list of six

suggested lines of enquiry, each of which raised questions
concerning the effect of immigration, or ·methods of processing food

The increase in the number of New Australians.
Market gardeners' produce - migrants do not hesitate to use
human excreta on the vegetable plots.
Milk from the country - because dirty containers were used
and the cows had rickets.
The "free milk" system - is there a link between this and
polio in children?
Washing hands was all very well, but what about washing
the vegetables and boiling the milk?
1 00 Public Health 1954, ( 1956). Appendix VIII, p.53, BL, 614.09 WES; File ACC

1003, AN 120/4, 689/52 contains many letters on the subject; DN, 23 February
1954. p.2.
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The over preservation (mummification) of food, tinned foods,
butter, cheese, etc, and the increase of disease . 1 0 1

Other suggestions were more direct, for example, warn parents that
money is very dirty and may be a means of spreading polio. 1 02 The
safety of food was often mentioned. A baker's delivery man was
reported to have stopped his horse, used the privy, and not washed
his hands before he continued on his rounds. 1 0 3 The crowding of
buses, subjecting children to long train journeys, and the hygiene
of roller towels were all included in the suggestions which should
be investigated, 1 o 4 along with the recommendation that pan toilets
be emptied at night, rather than during the day, to limit the
danger of exposing children to flies. 1 o 5

The Minister for Health

received a handwritten note which suggested "it is my personal
opinion that it is a disease caused by frogs, as it has increased
with them". 1 0 6

Once again, suggestions were not restricted to lay people. A retired

1 0 1 Letter to CPH, 26 February 1954, BL, ACC 1003, AN 228/ 54, p.51.
1 02 Letter, MEK to CPH, 26 February 1954, BL, ACC 1003, AN 228 / 54, p.52.
1 0 3 Letter, RIW to CPH, 26 February 1954, BL, ACC 1003, AN 228 / 54, p.53a.
1 04 Letters to CPH, BL. ACC 1003, AN 228 /54, p.53; pp.74-5; p.78; p.90; pp.82-3;.
1 05 Letter, RT to CPH, 4 April 1954, BL, ACC 1003, AN 228 / 54, p.87.
1 0 6 Letter, DR to Minister, 7 March 54, BL, ACC 1003, AN 228 /54, p. 117.
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health officer, not content to suggest the cause but also offering a
solution, wrote

Every effort should be made in seeking for a rare mosquito,
at present perhaps unknown to the scientists, which exists
in Australia in small numbers and in isolated areas. Thirty
years ago Australia rarely had a case of polio, presumably
because of its rarity here. In the period of years however,
these have slowly multiplied and so polio cases began to
appear in Australia. Polio cases would then become the
actual disseminators and the mosquito would be the indirect
carriers, in the same way as Malaria.
If circular letters were sent to all Local Health Authorities to
search carefully for any mosquitoes hibernating in bedrooms
where polio cases occurred and destroyed them by spray or
otherwise and forwarded them to your Department for tests,
some light might develop on the matter.
To assist the Health Inspectors, they would need a pair of
magnifying glasses in the form of spectacles ... 1 01
There is a connection in time, if not in fact, between the intensity
of the epidemic, manifestations of hysterical illness (see above p.
238 -239) and the number of unusual solutions put forward by the
members of the public. 108 The number of reported infections
1 0 7 Letter, JJS to CPH,

8 March 1 954, BL, ACC 1003, AN 228/54, pp.90-9 1 .
number of polio cases were reported in the weeks immediately
preceding the arrival of the royal party in Western Australia [Figure 20), a period
when community expectations and interest were at a peak, and alternative
solutions to the problem abounded. There was a higher level of infection, and
greater vigilance. but it is also true that the community expectations were at a
peak of excitement. One can only speculate at a possible link between the level
of anxiety in the community and vulnerability to the disease. The number of
reported cases declined markedly once the royal tour commenced, but the pattern
of the epidemic is consistent with that of 1956.
1 08 The largest
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declined rapidly, from the commencement of the tour, and did not
increase two weeks later as they had following the 1948 Royal
Show. Restrictions were lifted at the end of April. 1 09 The epidemic
had run its course, and the protective measures had been
effective.

The government sought the best possible medical advice to assist it
in planning for the continuation of the tour. The poliomyelitis
committee of the NH&MRC was invited to meet in Perth, which it
did from 10-12 March. As it happened, this was during the worst
phase of the epidemic. 1 1 0

Hosting this meeting in Western

Australia was a political coup. It provided the government with
impeccable medical advice with which to argue its case for the
continuation of the royal visit.

Snow and Miles gave reports to the committee, which was chaired
by the Director General of Health, former CPH for WA, Dr C.E.
Cook, who praised the approach to polio control that was taken by
his old department, suggesting that it serve as a model for other
states. I I I In connection with the royal visit to WA the NH&MRC
Committee recommended that

(a) The shaking of hands with Her Majesty and His Royal
Highness and the presentation of loyal addresses and
bouquets should be discouraged.
(b) The special precautions proposed by the West Australian
Department of Public Health should be applied in respect of

1 0 9 WA,

27 March 1 954, p.2; ST, 25 March 1954, p.6.
Public Health 1954, ( 1956). Appendix VIII, p.56, BL, 6 14.09 WES .
1 1 1 DN, 10 March 1 954, p. l ; Public Health 1954, ( 1 956). Appendix VIII, p.7, BL,
6 14.09 WES.
1 10

CHAPTER 6: A royal panic: 1 9 54

25 9
persons preparing and handling food for the the Royal Party;
(c) The arrival of the Gothic should be delayed as long as
possible and contact of the ship's company with the shore
should be reduced to a minimum. In addition it is desirable
that the Gothic be fully provisioned prior to departure for
Western Australia.
d) The Committee is of the opinion that Her Majesty should
not be subjected to undue fatigue. 1 1 2

The recommendations were conveyed to the Commissioner who
passed them on to the WA government. The recommendations of
the Public Health Department itself followed those of the
NH&MRC almost to the letter. Handshaking was to be eliminated,
the number of persons who prepared meals for the royal couple was
to be restricted and those chosen were to be subject to medical
examination and laboratory tests to ensure they were free of the
virus. In addition the Department recommended that the royal
couple receive injections of gamma globulin, that the Gothic be
provisioned with food before reaching Western Australia, and that
no shore leave be permitted to the crew for the duration of the
visit. 1 1 3

While the NH&MRC met more cases of polio were being reported
than ever before. An attempt was made to convince the public that
the outbreak was not as severe as that of 1 948, because a smaller
proportion of cases were paralytic. 1 1 4 The Premier declared that
the epidemic would not be allowed to stop the tour and the
Government did not intend to modify the programme for the visit
1
1
1

12 Public Health 1 954, ( 1956). Appendix VIII. pp.57-58, BL, 614.09 WES.
1 3 Public Health 1954, ( 1956). Appendix VIII, p.58, BL, 6 14.09 WES.
1 4 DN, 12 March 1954, p. l .
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At the time these decisions were being made, Betty Beazley, wife of
Fremantle MHR Kim Beazley and a former athlete of note, was
taken to hospital with polio. Her son Kim., who suffered from the
same illness, had Just been discharged and returned home . 1 1 6 The
Beazleys were among the many people who offered a theory about
those who caught polio, their belief being that it infected those
who became run down . 1 1 1

Mrs Beazley's condition was not

serious, but it was recalled with alarm that, on 15 February, she
had been in Canberra where she had shaken hands with the
queen. 1 1 8
The editor of the WestAustrallan wrote a leading article titled "The
Polio Danger" which advocated changes to the tour programme,
especially the Childrens' Review, which would -

. . . pack together children from different schools and different
suburbs - far more risky than if each school could be kept
together and properly separated from others - and it would
make them undergo an arduous day. In addition, the
potential danger would be increased by the inadequacy of
sanitary conveniences. 1 1 9
An alternative to the review, the editor believed, was to allow
children to see the queen as she passed by their school during the
many drives she would make around country districts and the
1 1 5 WA. 13 March 1954, p.l ; DN, 12 March 1954, p. l .
1 1 6 DN, 26 Februazy 1954, p. l .
1 1 7 DN, 5 March 1954, p. l .
1 1 8 DN, 27 Februazy 1954, second edition, p. l ; ABC 1V Social History
documentazy "TIME FRAME - Polio Days ", March 1997.
1 1 9 WA. 4 March 1954, p.2.
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metropolitan area. This arrangement would keep children apart

and would leave them within range of their usual conveniences.
There were six other major gatherings of children planned into the
royal itinerary, at Kalgoorlie, Boulder, Northam, York, Busselton
and Albany, and, with "dispersion rather than concentration of
crowds" as the

aim,

the editor suggested several means by which

small groups could be organised along routes that the royal party
would travel, even within the present schedule. So long as the
royal household was confident the tour should go ahead the editor
saw no reason for the West Australian administration to do
otherwise, but it was felt that it would be a . . . graceful gesture to offer to reduce to a minimum those
official presentations which will involve the Queen in the
personal contact of handshaking. 1 20
There were many who supported this approach to the tour. On the
same day as the editorial appeared the Premier announced that the
children's review would be replaced by setting up a series of
"strongposts" - positions near schools on a now expanded number
of routes to be taken by the royal entourage. The convoy would
slow as it passed these positions, thus providing a maximum
number of children with an opportunity to see queen. 1 2 1

Daily News columnist Mary Ferber provided a counter story. In
1948 Ferber took a lively interest in debating issues related to
polio. On this occasion she was more ready than others to ask the
1 20

WA. 4 March 1954, p.2.

1 2 1 WA. 4 March 1954, p. 1; DN, 5 March 1954, p. l .
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Should Western Australia sing: "We don't want to lose you,
but we don't think you ought to come?" As the polio
epidemic grows worse, anxiety must inevitably centre on the
Royal visit to Perth. Is it not so much fear that infection
could in any way be allowed to menace the Queen herself,
but that the presence of the Queen must mean crowds, long
waiting crowds. And polio loves crowds, weariness and
impromptu hygtenic arrangements. 122
Ferber reminded her readers that once before a royal visit had been
cancelled. The earlier occasion she referred to was the 1948 visit of
George VI, which was abandoned because of the king's ill
health. 123 On that occasion the grief of the community was
expressed in a cartoon by Davies in the Sunday Times . Under the
title "Any Offers?" there was depicted the window of a men's wear
shop in which, on an empty rack, hung a dress suit; next to it is
placed striped trousers, a top hat and gloves. At floor level stood a
sign which read "For Sale, Cheap" ( Figure 2 l ]. 124

West

Australians seemed to be greatly concerned with what they would
wear to greet the queen, and Ferber knew this.
We went through all the pangs and blisses of invitations,
curtsies, buying model frocks for her and dress suits for him.
We've done it again.
We could weather another
disappointment if it were necessruy and desirable. I 25
In 1948 Ferber did not resile from prompting the authorities to
122 DN, 1 March 1954, p.10. "Monday Commentary".
123 Doig, R.H. , BL. OH 2144, p.356. The visit had been postponed twice, in 1948
due to King George VI's illness, and again in 1952. when he died. Planning for
the tour began late in 1952.
124 ST, 28 November 1948, p.4.
125 DN. 1 March 1954, p.10.
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style.
As I have said before in the matter of the polio epidemic all
we have to do is to do what we are told. We don't want to
put any words into the mouths of the Royal tour officials,
who are far from likely to under-estimate any kind of
precautions. This royal visit is most importantly for the
children, whom we can't stop from going to see her. But if it
were decided that her tour should be postponed, we wouldn't
quarrel with that decision. 1 2 6
While the government proceeded to make changes to the children's
review, it remained resistant to the thought that the tour should
be cancelled entirely. 1 2 1
Neither the state nor the federal government, which faced an
election one month after the tour was to end, would have wanted
to take the politically unpopular decision to abandon the tour.
Under the circumstances it would have been difficult for the the
royal household to convince the organisers that the visit be
abandoned.

But the British prime minister, Sir Winston

Churchill, and the queen's surgeon, Commander D.D. Steele
Perkins Joined forces to in an attempt to do so.
Early in March the first of two high level consultations regarding
the WA tour were held in Melbourne. In attendance were the
federal director of the royal tour, Lieutenant General Benyman,
the private secretary to the queen, Sir Michael Adeane, and the
1 2 6 DN, 1 March 1954, p. 10.
1 2 7 WA, 4 March 1954, p. l .
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state director of the royal tour, Mr R.H. Doig. 8 The consultation
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revised the plans for the childrens' review. "Polio Brings Royal
Assent to Tour Change" announced the the West Australian
headline, 1 2 9 and alongside the article published a picture of small
school children washing their hands. The .proposed changes were
"designed to save children from infection", should the epidemic
remain unabated by the time the queen arrtved. 1 30
The next day an editorial appeared the West Australian in which
the changes were applauded, but the warning was given that Perth

. .. cannot feel it has heard the last of cancellations, or at
least revisions, made necessaiy by the present epidemic. 1 3 1
The editorial emphasised the reduction of risks to children, and
made less of the question of risks to the queen. The idea was
promoted that the real danger of infection lay in the gathering of
crowds of children from different locations, in potentially
unsanitary contexts, rather than in formal greetings extended by
adults to the queen.
As the date for the royal tour drew closer the epidemic increased in
1 2 8 DN, 3 March 1954, p. l .
1 2 9 WA, 5 March 1954, p. l .

130 WA, 5 March 1954, p.l.
1 3 1 WA, 6 March 1954, p.2. Two sub-editorials followed on the same page. One
concerned the risks to the public through unhygienic practices in connection
with food, and the other was a dissertation on the strengths and weaknesses of
" McCarthyism". Perhaps the policies of Senator McCarthy, and those of the
Communism he sought to combat, were considered to be equally dangerous each could infect the public, which had to maintain its vigilance in the face of
them and keep its hands clean.

CHAPTER 6 : A royal panic: 1 954

265
intensity. The month of March began inauspiciously, and ended
with the worst tally of cases on record. Eighty-six cases of polio
were reported in the first twelve days, and the second of four

deaths to occur took place. 1 32 As the number of infections grew,

and debate over the tour raged, the level of public fear rose. The
day before the queen arrived "a polio conscious scrawler" , painted a
cross on the doors of the Government House Ballroom with the
words "May the Lord have mercy on us all" and "Bring out your
dead". 1 3 3
The WestAustraltan editorialised on the subject for the third time.
The paper recognised the conflict involved and did not envy the
decision-makers their job.

Although some reservations were

expressed, particularly concerning the risks to children, it
supported the continuation of the tour.
If there were any strong possibility of there being what even
the most conservative would call a sizable increase in the
number of polio cases during the visit, the Government
would have been justified in asking that the tour in this
State be called off. . .. the aim must be to carry it through
with a minimum of risk to the Royal party and to the people
of the State. 1 3 4
Within a week the Commissioner and R.H. Doig were summoned
to Adelaide for a second meeting called to review the tour
arrangements. 1 3 5

They were requested to provide the federal

Minister in charge of the royal tour (Harrison) and the royal
1 32 WA,

10 March 1954, p.1.
DN, 25 March 1954, p.1.
1 3 4 WA, 13 March 1954, p.2.
1 3 5 Doig. R.H., BL, OH 2 144, p.356.
1 33
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epidemic, and the plans for the visit to Western Australia. 1 3 6
The men from Western Australia walked into an ambush. An
ultimatum was issued that the tour would go ahead only on
certain conditions which WA would have to agree to. Doig, who
had no prior knowledge of the conditions, had not been authorised
to make changes to the arrangements agreed to by cabinet. He
telephoned Premier Hawke who flatly refused to budge. 1 3 7 Doig
reported his premier's intransigence to the meeting and Harrison,
who strongly favoured cancelling the tour, said In other words, Mr Doig, you are saying that your Premier
considers the Queen's health to be a secondary
consideratlon? l 3 8
Doig protested that this was not Hawke's view, but he had not
authorised any changes to the program. The argument became
deadlocked.

Late-night sessions culminated in Harrison,

Berryman and Doig being summoned to Government House for
further consultations, but with no result.
Hawke advised his men that they were to return to Perth. Cabinet
had authorised the premier to finalise the matter on the basis of
their agreed changes.

The regular meeting was scheduled for

Tuesday 23 March but the premier was requested to call a special
meeting for Monday, 22 March in order to ratify any proposed
1 3 6 WA, 18 March 1954, p. l ; WA. 19 March 1954, p. l .
1 3 7 Doig. R.H. • BL, OH 2144, p.356.
1 3 8 Doig, R.H . • BL, OH 2144, pp.356-7.
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The leader of the opposition, Sir Ross McLarty,

publicly supported the premier's wish to see the tour continue as
planned. 1 40

In the final event cabinet did not meet and the

premier was not consulted. Changes were made to the programme
and the WA government had to accept them.
"Tour Alterations Seen as Political Football" read the Daily News
headline. Differences of opinion were reported between the queen's
surgeon and the Commissioner over the degree of risk involved for
the queen. But political game playing was seen to be the main
reason for a lack of decision The visit of the Queen and Duke of Edinburgh is still in
doubt because no one is willing to take the responsibility for
any drastic curtailment or cancellation of the tour through
the poliomyelitis epidemic. This is seen as the reason for the
delay in issuing an official statement from the conference
that took place here last night. The Commonwealth
Government is not anxious to make a decision to cancel or
alter the tour - scheduled to begin next Friday, for fear that
it may anger the people of Western Australia. This could be
a disadvantageous move with the Government facing an
election the month after the Queen is due to leave
Australia. 1 4 1
Eileen Travis, the special correspondent for the British paper the
Daily Mall, was in Adelaide for the royal visit. Her reports were

probably influential in the British press becoming so alarmed over
the polio epidemic in Western Australia. Travis cabled her opinion
that the tour to Western Australia should be cancelled. She also
reported that the queen was not worried about the risks to her own
1 39 WA. 20 March 1 954, p. l ;
1 40 DN, 22 March 1954, p. l .
14 1 DN, 20 March 1954, p. l .

DN, 22 March 1954, p. l .

CHAPTER 6: A royal panic: 1 954

268

health and would go along with whatever was arranged for her, but
was vecy concerned of the effect the tour might have on others. 1 42
Perhaps if the queen was thought to be concerned about the risks

to children it would strengthen the case for cancelling the tour.
The Adelaide papers made fair sport of the situation, giving the
impression to the world, said Premier Hawke, that "Western
Australia was riddled with disease". He replied that the percentage
of population affected by polio in Western Australia was currently
less than it was when the queen visited Canberra. 1 43 On the same
page as this, obviously in an attempt to offset negative publicity, it
was announced that the the governor, Sir Charles Gairdner, had
sent an assurance of loyalty to the queen, who had replied that
she was eagerly anticipating her visit to WA. If the queen was not
worried, no one else need panic.
Despite the deadlocked meeting, the plans rejected by the West
Australian delegates were already going ahead. Unofficial news
was received that the Gothic had been provisioned in Adelaide and
was about to make an early departure for WA, a sure signal that,
unless the epidemic suddenly worsened, the royal tour was going
ahead. 1 44
Prior to their departure for Perth, the royal couple, their household
and members of staff under the age of thirty-five, received a second
injection of gamma globulin, the first having been administered
1 42 DN, 20 March 1954, p. l .
143 WA, 23 March 1954, p. l .
1 44 WA, 23 March 1954, p. l .
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Doctors from Melbourne and

Sydney questioned the validity of giving the injections. 1 46 The
Commissioner agreed with them; he did not want to support
changes to the tour plans, or have to deal with a run on the
serum. He stated that gamma globulin, which was difficult to
produce in large quantities, was an unproven preventative, the
protective powers of which were limited.

Supplies were being

issued to those who were regarded as being exposed to special
risks, but it was quite useless for those who had already become
infected. 1 4 7
At the instigation of Harrison, the Commonwealth director of the
tour, Prime Minister Menzies flew to Adelaide to intervene.
Menzies held consultations concerning the tour arrangements,
unencumbered by the presence of Hawke's men. He discussed the
arrangements in detail with Harrison, who by now must have been
exhausted but pleased to be getting his own way, and then dined
with the queen and presented his views. Late on Monday night,
without having conferred with the WA cabinet, Menzies announced
the changes to the tour.
The Gothic will be used as headquarters in Western Australia
for the Queen and the Duke of Edinburgh, the Royal
household and staff, and Press representatives going on from
Australia.
For the crew and other naval staff, the Gothic will be a
restricted ship and permission to go ashore will be confined
to those on duty.
1 4 5 WA, 24 March 1954, p. l ;
1 46 DN, 25 March 1954, p.2.
1 4 7 DN, 25 March 1954, p.9.

DN, 23 March 1954, p. l .
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All meals taken ashore by the Queen and the Duke and the
Royal household and staff will be from food prepared in the
Gothic and brought ashore.
Indoor functions will be limited to formal functions such as
the Executive Council meetings. Attendance at other indoor
functions such as the church service and Parliamentary
dinner, will be cancelled and, where possible, suitable
alternative arrangements will be made.
Shaking of hands will be eliminated.
Where a child is to present a bouquet the child should walk
towards the Queen but should retain the bouquet or place it
in some suitable position. 148
These decisions, which highlighted the safety of the queen rather
than the children, differed from the wishes of the WA Government
in several respects, and from the proposals of the Public Health
Department and the polio committee of the NH&MRC.
The use of the Gothic as the royal headquarters was an innovation.
The deletion of the Parliamentary Dinner at Government House
and the church service at St George's cathedral were also new
arrangements, but the plan to utilise trips to and from the ship to
provide opportunities for the population to see the queen was an
idea already under discussion. 149
The Menzies scheme allowed the tour to proceed, thus satisfying
the felt need for children to see the queen, but forced a greater
separation between the royals and the public. Menzies built upon
148 WA, 23 March 1954, p. l. Press statement by the Prime Minister, M, A462 / 4.
825 / 1 4/48. p. 9; Record of events affecting WA programme resulting from
poliomyelitis epidemic 1954, 22 March 1954, M, A462 /4, 825/ 1 4 /48. pp.22-24 ..
149 WA, 24 March 1954, p. l .
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decisions already in place, such as the elimination of hand
shaking, restriction of the movement of the ship's crew and the
provisioning of the Gothic from outside Western Australia.
The changes won the approval of the British government.

A

personal message from Sir Winston Churchill was cabled to
Menzies which expressed "deep appreciation" for the advice given to
the queen and the the stringent precautions put in place.

It

concluded with
Your friends and colleagues here realise fully all the
difficulties you had to contend with and so appreciate your
action the more. We are thankful you were at the helm. 1 5 0
Neither government wanted to risk the unpopular move of making
changes to the tour, but Menzies "grasped the nettle". He justified
his actions by showing that Premier Hawke had not taken
seriously enough the expert information provided to him, that his
plans for the tour were still too conservative, and that the queen
was exposed to too grave a risk. He said To do him [Hawke] justice, I must say that I am informed
that the Premier does not believe himself that the risk of
infection is great.
However, as Her Majesty's Prime Minister, I cannot allow
that opinion to weigh against the recommendations of the
poliomyelitis committee of the National Health and Medical
Research Council, of the the Premier's own Commissioner of
Health, who, in a report on February 25 described the
outbreak as a major epidemic which was expected to worsen
in the following month or two. 1 5 1
1 5 0 Cablegram, Stephen Holmes to Menzies, 24 March 1954, M. A462/4,

825 / 14/48, no page number,
1 5 1 WA, 23 March 1 954, p. l .
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The premier responded angrtly, claiming unnecessary interference,
but he was accused of wanting someone else to make the
decision. 1 5 2 While he disapproved, in the end Hawke had no
option but to go along with the changes imposed.

Western

Australia fell in with the new plans, which Doig re-drafted on his
way home from Adelaide, 1 5 3 and the premier announced ... the State Government would co-operate fully with the
people of the State in giving to the Queen and the Duke of
Edinburgh a very warm, loyal and friendly welcome in
accordance with the best traditions of Western Australia. 1 54
His strong resistance to any changes had been based on the advice
of the Public Health Department, which in turn had gathered
support from several sources. 1 5 5 And his expressed concern had
always been for the safety of the children and people of Western
Australia.
The next day the Cabinet released a statement aimed to leave no
doubt in the public mind that it was enraged by Menzies'
intervention. Insult had apparently been added to injury in the
way the decisions were conveyed to Western Australia.
The Cabinet expressed strong resentment at the fact that at
no stage before he made his decision had Mr Menzies made
any attempt to discuss the matter with the Premier (Mr
1 52 WA, 23 March 1954, p. l . Notes for press release, M. A462/4, 825 / 14 /48,

p.2, " . . . it was indicated by the Premier of WA that he wanted someone else to
make the decision".
1 5 3 Doig, R.H., BL, OH 2144, p.357.
1 54 WA, 23 March 1954, p. l .
1 5 5 Doig, R.H., BL, OH 2144, p.355. "Hawke took the view, right from the start
that the risk was minimal".
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Hawke), which it is claimed he could easily have done by an
Adelaide-Perth telephone conversation.
The Cabinet also expressed resentment at the fact that the
Premier had received his first advice last night [Tuesday 23
March) of the decisions made by Mr Menzies from a Perth
Newspaper office, about half and hour before he had received
any official advice from Mr Menzies. 1 56

But telephoning Hawke who, as Doig had made clear, was
adamant in his view, would have served little purpose. And the
return of his men to Perth had signalled that, as far as he was
concerned, the discussion was over.
The editor of the Daily News, who loyally supported the WA
government as the final, responsible authority regarding tour
arrangements, was scathing of the forces that had overridden the
premier. 1 57 A not so successful attempt was made to turn the
tables on the prime minister. Since the information on which the
final action was based was known a month before the tour began,
Menzies, the Commonwealth authorities, and presumably the royal
household, should have made their decision sooner. The editor
wrote . ..on February 25 the Commissioner of Health in Western
Australia had described the outbreak as a major epidemic
which was expected to worsen in the course of a month or
so. . .
. . . that being so, action should have been taken at the end of
February instead of leaving the public and all concerned in
this State in doubt until the proverbial eleventh hour. 1 5 8
1 56

WA, 24 March 1954, p. l .
28 March 1954, p.8.
1 5 8 DN, 28 March 1954, p.8.

1 5 7 DN.
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The editor accepted that, in the light of information provided by
the Commissioner, the local administration had thought out all
the implications and decided it was safe to go ahead with the tour.
He took the opportunity to point out that polio was equally as rife
in Canberra, New South Wales, and Victoria, 1 59 so that if other
states had planned as thoroughly as Western Australia, changes
would have been made to tour arrangements in those places.
Western Australia, it appeared, had been "scapegoated", and this
had happened, it now emerged, on the advice of the queen's
medical advisor. The state's reputation for being a healthy place
had been damaged, but, after all this,
. . .it has not in any way dampened our enthusiasm or our
demonstration of affection for the Royal Visitors to whom we
are proud to be hosts. 1 60
The Public Health Department acknowledged that much of its
thinking and planning had been rendered redundant by the
Adelaide conference and the inteiventions of the prime minister. 1 6 1
However its thorough research and preparation had assisted the
government in its planning, and during the arduous negotiations
over the tour. It provided them with a sound basis for discussion
and decision making even though others interpreted the data
differently and used it against them.
Figure 3, Chapter 2 above. NSW had 562, Victoria 572, Queensland 1 40, SA
1 74 and the ACT 26, the second highest total on record.
1 6 0 DN, 28 March 1954, p.8.
1 6 1 Public Health 1954, ( 1956). Appendix VIII, p.58, BL, 614.09 WES.

1 59
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While decision makers struggled over the future of the tour, public
discussion of safety issues continued. A party of passengers who
arrived at Fremantle in transit from Cape Town followed the advice
of the port health officer and kept their children on board ship,
rather than risk infection on land. 162 The south west town of
Bridgetown, not far from Noggerup, banned all children under
fourteen from attending the local picture theatre.

They also

applied to the Commissioner for the power to quarantine for
fourteen days any people who visited an infected area, that is, who
travelled outside the road board boundaries. 163 The move was
aimed to restrict residents from travelling to Perth, or to nearby
districts to see the queen.
Warnings were issued against the use of roller towels, which came
in for special criticism from Snow. He said they were "the most
criminal type of towel " l 64 provided for public use and
recommended that every public convenience be fitted with
disposable towels.
Swimming in Lake Monger and the Swan River were strongly
discouraged by the Health Department, while correspondents aired
their views and fears concerning the handling of food in the public
domain, the use of dirty taps, and drinking from public

162 WA, 5 March 1954, p.8.
163 WA. 24 March 1954, p. l .
164 WA, 5 March 1954, p.3.
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fountains. 1 6 5 A correspondent to the papers suggested that street
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drinking fountains should have foot operated taps, to minimised
the possibility of contamination. In reply the Health Department

said that, though the idea had merit, it was impossible to
implement it quickly enough to make any difference to this
epidemic.
The churches also joined the fray.

Having previously offered

special prayers for the queen's safety, and also prayers for polio

sufferers, because of the epidemic the two subjects now came
together.

The Revd Ralph Sutton, superintendent minister at

Wesley Church indicated that if the epidemic worsened -

The World Council of Churches would be approached to
organise prayers on a State-wide basis. 1 66
Letters to the editor in the daily papers represented both opinions that the tour be cancelled, and that it continue. Many based their
reasoning on patriotic grounds. Others, in a manner reminiscent
of the 1 948 epidemic, reflected that there were cases of polio in
other states when the queen had visited and hygienic practices

were being breached in the community every day, leading, they

thought, to the obvious conclusion that the tour should go

ahead. 1 6 7 One such,"Worrted", wrote -

I hope nothing will be be done to cancel the Royal visit
unless it is of the gravest necessity, endangering not only

1 6 5 WA, 9 March 1954, p.13; WA, 5 March 1954, p.3; WA, 6 March 1954, p.11;
WA. 10 March 1954, p.9.
1 66 DN, 15 March 1954, p.2.
1 6 7 WA. 4 March 1954, p.7; 6 March 1954, p. 1 6; 13 March 1954, p.9.
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If the epidemic is a matter of faecal contamination, how does
it account for the scattered nature of the cases? Unless we
have complete isolation, what other precautions can avail?
Hospital visiting, school attendance, etc., have not ceased.
People with children, or having contact with them, are on
public conveyances. People still attend church, cinema, and
crowd into the shopping areas.
This is not the only State with polio at the present time, and
the spreading out of crowds, (with children at points
involving the least travelling, and mixing mainly with those
already of their group) should be as good a safeguard as any
agatnst increase. 1 6 8
On Friday 26 March 1954 the royal tour to Western Australia
commenced according to the Menzies recommendations. The local
newspapers eulogised the royal couple, and trumpeted the welcome
they were afforded by their loyal Western Australian subjects.
The cancellation of the service in St George's cathedral was
regarded, particularly by the dean, as the most disappointing
aspect of the changes.

The question was asked as to why a

"suitable alternative", such as a service in the open air, could not
have been substituted. Dean Bell announced that the service, a
harvest thanksgiving, would be held as planned. The governor
would read the first lesson, as intended, but without the royal
couple present. He urged those invited to still plan to attend, with
the words "I would like people to remember that God will still be
there". 1 6 9
While Dean Bell believed that God would still be at the cathedral,
1 68
1 69

WA. 12 March 1954, p.6.
DN, 23 March 1954, p. l.
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during her stay in Western Australia the queen would not reside at
Government House.

She was to be housed on the Gothic.

A

photograph of the government house bedroom which had been
prepared for the queen but was no longer required was published
over the plaintive caption "Where she would have slept". 1 10
As the royal tour had progressed through the eastern states the
Women's Weekly had provided its readership with a rich diet of

stories accompanied by photos of the queen in the company of
Governors, Archbishops, and crowds of people. Western Australia
received very different treatment from correspondent Anne
Matheson, who took an entirely different line. The only picture to
appear was the one of Raewyn Coppin, and there followed an
article headed "Family Picnic Atmosphere in Perth" which now
reads like a send up the event.
A refrigerated ice-cream van in the Royal progress through
Perth set the family picnic atmosphere that persisted
throughout the Queen's Western Australian tour.
The van carried a picnic lunch and dinner for the Queen and
the Royal Household, specially prepared on board the Gothic.
The Queen's "quarantine diet" was a cold collation for both
lunch and dinner. Even table linen and cutlery were brought
from the Gothic.
The meals were prepared by her page, sergeant footman and
footman who kept the required six feet away from all
members of the Government House staff while they set the
table and served the meal.
The Queen and the Duke and the Royal Household lunched
and dined in a private dining room while the Governor of
Western Australia, Sir Charles Gairdner, and the
1 70 DN, 23 March 1954, p. l .
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Honourable Lady Gairdner, and their staff, dined alone.

The Queen and her household had fairy toast, since no fresh
bread was eaten on their polio precaution diet. Although the
salads were brought in the Gothic to Western Australia, they
were carefully washed and prepared in a very slight antiseptic
solution that was quite tasteless.
Grapes were all peeled before being eaten and no fresh water
placed on the table. I 7 1

was

Matheson went on to report on the "keep your distance" and "no
handling" rules in action, assuring her readers that because of
them the reception lines lost none of their dignity, even though the
queen and the Duke shook hands with no-one.
When it came to planting a tree in King's Park, and laying a
wreath at the War Memorial, all those who prepared items for her
wore gloves. It was agreed the queen would wear gloves, for added
protection during the ceremonies, and discard them afterwards. At
the investiture ceremony, which took place out of doors as a
precaution against polio, the queen broke the rules, discarded her
gloves and "touched all whom when invested with honours" . 1 12
The arrangements for the tour were controversial, but after it was
all over, the state Director, R.H. Doig conceded that, because of
the extra travelling to and from Fremantle, "a lot more people saw
the Queen". 1 73
In June the Commissioner wrote to Commander Steel-Perkins, the
1 7 1 Women's Weekly, 7 April
1 7 2 Women's Weekly, 7 April
1 73 Doig, R.H., BL, OH 2 144,

1954, no page number
1954, no page number
p.357.
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physician who had accompanied the queen on the tour. 1 7 4

CHAPTER

Referring to an enclosed histogram of the incidence polio the
Commissioner had to admit that although the epidemic had
declined fairly rapidly after the tour, it had not subsided
completely.

He remarked on the low rates of paralysis and

mortality and especially drew attention to the department's
championing of the faecal contamination theocy, and the fact that
the incidence of polio had not risen following the tour. He wrote ...it is clear that the unusual collection of crowds in the
metropolitan area during the week of the Tour did not in any
way affect the course of the epidemic and did not produce a
rise in the number of cases notified ...
You will perhaps recall that this Department insisted in its
publicity and propaganda that epidemic poliomyelitis should
be regarded and treated as a faecal disease and that the
methods for its control should be designed accordingly. I 7 5
The Commissioner reiterated "there can be no doubt that the Royal
Tour did not in any way produce an increased incidence of the
disease" and used this to justify his Department's policies. "We
are reassured by the feeling that our labours have not been
altogether in vain" he said. 1 76

If there had been a clash with

Steel-Perkins before the WA tour began, the Commissioner found
some opportunity from these results to rub his nose in it now.
During the 1954 epidemic vecy few photos of polio victims appeared
in the press. No doubt the editors were aware that the community
1 7 4 Letter, CPH to Steel-Perkins, 24 June 1954, BL, ACC 1003, AN 228 / 54,
pp. 162-165, Memo attached to Minister of Health.
1 75 Letter, CPH to Steel-Perkins, 24 June 1954,BL. ACC 1003, AN 228 /54. p.163.
1 7 6 Letter, CPH to Steel-Perkins, 24 June 1954,BL, ACC 1003, AN 228 /54. p.163.
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did not want to be reminded of the scourge of paralysis, and, as
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was the case in 1 948, when attention was given to the subject it
tended to be stories with an element of heroism.
Near the end of February, when the Red Cross March Appeal was
about to commence, there appeared a picture of students at the
Lady Lawley Cottage school. The cottage, which was run by the
Red Cross, was home to children who were receiving after-care for
polio or cerebral palsey. 1 1 1 The school, run by the head teacher
Mrs Miller, had formed a percussion band to enable the students
to develop better muscle co-ordination. Rather like present day
Telethon appeals, the picture of the band was presented as a
motivator for fund-raising.

The photo, which included many

children wearing orthotic devices, was pictured over the caption,
"Spastics Play In Own Band" . 1 78 A week later, once more in the
interests of the Red Cross March Appeal, a nine-year-old boy
named Herbert, who was infected with polio in 1 948 and had spent
long periods of time at Lady Lawley Cottage receiving physiotherapy
treatment, was pictured with two young girls, Patty and Anne over
the caption "Despite Infirmity, Herbert is Bright and Cheerful" . 1 79
Finally, near the end of the epidemic, Dr John Colebatch, who had
polio in 1 953, while working as medical registrar at the IDH. was
pictured with a frame that he had designed to enable him to move
1 77 Marshall, J. ( 1996). Starting With Threep ence, p.47; Stewart, N. ( 1966). The

Lady Lawley Cottage By The Sea 1902-1966, unpublished manuscript held at
Lady Lawley Cottage. Arrangements for the after-care of crippled children in
Western Australia were strengthened in 1927 when the Children's Hospital
formed a link with Lady Lawley Cottage, a convalescent home for children that
had been established in the seaside suburb of Cottesloe in 1902.
1 78 DN, 23 February 1954, p.7.
1 79 DN, 1 March 1954, p. l .

CHAPTER 6: A royal panic: 1954

282

about his house. The heading for his photo read "Doctor Polio
victim Sets High Example". From such an heroic context came
Colebatch's advice to all. He said "throw off your pessimism, and
determine to help yourself'. l 8 0
The will to overcome the effects of polio was strongly present in
individual lives during 1954, as it was present in the minds of
political leaders who planned to go ahead with royal tour, despite
the real and potential risks to the queen and members of the
community. Although the community was divided over the matter,
a strong consensus in favour of the tour proceeding remained. The
interconnection between the timing of the tour and the rise of the
epidemic created an unprecedented level of frustration for
administrators, politicians and members of the community alike.
The Public Health Department, which aimed to avoid the criticisms
it suffered in 1948, endeavoured to keep the public informed about
polio, the precautions to take, and the course of the epidemic. But
it did not have things its own way. The coming tour stimulated
more public debate than might otherwise have occurred and the
department felt more pressure than it was expecting.
The fear of polio, which reached hysterical proportions in the lead
up to the royal tour, was ever present during the 1954 epidemic.
The tour exacerbated the fear, and made it difficult for the Premier
and the Public Health Department to maintain their "minimal
risks" approach. In the end they lost out to British based fears for
the safety of the Queen. And since children were considered the
l 8 0 DN, 13 April 1954, p. l .
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most likely to transmit the polio virus, her "white-gloved hand"
waved from afar and "touched no-one" except some politicians and
other dignitaries.

***
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Figure 18: Public Health 1 954 , (1956). Government Printer, Perth,
Appendix VIII, p.63, BL, 614.09 WES .
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Figure 19: WA, 22 Februazy 1954, p.2.
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Figure 20: Public Health 1 954, (1956). Appendix VIII, p.62 , BL,
614.09 WES .
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Figure 21: Sunday Times, 28 November 1948, p.4.
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The 1956 polio epidemic was the last to occur in Western Australia
before mass immunisation quelled the activities of the virus. The
short, sharp and painful epidemic was handled very effectively by
the Public Health Department, which had gained expertise and
resources from the experience of the previous two outbreaks.
Because it did not last a year, as in 1948, and was not associated
with a major event, as in 1954, the 1956 epidemic was reported
and commented upon less than the previous two. An added factor
was that news about polio concentrated on the preparations for
the immunisation campaign rather than the progress of the
epidemic.
The news about Salk vaccine stirred the hope that immunisation
would soon rid the world, of polio's curse. A report was published
which revealed the results of an American survey in which, in a six
month period of 1955, the incidence of polio amongst eight-year
olds was shown to be 52% less than for the same period in 1954,
the difference being attributed to Salk vaccine. I

In 1955 it had

been announced that Salk vaccine would be introduced into
Western Australia within a year, following successful mass trials
conducted America. 2

While the polio virus was notoriously

unpredictable, it is possible that, with the promise of relief in
sight, the community had begun to lapse into a sense of false
security.
l WA. 24 December 1955, p 8.
2 Public Health 1 955, ( 1956 ). Appendix VII. p.55.
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West Australians were used to long gaps between polio epidemics.
There were ten years between the initial flurry of activity in 1938
and the first major outbreak in 1948, and it was a further six years
before the next epidemic in 1954. Although the incidence had been
higher than usual between 1948 and 1954, only thirty three cases
of polio were confirmed in 1955, the lowest for more than a decade
[Figure 22].3
The shadow of the impending disaster began to fall before the close
of 1955 as reports of the activity of the polio virus were received by
the Public Health Department. After New Year the number cases
began to increase and on 5 January 1956 the Commissioner, Dr
Henzell, had the unpleasant responsibility of announcing that two
very young boys, one each from the country and the city, had died
at the IDH, and that two adults at the hospital were receiving
respiratory su pport. 4

He informed the public of these

developments, recommended that high standards of hygiene be
maintained and called for prompt attention to cases of sickness.

The incidence of polio infections continued to rise and very soon
3 Public Health 1 955, (1956). Appendix VII, p.55. The annual number of cases
reported 1949 - 1953 were 61.59,96,37, and 44 respectively, an annual average of
59.4.
4 WA, 5 January 1956, p. l .
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more stringent precautions were in place. 5 As before, the papers
resorted militaristic imagery: "Public Told How To Fight Polio"
announced the WestAustralian . 6 The Commissioner recommended
that tonsillectomies be deferred, that gatherings involving the
mingling of children from different districts be postponed, and that
the public maintain strict standards of hand hygiene.1

The epidemic was notably severe and intense. A total of 401 cases
of polio occurred, of which 359 were reported during the first three
months of the year; 151 in January, 143 in February, and 65 in
March. 8
There was a disturbing increase in the number of paralytic
infections, added to which it was found that the age of those
affected by polio had also risen.

Of the 172 paralytic cases

recorded in 1956, 150 were reported during the first three months
of the epidemic. Worse still, the majority of those paralysed were
young adults, an indication that the behaviour pattern of the
virus, or the virus itself, had changed. A total of twelve deaths
occurred during the year, (a mortality rate of 3%), compared with
twenty five in 1948 (8%), and four in 1954 (1%).

5 DN, 20 Januruy 1956, p. l , "Five more makes it 60" .
6 WA, 17 Januruy 1956, p. l .

7 WA, 1 7 Januruy 1956, p. l ; DN, 14 Januruy 1956, p. l .
B PubUc Health 1956, (1958). Appendix VII, Table II, p.55.

1 956
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During January, the most severe month, the number of infections
CHAPTER 7: A savage storm:

increased rapidlyg and by the beginning of February there had been
151 cases of which 70 had been diagnosed as paralytic. 1 0 This
avalanche of paralytic cases, many of whom were adults rather
than children, 1 1 heavily taxed existing physiotherapy and
respirator services. 1 2 Physiotherapists curtailed their leave and
returned to the IDH to assist with the emergency. Facilities, such
as the therapeutic pool that had been built at the IDH, were in
constant use. Over an article headed "Pool Never More Vital" the
Dally News placed a photo captioned "Polio fight Goes On". 1 3 The
language of combat cast polio as a public enemy.

The greater number of deaths recorded in 1956, compared with
1954, was a direct result of the severe paralysis and attendant
respiratory cases. By the end of February eight deaths had been
recorded, 1 4 and in mid March a twenty-four year-old expectant
mother became the ninth. 1 5 More deaths followed. 1 6 Every effort
9 WA.

19 January 1956, p. l ; 21 January 1956, p. l ; 24 January 1956, p. l .

1 0 Public Health 1 956, ( 1958). Appendix VII. p.55; DN ,3 February 1956, p. l .

1 1 DN. 15 February 1956, p. l .
1 2 WA. I 8 January 1956, p. l .
1 3 DN, 1 1 February, 1956, p.6
1 4 DN, 27 February 1956, p. l .

1 5 WA. 13 March 1956, p. l .
1 6 WA. 5 April 1956, p. 10; WA. 25 April 1956, p.6.
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was made to provide the thirty two people who required it with

respiratory support, and by this means many lives were saved. The
death rate was less than half that of 1948, but the total of twelve
was three times that recorded in 1954. Despite this, Western
Australia did not lose many people to polio, compared with other
places. The Dally News published a story from Buenos Aires which
told of 138 deaths from polio. 1 1

From the outset of the epidemic the Public Health Department, in
consultation with the State Poliomyelitis Advisory Committee
(SPAC), applied the usual methods of control.

Patients were

isolated, child contacts were placed under "house and garden"
quarantine, gamma globulin was administered to those who had
been in contact with paralytic cases, less severe cases were treated
at home and tonsillectomies were deferred. Increased emphasis
was given to the importance of hand hygiene, while organised
gatherings of children and young people were cancelled. 1 8
Three aspects of this epidemic were notable and alarming. The
first, and perhaps the most significant, was that the causative
virus was difficult to identify. It was eventually named as Leon, or
Type III, a variety unknown in any previous Australian epidemic. 1 9

1 7 DN, 13 March 1 956, p. l .
1 8 Public Health 1956, (1958). Appendix VII, p.53.
1 9 Public Health 1956, (1958). Appendix VII, p.52.
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At the end of 1955 the Children's Hospital reported the occurrence
of a few atypical cases of illness which were thought to be due to
"polio or related viruses". 2 0 Any uncertainties that existed were
aggravated by the fact that Western Australia still did not have its
own diagnostic laboratory and had to wait some time to gather the
results of any testing, a fact bewailed by the Public Health
Department.2 1 Dr J .A.R. Miles had formerly assisted with virus
diagnosis, but his departure from the Institute of Medical and
Veterinary Science at Adelaide caused Snow to seek help from Dr
A. Ferris of the Epidemiological Research Unit at the Fairfield
Infectious Diseases Hospital in Melbourne.
A month after the first samples were sent to Melbourne the virus
had still not been identified, and the situation was regarded as
very grave.2 2 More samples were sent for analysis and eventually
the causative virus was identified as Type JII. 2 3

The same virus

was subsequently found to be present in the majority of fifty
samples of faeces and paired sera that the Public Health
Department sent to Melbourne for analysis. 2 4 The serial spot map
for 1956, [Figure 23 ) suggests that paralysis from Type III infections
occurred largely in suburbs north and east of the rtver.2 5
The second disturbing feature of the epidemic was that a higher
2OLetter, DJR Snow to A Ferris, 8 December 1955, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120 / 4.
270/54, p.78.
2 1 Public Health 1956, (1958). Appendix VII. p.52.
22 Letter. DJR Snow to A Ferris, 6 January 1956, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120 /4,
270/54, p.79.
2 3 WA. 17 February 1956, p. l .
2 4 Public Health 1 956, ( 1958). Appendix VII. p.53.
2 5 Public Health 1956, (1958). Appendix VII, p.53.
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proportion of young adults were affected by paralysis. The greatest
proportion of cases, 60% , occurred in the 1 5-34 age range, 1 5% in
the 2 5-29 age group. 2 6 Young adult males from rural districts,

who in the past had been shown to be particularly vulnerable to
paralysis, were amongst those most severely affected in 1956 . Two
factors are likely to have affected this incidence: the less
meticulous personal hygiene habits of rural males, and the
likelihood that they did not cease activity when suffering from the
febrile illness. which had exacerbated the level of paralysis
incurred.
The high level of severe paralysis amongst country people meant
that it was necessary to devise a means of transporting to Perth
those people who required respiratory assistance. Nine patients
were delivered safely to care using a vehicle especially fitted out
with respirator equipment. 2 7 While the mobile unit continued to
be put into service in this way other means of transport were also
utilised. 2 s A fourteen-year-old girl from the southern town of Mt
Barker, who urgently required respirator assistance, was rushed to
Albany airport and flown to Perth aboard an especially assigned
RAAF Dakota aircraft, with a doctor and four nurses aboard. 2 9
The high proportion of cases that resulted in severe paralysis, was
26 Public Health 1 956, ( 1958). Appendix VII, p .52.
2 7 WA. 24 February 1956, p.3.
28 WA. 25 April 1956, p.6.
2 9 WA, 27 February 1956, p.3.
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the third, and most trying aspect of the epidemic, because it often

required the patient to be placed in an iron lung. During 1956 a
total of thirty two people required respirator assistance, 3 0 twenty
six of whom were admitted in a short space of time.

All available

resources were severely strained in February when a record number
of thirteen persons were simultaneously receiving respirator
support, more than double the previous record of six established a
month earlier. 3 1 On occasions as many as three new respiratory
patients were admitted to the IDH in one day . 3 2

Respiratory

patients were the most vulnerable, and some did not recover. The
value of mechanical respirators was clearly demonstrated in 1 956.
Twenty two of the thirty two respiratory cases survived the acute
stage of the first month. Although one person subsequently died,
seventeen of the remaining twenty one patients achieved
respiratory independence. 3 3
Special resources were made available to assist the Public Health
Department in its "fight against polio".

At the onset of the

epidemic the Commissioner sought, and was immediately granted,
a special allocation of State Government funds to finance extra
physiotherapy and consultative services. 3 4

Stocks of gamma

Public Health 1956, (1958). Appendix VII, p.52.
Public Health 1956, (1958). Appendix Vil, p.53, see also HJH Colebatch, "Tank
Warfare", Royal Perth Hospltal Joumal, Vol. 9 , p. 249.
3 2 Public Health 1956, (1958 ). Appendix VII, p.53.
33 Public Health 1956, (1958). Appendix VII, p. 53; Letter, HJH Colebatch to DJR
Snow, 18 July 1956, BL. ACC 1003, AN 120 /4, 5178 /57 pp. 86-88.
3 4 WA, 18 January 1956, p. l .
30
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globulin, more readily available than in 1954, were also
obtained. 35

As the epidemic worsened there was increased demand for gamma
globulin, and the Commissioner was required to publicly restate
the conditions under which it would be administered. 3 5 Earlier he
had publicised the availability of the preparation and reminded the
public that the royal couple had been given it in 1954.

His

enthusiasm may have been intended to convince the public that,
while the number of cases of paralytic polio continued to rise, his
department was doing all that it could to protect the most
vulnerable members of the community.

The tragic irony of the 1956 epidemic was that it occurred as Salle
vaccine became available and a plan for mass immunisation was
being developed. All children aged fourteen and under, a total of
194,750 in Western Australia, were targetted for three injections.
But Salk vaccine came too late for some. If immunisation had
been possible a year earlier the 1956 epidemic would probably have

35 Notes on Poliomyelitis, 1 9 Januruy 1956 , BL, ACC 1003, AN 1 20 /4, 689/52,

p,235; WA, 1 8 Januruy 1956, p. l .
3 6 WA. 19 Januruy 1956, p. l .
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been avoided. As it was the virus had one last chance to wreak its
crippling power before it disappeared at the hands of the Public
Health Department which planned, with military precision, to
eradicate this threat to the community.

Mass immunisation

commenced in July 1956 and there was a dramatic drop in the
incidence of polio infections from 1957 onwards.

It had been proven that the polio virus was present in the faeces
during the acute stages of the disease and in 1956 plans to control
the virus were clearly based on the recognition of the faecal
contamination theory, as this statement by the Public Health
Department reveals.

Modern opinion is that by its presence in the faeces
contamination occurs from person to person by such
methods as faulty personal hygiene, with the resultant
contamination of fingers, domestic appliances, and food. . .
strict attention to personal hygiene is essential on visiting
the toilet, after which the hands should be thoroughly
washed with soap and water. ..
If possible, avoid
contamination of the W.C. chain, door handles and taps.
Hand washing should also be done by the housewife before
any handling of food and by all before eating. 3 7

37 Notes on Poliomyelitis, 19 January 1956, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120 /4, 689 /52,
p.236.
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The clarity of emphasis was no doubt, one result of Snow's

research conducted during the royal tour.3s
The link between faecal contamination and swimming once more
resulted in the disruption of summer patterns of recreation. Over
eight thousand school children were affected when the Education
Department cancelled the vacation swimming classes planned for
the numerous baths on the Swan River. 3 9 Seaside instruction was
still offered at South Beach, Fremantle because the Public Health
Department had expressed the view that small groups which swam
in large bodies of moving water would be safe from polio infection.
River water, on the other hand, which did not circulate, was
believed to harbour the virus for up to 1 80 days. 40 The result was
that small groups of people frequented the ocean although, despite
the warnings, some individuals continued to use the Swan River.
In the interest of public health and safety, local authorities
banned swimming in the Preston and Blackwood rtvers. 4 1
Fear of polio led to the curtailment of seaside and river based
3 8 See Chapter 6 above.
3 9 WA, 1 6 January 1956, p.2. Baths were operated at Crawley, Nedlands,
Claremont, Mosman Bay, Bicton, Applecross and Como.
40 WA, 23 March 1956, p. l .
4 1 WA, 1 8 January 1956, p. l ; WA, 24 January 1 956, p. l .
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activities throughout the state, along with other events that

brought people together.

The tenth annual log-chopping and

swimming carnival at Manjimup was cancelled, as was a nurses'
swimming carnival to be held in Crawley baths. 4 2 A Legacy camp,
scheduled to be held at a new campsite at Busselton, was deferred
until May and an inter-school camp for children from the North
West, planned for Point Peron, was postponed. 43 The Barmaid's
and Barmen's Union announced the cancellation of their annual
picnic at Coogee beach while the Butchers, who on 20 February
were to have relaxed together on the river at Keane's Point,
Peppermint Grove, decided to forgo the picnic but not the day off
work. 44

The fear of water born infection was put to a real test during a
heat wave at the end of January.

In eleven days maximum

temperatures ranged between 110. 7 and 90 degrees Fahrenheit,
while the average minimum was 63.2 degrees. Still no one dared
swim in the Swan River. The WestAustralian published a graph of
the heat wave temperatures and over it placed a photograph titled
4 2 WA, 20 January 1956, p.2; WA, 24 January 1956, p. l .
4 3 WA, 17 January 1956, p. l ; 19 January 1956, p. l ; 21 January 1956, p. l .
44 WA, 1 February 1956, p. l .
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Near a normally popular, but now

deserted swimming spot, a small group sat by the river, in the
shade of trees, trying to cool off as best they could.45

The population's fear of swimming in the river affected the
livelihood of those who ran businesses in the vicinity. A frustrated
and economically threatened River Beach Shop Proprietors'
Association fought the restrictions imposed on river swimming.
The Association, which claimed that its members would never be
able to recover the twenty thousand pounds in trade that had been
lost as a result of the two recent epidemics, called for "a public
examination into the polio cases reported this year to see if there
were any river swimmers amongst them" - 46

Duncan Christie, President of the Association and lessee of
Crawley Baths, highlighted the apparent contradiction in banning
swimming while allowing children to attend picture theatres. To
support his case he drew attention to differences in the opinions of
experts and offered the view that the supposed link between
45 WA, 1 February 1956, p.2.

46 DN, 28 January 1956, p.2. Greenland, W. ( 1990). Infantile Pam.lysts, p.37, In
1937 the city of Melbourne estimated that £500,000 had been lost as a result of
restricting children's attendance at cinemas and other forms of amusement.

1 956
swimming and faecal contamination was spurious. 4 7
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Christie

pointed out that, in contrast to Snow, Dr Bazeley of the CSL held
the view that "there is no reliable evidence yet shown that water,
sewage, flies, or food played any important part in the
transmittance of the polio virus" - 48 When two experts could differ
on such a fundamental point Christie believed the public should
receive the benefit of the doubt, which for him meant that picture
theatres should be closed and swimming baths left open.

The ban was not lifted but the deputy Commissioner made a
speech to the Association in which he raised the members' hopes,
stating that it was unlikely the coming Spring would see a ban on
swimming in the Swan river, due to the commencement of
immunisation.

Following the speech a deputation from the

Association waited on the Minister for Health in order to clarify
"future Government policy on river swimming". 49 So certain was
the Minister of the efficacy of Salk vaccine he replied that, in their
position, he would be willing "to speculate on the future".50

4 7 WA, 4 February 1956, p.4.
48 WA, 4 February 1956, p.4.
49 WA, 23 March 1956, p. l ; DN, 28 January 1956, p.2.
50 WA. 23 March 1956, p. l .
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Although it seemed anomalous to some, picture theatres continued
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to function with children in attendance, just as they had during
previous epidemics. This time Snow justified the practice on the
basis of evidence, gathered from the royal tour, that polio was
transmitted through faecal contamination rather than oral/ nasal
droplets.

Contacts at cinemas "were not sufficiently close or

prolonged" to present a risk he said, and children would be safe so
long as they washed their hands on arriving home.5 1

The growing publicity given to the faecal contamination theory,
along with the residual belief that adults were less vulnerable to
the polio virus than children, may account for the determination
of the West Australian Cricket Association to proceed with its
annual Country Week cricket carnival. Having sought advice from
the Public Health Department, special arrangements were made to
keep the toilets clean, and cricketers who manifested any
symptoms of illness were to be advised not to play.52

Early in March, the Commissioner cautiously greeted signs that

5 1 WA. 20 January 1956, p.2.
52 WA. 27 January 1956, p.2.
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the epidemic was abating, 5 3 but a month later, after four more
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cases had been reported during the Easter period, 5 4 the public
were warned not to relax their guard.55 Hopes were raised as plans
were announced to "wage war on polio" 5 6 with the assistance of
the special mobile immunisation clinics. Community spirits were
boosted by the announcements that further help would soon be
available in the form of the newly created Sabin oral vaccine,
currently being tested in the United States of America. The public
had little knowledge of Sabin at this stage, but the effectiveness of
the Salk vaccine and its potential to rid the world of polio
"altogether" was strongly championed in the press. 5 7

The 1956 epidemic had its share of tragic cases. In March a photo
of a man in a wheel chair captioned "End of an Easy Life" headed
the story of Rod Harrod, a bank officer who lost the use of his legs
as the result of polio he contracted while working in Suva. The
island paradise was one in which "the disease was unusual enough
not to be diagnosed for several days" . 5 8 The implied criticism of
5 3 WA, 8 March 1956, p.2; DN, 9 March 1956, p. l .
5 4 DN, 4 April 1956, p. l .
55 DN, 9 April 1956, p. l .
5 6 WA, 9 March 1956, p. l .
5 7 WA, 13 June 1956, p. l .
5 8 DN. 7 March 1956. p 1 .
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the "primitive medical conditions" of Suva were somewhat off-set
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by the fact that it was the well-to-do white westerner who had
succumbed to polio. The Bank of New South Wales generously
transported Rod and his family back to Perth where, after intensive
therapy at the IDH, he was reported to be regaining the use of his
muscles.

The press continued to portray polio survivors in a heroic light, for
example. in the report on Reno Cammarri, a seven year old boy
from Waroona who was paralysed by polio in January.

Four

months later a feature article on Reno appeared in the Dally News
which described how muscles in one of his legs, his neck and
abdomen were affected.

Reno had "fought back" against his

paralysis and was now able to walk. Despite missing his large
family Reno was reported to be "one of the most cheerful children
in the Golden Age", and was "not even falling behind in his school
work". 5 9

The good will towards others that was traditional in rural areas
was eVident when in May the neighbours of Peter Bott, a farmer
5 9 DN, 7 April 1956, p 2.
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from the wheatbelt town of Meckertng who was confined to the
IDH with polio, rallied to plant his crops. To complete the task
tens of thousands of pounds worth of tractors and machinery were
assembled from far and wide. Work done, the farmers left with the
optimistic promise that, if necessary, a similar working bee would
be organised to bring in the harvest.B o

Not so cheering was the news from the Great Southern town of
Katanning. Vernon Smith, a married man in his early twenties,
became the fourth member of his family to be infected with
paralytic polio. He had the added distinction of being the first
person to be placed in the Nuffield iron lung which had been
installed at the local hospital in 1938 and had lain idle ever since.
Vernon's father had died from polio two weeks earlier and his
mother and brothers were hospitalised in the IDH when he himself
took ill. 61

Vernon's mother requested immunisation for the

remainder of her family, who received their injections at the
Stirling Street Clinic, some months ahead of the scheduled visit of
the mobile clinic to Katanning. 62 Medical experts declared that no
60 WA. 23 May 1956, p.3.

6 1 WA. 12 June 1956, p. 1.
62 Letter, Mrs E. D. Smith to Dr Thorbum, and reply. BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4.
1242/55, pp.137.138.
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comparable case was said to be known in Western Australia,

although a set of twins had been infected with polio in 1954.
Multiple infections were known in Western Australia, but were not
always recognised by the doctorS. 6 3 The Commissioner stated that
four examples of multiple infections within the same family had
been found in the United States of America and there had also
been one such case in England. The worst known example was
said to come from Australia where, in 1952, a family from Victoria
reported five cases of paralytic poli0.6 4

As on previous occasions members of the community offered their
ideas concerning the the cause and cure for polio. 6 5 The range of
theories included those that were as bizarre, and sometimes as
near to the truth, as those received in previous years, but in 1956
there were fewer of them. 6 6 The news that a suitable vaccine had
been found may have deflected some public interest away from
speculation over causes of polio, but some offered their thoughts.
A naturopath who lived in Victoria was said to have had a large
6 3 WA, 'Big Weekend', 26 November 1994, p.2. An article, "Epidemic struck down
four in family" , referred to three Jupp children from Geraldton, and a cousin
from their extended family. Oral History Interviewee H reported three cases of
polio in her family in 1946 but these were not recognised by the doctors at the

time.
6 4 WA, 12 June 1956, p.3.
65

File: Poliomyelitis - Suggestions From the Public, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120 /4,
44/56.
66 DN, 1 February 1956, p.4.
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measure of success in treating numerous diseases.
He

CHAPTER

telegrammed the Commissioner with his cure for polio.
Polio caused by chill between the shoulders. Certain things
develop in the head first, causing headaches, discharge from
the nose. Certain things go [ to] the back, hips and groin.
When fully developed inside they paralyse the body. Formula
- give the child boiled cabbage and all things inside will come
out. Letter following by air mail.6 7
A farmer from Salmon Gums, a relative of the Minister fo r Health,
sent the opinion that his neighbours had shot several horses and
the flies which had bred up as a consequence were sure to be the
cause of polio.5s

An old digger reported that when he was on a

troop ship in 1916 the Medical Officer contained an outbreak of
meningitis by ordering the men to gargle salt water.5 9

Others

suggested that polio was caused by the tick virus in hens eggs, or
fruit fly, 7 0 and milk did not escape entirely.

A man wrote to

convey the results of his wife's independent research which
concluded that the cause of polio was the tall metal containers
used to make milk shakes in cafes and milk bars. She argued they
were not sterilised adequately and that it would have been better
6 7 Telegram PK to Commissioner, 17 February 1956, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4,
44/56, pp.1-2. The letter following included many laudatory testimonials to the
naturopath's work.
6 8 Letter AEN to Minister for Health, 27 January 1956, pp.24-26.
69 Letter Digger to Commissioner, 27 January 1956, p.23.
7 0 Letter SJ to Commissioner, 14 January 1956, pp.3-7.
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to use disposable waxed paper containers. 1 1 Food was targetted in
other forms.

Regarding Poliomyelitis and its cause, may I suggest that it
could be transmitted through the tomato, which most people
eat raw and often from plant affected by wilts which is
caused by a virus disease. I feel sure that your Department
has already investigated this field, however little things are
overlooked.
I trust that you will accept this as merely a suggestion to
help eradicate this crippling scourge from our community
and would be glad if you would be good enough to reply at
your convenience.1 2
Similar themes recurred in correspondence to the press where some
writers linked their facts together in interesting ways.

A

correspondent from Midland Junction targetted one of the chief
weapons used in the control of flies.

I think the spraying of fruit and vegetables with DDT and
similar sprays may have a bearing on the polio position.
These sprays were a product of World War II. From this time
onward there has been an upward trend in the number of
cases. As the summer comes on, fruit, often sprayed with
DDT appears, and if eaten unwashed, particularly by
children, may readily have a paralytic effect on the muscles
and stomach. Research from cold countries which do not
7 1 Letter CB to MO, Perth, 14 January 1956, pp.3-7.
7 2 Letter WHJ to Commissioner, Perth, 1 February 1956, p.30.
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grow fruit which require these sprays would be interesting in
comparison. 73

The reply of a Public Health Department spokesperson was
unequivocal,

"One of the most explosive polio epidemics of all

time occurred among the Eskimos of Canada's frozen tundra".7 4
The handling of foodstuffs was always an area of controversy where
the quest for better hygiene was challenged.

I. J. Blotnicki of

Subiaco wrote to point out that it was impossible for those who
handled foodstuffs to keep their hands hygienically clean, but that
improvements could be made by introducing the use of tongs, and
more frequent hand-washing.75

Frustration and bewilderment over some aspects of Public Health
Department policies also emerged. During the first weeks of the
epidemic Shackleton resident Agnes F. Bland wrote to ask what
research into polio had been conducted in Western Australia in the
past two years. She drew attention to a paper by the World Health
Organisation which pointed out that polio epidemics were known

73 DN. 1 February 1956, p.4.
7 4 DN, 1 February 1956, p.4. Killalea, A. (1995). Scourge. pp.135-6. Summary of

the worst epidemics.
75 WA. 6 February 1956, p.4 .
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to occur in "countries with a high standard of living, with all the

best in hygiene".7 6 Quoting the London Times which had reported
that in countries where "filth, flies, absence of sanitation, overcrowding and entire lack of hygiene prevailed, people developed
resistance to the virus" , she questioned why the public were being
urged to "become even cleaner and more hygienic" . 7 7 Since the
cause of polio evidently did not lie amongst the "filth of under
developed countries," where she believed "most other scourges of
humanity" were to be found, she considered the public should
demand that governments undertake more research to discover the
real causes of polio and defeat the "fearful scourge".7 8

Jessie Richardson from Gnowangerup, a physiotherapist with
fifteen years experience at the Children's Hospital in NSW, wrote
to criticize the "casual way" she felt polio was treated in Western
Australia.7 9 In her experience even non-paralytic cases of polio
were hospitalised at the IDH in New South Wales where they were
kept in isolation for three weeks. All who attended them had to
wear "caps masks and gowns", contact with other children in the
7 6 WA. 30 January 1956, p.4.
77 WA. 30 January 1956, p.4.
7 8 WA. 30 January 1956, p.4.
79 WA, 24 February 1956, p.4.
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family was prevented, and parents could not visit during the first
two weeks.

Richardson observed that in Western Australia

attitudes to isolation were far more casual. "Contacts still go to
school and serve in shops - including food" she said, and "victims"
of non-paralytic polio mixed freely in the community as soon as
they felt well enough to get about. so

She believed that the

"common people" in Western Australia needed the protection of a
much stricter policy of isolating polio sufferers and contacts.
Richardson regarded the Public Health Department as at fault and
the sting came in the tail of her letter when she wrote -

WA made a ludicrous spectacle of itself when the Queen was
here with its ban on handshakes and the six feet keep-your
distance rule which was not considered necessary in NSW
and Victoria, which were also in the throes of a poliomyelitis
epidemic while she was there.s 1
Her anxiety about the lack of isolation between contacts in 1956
may have been well founded, but her argument was undermined by
the illogical criticism of the West Australian "keep-your-distance"
rule enforced during the royal visit.
By the end of March the 1956 polio epidemic had run its course,
8 0 WA, 24 February 1956, p.4.
8 1 WA. 24 February 1956, p.4.
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and the immunisation campaign, which was scheduled to begin in
July, had moved to centre stage in the attentions of both the
community, and the Public Health Department. The number of
reported infections declined from 65 in March to 23 in April and 16
in May, after which there were only 9 more before the end of the
year. 82 One case of polio was reported in September and none in
October and November. While the effects of immunisation were
still building up, the virus was not in epidemic mode.
By the end of December 225,166 doses of Salk vaccine had been
administered in Western Australia. 83 Despite the commencement
of the troublesome period of school holidays, only one more
reported infection was added to the list.

The decline in the

incidence of polio heralded a new era in which, thanks to the
meticulous planning of the Public Health Department, Western
Australia was to become permanently freed from the fear, the
ravages, and the frustrations wrought by the polio virus.

***

82 Public Health 1956, (1958). Appendix VII, p.55.
83 Public Health 1956, (1958). Appendix VII, p.58, see Ch. 8 below.
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Figure 22: Public Health 1 955, (1956) . Appendix VII, p.56, BL,
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Figure 23: Public Health 1 955, ( 1 956 ) . Appendix VII, p. 57, BL,
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CHAP'J'ER 8: Immunisation: the war against polio

The mass immunisation campaign, 1 which began in 1956, was
represented in the press as the "anti-polio war". Snow, who had
served in the British army, did not shrink from comparing the
campaign to a military operation, with "an objective, a plan,
logistics, reconnaissance, and even propaganda" . 2 The day the first
injections were given provided Snow with the perfect occasion to
demonstrate his point.

Looking much like airmen loading a

bomber in preparation for a raid, he and the staff of one of the
specially prepared mobile clinics were photographed filling the
refrigerator with Salk vaccine, in readiness for the assault on the
country districts. 3 The "anti polio war" had begun.

Photo

opportunities over, the four mobile clinics left to commence

I The subject of this chapter warrants further investigation that extends beyond
the purpose of this thesis. I have explored how the people and the health
authorities in WA responded to the mass immunisation campaign, but further
work is possible to show the connections between this and the negotiations the
Commonwealth entered into to secure supplies of the vaccine and supply it to
the states. Detailed evidence is available in the following files which I have
examined. held by the Australian Archives, Canberra. Poliomyelitis
Immunisation Campaign, AA, A 463/17, 57/ 27, Poliomyelitis Immunisation
Policy, AA. A4940 / I , C889, Interstate Committee on Poliomyelitis, AA, A 1658 / I ,
6 17/ 1 / 17, Poliomyelitis - general polio vaccine: policy, AA, A l 658/ l , 259/ 1/ 10,
Poliomyelitis Vaccine, AA. A4940/ 1. C l 450, Salk vaccine manufacture, AA.
A463/ l 7, 1957/ 25, Dr P.L. Bazeley. AA, A463/ l 7, 1957/ 26, Salk poliomyelitis
vaccine - manufacture in Australia, AA, A463/ 17, 1957,25. A report is available
by Bazeley, P.L. ( 1956). "Immunisation against poliomyelitis", MJA, 1, 20, 19 May,
pp. 821-828. A general account can be found in Brogan, A.H. (1990). Committed
To Saving Lives: a history of the Commonwealth Serum Laboratories, Melbourne:
Hyland House.
2 Snow, D.J.R. (198 1). Progress, p.70.
3 WA, 2 July 1956, p.8 .
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operations, two in the country, and two in the metropolitan area.4

The Commonwealth Government agreed to provide the states with
free Salk vaccine, 5 and they had the responsibility of organising
its distribution to the population according to agreed priorities,
which included that children under fifteen years of age be
immunised first.

There were two features of the Western Australian immunisation
campaign that reveal the dogged ingenuity of Snow. Mobile clinics
were the first, and the development of a new type of syringe was
the second. Mobile clinics were created from four caravans, three
of which were purpose built, at a cost of one thousand pounds,
and a fourth was created by modifying a van built earlier to
transport respirator patients to Perth. 6

The immunisation

caravans, which were towed by two ton Bedford trucks, were
modified versions of those already used by the school dental
service. They were provided with running water, electrical power,
4 WA. 2 July 1956, p.8; WA. 3 July 1956, p.6; Buxton, ( 1977). Pollomyelltts, p.80.
The South Australian Government employed exactly the same strategy, and may
have copied the design of WA's mobile clinics.
5 Australian Health Information Service, ( 1965). Health ln Australia, p.9. Between
1 965-65 the Australian government expenditure on polio vaccine amounted to
£3,867,000.
6 Public Health 1956, ( 1958). Appendix VII. p.58. See Ch. 7 above.
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sterilization facilities and refrigeration to preserve the potency of
the vaccine. The refrigerators had to be run on batteries charged
by small, petrol driven, generators because kerosene powered

refrigeration were too unstable for the task.

The Sydney City

Council wrote to the Commissioner seeking information regarding
the mobile units used in WA1 so that it could manufacture one for
its own use, and the South Australian Health Department also
employed mobile units in their campaign.a

The second feature was the special arrangements made to provide
the clinics with an adequate supply of sterilized syringes and
needles. A separate needle was required for each child, and each
syringe had the capacity for ten injections. After use both items
were manually checked and cleaned before being sterilized, for a
minimum of one hour, in dry heat of 160 degrees centigrade.g A
chrome-copper syringe and needle carrier with the capacity to hold
supplies for one hundred inoculations was invented and

7 Letter, 10 October 1956, and reply 15 October 1956, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120 /4,
1242/ 5, pp.157-9.
8 Memos, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120 /4, 806/57, pp.44-48.
9 Public Health 1956, ( 1958). Appendix VII. p.58: See also photos.
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manufactured for the campaign. 1 0 The Commissioner, who sent

the details of this innovation to Health Departments in other
states, was congratulated on his initiative by Director of Public
Health of New South Wales. 1 1

In a move that coincided with the Government's plans for the
mass immunisation campaign, it was announced that Snow, the
43 year old Englishman, would celebrate his ninth year in
Australia by being elevated from the position of Government
Epidemiologist to the newly created role of Director of
Epidemiology. 1 2 Small reward for his thoroughgoing efforts in the
"war against polio".

The first injections of Salk vaccine administered publicly were
given on 29 June 1 956. 1 3 A schoolgirl from Wundowie, ten year
old Beatrice Oldridge, wrote to the Daily News and requested that
she be the first to be immunised with Salk. Her wish was granted
and, like a true soldier, she and received her vaccination without

1OPubUc Health 1956, (1958). Appendix VII, p.58. The initial order was for 60
carriers, 800 syringes and 16,000 needles.
1 1 Letter, 24 Februaiy 1956, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 1242/55, p.36.
1 2 WA, 29 May 1956, p. l .
13 WA, 30 June 1956, p.2.
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flinching, in front of the admiring gaze of Snow and the
Commissioner. 14 In order to derive maximum benefit from the
occasion a photograph of Beatrice, smiling at the needle in her
arm, appeared on the front page of the Daily News alongside that
of a seven year old country girl named Suzanne who, having
suffered from polio as a baby, was reported to have just taken her
first step. The Commissioner was also photographed immunising
his son Robert and the Minister of Health's four "curly haired
grand-children", who were included in the first batch. They too
were reported to have received their vaccinations bravely; and they
enjoyed the free toffees, purchased with a special grant from the
Lotteries Commission, which were distributed to all vaccinees. 15

The reported reaction of children to the commencement of the
immunisation campaign replicated the triumphant or heroic style
that had characterised the stories of those who had suffered from
polio itself. Four year old Mary Nulsen, grand-daughter of the
Minister for Health, was declared that "it didn't hurt at all", 16 and
when the first two mobile clinics began their work, rather than
14 DN. 29 June 1956, p. l .
1 5 WA, 30 June 1956, p.2.
16 WA. 30 June 1 956, p.2.
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showing fear or pain, the children were seen to take the Salk
vaccine needles in their stride - "buoyed by the camaraderie of
each other's presence, most of them treated the experience as a
Joyous adventure". 1 7

Prominence was given to children of three American families, who
had received their first two doses in the United States before
moving to Perth and now became the first in Western Australia to
be given their third injection to complete the course. One of the
children, Dale Bautel, had been amongst the "polio pioneers",
children who had taken part in Salk trials, in Michigan. 1 s Lest
the public wonder at the American children receiving priority
treatment, Snow used the moment to demonstrate an example for
others to follow. He carefully explained the importance of having
children immunised and completing the cycle of injections, and
expressed the view that West Australian parents who had doubts
about Salk vaccine would be reassured when they observed the
confident approach adopted by the American mothers. 19 Above all,
Snow claimed that the early vaccination of the American children
1 7 WA. 3 July 1956, p.2.
1 8 Smith J .S. ( 1990 ). Patenti.ng the Sun grew from her experience as a "polio
pioneer".
19 WA. 30 June 1956, p.2.

32 1
stood as a "small gesture of appreciation to the country
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responsible for the Salle Vaccine" .2 0

I t was part of the strategy of the campaign t o show that things
were progressing successfully and smoothly but, while there were
only three of four accidents reported, such as when a needle broke
in the arm of a child, the injections were often painful for the
children who received them, and some parents were still suspicious
that live virus nlight be present in Salk after all.2 1

Nevertheless, during the first two months of the immunisation the
consent rate22 was so high that the Commonwealth Serum
Laboratories was requested to send an extra ten thousand doses of
vaccine, which it agreed to do for one month only. 23 Eventually
the Public Health Department was able to record that its careful
planning had produced the intended results. Between 2 July and
31 December 1956 a total of 225,166 doses of Salk vaccine were
administered in Western Australia, after which it was announced
2 0 WA, 30 June 1956, p.2.
2 1 File: Poliomyelitis Immunisation Campaign: Accidents, BL, ACC 1003, AN
120/4, 1555/56.

22 DN, 4 July 1956, p. l ; 5 July 1956, p. l . By 4 July the 4600 children had

received injections, 1000 more than planned.
23 Telegram and reply, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/ 4. 1242/ 55, pp.112-113.
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that no untoward reactions had been recorded. 24 By that time

half of all West Australian children up to the age of fourteen had
received their first two injections along with 4,936 who were
between fifteen and nineteen years of age.25

A further 5,827

special cases of persons over twenty years of age were also
immunised. The plan was to complete the immunisation of all
children by the end of 1957, after which the vaccine would be made
available to other age groups in the community.

The Public Health Department carefully monitored any reactions to
the Salk vaccine. After 100,000 doses had been administered,
Snow reported to the Director-General of Health that there had
been no "notable" reactions, other than "a few rashes of transitory
and bizarre type" , and provided notes on a case of severe and
" unusual familial sensitivity to some component in Salk
vaccine" .26 Snow suggested that any similar experiences should
be gathered from around the states and shared so that the health
authorities could learn from the experience of others. Perhaps he
was sensitive to the possibility that there may be undiscovered
24 Publlc Health 1956, ( 1958). Appendix VII, p.58.
25 Public Health 1956, ( 1958). Appendix VII, p.58.
26 Letter, 17 October 1956, BL, ACC 2488, AN 120 /25, 1623 /56, p.2.
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dangers to uncover. However the vigilance of the department was
matched by the vigilance of the public, who readily reported any
strange reactions experienced, in them or their children, following
Salle injections, and just as readily sought financial compensation
for any difficulties they experienced.

Between October 1 956 and August 1 963 forty three cases of
suspected reaction to Salk injections were reported to the Pu bile
Health Department. Twelve were in children under ten years of age,
one of whom was identified as having polio. The bullc of the cases,
twenty three in all, were in adult members of the population.
Slightly more of the sample reported problems after their third
injection, the most common form of reaction being either rash or
muscle pain, and sometimes vomiting and collapse. 2 1

Snow later circulated a report on neurological sequelae
attributable to Salk Vaccine, and used for his study three adults,
aged 50, 54, and 57, who had reported in this way. 28 Not counted
in the total of forty three cases mentioned are the figures from an
2 7 File, Salle Vaccine Reactions, BL, ACC 2488, AN 120 /25, 1 623 /56.
calculations my own.
28 File, Salle Vaccine Reactions, BL, ACC 2488, AN 120 /25, 1623 /56, pp. 1 4 1 -2.
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noted that, out of its staff membership of 105, a high proportion of
those who had the polio needle reported sick with the 'flu, whereas
the proportion amongst those who did not receive vaccination was
much smaller.2 9 Leaving the Public Works Department staff aside,
the basic foundation of forty three reactions reported to 1963, does
not amount to a very high rate of problems in the mass
immunisation programme. Between 1956 and 1963 it appears that
only one person could be construed as having contracted polio in
the process of immunisation.

Planning for the immunisation campaign commenced long before
the mobile clinics first drove away. The provision of a suitable
polio vaccine for Australia had been the concern of the federal
Minister for Health since at least as early as 1952 . In November of
that year Dr P. L. Bazeley of the CSL had been sent to Pittsburgh
to work with Jonas Salk, 30 the agreement being that when a
reliable vaccine had been created, Bazeley would return and make
2 9 File, Salle Vaccine Reactions, BL, ACC 2488, AN 120 /25, 1623 /56, p. 180. Of
the total ( 105) 56 had injections and 25 were sick with flu. Of the 49 who did
not have injections, only 7 had the flu.
3 0 File - Poliomyelitis Vaccines, Statement to the Federal Parliament by Sir Earle
Page, 28 April, 1955, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120 /4, 4 1 1 /55, p.26.
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his knowledge available to enable its production in Australia. The
Salk trials were carefully monitored by the CSL and, as
developments progressed in Pittsburgh, preparations were made to
provide the facilities, and the monkeys necessary to produce
vaccine in Australia.3 1

After Dr Francis of Ann Arbor announced, on 12 April 1955, that
Salle gave 80% protection against paralytic polio and 60% against
other types of the virus, the drug companies Parke, Davis and
Company and Eli Lilly International Corporation expressed an
interest in importing American manufactured Salle into Australia.
The federal Minister for Health met first with representatives of
these firms, 32 and then with the epidemiological committee of the
NH&MRC, which suggested that 100,000 courses of vaccine per
month be imported into Australia for six months, to cover the
period until the CSL was in full production.

At first it was

thought that imported stocks would be used to give Australian
children their first two injections, and by the time they were ready
for their third, the CSL would be producing enough stock to cover
3 1 Statement by Sir Earle Page, 28 April. 1955, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/ 4, 4 1 1 /55,
p.26.
32 Meeting held 22 April 1955, Statement to the Federal Parliament by Sir Earle
Page, 28 April, 1955, BL, ACC 1003, AN 1 20/4, 4 1 1 /55, p.25.
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The NH&MRC understood the risks of using imported vaccine. The
time lag between its manufacture and use, including the the
possibility that the preservatives used may begin to break down,
were factors which had to be considered. 33 Salk vaccine could be
kept safely in bulk storage at 0-2 degrees centigrade for several
weeks and when placed in ampoules for distribution it retained its
potency for another month if kept at that temperature. There was
the risk of lost potency if it was alternatively frozen and then
thawed for use, 34 and if kept at room temperature potency fell to
50% within forty eight hours.35 Therefore, once removed from cold
storage and opened a vial of Salk vaccine had to be used as quickly
as possible. The Western Australian Public Health Department
used the ..Aero-Jablex" Ice Box to keep vaccine cold while being
held for use, or transported over short distances. 3 5 The need to
maintain maximum levels of potency in the vaccine also meant
33 Notes - NH&MRC Committee, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 411 / 55, p. 19.
34 Letter, Snow to Town Councils, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120 /4, 593/56, pp. 85-86.
35 Letter, 17 January 1956, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/ 4, 1242/ 55, p. 27
36 Letter,CPH to Agent General, London, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 692/64, pp. 12, 5; and Snow to Bazeley, 19 January 1956, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120 /4, 1242/55,
p. 19. The plastic ice box, which had a capacity of one cubit foot, was
manufactured in England and was recommended to Snow by the WA Red Cross
Blood Transfusion Unit. Snow sent the information on to Bazeley in the hope
that he might pass it on to Dr CE Cook for the information of other States.
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that once the immunisation campaign had commenced its progress
had to be carefully maintained to avoid wastage and risk to those
inoculated.

The Public Health Department had maintained a close watch on
the development of Salk vaccine and collected reports of field trials
from the United States of Amertca.37 The Commissioner was keen
to have supplies of the vaccine as soon as possible and three days
after the announcement by Dr Francis he urgently telegrammed
the Sydney representatives of Eli Lilly and Co seeking the cost and
availability of Salk.3 s No import licenses had yet been granted to
this company and the meeting to discuss the matter with Sir Earle
Page, the federal Minister for Health, had not yet been held.39

The Public Health Department also wrote to Parke, Davis and
Company, Sydney, who indicated that they had been granted a
limited temporary license to import small quantities of vaccine.
Priced at £3 / 5 / 7 per 9 cc. vial the Parke, Davis vaccine would have
37 File - Poliomyelitis Vaccines, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 411/55, for example,

report from Eli Lilly and Co, Indianapolis, unnumbered pages; pp.1-8, Evaluation
of field trial conducted by Dr Robert F Korns.
38 Telegram, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/ 4, 411 /55, p. 10.
39 Telegram, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/ 4, 411 / 55, p. 11.
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cost in excess of £100, 000 per 100,000 thousand doses, provided
sufficient quantities could have been obtained. 40

The Public

Health Department showed some enterprise in attempting to gain
vaccine for the children of Western Australia and while altruistic
motives may have been paramount, there can be no doubt that it
would have been a significant feather in Western Australia's cap if
the plan had worked.

Pressure was also brought to bear from other quarters. Members of
the public, and in particular some Local Authorities, showed that
they were excited over the success of Salk vaccine and keen to avail
themselves of its saving power. The secretary of the Kalgoorlie
Road Board wrote to the Commissioner

As you are aware, much public interest has been aroused
with the announcement of Dr Jonas Salk's Polio vaccine.
My Board is very much alive to the advantages gamed by the
-conducting of various immunisation clinics and. . . I was
directed to approach your Department and request that the
name of the Kalgoorlie Road Board be recorded as a Local
Authority requiring this vaccine when it becomes available. 4 1

40 Letter, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/ 4, 411/55, p. 14, calculations by Snow.
4 1 Letter, Kalgoorlie Road Board to CPH. 22 April 1955, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4,
4 1 1/ 55, p. 12.
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question of the safety of imported vaccine, 42 coupled with
controversy over the infamous "Cutter" incident, led the
epidemiological committee of the NH&MRC to reconsider the plan
to utilise American vaccine. The "Cutter" incident was crucial to
this decision.

During an American Salk trial held in 1954 live virus was found to
be present in vaccine manufactured by the Cutter Laboratories of
Berkeley, California. 43 The vaccine was hurriedly withdrawn but
the mistake resulted in the infection of 204 children, three
quarters of whom became paralysed and eleven died. 44

The

incident seriously undermined public confidence in the use of Salk
both in America and Australia.

In May 1955 a meeting of the

public health committee of the NH&MRC resolved that

No vaccine should be permitted to be imported into Australia
by any agency unless it complies with standards acceptable

42 The question of the safety of Salle was not the only concern. Immunisation

against Diphtheria and Whooping Cough had been suspended during epidemics
of polio, especially since, in the 1 950s, a Victorian doctor had found a link
between them and the incidence of polio. The Public Health Department carefully
monitored this issue from 1950. See Poliomyelitis and Injections, ACC 2849, AN
1 20/26, 1 273 /63, pp. 3, 9, 22-26, 3 1 -32.
43 Gould, T. ( 1995). A S ummer Plague, pp. 1 53- 157. The Kolmer /Brodie debacle of
the mid 1930s was similar to this incident.
44 Paul, J.R. ( 1 97 1). History, p. 437. A mortality rate of 5%.
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to the Commonwealth Department of Health. 45

The subject was again discussed at length on 22 July, 46 and in
September, with the result that the committee reversed the
decision to import import Salk vaccine manufactured by American
drug companies and recommended that the Commonwealth
produce its own. 4 7

Progress with the manufacture of Salk vaccine outside America was
followed with interest, and pressure had been brought to bear on
health authorities in Australia to follow suit. 48

A motivating

factor was the knowledge that Canada had used locally
manufactured Salk vaccine without any sign of a mishap, and a
similar story had emerged with respect to Denmark and South
Africa. The Public Health Department had received a lengthy report
on the Canadian immunisation campaign which included a section
titled "Free Enterprise Until It Hurts". Critical of the American
approach to public health it concluded with the statement 45 Report, May 1955, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120 /4, 411/ 55, p.80.
46 Minutes, NH& MRC, May 1955, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120 / 4, 411/ 55, pp.58-62.
Letter, Health Department to BMA, 25 October 1955, BL, ACC 1003, AN
120/ 4, 1242/55, pp. 26-28.
48 Hansard, Vol 140. New Series, 1954, Vol 2, p.984, and Vol 3, p.3695, BL,
328.9412. WES.

47
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The introduction of anything so important as a new polio
vaccine amounts to a national emergency and calls for some
form of national control.49
The question of quality control became a priority concern in
Australian public health and the fortieth session of the NH&MRC
Council, which met in Melbourne in November 1955 resolved that -

The Council considers the prevention of Poliomyelitis to be a
public health problem of high importance. The use of Salle
vaccine in Canada and other countries has demonstrated
that the vaccine, when prepared under strict supervision and
scientiflc control, is a safe and effective prophylactic. 50
Financial and safety considerations aside, the decision to
manufacture Salle vaccine in Australia was made easier by the fact
that during World War II the power of the federal government to
intervene in the social life of the community life had increased
stgniflcantly, particularly with respect to public health and welfare.
By the mid 1950s Australians had come expect that their
government would provide them with just such a safety net.

49 Report, 14 July 1955, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120 /4, 411/55, p.39.
50 Letter, CPH to BMA. 25 October 1955, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 1242/55,
p.27.
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Prime Minister Menzies wrote to all state premiers with the news
that the Commonwealth would produce Salle vaccine at the CSL.
He advised that, commencing in June 1956, the CSL would
produce 440,000 doses of Salle vaccine each month which would be
distributed to the states pro-rata on the basis of population. 51 It
was calculated that every four weeks, until immunisation was
completed, Western Australia would receive an instalment 30, 000
doses of vaccine. 5 2

The Commonwealth made Salk vaccine available free of charge for
voluntary immunisation programmes provided the States accepted
responsibility for administration of the campaign, agreed to keep
sufficient records to enable adequate surveillance and accurate
analysis of results, and observed the vaccination priorities
established by the NH&MRC. 53 It was agreed that, apart from the
51 Letter, RG Menzies to ARG Hawke, 6 September 1 955, BL, ACC 1003, AN
1 20/4, 4 1 1 /55, p.69; Reply, l O October 1955, p.78; Letter, NSW Public Health
Department to BMA, 25 October 1 955, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 1242 /55, p.28.
5 2 Public Health 1955, (1956). Appendix VII, p.53; WA, 25 February 1 956, p. 10;
Press Statement. Federal Minister for Health, 12 June 1956, BL, ACC 1003. AN
1 20/4, 1 242/55, p.97. The remainder of the allocations were - NSW, 75,000,
Victoria 26,000, Queensland, 30,000, South Australia, 18,000, Tasmania 18,000,
ACT, 1 ,500, NT, 680.
53 Statement by Sir Earle Page, 30 August 1 955, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120 /4,
4 1 1 /55, p.7 1 .
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reservation of some vaccine for pregnant women, the first priority

was to immunise children aged fourteen and under.54

Sir Earle Page was emphatic that thorough checks would be made
to ensure that no live virus was released to the public, and
promised that, if necessary, an attenuated strain would be used. 55
Surveillance was undertaken by the federal government which
established a vaccination surveillance committee. 56 Doctors in all
states were required to complete a report for every suspected, or
actual case, of polio, and to forward specimens of blood and faeces
from every case of polio that occurred in a vaccinated subject.57

Once the terms and conditions of the Commonwealth's offer had
been accepted the Commissioner sought approval for the
expenditure necessary to establish the administrative structures to
5 4 DN, 4 July 1956, p. l . This policy was adhered to in Western Australia.
55 Statement by Sir Earle Page, 30 August 1955, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120 / 4.
41 1/55, p.71.
56 Vaccination Surveillance Committee, BL. ACC 1003, AN 120/ 22, 983/ 56, pp.
9, 13, 84. The Commonwealth convened a meeting of the heads of Virus
Reference Laboratories on 14 July 1956. The meeting set the standards for
collection and transmission of specimens. alternative diagnostic laboratories, the
extension of diagnostic facilities. and recommended that the NH&MRC provide
funds for training technicians in the special methods required for cultivating
viruses. Present were FG Morgan and PL Bazeley of the CSL, Sir Macfarlane
Burnet, Walter and Ellza Hall Institute, Melbourne, N Stanley, Prince Hen:ry
Hospital, Sydney, P Warner, Institute of Medical and Veterinruy Research,
Adelaide, A Ferris, Children's Hospital, Melbourne, and C E Cook.
57 Circular 438, 19 July 1956, BL. ACC 1736, AN 120/ 122, 983/56, p.13;
Telegram 27 June 1956, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 1242/55, p. I O l a.
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support the campaign, and to construct four mobile clinicS. 58 The

anticipated cost was £25,000 in the first year, and £15,000 in the
years to follow .

All decisions, including the choice to use

Australian Salk vaccine, were placed before SPAC for its approval.

Careful detailed planning followed. 59 The main components of the
effort were a poliomyelitis immunisation unit, within the Public
Health Department, that maintained a central registry. The unit
was established in offices developed on the site of a former infant
health centre at 11 Stirling Street, Perth.60 The campaign team
consisted of four doctors, four driver-attendants, two clerks, one
typist and two laboratory assistants. 6 1 Each mobile clinic was
staffed by a doctor, a medical orderly and, in the metropolitan
area, two Red Cross volunteer workers assisted. Supplementary
static clinics were established in selected local government areas. 6 2
58 Letter, CPH to Minister for Health, 25 October 1955, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120 /4,
1242/55, p.2.
59 For example see letters in file, BL. ACC 1003, AN 120/ 4, 1242/ 55, 2/ 12/55,
pp.6-7; p.8, p.16; p.20; pp. 44-45; p.53; File - Correspondence re Static Clinics,
BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 393/56.
60 Letter Undersecretary for Health to Secretary, Railways Commission, 24
November 1955, BL. ACC 2488, AN 120 /26, 354/56, pp.1-2,5; Secretary of
Railways to CPH, 14 April 1960, p.90. The property was owned by the Railway
Commission.
6 l Public Health 1956, ( 1958). Appendix VII, p.55.
62 Letter, CPH to Minister For Health, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/ 4, 1242/ 55, pp.6-7;
Letter, Snow to Red Cross Society, BL. ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 593/56, p.53.
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The Public Health Department received widespread support from
public bodies and organisations, including the departments of
Education and Infant Health, Local Health Authorities, Public
Works, the Red Cross, and Parents and Citizens' associationS. 63
In addition the Lotteries Commission donated funds to provide an
incentive in the form of sweets that were given to the children at
the time of their injections.

In order to service all city and countiy children aged fourteen years
and under as quickly as possible it was planned to dispense the
injections using a combination of mobile and static clinicS. 64
Western Australia was divided into twenty four zones, twelve in the
metropolitan area containing 6000 school children, and twelve
containing 3000 children in the countiy districts. On the basis of
delivering 300 injections each day in the city and 1 50 each day in
the countiy, it was calculated that by the end of 1 956 half of the
state's children would have received two of the necessaiy three
doseS, 65 a target that was in fact achieved. 66
63 Public Health 1 956, ( 1958). Appendix VII, p.58.
64 Public Health 1 955, ( 1956). Appendix VII. p.55.

6 5 Public Health 1956, ( 1958). Appendix VII. p.55.
66 Public Health 1956, ( 1958). Appendix VII, p.58.

Although some
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children waited ten months for their first injection, all received two

of the required three doses within twelve months. 6 7 The exception
to the rule was the north west which, because of its remoteness,
formed a zone of its own where the resident District Medical
Officers, were made responsible for administering the vaccine, at
this stage the only local doctors empowered to do s0.68

As the plans for the mass immunisation campaign evolved they
were regularly featured in the press.5 9

Pictures of the special

mobile clinics were published under the heading "To Wage War on
Polio", 7 0 and a photo of the immunisation consent card was
accompanied by an explanation for its use. 7 1

The question of the safety of Salk vaccine manufactured in
Australia continued to dog the Public Health Department. The
public was reassured of the safety of Salk with word from the
experts and images of science at work. A white coated laboratory
6 7 Publlc Health 1 955, (1956). Appendix VII, p.56.
68 Publlc Health 1 955, (1956). Appendix VII, p.56; WA, 16 June 1956, p. l ; Letters

CPH to Town Clerks, and District Medical Officers of Carnarvon, Broome, Derby,
Port Hedland, Roeboume, Wyndham, Onslow, Halls Creek, Marble Bar, Shark
Bay and Nullagtne, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/ 4, 660 /56, pp. l -2; Note attached to
p.26. Snow calculated that there were 2,525 people in the North West in need of
vaccination.
69 WA, 7 May 1956, p. l .
7 0 WA, 9 March 1956, p. l .
7 1 WA, 5 April 1956, p.10.

33 7
technician was pictured engaged in manufacturing Salk vaccine.7 2
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Alongside there picture appeared a report which stated that the
federal council of the British Medical Association (BMA), which
relied heavily on Bazeley's advice, had declared Salk "safe", and
was strongly supportive of the immunisation campaign. Bazeley
stated that Salk manufactured in Australia would be subjected to
a second check conducted by a panel of independent experts. This
news was publicised early in 1 956 because many parents
remembered the "Cutter" incident and some were yet to be
convinced of the safety of immunisation. The Commissioner, who
was keen to highlight the beneficial effects of Salk rather than the
risks, repeated the assurance that Australian Salk vaccine would
be tested "even more rigidly" than in Canada and the United States
of America.7 3

From America Sir Macfarlane Burnet, Director of

the Melbourne based Walter and Eliza Hall Institute, and one of
those involved in the decision to produce Salk locally, stated that
it would be manufactured correctly and properly tested.7 4

An element of doubt continued to lurk in the popular mind and,
72 DN, 2 March 1956, p. l .
7 3 WA, 1 March 1956, p.2.
7 4 WA, 5 April 1956, p. 10.
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despite such eminent reassurance, any form of questioning became
disturbing to professionals and public alike. Truth published an
article in which seven West German doctors were claimed to have
said that the children of American service families immunised in
Frankfurt had become polio carriers.

Fears of "the greatest

catastrophe in the history of preventative medicine" had the
Commissioner scurrying to cable Bonn seeking verification from
the health authorities. 7 5 The reply indicated that although the
report was garbled, the team of doctors, whose opinion was not
shared by "any German Public Medical Authorities", did have some
valid criticisms of American Salk.76

Fears of another more insidious kind surfaced. In a letter to the
CPH the federal Director-General of Public Health voiced the
concern, raised by the Victorian Consultative Council, that
immunising migrants on their arrival in Australia should be a
priority.

The Commissioner replied forthrightly that this was

"neither necessary on epidemiological grounds nor desirable for
other reasons", and added -

7 5 Cablegram, 17 April 1956, BL, ACC I003, AN 120/ 4, 1242 /55, p. 105.
76 Cablegram, 19 April 1956, BL, ACC I003, AN 120 / 4, 1 242 /55, p.104.
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The views and the evidence which lead [them] to make this
suggestion are not know to us, but one assumes that the
main reason for the proposal is a suspicion that migrants
are at present responsible for the the introduction of virus
strains to which the Australian commu nity is
unaccustomed, and that prompt immunisation of migrants
would neutralise this suspected hazard. Strong evidence
would have to be brought forward before this can be
accepted.11

Any existing discrimination towards migrants would be
exacerbated by allowing them to have their injections ahead of
"long standing residents", especially if the latter had a lengthy wait
before they could be immunised.

Several other safety issues were dealt with by the Public Health
Department during the campaign .

The question of adequate

protection through hygiene, the effect of competing immunisation,
and in relation to the immunisation and indemnification of staff.

The need to maintain the highest standards of hygiene were
obvious. All items used in the immunisation campaign, whether

77 Letter, CPH to DGH, 1 8 September 1956, BL, ACC 1 003, AN 120/ 4, 1242/55,
p. 127.
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to give injections or preserve the potency of the vaccine, were
meticulously tested and checked to ensure their reliability.

Syringes were sterilized in a dry heat for one hour at a heat of 1 60
degrees centigrade, a thorough practice, but one that, in view of
the importance of the matter, was not regarded as "overcautious".78

Public confidence in the campaign would have been undermined
had there been the slightest hint of any risk to the children, or
ineffectiveness in the administration of the vacc ine.

The

possibility that antigenic interference from other vaccines might
reduce the effect of Salk vaccine led to the precautionary measure
of recommending that other injections, such as for diphtheria and
tetanus, be suspended for four weeks each side of immunisation
against polio.7 9

Staff involved directly, and indirectly, in the campaign were
amongst the first adults to be immunised Registered Nurses and
trainees working in hospitals, and young doctors with families,

78 Letter, 24 February 1956, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 1242/55, p.36.
7 9 Letter, 18 July 1956, DJR Snow to PL Bazeley, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120 /4,
1242/55. p. 123.
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especially those in general practice, were immunised; a decision

that required an estimated 4,500 extra doses of vaccine. 80 The
local branch of the BMA wrote with a question concerning the
liability of staff who administered the vaccine, to which the
Commissioner replied that under Section 365 of the Health Act,
doctors would not be held personally responsible for any liability
that arose as a result of polio immunisation.8 1

A first principle of the campaign was that immunisation was
provided on a voluntary basis which required parents to request
vaccination for their children using the consent card mentioned
above.

The Public Health Department

aimed to achieve the

highest possible rate of immunisation and made it clear that it did
not want to cope with large numbers of stragglers.

The

Commissioner warned parents against adopting a "wait and see"
attitude, 82 and ensured the maximum degree of surveillance and
control by denying medical practitioners access to the vaccine until
80 Letter, CPH to Director General of Health, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120 /4, 1242/55,
p. 1 14. There were estimated to be 2,300 registered nurses, 1,200 students, and
600 practising doctors in WA at that time, plus there families, each of which
would require two doses of vaccine within a few weeks. Staff in the Health
Department itself, and the Treasury, were also provided with polio immunisation,
see Memo, 1 November 1957, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 95 1/57, p.75.
8 1 Letter, 1 1 June 1957, CPH to BMA, ACC 1003, AN 120 /4, 672 /56, p.25.
82 WA, 16 June 1956, p. l .
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the immunisation campaign was completed. This, coupled with
the dual constraints imposed by the size of the monthly quota of
Salk vaccine supplied to Western Australia, and the plan for
delivering it to the community, meant that those who did not
attend the clinic when it visited their district faced the daunting
prospect of having to wait eighteen months to receive their
injections. The strategy also meant that a child who commenced
having injections after others had begun would find it difficult to
complete the cycle.

It was a deliberate part of the Public Health Department's strategy
to educate the community regarding the efficacy of Salk vaccine
and to motivate parents to consent to the immunisation of their
children. The Health Education Council was enlisted in support,
press releases were produced, radio broadcasts were made and
addresses were given, particularly to parents and citizens groups.
The achievement of an acceptance rate of 97% amongst parents of
school children was attributed to the popularity of these talkS, 83
but publicity and education was not the only motivating factor.
The warning that stragglers would have to wait, together with the
83 Public Health 1956, ( 1958). Appendix VII, p.55.

CHAPTER 8: Immunisation

343

restriction of the vaccine to the departmental outlets, created a
'narrow gate' through which some will have been herded by a long
standing fear of the polio virus. In 1956 the departmental policy of
operating by persuasion and recommendation had been extended
by decisions which had the effect of directing and con trolling the
community response, while still allowing freedom of choice.

In April, eight weeks before the before the commencement of the
immunisation campaign, the Dally News published a series of
articles by Lloyd Marshall which aimed to educate and inform the
public concerning the history of Salk vaccine the benefits of its
use. The first of these traced the history of polio and the second
featured a magnified picture of the polio virus alongside another
photo of crates of Salk vaccine. "The answer to polio prevention is
now in our hands" 84 it began, and continued to explain the variety
and character of the different polio viruses, and the means by
which infection was passed on and took hold in the body.
Emphasis was given to the faecal contamination theory and the
importance of hand hygiene. The third article, which detailed the

84 DN, 25 April 1956, p.5.
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search for a vaccine, 85 first explained how gamma globulin was

made and why its limitations made a more effective prophylactic
vaccine necessary.

It told of the first stages of research and

discove:iy by Enders, upon whose work Salk had later successfully
built and whose vaccine, once accepted by the NFIP, was tested on
hundreds of thousands of children in the United States of America.

The failure of the Cutter vaccine was a blemish on the triumph of
Salk that was not easily erased. The fourth article, headed "One
Terrible Mistake - and people began to have their doubts" ,
attempted to deal with the damage it had caused to public
confldence.86 It was freely acknowledged that some resistance to
immunisation had developed, as revealed by the results of a poll
taken in Western Australia in which 56% of those asked favoured
inoculation, 26% were against, and 1 9% were undecided. 8 7
Possibly because of this level of skepticism this article attempted
to clarify the matter by detailing the investigation that had
resulted from the Cutter outbreak, and the faults in the
. manufacturing process that were identified and corrected. Federal
85 DN, 26 April 1956, p.5.
86 DN, 27 April 1956, p.5.
8 7 DN, 27 April 1956, p.5.
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intervention by the United States government resulted in the

application of stricter controls, with the result that confidence in
Salk was restored in forty six of the forty eight American states.
The author admitted that such setbacks had to be expected in the
evolution of medical science, and that doubts had been cast on the
efficacy of immunisation, but concluded that "it is undeniably
cruel to say so, but it has also been of immeasurable value" .88

Australians did gain from not being the first to receive Salk
vaccine. As a result of the Cutter incident, vaccine manufactured
at the CSL was a "precision product", like that developed in
Canada by the Connaught laboratories of Toronto, and in
Denmark, where no children had suffered from "post-inoculation
paralysis" - 89

The story quintessentially expressed Australia in the 1950s,
implying that vaccine manufactured at one federally controlled
laboratory would be regarded as safer than that created in the "free
enterprise" system in which quality control was more difficult to
maintain. Public confidence in Salk vaccine was the issue at stake
88 DN, 27 April 1956, p.5.
89 DN, 27 April 1956, p.5.
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and everything was done to ensure that this was kept at the
highest level. The series of articles concluded with the reported
comments from nine prominent parents, mostly wives of
community leaders and mothers of young families, who all gave
their seal of approval to the immunisation of their children against
polio.g o

The Public Health Department enlisted the support of many
different sections of the community in the execution of its war
against polio. It negotiated the use of the Perth City Council's
Beaufort Street diphtheria clinic to serve as one of its static clinics
and seconded Dr A.P. Davis, a medical officer from the Perth City
Council, to assist with the campaign. Stationary immunisation
clinics, at which appointments were required, were established at
Fremantle and Princess Margaret Hospitals,

the Perth

immunisation centre, and in the suburbs of Maylands, Mt Lawley,
Osborne Park, Scarborough, Midland Junction and South Perth. 91

9 0 DN, 28 April 1956, p.5.They were, Mrs Charles Court wife of a politician, Mrs A
Knight, member of the Kindergarten Union, Mrs Fred Chaney, wife of the MHR for
Perth, Mrs I M Dickinson, mother of four. Mrs R H Leach, Mother's Union, Mrs
Ross Smith, wife of a Psychologist, Em Henfry, football coach, Mr R E Halliday,
National Fitness Council, Mrs M Ellis, Parent's and Citizens's Federation.
91 WA. 20 June 1956, p.3; Letter, CPH to Town Clerks, BL, , ACC 1003, AN 120 / 4,
593/ 56, p. l .
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Infant Health facilities at Albany, Bunbury, Collie, Geraldton and
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Kalgoorlie were also enlisted for this purpose and, in order to gatn
the full support of the relevant local government authorities for
the duration of the campaign, a subsidy of nine pence per
innoculation was offered to defray expenses. 92 As the time for the
campatgn to begin drew near, comprehensive information was once
more made available to the public through the press.93

The

assistance of the Red Cross was called for, to provide back-up
support for the mobile clinics, 94 while the Education Department
was requested distribute the 200, 000 consent cards, a task it
believed it would not be able to undertake. 95

When it came to administering vaccine to Aboriginal communities,
the paternalism of the day is clearly evident. In order to achieve
parental consent the C ommissioner requested that the
Commissioner for Native Affairs (CNA), who under Section 8 of the
Native Welfare Act was regarded as the legal guardian of all

92 WA. 16 May 1956, p. l ; Letter, CPH to Town Clerks. BL,, ACC 1003, AN 120/4,
593/56, pp.85-86.

93 WA, 16 June 1956, p. l .
9 4 Letter, Snow to Red Cross Society, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 593/56, p.53.

Snow requested that two volunteers be available to assist on each mobile clinic.

95 Memo, 20/3/56 Director of Education to CPH; Letter to all teachers 19/3/56,

BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 593/56, p.50 and pp.44-45.
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The CNA

sought advice from the Solicitor General and then gave "blanket"
approval for immunisation to take place provided strict conditions
were observed.

In a letter to all field staff, officers in charge of

institutions and mission superintendents the CNA requested

a) that the injections be given by or under the supervision of
a duly qualified medical practitioner;
b) that the practitioner satisfies himself beforehand that
each child who is to receive injections is sufficiently fit to
receive them in the manner in which they are to be given;
c) that the practitioner is informed of any known sickness
from which the child is or appears to be suffering
immediately prior to the giving of injections; and
d) that any directions of the practitioner as to the care of
the child before or after receiving the inj ection are
observed. 9 7
He particularly requested that conditions c) and d) be strictly
adhered to, in order to minimise the risk of a claim of damages "in
the event of death or disablement resulting from the injections".9 8
While this request may have been routine, an extra level of

96 Letter, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 660/56, p.2 1.
9 7 Letter, BL. ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 660/56, p.2 1 .
9 8 Letter, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 660/56, p.2 1.
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protectiveness is evident here. suggesting a concern over Aboriginal
people's vulnerability to the vaccine, despite the much touted
safety of Australian Salk.

The north west, designated a special region, was home to the
largest proportion of Aboriginal children in the state and some
controversy arose concerning their immunisation. The District
Medical Officer for Derby, Dr L. J . Holman, wrote to the
Commissioner to suggest that the department deliver Salk vaccine
to remote areas by aeroplane, and asked whether or not Aboriginal
children were to be included in the immunisation programme.
Holman was apprehensive and wrote

I understand that the vaccine is an attenuated virus, and
the community here has no contact with Polio, and therefore
no indigent immunity, and could possibly develop polio from
the vaccine. 9 9
The Commissioner replied that the vaccine was not attenuated,
but a killed virus, and was therefore regarded as quite safe, that all
Aboriginal children under 15 should be immunised, and he agreed

9 9 Letter, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120 /4, 660/ 56, p.12 .

35 0
to investigate the chartering an aeroplane as suggested. 1 oo The
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fear of an outbreak of polio amongst Aboriginal children was
something which both Commissioners had to consider. The CPH
wrote -

Although paralytic poliomyelitis is rare among natives, cases
do occur, and with their improving standard of living
incidents may be anticipated. 1 0 1
At the commencement o f the immunisation campaign the
Commissioner was reported as saying that provision had been
made for Aboriginal children to receive Salk on an equal basis with
non-Aboriginal children, 1 02 but a few months later an allegation
was passed on to the Public Health Department, before it was
made public, that during immunisation conducted at Fitzroy
Crossing Aboriginal children from the United Aborigines Mission
and pregnant Aboriginal women had been overlooked. 1 0 3

1 00 Letter, BL. ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 660/56, p.10.

1 0 1 Letter, BL. ACC 1003, AN 120 /4, 660/56, p.20. This reflects the argument
that the polio virus was endemic in 'primitive' communities and epidemic in
'civilised' communities.
1 02 DN, 29 June 1956, p.2. In the late 1960s, when Sabin oral vaccine became
available, nurse Robin Miller, who became known as the "Sugarbtrd lady" ,
delivered it to remote communities by means of an aircraft. See Robin Miller
( 1971 ). Flying Nurse, Rigby, Perth, Chapter 9, pp.49-54; Letters, BL. ACC 1736, AN
120/22, 783/61, pp.250,254,256-7.
1 03 Letter, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 660/56, unnumbered page.
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Snow telegrammed Holman, who explained that while he was still
calculating the number of vaccinations required for his region, he
had received a supply of 300 doses, 150 short of his requirements.
In order to cover the situation, while he awaited further supplies,
he chose to temporarily exclude from immunisation those
Aboriginal children and pregnant mothers who did not have
Citizenship Rights.

Holman claimed that he explained his

predicament, and his rationale for dealing with it, in a letter to
Snow, and had received a telegram which said "arrangements for
polio immunisation satisfactory" . 1 0 4 Snow made a lengthy reply to
Holman in which he denied there was any correspondence with his
office which explained or approved the administration of vaccine to
Abortginal people on the basis of citizenship rtghts. 1 o 5 The matter
was soon sorted, and no negative publicity against the Public
Health Department surfaced.

A steady rate of immunisation had to be maintained to avoid the
risk of deterioration in the monthly supply of vaccine. During
term breaks, when vaccination of school aged children ceased,

I 04 Letter, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120 / 4, 660 / 56, unnumbered page.
1 05 Letter, BL. ACC 1003, AN 120 /4, 660 / 56, unnumbered page.
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extra efforts were made to immunise pre-school aged children
through the stationacy clinics. For example, an offer to double the
quantity of vaccine available to the Albany Kindergarten
Association during December and January was accepted. 1 06 The
choice of Albany was a politically astute decision. Polio was a
summer disease and families from the surrounding region flocked
to the coastal town for their holidays. The availability of extra
vaccine would have assisted those who had missed injections at
home, and possibly added to the sense of security felt during the
vacation.

Not so astute was a decision to defer the immunisation of children
in the riverside suburbs of South Perth/ Como in preference for
those in coastal suburbs of Rockingham/ Safety Bay.
reaction followed.

A swift

The sitting federal and state members of

parliament, Richard Cleaver MHR and W. Grayden MLA, raised the
matter in their respective houses. 1 0 7

A deputation of angry

citizens waited on the Minister for Health to object to the decision,

1 06 Letter, 23 November 1956, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 593/ 56, unnumbered
page.
1 07 Press clippings. 16 and 23 October 1956, BL. ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 1242/55,
p.160.
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and the South Perth Council wrote to the Minister. 1 os

Grayden entered the fray several times and drew on every angle
possible to make his case. 1 09 South Perth and Como were also
suburbs where many went to swim, in the river not the sea, which,
he argued, n1ade them more wortl1y of prolec iion than the seaside
suburbs.

The citizens, and the river beach traders who had

suffered during past summers, did not intend to miss out once
more.

The Minister was ren1inded that the Como school had

earlier given its full co-operaiion in conneciion with a series of
serological tests conducted by Snow. 1 1 o Within a short time, in
reply to the fmal question from Mr Grayden, the Minister replied
that

Sufficient additional vaccine has now been promised which
will enable U1e entire South Perth zone to be dealt with
before Christmas, as ortginally planned. 1 1 1
Without loss to the coastal suburbs in question, during the
1 08 Letter, 9 October 1956, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120 / 4, 1242/55, pp.164 and 24
October 1956, p. 159.
1 09 WA Parliamentary Debates, Hansard, ( 1 956). Vol 1 . p.1 1 78, Vol 2, 1956, pp.
1254-55, and p.1567, BL, 328.94 12. WES.
1 1 0 Record of Deputation, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120 / 4, 1242 /55, p. 1 64.
1 1 1 Hansard., ( 1956). Vol 2. p.1567, BL, 328.94 12. WES ; Letter, and Press
stalement, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120 /4, 1242 /55, p.173, a11<l p. 187.
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summer of 1956 / 57 parents of children living near the river were
spared the drudgery of having to find ways of amusing their

offspring due to the loss of access to their main form of recreation.
And the River Beach Shop Proprietors' Association capitalised on
the advent of Salk vaccine to ensure they would have an
opportunity to make good the losses they had sustained in past
years.

Other forms of resistance to, or questioning of, the plans for the
immunisation campaign also met with a strong response from the
Public Health Department. The municipality of Midland Junction,
where the Department expected a lower rate of acceptance,
provides a case in point. The Mayor, W.S. Doney, JP announced a
public meeting at the Town Hall for 15 May 1 956 at which Snow
was scheduled to speak on the topic of "Salk Vaccine
Immunisation". 1 1 2 In the three weeks prior to the lecture, and the
week following, articles on the history of polio and the
development of the Salk vaccine were published in the local paper,
the Swan Express , ending with a challenge thrown out to parents,

1 1 2 TheSwan Express , 25 April

1956, p. l.

3 55
" . .. its up to you . " 1 1 3 The strategy was seen to have been successful.
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An acceptance rate of 93% was reported at Midland Junction high
school, lower than the final state average of 97%, but higher "than
had been expected". 1 1 4

The publicity in the Swan Express, connected with Snow's public
lecture at the Midland Junction town hall, differs from the series
of articles that appeared in the Daily News in that it emphasised
the safety of Salk but neglected any reference to the "Cutter"
incident. 1 1 5 A better strategy may have been to have followed the
example of the Daily News, because evidence suggests that some
residents of Midland were worried and were advocating that
parents refuse immunisation and resort to alternative forms of
protection.

In a speech at the Midland town hall Snow vigorously attacked
those who opposed the use of Salk. In an intemperate outburst he
advocated such people "should be gaoled", 1 1 6 and heaped ridicule
1 1 3 SE , 2 May, 1956, p. l ; 9 May 1956, p. l ; 16 May 1956, p. l , and 23 May, 1956,
p. 1. Original emphasis.
1 1 4 WA, 3 July 1956, p.2. Vaccination continues to be a controversial topic ...
1 15 SE , "How Good is Salk Vaccine?" 16 May 1 956, p. 1.
1 1 6 WA, 17 May 1956, p.6.
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on a "subversive organisation" which opposed the use of the

vaccine and advocated that polio could be prevented through
avoiding carbohydrates, eating carrots and washing out the bowels
twice daily. 1 1 7

Snow was forced to admit what had not been

included in his pre-lecture publicity, that more than 200 American
children had indeed become infected through receiving the unsafe
Cutter vaccine. However he stated in defense that, since then,
20,000, 000 people had been "successfully inoculated with Salk
vaccine". 1 18 Midland Junction was the place where Snow focussed
his attentions on resistance to immunisation but, as the rates of
acceptance became known, he could count his talk there amongst
his successes. 1 19

Criticism suffered by the Public Health Department in 1948 and
1954 had left its mark. During the 1956 publicity campaign care
was taken to leave no opportunity for its policies to be publicly
undermined. The department received prior advice of criticism
about to appear in the press and those who raised their voices to
dissent from the immunisation policy were confronted forthrightly.
1 17 WA, 17 May 1956, p.6; Snow, D.J.R. (1981). Progress, p.75. Weird and

wonderful ideas continued to have currency even at this stage.
1 18 WA, 17 May 1956, p.6.
1 19 WA, 3 July 1956, p.2.
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A combination of improved management and tighter control of
public relations meant that, in proportion to earlier epidemics,
1956 appeared to be almost trouble free and the voice of critics was
muted.

The effectiveness of the immunisation campaign can be partly
gauged by the fact that the two cases of paralytic polio that
occurred in the six months following the commencement of
immunisation were

in

people who had not been immunised with

Salk vaccine. 120 Between 1957 and 1966 the annual incidence
declined from eight to nil, and did not surge upwards in 1961-62 as
in other several states. Once the vaccination of children was
complete, those over fifteen years of age, and the adult population
were immunised. 12 1 In 1966 Sabin vaccine was introduced, and
eventually both it and Salk were made available to General
Practitioners. 122 The availability of Sabin greatly facilitated the
continued immunisation of the scattered population of Western
Australia, which suffered no more from the feared outbreaks of

120 PubUc Health 1 956, (1958). Appendix VII, p.58.
12 1 BL, ACC 1003, AN 120 / 4, 951 /57, pp.4- 1 19.
122 Letter, Director General of Health to CPH, 30 July 1968, and reply, Snow to

Oirector General of Health, BL, ACC 1003, AN 120/4, 1449/60, pp.71-72.

CHAPTER 8: Immunisation

358

polio. While Sabin must be credited with keeping polio under
control, it was Salk vaccine that broke the cycle of epidemics that
had so troubled the people and the health and medical experts in

Western Australia, particularly between 1 948 and 1 956. The virus
ceased to be a force to contend with, and the community relaxed
and forgot about polio, except for those who had been affected by
it. They continued to live with the consequences, and two or three
decades later found themselves unexpectedly required to revisit
their original experience of polio, as Post Polio Syndrome began to
make its presence felt.

***
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"Patients loom small in medical history" . I

Polio survivors' memories of life at the hands of the virus during
the 1 940s and 1 950s may have remained out of sight but for the
impact of Post Polio Syndrome. After the immunisation campaign
removed the threat it posed, a silence fell around anything to do
with polio. Since that time the official version of the story has
been the one that has had currency.

Polio is a subject that,

outside a few biographical accounts, was only mentioned in
connection with other subjects, such as the 1 954 Royal tour, the
history of the Commonwealth Serum Laboratories, or the life of
leaders in the medical field such as Dame Jean Macnamara. Polio
survivors helped maintain the silence .

In their quest to

rehabilitate themselves and live a normal life most concentrated
on "mainstreaming" themselves, and were interested in leaving
their painful memories behind. Their experiences have remained
an inside story that has never been fully explored or investigated
because it was rarely articulated. But memories of the polio years
have unexpectedly and painfully been brought back into focus with
the result that old issues long buried have had to be addressed,
and a counter story is now emerging to challenge the official
history. 2

The memory of the polio years is now supplemented by

knowledge of life since then, presenting a wealth of new material to
1 Smith, F.B. ( 1979). The People's Health 1830- 1 91 0, Canberra: Australian
National University Press, p.9.
2 Bearup. C. ( 1991 ). The outcomes qfthe Poliomyelitis Epidemics in South Australia:
1 912-1960, unpublished Honours Thesis, Flinders University, p. 18.
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consider in relation to that period of our histocy. The 1 950s have
been regarded as a forgotten period in Australian histoiy, 3 and
within that time frame the histocy of polio has remained deeply
buried.
A sample of two families and ten survivors were interviewed for this
section of the thesis. Interviews were based on a set of questions
formulated according to qualitative research principles as described
by Denzin, and Lincoln. 4 An outline of the questions can be found
in the Appendix. The questions were aimed to explore the subject's
memories of their polio experience , what they felt it did to their
sense of self, and what type of reaction they were able to judge it
brought out in those around them. All interviews were recorded on
tape , transcribed and checked with the subjects. Release forms
were obtained in every case and confidentiality has been
maintained according to the ethical requirements of Edith Cowan
University. Interviewees were offered psychological support if the
process of remembering became painful. Only one subject reported
a follow-on reaction to being interviewed. Interviewees were also
asked how they were affected by the coming of PPS , and how they
have been able to make sense of their experiences.
The age at which this sample of survivors encountered polio ranged
from four to twenty eight years of age. One of the families had a
son who had polio at fourteen months while the boy in the other
3 Murphy, J. and Smart, J. (eds.) (1997). "The Forgotten Fifties" Australian
Historical Studies, Number 109: Melbourne.
4 Denzin, N.K. and Lincoln, Y.S. (eds.) (1994). Handbook ofQualttattve Research,
London: Sage Publications. Chapter 22 "Interviewing".
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family had polio at eleven years. 5 Periods of hospitalisation varied
from nil, through a few months to several years, and in one case
was much longer. Three record being placed in a tank respirator,
or "iron lung" , to recover lost respiratory capabilities. While the
participants had vastly different experiences, some very strong

common threads emerge from this material. This chapter explores
key themes that emerged from the interviews, and draws heavily on
the testimonies given. The addition of emphasis in quotations
used is indicated in the footnotes and occasionally, for the sake of
clarity in particular quotes, original emphasis is also indicated.
Memories gathered forty or fifty years after the event naturally
include the individual's reflections on their experience in the light
of what has happened in their life since. The interpretation offered
is the one they now choose to place on the past, rather than a
factual account of the event.

The questions posed by the

interviewer form another part of the complex weave of influences
that determine the way testimony is given and what is gathered
from it. The process of editing and shaping the testimony for use
as evidence affects the source, but hopefully does not violate its
integrity, any more than is possible using written materials. The
length of quotations used in this chapter is Justified on the basis
that the

aim

has been to preserve, as much as possible, the full

voice of the polio survivors interviewed. Through these testimonies
another side of the polio story has emerged to present a counter
narrative to the type of official history that has so often claimed
the main ground.

F.B Smith has written-

5 Interviews A and G. I myself had polio at two and a half years of age.
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. . . medical history is the history of social relations, with the
patient as client, mostly but not always passive, and the
medical practitioner as only another of the forces, albeit in
many transactions the crucial one, shaping the well-being
and ill-being of men and women during their seven ages.
Within this complex set of relationships the historian is another
active force in the transaction that has led to the writing of this
history in which the experience of ordinary patten ts has not
loomed large, and the perspectives of the medical experts has often
dominated. Hopefully, from this in terraction, a new polio history
may begin to emerge which is less clinical, more democratic, and a
richer reflection of life as it has been lived by polio survivors.
Ignorance and misdiagnosis

The impression gained from examining the records of the Public
Health Department, and newspaper reports, is that information
about polio was disseminated widely. But a surprisingly high level
of ignorance about polio seems to have persisted amongst members
of the public and the medical profession alike.

Survivors testify

that they were not given accurate information concerning their
illness, and in some cases were not told anything at all. 6 Despite
the publicity, some subjects only became informed about polio
after they were affected by it, 7 and it is evident that even amongst
the medical profession uncertainty about polio continued right up

6 Interview D. p.35; J, p.84.
7 Interview I, p. 76.
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to receiving strong medical support, 9 but in other cases "the
standard of treatment was abysmal" . 1 o The uncertainties evident
in the history of polio are reflected in the accounts given by those
interviewed. By the mid 1 950s the most commonly understood
precaution was that of adequate hand hygiene, 1 1 but fear,
superstition and ignorance remained. 1 2

While some regard the

symptoms of polio as unreliable, one would expect to find that
during the 1950s anyone who presented with a febrile illness would
be tested for the disease, but it was not so . Medical professionals
often disregarded or overlooked the presence these symptoms and
implemented treatment for some other complaint. An unexpected
result from these interviews has been the discovery that 50% - six
cases - were at first misdiagnosed. 1 3

One survivor, who was

himself a doctor, recounts I think there were many erroneous diagnoses. There's no
test for poliomyelitis as we know tests for various illnesses
today . . . Lumbar puncture was done, but there was no
specific test. The virus took too long to grow and be
8 For example, Interview K. Two subjects (A, p.6, and F,) report receiving strong
medical support, and it is clearly evident in the case of others.
9 Interviews A, p.6; F; B. p. 17 .
1 O Interview B, p. 17.
1 1 Interview F. p. 54.
1 2 Brogan, A.H. ( 1990). Committed to Saving Lives, p. 1 13. Brogan remembers that
during the 1930s he was sent to the countiy to escaped the epidemic. When he
returned home to Bendigo his father had enclosed the verandah where he slept
with fly wire, so he could have the benefit of fresh air without the contamination
of flies. And he kept germs at bay by wearing camphor in a small bag attached to
his singlet.
1 3 Interviews B. C, G, H, K, and L. In addition to these, the daughter of lnterview
H, ( p. 70) was admitted to hospital with breathing difficulties, "stiff neck and high
fever", not diagnosed as polio, and was operated on for removal of adenoids to
clear her breathing. Her polio was revealed in adult life when she unexpectedly
presented with PPS. In retrospect the symptoms seem clear but her records make
no mention of polio. This case is not included in the count from this sample,
nor is my own, if they were the result would be eight misdiagnoses out of
fourteen, or 57%.
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identified. But mind you the diagnosis was not, in
general, exceedingly difficult to make providing one
understood the characteristic features, and did some
simple tests. 1 4

It is not possible to argue that misdiagnosis was due to these six
cases having occurred at an early stage of polio research. Apart
from one case, which occurred in Western Australia in 1946 - prior
to the first major epidemic of polio - the remainder were infected
when polio was relatively well understood and accurate diagnosis
could reasonably be expected. Of the five remaining, one had polio
in 1953, three in 1954, and one in 1956. Of these only one - from
1954 - was not a West Australian.

Two believe they actually

caught polio in hospital. 1 5
Misdiagnosis resulted in a variety of responses ranging from the
performance of a laminectomy, to relieve "cord compression", 1 6 to
insisting the patient walk, which exacerbated his paralysis, 1 7 to
the removal of adenoids. 1 s The survivor quoted above recounted .. .if I hadn't had medical knowledge there's no chance I
would have survived. ...I had to give instruction to my
medical attendants. Even so, I couldn't stop them doing
some of the harmful things that they insisted on doing,
because I didn't know about them until after the event. 1 9
Exposure to polio presented difficulties for those on both sides of
the hospital bed.
1 4 Interview B, p. 18.

Patients with early symptoms of polio

Emphasis added.
Interviews B, and G.
1 6 Interview B.
1 7 Interview G, p.58.
1 8 Interview C.
1 9 Interview B, pp.23-4.
15
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encountered the disbelief of doctors and medical staff, as they have
in recent times when presenting with PPS. One doctor, an old
school friend of the patient, was said to have, " . . . reckoned I was
putting on a bit of an act" . 20 Another survivor presented herself at
hospital late at night with "high fever and severe back pain" was
prescribed APC and morphia, and instructed to "come back
tomorrow if the pain hasn't gone" . 2 1 The pain did not abate and
the next day she returned. Although muscle loss had begun to
occur x-rays were taken but revealed nothing.

The x-ray

technician said "You look as if you've got infantile paralysis to me,
but its none of my business" . 22 The doctor in charge visited for
the first and final time ten days later and said "she can go home".
The patient replied "Doctor, please, I have two little babies at
home, I can't walk. Please look at my leg". Before he walked off
the professional replied - "Grow up! And if you won't, get yourself
some crutches" . 23 The majority of survivors in this sample did not
record experiencing such appalling and abusive treatment. Some
doctors were alert to the symptoms of polio, or their colleagues
were, and responded immediately with appropriate measures. 24

Hospitalisation and its effects

Of the many stories of the ravages wrought by polio those involving
2 0 InteIView K.
2 1 InteIView H, p.64.
2 2 Interview H, p. 71.
23 InteIView H, p.64.
24 Interviews A, p. l ; F, p.49, and K. p.9 1.
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difficult to uncover. While psychological injury is evident amongst
this sample, only one interviewee indicated receiving any form of
psychological support at the time, or since .25

The evidence

suggests that the health system was in general not attuned to the
psychological and social effects of polio and hospitalisation. There
is a silence around this field of enquiry amongst medical and
health professionals, and polio survivors themselves. Attending to
the immediate physical and technical needs of the patients may
have been easier, and seemed more useful, than confronting the
more nebulous psychological and social impact of polio on their
lives.

Extended periods in hospital isolated from family and

friends during the formative years has left deflcits2 6 which have
affected relationships , adding to the restriction physical
limitations sometimes placed on social life.2 7
The effect of child care and nursing practices in place prior to the
1 950s contributed to the psychological wounding of polio
survivors, as it did to any very young children who were isolated
from their families for lengthy periods. Early in the twentieth
century child-care policies were based on a belief that "firm, cold
detachment" was the best approach, while the expert opinions of
those such as the New Zealander, Truby King, and J.B. Watson
combined to produce what we would now regard as an inhuman
25 Interview A, p.6.
2 6 Interview A. p.4 ;

My own experience of being hospitalised and isolated from
the family for seven months at the age of two and a half years is also relevant
here, as is the experience of the "Stolen Generation" and the "orphans of the
Empire" children, to name two other examples ..
2 7 Being unable to dance, run and participate in sport is frequently recorded as a
consequence of polio. This is discussed in more detail below.
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J .B Watson advised

regarding child care:
Never hug or kiss them. Never let them sit on your lap. If
you must, kiss them once on the forehead when they say
good night. Shake hands with them in the morning. Give
them a pat on the head if they have made an extremely good
job of a difficult task. Tiy it out. In a week's time you will
find how easy it is to be perfectly objective with your child
and at the same time kindly. You will be ashamed of the
mawkish, sentimental way you have been handling it.2 8
Fred Davis, who from 1954-55 followed the histoiy of fourteen
American polio survivors and their families, comments that
exposure to hospital life loosened familial ties and introduced
changes that made it difficult for a child to reintegrate with home
life. 2 9 He found hospital routine was deadening for children, and
interactions with professionals inhumane and alienating, though
this is true for more than just polio survivors. Humphries and
Gordon report that, in British institutions for the disabled, often
no pity was show to the child who cried.30

E vidence of

punishment or other penalisation of children with polio is scarce,
but it is known that hospital staff recorded whether their charges
were "ciying" or happy.3 1

A phobia of "spoiling" children left

Darbyshire, P. (1994). Living with a Sick Child in Hospital; the experiences of
parents and nurses, London: Chapman and Hall, Quoted in Hardyment, (1983).
p.175. While some changes to this approach can be found as early as 1927. real
28

reform came much later in the late 1950s and 1960s.
Davis. F. ( 1963). Passage Through Crtsis:polio victims and theirfamilies, Bobbs
Merrill Co. Inc. New York. pp.120-123, p. 1 71.
30 Humphries, S. and Gordon, P. ( 1 992). Out OJ Sight, p.91. They also report
that sensory deprivation was common in institutions that housed blind and deaf
children, and that it even extended to a ban on using sign language. leaving
them totally alienated.
3 1 Princess Margaret Hospital. "Examination Sheet for John Smith. Ward 2".
January 1949, General Appearance "Crying boy of 2 1 /2, walking with stamping
gatt". "Examination Sheet. for John Smith, Ward 2", 13 July 1949, "Temperature
102.2. Child flushed but happy". "Examination sheet for John Smith, Ward 9",
May 1950, "Crying boy of 4". Copies in the possession of the author.
29
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Mary Westbrook's survey of the clinical literature reveals that,
especially when it came to dealing with children, Australia medical
professionals are particularly guilty of misjudging the level of
psychological distress caused by having polio.3 3

She reports that

the dominant medical myth was "contracting polio is not very
upsetting for children; they soon get over any distress unless they
are spoilt" .3 4 Many polio survivors report that it was taboo for
them to be "spoilt" or "mollycoddled" - even by their parents. An
interviewee reports her mother thought being "mollycoddled... had
led to the illness in fact". 3 5 Parents and nursing and medical staff
alike showed an aversion to normal expressions of tenderness and
concern. Coupled with this was the dominance of the heroic or
triumphant model for surviving distressing experiences which
encouraged survivors to live as if they had no disability to contend
with.
Impetus for reform of child care policies came following the work of
John Bowlby and James Robertson who studied the effects of
maternal and familial deprivation, in connection with the war time
evacuation of children.

They also filmed the effects of

hospitalisation on children and revealed the startling outcome to a
32

Interview C. p.28; E, p.46; I. p.8 1 .
33 Westbrook, M. ( 1 996). E arly Memories, p.5, see also Bearup, C . ( 1 99 1).
Outcomes , p.56, "By today's standards. . . little attention was paid to the psycho
social needs of the polio patient. . . "
3 4 Westbrook, M. ( 1 996). E arly Memories , p.5.
3 5 Interview C, p.28. My own experience was that, after long periods of
hospitalisation I would return home. The tantrums that attended my
reintroduction to family life were explained by the comment - "the nurses must
have spoilt him".
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disbelieving medical

profession. 3 6

3 69

The work of Bowlby and

Robertson had its impact too late for many children hospitalised
during the polio epidemics but it has contributed to a radical
reshaping of the child care offered since.
Jane S. Smith has written "a buried fear is hard to resurrect" 3 7
and among this sample there is evidence that memories of early
experiences of hospitalisation are difficult to uncover.

Factors

may have influenced the silence include the severity of the
experience, the age at which it took place, and the relationship of
the survivor to the person reporting the effects. A nurse, who in
1969 married a polio survivor who had been infected at eleven
years of age, reports that her husband, now deceased, was quite
reticent about his past even though his early experience of
hospitalisation had proved almost fatal
... trying to get any information about what happened when
he actually had polio, or even his life before he had polio,
was very difficult... I was trying to write something down for
the children so that they would... know how Dad managed,
but it was extremely difficult to get anything out of him,
particularly about the time that he was at the "Golden
Age", 3 8 which, thinking back now, and having talked to a lot
of other polio people, probably means that he didn't have a
very good time there at all...
... one of the only things that he ever did talk about, was
when he was left in the bath [ in] only a couple of inches of
water. At that time he was completely paralysed, so he could
Just lift his head up. He was lying on his tummy - the nurse
3 6 Bowlby, J. (1953: 1990). Child Care And The Growth ofLove, Penguin,
Harmondsworth, especially pp.21-52. Robertson, ( 1962: 1970). made two films,
John: Nine Days in a Residential Nursery, and A Two-Year-Old Goes to Hospital,
and SBS 1V Documentary, Are Mother's Really Necessary? Episodes 1-4.
3 7 Smith, J. S. ( 1990 ). Patenting the Sun, p.24.
38 The "Golden Age", formerly a hotel. was bought from the Swan Brewery and
converted into an annexe to house patients from Princess Margaret Hospital
who required polio after-care.
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had gone to get a flannel - he couldn't keep his head up any
longer and... was drowning in water, and he was aware that
he was drowning, and she... came back and grabbed his head
out again in time. And he spluttered and coughed and
managed to get the water out of his mouth, and his
comments have been that he's nearly died so many times
that he was not afraid of dying, because he'd faced it so
many times rtght from back then.3 9

Very young children may have been the worst affected by
hospitalisation - whether due to polio in themselves, or the long
term removal of a parent affected by polio. And absence from home
because of hospitalisation provoked gender issues in some families.
In this sample alienation from one parent was sometimes
countered by growth of relationship with the other, though no
discernible pattern can be found. 40 But some recognise there was
an impact arising from the separation.

The parents of the

youngest polio survivor in this sample report that after their
fourteen month old son had been totally separated from them for a
month, "he didn't know who we were - it was terrible", 4 1 and that
"the psychological effect .. . [ of polio on her son) was much worse
than the physical effect". 42 The mother reports that she felt their
son was twelve years old before he "really ... accepted me as his

39

Interview G, p.60.
Interview B, pp.22-23, a male, developed stronger mother attachment; C, p.30,
a female, developed negative mother relationship but the father remained
positive; d, p.36, retained positive relationships with both parents; E, p.46, had a
positive mother relationship, but her siblings were resentful; F, p.5 1 , "couldn't
have wished for better parents; I, pp.77-78, records that on return home, things
continued as normal. In my own case my father was the primary carer, and if I
experienced any depletion of the mother-bond, it was compensated for by a
development of my paternal bond.
4 1 Interview A, p.2.
42 Interview A. p.14.
40
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true mother" . 43 Relationships with other members of the family
were also affected, but one month's absence at such a young age
was sufficient to severely disrupt the maternal bond, at least in the
mother's eyes. Such disruption was exacerbated by the hospital
visiting policies in place at the time. The parents testify [Mother] We were allowed in those days to see him twice a
week, Wednesday between five and six [pm], and Sunday
between three and four [ pm). That's all the time we were
allowed to see him and because he was taken away from us
for a month, we would go in and he didn't know who we
were. But by the time we were about to leave he was
beginning to recognise us and then we'd have to go, and he'd
scream, and all the children would scream.
[Father] I think that was the worst part of the whole system
because... he was living away when he was at the age where
he was beginning to be part of a family, and understand that
we were his parents and things like that. He didn't and I
think that was a lot of the psychological problem that he
had the rest of his life. It's only really. . . in the last ten
years, that he's really in a sense, knows that he's part of the
family. I mean he's always known, well, we've told him and
he knows, but the actual acceptance of it like a normal
family would be.44
[ Mother) . . . we have some terrible memories.. . things he
would do spontaneously. .. right up to in his twenties. He'd
come home for ... the holidays ... and I'd be so worried about
him driving this long distance across Australia on his own...
I'd hear the car come up the driveway and I'd go to the door,
like I would greet anybody - more so a family member - and
I'd say [hello] and I'd go to kiss him. He'd tum his face rtght
away - as though... stabbing me in the back. .. Those were
things I found very hard to handle. I couldn't understand
why he would do that to me.45
The official versions of polio history in Western Australia pay no
attention to these dimensions of the story, concentrating instead
43 Interview A, p.4 . Original emphasis.
44 Interview A. p.4. Original emphasis.
45 Interview A. p.14.
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on the medical victory, fear and the "conquest" of the virus, and
the heroic triumph of selected survivors. Nor is there any evidence
of psychological support being provided in the system of care and
after-care. But the losses suffered by polio survivors and their
families went far beyond those imposed by physical disablement
and separation from home.

Not all experiences of hospitalisation were negative. For those
children old enough to be less vulnerable to the effects of familial
loss, and whose level of mobility allowed them a degree of
independence, periods of hospitalisation could be relatively happy
times.

There was a great deal of camaraderie and life-long

friendships were sometimes formed with patients and staff. 46

After three years away in hospital, commencing at eleven years of
age, a young woman returned home to find her friends had grown
up. She made various personal gains during her absence, but her
story reveals six levels of loss. Separation from family due to
hospitalisation; the loss experienced when others were sent home;
separation from the friends she had made during three years in
hospital; the feeling of alienation from friends and family on her
return home; loss of the ability to dance, and the perception that
having a normal married and family life would be unreasonable.
She recalls
I was an only child and we lived on a farm, way out. I only
saw my Dad when I was able to go home for that week at
Christmas time, and Mum used to try to come up and visit
46

Interviews I, J, and K record this. See also "Friendship heals polio scars",
April 1997.

Busselton-Margaret River Times,
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. . . I'd never been away from home before ... the doctor had
said to me "Oh, you'll probably be home for your birthday" ,
but he didn't say it was going to be birthday three years
along the road. [ I ] went up to Princess Margaret... and
didn't really know what was wrong with me until a lot of the
kids came along and said "Oh, look this is my polio arm, and
this is my polio leg, and which one is yours?" It suddenly
struck me what was wrong with me . . .
Then, after Princess Margaret, [ where] we had a teacher and
used to do our schoolwork . . . [ I ] went to the Golden Age,
which was the annex of Princess Margaret . . .the older girls..
could. . . walk around. . . and help change the babies and . . .
feed the little ones. It was just like one big happy family.
We had our own classroom. I was quite happy there.
Probably its not a very good thing to say, but you know if
you have to be somewhere, it was a good place to be .
. . . [ once] back home.. . you had to adjust from losing your
big . . . happy family. . . and finding that all the kids . . . I'd had
[ as] friends before I went had all grown up... They'd gone out
to work and .. . all had their own group of friends . . . You
basically have to start all over again.
It was. . . like getting used to another family again ... Quite
difficult at fifteen.. . all the other kids were going to
dances. . . I used to try, but I'd fall over too often and look an
idiot, so I gave up.4 7
[ In hospital] there was a lot of not-so-happy times, especially
when somebody would be getting a lot better, and leaving
your friends behind, and you could see that that person was
not getting better at all. And you. . . had a . . . feeling of guilt. . .
because you . . . could see that you were getting to a higher
level and that other person just was staying put. Especially
when they went home. . . and you knew that they weren't
going to get much better. You'd see them going off. . . not
being able to walk or anything, and you'd think "well,
probably that's it" , because they didn't send people home
unless they were sure that they weren't going to get any
better.
There was a lot of nice people up there. We were allowed to
go out on a Sunday. Because I didn't live . . . anywhere near. . .
other people would take us home for the Sunday . . . when
they took their children. But a lot of the times weren't very

4 7 Interview J, p.84-85.
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happy, . . . I think you're inclined to try to sort of forget those.

[When I came home] I don't think it was ever the same as
before I went, because it was . . . so long between visits and
with being away for so long, and being with other people,
and seeing a whole different lifestyle, to come back to how it
was, it didn't work that well. . . . you look forward to coming
home; you look forward to the happy day when you're going
to be there, but when you got there it wasn't what you
expected. It really was completely different.
[My parents had] got older and things ... weren't the same,
and... they were over protective. . . [They would say] ... "Oh
no, I don't think you should go and do that" and "No! I
don't really think that would be a good idea" . . . rtght up
until. . . we were going to get married. Mum didn't think that
marriage and family . . . was a good lifestyle. She thought that
maybe it's not the thing that you should be doing. Not that
anybody ever took any notice . . . 4 8
No, it wasn't the homecoming that I'd expected. . . from my
point of view because living away and living in Perth was
totally different to coming back here, right away from
everything... We were about twenty kilometers out of town,
and it wasn't a matter of Just being able to go and see your
friends when you wanted to. You had to rely on them to be
able to take you and they didn't really live that lifestyle. 49
The loss of childhood, and the disruption of sibling relationships is
evident the testimony of a male survivor who spent four years in
hospital.

48

I resented. .. being in hospital. One of my sisters - the one
closest to me in age - had had slight touch of polio. . . but
she didn't have to go to hospital and I objected to the fact
that I was the one that was sent to hospital. I objected to
the fact that I was miSsing out on all the wonderful things
that happen on a farm. We had a marvellous childhood, but
as I said we weren't at all wealthy. My father was a soldier

Humphries. S. and Gordon, P. (1992). Out Of Sight, pp.144-50; There was a
strong prejudice against having a relationship with a disabled persons, and
relationships between disabled couples were strongly disapproved of. often on the
basis of Eugenics.
4 9 Interview J, pp.87-88.
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settler from the First World War, and had a small holding at a town called Dunorlin, which is close to Deloraine - and
raised dairy cattle.. . We had a marvellous childhood until
this polio struck, and I always objected that I was the one
who was singled out to go to hospital, and I missed out on
all the marvellous things that happen to kids when they're
ten or eleven years of age, and in the company of big
brothers and sisters.5 0

The impairment of physical functioning, leading to curtailment of
social opportunities, was frequently remarked upon by those
interviewed in this sample. Difficulties were acknowledged with
mobility, dancing, sport, horse riding and work. 5 I Loss of body
image and the prospect of decreased economic and social
opportunities obviously lie behind this concern. For the males,
loss of work and sporting capacities was a major consideration,
along with the social training that came through normal childhood
interactions. The male survivor above reports that hospitalisation
from polio
. . . deprived me of the opportunity to play games and
undertake activities with children of my own age... There
might have been twenty beds in the hospital ward that I was
in. There would only be a few boys of my age; some of them
a good deal younger, some of them a good deal older. I never
had the chance to play team games, even ... sedentary games
you can't play very well in hospital. I think I missed out a
lot in learning the ethos of the team. That's my biggest loss.
I think I never learned to share victory and defeat in team
sports, that other boys of my age would have had. I think
that was the biggest loss. 5 2

5 0 Interview

D, p.37.
5 1 Interviews, D, p.37; I, p.79; J, p.85; K, p.93; L, p. 100. "Dad played drums for
the local hall and Mum relieved on the piano every now and then. If there was a
barn dance, or a slow dance I stood up with Mum and had the dance. These
days I can't dance, it's too much, but I was young then and I could get around".
(Interview I, p. 77.)
5 2 Interview D, p.40.
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A mother of two who, after polio, had a third child in 1 96 1 and
now regularly uses a wheelchair reported, "I.. . find some things
hard. I taught all the kids to ride a horse - that's hard from the
ground - and things like that were difficult". 53 A farmer, who was
initially hospitalised for ten months, was allowed home in a wheel
chair to class the wool clip at shearing time. His verdict was that
this was "terrtftc therapy as far as I was concerned" and it formed
the basis for his decision to return to to the land despite his
disability and the adjustments he had to make as a result.54
Parents who were hospitalised with polio and had small children at
home suffered from being deprived of their children. Assisted by
other members of the family their children may have had the
advantage of a better quality of care than those children with polio
received in hospital, but relationships were also disrupted, though
perhaps not as badly. Keeping the family going required additional
help and extra effort on the part of spouses and in-laws. A mother
with one young child was
Six months pregnant when I got [ polio] and there was
nothing wrong with the baby. .. she came home, my mother
in-law had her. . . for twelve months, because she didn't
come home immediately I went home. I came home once, I
think, during that twelve months... for Christmas...
Until [the baby] was perhaps a year old, we had a girl, a live
in girl that had just finished school. ...we had three girls
that stayed three years each, and then... they went off and
did their own thing. .. it worked out well for. . . all of us.
In connection with the separation from her baby, she said ...that was a bit hard you know. My husband used to come

5 3 Interview L, p. 100.
54 Interview K, p.92.
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to Perth every fortnight and stay with friends. And ...
occasionally he brought... the eldest girl, but he didn't bring
the baby up of course. But, you know, I don't think anyone
had any lasting effects from it. My mother-in-law used to
have . . . a fair bit to say about whatever affected that
particular child. Well she had a right to I suppose... but
there was no drama about that.55

A mother of two who was hospitalised for three months found that
her two children, a boy of twenty months and a gtrl of three years,
were disturbed by her absence.

During her three months of

hospitalisation her son was also admitted to PMH with polio and
her daughter was cared for by her sister who lived in the country.
She felt deeply about not being able to see her children.
Most traumatic was .. . not being able to see my children.
You didn't have visitors. My husband [ who] was in the
Services . .. nearly got a court martial over trying to cope with
[ my son] when he was fretting. It was traumatic because I
had no family in Perth. My mother was [ in Bunbury], my
sister was at Wagin, so she took [ my daughter] to Wagin. I
was a woman that craved to have children and here I am in
hospital months on end, and I never saw my babies.
When she was discharged from hospital she found that her son,
who was still receiving treatment, did not know her. Then, after
enduring the difficulties of making a journey to Wagin to see her
daughter, she encountered a similar reaction.
We got off at the station and [ me with] that caliper on my
leg, . . . we got lost, and... by the time we got to my sister's
place... I was so tired. . . she said. . . "Go and lay down on
our bed" . They brought me a cup of tea.. . I was . . . so
exhausted that I fell asleep with ( it] in my hand.
... when I did see [ my daughter] she didn't know me. Well I
broke my heart, to think there's my babies, they don't know
me. No-one can understand what that's like when you're
55 InteIView L. pp.97-98.
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separated from you r children for so long, unless they've been
through that. But you suIVive.5 6
While separation from her children drove this mother to the brink
of doubt and despair her "but you suIVive" reveals a strong sense
of determination to win out over polio. She continues I cried day and night. I can remember crying for my children,
so many days, so many months. I just sometimes wondered
if I'd ever see them again - you long for them. My [ daughter ]
was just at the stage of beginning to talk - and I thought
"I'm missing all this and not because I want to" , .... you do
wonder and then you think I'm going to beat it, it's not going
to beat me, I'm going to beat this thing. 5 7
In later life this mother has also reflected on the other side of this
story - the effect of the separation on her children. She said,
wistfully I have wondered. I have really wondered... I think [ my
daughter] having nothing the matter with her, ... always
mothered [ my son] but I often wonder if she felt he got all
the attention, and maybe she missed out. She would deny
that possibly... but I have wondered.SB
Separation from family and friends was affected by rules about
hospital visitation. During the early stages of infection quarantine
restrictions often applied, but even where this was not so, parents
frequently had little time with their children, as noted above. A
male suIVivor hospitalised in Tasmania at nine and a half years of
age recalls that for the first two weeks he had no visitors because 5 6 Interview H, p.66.
5 7 Interview H. pp. 70-71.
5 8 Interview H, p.70.
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I was in the Infectious Ward in the old Launceston Infection
Diseases Hospital, but after that I was able to. My parents
lived some distance away - they were farmers - we certainly
weren't wealthy people by any means. My parents were able
to make the trip into Launceston - this was forty miles - to
begin with they used to come and see me every weekend, but
after a while they gave up quite such regular visits, because I
did have a sister, and later on two sisters, and one brother,
who were attending high school in Launceston, and they had
to board, and though they did go home by train some of the
weekends, some weekends they spent in Launceston and they
would visit me. So the system worked out, roughly speaking,
my parents came once a fortnight and the the odd fortnight,
either my brother or one of my sisters would come to see
me.59
Added to this form of isolation was the regime that existed in the
hospital in 1937 / 38 .
. . . my first recollection is of a system that didn't really
believe in explaining to the patient what was going on. The
patient wasn't expected to know, or to be able to take in.
They treated us as children - of course we were children - but
they talked down to us. . . 60
Those who were transferred to the city from country districts were
sometimes little worse off than those whose families lived in the
metropolitan area. A Perth woman who had polio at four years of
age recalls I know my family visited, but I don't know if anyone else did.
I don't know how regular my family were. I know we didn't
have a car in those days, so they would have had to depend
on public transport. 6 1
5 9 Interview D. p.35.

6 0 Interview D, p.35.
6 1 Interview E, p.45.
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Polio and hospitalisation brought many deficits, but some gained
advantages from the experience which proved to be a crossroads at
which they made fundamental decisions about their future
directions in life. The Tasmanian, who in adult life became a high
ranking librarian, continues
Scholastically it didn't worry me, because I did reasonably
well. One of my first gifts that my parents and brothers and
sisters gave me was a set of books called Practical Knowledge
For All, which I can still see on the shelf right across in this
very room, and I became an avid reader. In St Giles Home...
they had a small library there and I took charge of it and
used to arrange the books properly. I used to get somewhat
annoyed, because I used to arrange them alphabetically by
the name of the author and someone would come along and
arrange them by the colour, or the size of the binding.
I got terribly interested in scholastic things, reading and so
on, and I think I benefited from that... I was interested in
history and so on, because of the reading I did in those days,
so I never regretted it from that point of vtew.62
And the doctor, who in 1953 spent seventy four days in an iron
lung, turned his attentions to respiratory research.

A

distinguished career followed over the next thirty years, marked in
1989 by his being awarded the inaugural "Fisons" medal of the
Thoracic Society of Australia and New Zealand. Three years later

62 Interview D. pp.40-4 1 .
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was made a Member of the Order of Australia.53 His career, which
included working with Julius Comroe at the Cardiovascular
Research Institute, San Francisco, grew directly out of his
response to having polio
I left Perth in 1 957 to take up research at Sydney University.
I was partly inspired by reading books such as that of Julius
Comroe The Lung , which was a mine of useful information.
And there were other works, other publications, that I found
extremely helpful in managing people with respiratory
paralysis during the '56 epidemic. . . These works led me to
the idea that the best thing for me to do - considering that I
was fairly severely paralysed, and would be permanently
paralysed and have to walk with crutches - was medical
research. . . I gained an appointment at Sydney University,
working on pulmonary function [and] was there for three
years. . . The problem was what to do then and it seemed to
me the best thing to do was to gain further knowledge of
research through working at one of the major centres in the
United States. In my case it was the Cardiovascular
Research Institute, whose director was Julius Comroe - the
same Julius whose book on the lung I'd read in 1 956. At the
time, in 1 956, I remember idly remarking that it would be
nice one day to work in Comroe's Institute, and in 1 96 1 I
found myself there. 6 4
Not everyone was able to turn their polio experience to such

advantage but some did, as is evident from these testimonies. One

result of their decisions, and their determination not to let polio
beat them, is a notably high level of achievement amongst polio
survivors.
Fear and stigmatisation

63 Thoracic Society News, November 1992, p.63. An A.M was awarded in 1992.
64 Interview B. pp.21-22.
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Vivienne Overheu, a polio survivor of the 1954 epidemic, records
that she and her family were stigmatised because of the polio she
had when twenty-two years of age. While she was still in hospital
in Perth, friends and acquaintances in her home town "tended to
cross the street" rather than come in contact with her parents, and
"even the public telephone was disinfected after they had used
it" .5 5 Stigmatisation was not confined to country areas. Overheu,
who had to use a wheel chair, records that during a visit to Perth
with her mother she had great difficulty in finding a hairdresser
who would accept the job of cutting her hair. 66

The sight of her

entering the premises was enough to prompt whispered conferences
amongst the staff and declarations of full appointment books.

Fear of polio which resulted in the stigmatisation of survivors is
recorded by eight interviewees. It is clear from this sample that the
age at which the subject had polio affected their likelihood of being
sttgmatised, and also the the memory of the experience. Fear and
stigmatisation is evident among family members, and the public,

6 5 Overheu, V. ( 1984). ItPays to beStubborn, Perth: St George Books, p.34

66 Overheu, V. ( 1984). It Pays to beStubborn, pp.73-4.
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as well as hospital and medical staff, and it was not left behind at
the end of the polio era. Parents who indicated that as a result of
their son's polio in 1951 their friends "sort of dropped off a bit"
reported that in recent years their son, who is able to "dance quite
well", was refused by a woman on the grounds that "she wouldn't
dance with a cripple". The refusal was deeply felt He broke down on the phone . . . he was really upset. We
thought things had come a long way really over the years,
but when you hear that, some people haven't come any way
at all.6 7
Sadly, stigmatisation was sometimes felt within families.

The

woman referred to in chapter two, who at school found herself
rejected by the members of her basketball team, is a case in point.
She recalls how her mother, in particular, felt that polio had
brought shame and unwanted attention to the family, with
obvious consequences for the sense of guilt and shame she herself
accumulated. She said ... the biggest sin was to draw attention to the family and in
some way make us ... you know ... [ other] children didn't get
these things, but I did. And, of course, it implies ... neglect ..
which was I think why my mother accentuated how
mollycoddled I had been... It was not her fault, either way.
You can't blame her. It was the nurse; it was the hospital,
or it was God when I was bom. 68
Interpreting childhood memories is made more difficult because
stigmatisation was not always expressed directly. When asked if
6 7 Interview A. p.8.
68 Interview C. p.3 1
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he found people treated him differently after he had polio a

survivor said
It would be hard to tell that I think, because... I suppose
there was a difference. I don't remember any sort of, any
discrimination against me, on the grounds of "that family's
unclean because they've had polio". I don't remember
anything like that at all. I may have been too young to
notice, or may Just have been unobservant, but I don't
remember anything like that. It is true that vecy, vecy few
people, apart from my family, came to see me in hospital.
We had one old chap who worked on the farm, occasionally
hired by my father as a labourer. He was vecy fond of me
and I remember him coming to see me once, but by and large
I can remember vecy, vecy few people coming in to see me in
hospital.

I think there was some suggestion that some of the cousins my mother had a brother who lived in the same town... he
had a largish family . . . They wouldn't come near our
household, about the time of the infection, but I don't think
it lasted vecy long. 6 9
A similar lack of direct personal experience of stigmatisation is
recounted by an adult survivor. He knew that others had
encountered stigmatisation and, with humor, is able to show that
it did exist not far from him. He said I can't say that I had any... experiences that made me feel
that I wasn't welcome in their company. .. Others have
talked about that, but no, I can't say that. .. The only thing
that I heard I think, was that an old gentleman that had
been contact with me prior to my going down with polio... he
said something like he wished he had known, because he
was one of those that if he went out he used to always gargle
with something, salt and water, or some old fashioned
remedy... He wished he had known, because he would have
gone home and done that but he didn't know and he didn't
get polio so I don't know what he concluded from that. But,
no, I can't honestly say that I encountered anyone whose
reaction was ... reluctant to be in my company. 1 0
69
70

InteIView D, p.37.
InteIView K, p.95.
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On the other hand the doctor who had polio as an adult stated he

did not experience stigmatisation or ostracism. If it was present,
he obviously refused to accept it.
I suppose if you look hard enough for it, you'd find it, but
that doesn't apply solely to polio. There are some people
who don't like dealing with people with disabilities. That's a
perfectly general phenomenon. I regard those people as
having a curious attitude. Certainly there are such people,
but, in general, I either ignored such attitudes or they
weren't very apparent in most people I dealt with. But there
are some people who don't like dealing with the paralysed.
They used to call them cripples. You're not allowed to use
the word cripple any more. It's supposed to be one of those
forbidden expressions - let's not drift into that.1 1
The schoolyard was the most obvious place for children with polio
to feel the presence of stigmatisation. Even school children are
remembered as basing their attitude towards of polio survivors on
fear and the uncertainty that surrounded its cause and means of
transmission. One survivor recalls that, as a schoolgirl she was
upset by the taunts in the school yard.
I know I used to get teased a lot at school. . . because I had a
caliper on my right leg... get called names and that, get a lot
of teasing... "Football boots", "Limpy", "Hopalong Cassidy" ...
I remember... names like that, yes.
I don't think anyone really knew how you caught it, and
[ they said] ... "don't play with her 'cos you might get it as
well" - and all sorts of things like this.
Not all her experiences were negative. Being victimised also
brought out the help and protective influence of others, even if its
effect was temporary.
. . there was this other boy who was younger than me, his

7 1 Interview B, p.23.
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sister also had calipers, or [ was) disabled, and he used to
come up and say "Oh, leave her alone... " He knew what it
was like, because his sister was similar. And I think the
teachers used to tell them to leave me alone, but when the
teachers weren't around it all started again. 12

A similar experience of protection is recalled by a male interviewee
who, as a teenager became involved in a school yard fight..
... after my hospital experience of course I went to... high
school like any other child ... The very first day I was there, I
was thirteen years of age at the time, I was still in hospital I went to high school from hospital - and I got into a fist
fight with a boy... someone rushed up to this boy and said
"Cut it out John. Don't hit him, he's in hospital, he's a
polio sufferer... So John, whom I still remember quite well,
stopped the fight immediately. 73
A female interviewee who came from a close knit rural community
records no personal stigmatisation, or pity. If it was present it
was too understated to register.

However, on discharge from

hospital she had to surrender her personal possessions for fear of
them conveying germs to others.
I don't think anyone felt sorry for me. I just went in with
the group of kids that were going. Some of them didn't like
me because I was slow in keeping up, but apart from that I
was always involved with them. .. It didn't worry me.7 4
Mum bought me a book when I went into Margaret River
hospital... and they said that I couldn't take it to Perth,
because it was infected - the book was infected. I can't
remember but I have a feeling that it did go to Perth
somehow, and Perth was different - it was all right in Perth,
but it wasn't all right in the country.. . it hasn't really
worried me and I don't think the people around me... didn't
stick up for me or anything.. . 7 5
7 2 Interview E, p.45.
7 3 Interview D, p.39
7 4 Interview I, p. 77.
7 5 Interview I. p. 79.
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The male survivor who was hospitalised in Tasmania in 1937/ 38
had a similar experience.

His personal possessions were

confiscated due to fear of cross infection.
When I first went in there I'd made some progress with my
education, so I was able to write and I had with me a set of
stamps, and some writing paper. And that was taken from
me and I asked for it after a while and they said "You can't
have it." . . .I said "Why can't I have it" and they said because
it would have "wogs" on it. Well I objected to that word
"wogs". I thought that was just talking down to me. If they
had said germs I would have thought that's fair enough,
but... the word "wogs"... I thought was a word you mtght use
for insects, rather than tiny little bacteria, or. . . viruses
And . . . my mother had bought me. .. a new suit, and I'd worn
that into hospital.. . Of course that was taken from me - I
was put into pyjamas - and that suit never materialised
again. My mother was quite upset about that, because it
was quite expensive for us. . . eve:iy penny was pretty hard to
get, and my mother and father were quite upset that that
suit disappeared. I asked for it and they said "It's got wogs
on it and you can't have it". But it was never fumigated and
given up to them or anything like that. Of course by the
time I came out of hospital, four years later, I was far too big
for it anyway . . . 7 6
The same interviewee remembers there being an embargo on travel
between Victoria and Tasmania 77 and recalled an amusing stoiy,
current in Tasmania at the time, which even if it is apociyphal
reflects how people felt about polio at the time.
There was a lot of superstition about... before I went into
hospital a stoiy appeared in a newspaper that someone had
sent a pound note by mail from Melbourne to a person in
Tasmania, but the person didn't know there was a pound
note inside the envelope, and put the envelope inside the
7 6 Interview D. p.38. Bearup, C. (199 1). Outcomes, pp. 27, 30, reports the

destruction of one polio survivor's toy, and another who, before her return home
was bathed in phenyl, along with all her effects.
77 Interview D. p.39.
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kitchen range, in the oven space, to disinfect it... The thing
caught fire and the pound note burnt, and my mother was
vastly amused at that... a pound was a fair bit of money.
You didn't bum a pound note, no way. 7 8
The testimony of a woman who had polio as an adult in 1946
reveals that, even if the doctor was not afraid of polio, he allowed
for the fact that others might have been.
. . . the doctor came and said "We're moving you from the
ward, but you've had this long enough now that it shouldn't
be contagious"... I was put down in a room and he said "just
don't say anything to the other patients because you've got
infantile paralysis, and it could cause panic, but I'm sure
that you're past the contagious stage". 79
A woman, who had polio in 1948 at eleven years of age, has clear
memories of the fear and stigmatisation present at that time.
Nurses were given the choice of caring for polio patients while she
herself encountered stigmatisation during walks in the streets
around PMH.
I have the feeling when I went into hospital that they asked
the girls, the nurses, who would be prepared to look after
me, because the two people that did are still friends of
mine... and I get the feeling that they had to volunteer to do
that job.
.. .I know people didn't like to be around you, because when
we were at the Golden Age... once we got back to walking a
bit we were allowed to walk around the block, ...people
would see us coming and they'd all cross the street. So
what we used to do was, the ones that were able to walk
would cross the street and walk on the same side as the
other lot, so they either had to walk in the middle of the
road, or something like that. A bit nasty when you think
about it.
And even after I came home, when I was... better, after the
7 8 Interview D, p.38.
79 Interview H. p.65.
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three years, people would say - because I still had my
crutches sometimes then - "oh, what's the matter with her"
and Mum would... say "oh well, you know she's had polio" ...
You could see them sort of taking a few steps back. BO

Given the uncertainties about modes of infection that existed until
the the late 1940s, and the comparison that could be made with
Tuberculosis, such fear and stigmatisation may have been
reasonable, however uncomfortable for the polio survivors. On the
other hand, there were occasions when polio survivors were treated
kindly with positive result.
There was a Launceston Gymkhana and we were taken
[ there] in cars by people from The Society for the Care of
Crippled Children. . . some of the children were sitting up like
walking wounded and it was obvious to the crowd in the
streets of Launceston that we were a special group. . . as we
were driven along the street in Launceston, all these people
on either side of the road.. . cheered us, because we were
crippled children. I suppose they thought they should do
something to show their sympathy ... There were occasions
like that. We had great kindness shown to us and we
appreciated that.s 1
The culture of denial
A corollary to the stigmatisation and ostracism of polio survivors
by others was a level of denial that they themselves, and
sometimes those around them, exercised in connection with their
condition. Denial has been another element that has maintained
the silence around polio. Evidence suggests that a strong culture
of minimising or denying the effects of polio has existed, as it had
done for other forms of disability, and that this is part of the
80 Interview J, pp.85-6. Emphasis added.
8 1 Interview D. p.4 1.
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strong desire to overcome the effects of the disease, even to the
point of living as though no physical or other deficits have been
created. In his autobiography, I Can Jump Pu d dles, Alan Marshall
wrote
The word "crippled", to me, suggested a condition that could
be applied to some people, but not myself. But, since I so
often heard people refer to me as crippled, I was forced to
concede that I must fit this description, yet retained a
conviction that though being crippled was obviously a
distressing state for some people, with me it didn't matter. 82
At the time of writing his biography Marshall remembers that, as a
child, being a cripple is not something he associated with
himself. 8 3 He gtves further examples of his refusal to take notice
of his condition and considers that such a perception does not
come from within the afflicted one, but from people who categorise
in this way. 8 4 While there is no reason to doubt his childhood
experience, it is clear that his outlook includes his reflection on
this subject as an adult.
Evidence also suggests that the attitude of some members of the
medical profession encouraged those with a disability to overcome
their deficits and become part of the mainstream of life. The West
Australian orthopedic surgeon, the late Sir George Bedbrook,wrote
in the Foreword of polio survivor Vivienne Overheu 's
82
83

Marshall, A. (1955). Puddles, p.71.
His disease was polio, but a similar attitude can be detected in connection
with other forms of disability where it was believed the effects had to be
overcome, minimised or denied to ensure social and personal success to the
survivor. See for example Humphries, S. and Gordon, P. ( 1992). Out Of Sight: the
experience of dtsabUtty 1900-1950 , Northcote House.Plymouth, p.42 "For David
Swift the ultimate aim was to hide his disability altogether and to make himself
appear exactly the same as other children".
8 4 Marshall, A. ( 1955) Puddles, pp.99-100, 195.
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Throughout the narrative, it is her ability that shines out
rather than her disability and this, indeed, is the goal that
all disabled people are striving for. 85
After her paralysis in 1954 the author battled with the
consequences to live a full life which included marriage, children,
and duties as a farmer's wife. The title of her book, It Helps To Be
Stubborn,

was chosen because of the particular brand of

determination - the "cussedness" - the which gave her the will to
fight.
A heroic style in the face of difficulties, reflected in strong willed
behaviour, stubbornness, denial and, often, an outstanding level of
achievement, is common amongst polio survivors. The evidence
suggests that once a person became paralysed the prevailing social
and medical culture trained them to overcome their difficulties, an
attitude that often led to what could be described as
overcompensation. As a result many drove themselves to reach the
same level of achievement as those living without a disability. The
following report on the 1981 West Australian People's Marathon
provides a case in point. Although the official maximum time
allowed for the race was five hours the time keeper left the timing
gates open a few minutes longer to allow the last competitor, Tony
Parnell, a polio survivor, to cross the line. Parnell . . . whose right leg is completely withered with virtually no
muscle structure, ... uses it purely as support while he drives
with his good leg. A magnificent effort... he took up running
because his doctor told him he couldn't do it, and he decided

85 Overheu, V. (1984). It Helps to Be Stubborn, p.5.
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The biographies of polio survivors frequently chart the course of
one who exercised rigid discipline in order to restore lost
capacities. If regained these capacities can be retained, at first,
because polio is not a degenerative disease.

Many survivors

describe themselves as having "had" polio, and have difficulty
acknowledging the legacy of special needs the disease created.
Indeed, some have gone out of their way to ignore them.
After surveying several biographies, Macy Westbrook summarises
the experience of polio survivors as governed by "ignore your
distress: hard work and cheerful acceptance will overcome polio". 8 7
Denial and hard work was the salve applied to wasted muscles and
twisted lives. "Use it or lose it" was the programme instilled into
many polio survivors, and by this means they built up their
strength, overcame the effects of their affliction and moved into
the mainstream of life. S B Unfortunately in the long term this has
proved to be the reverse of the strategy needed to care for and
preseive weakened muscles and twisted bodies. For some survivors
the dividend is now being paid in significant psychological
distress, 89 and the curtailment of activity at an earlier age than
might otherwise have been the case. As understanding of PPS
8 6 Western Australian Marathon Club, Newsletter, Spring 1981, p.12.
8 7 Westbrook, M. (1996). Early Memories of Polio-Survivors: Memories Versus
the Official Myths, Proceedings. International Post-Polio Conference, NSW, p.5-6.
88 Scheer, J. and Luborsky. M.L. (1991). Post-Polio Sequelae: the cultural
context of polio biographies, Orthopaedics, Vol. 14, No 11. pp.1178-9.
89 Conrady. L.J. . Wish. J.R. . Agre. J.C., Rodriguez, A.A., Sperling, K.B. ( 1989).
Psychologtc Characteristics of Polio Survivors: a preliminruy report, Archive of
Physical Medical RehabUltatton, Vol. 70, p.462.
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develops polio survivors are learning they must "conserve or lose
it", a program that involves them in a complete reorientation in
life. Conservation means having to recognise and face their own
special needs, refusing to deny or minimise their difficulties, and
letting go of the pretense that they can perform as people without
a disability. This is the challenge facing polio survivors in the
1990s.
Amongst these interviews denial was at times part of the personal
style of the interviewee, 9 0 was present in the form of not expecting
to get polio, 9 1 or not mentioning the subject, even amongst close
friends. 9 2 Sometimes the polio patient was denied any knowledge
of what was wrong with them, even when the infection had first
struck. A young girl's febrile illness, followed by her complete
collapse, was left entirely unexplained by family and medical staff.
She later recalled
. . .nothing else was said about it and nobody told me what it
was I had wrong with me, they just took me to hospital and I
used to think it was really funny that nobody would come in.
Mum and Dad weren't allowed to come in. And I had two
nurses that used to just come in and do what they had to,
all dressed in white with masks, and heaven only knows
what. And I used to think "well, this is really awful", but
nobody would say why I had to be like that. 9 3
The wife of a severely paralysed male survivor records that she got
caught up in her husband's denial, expressed in his attitude
90

Interview H. p.72. "I can't take empathy, I can't take sympathy, I like people to
understand that".
9 1 Interview F. p.53.
9 2 Interview I. p. 77. "I don't think ... and I ever talked about me having polio. We
were just friends and that was that".
9 3 Interview J, p.85.
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... the way he dealt with it was to pretend that it was entirely
normal to live the way he was, with the disabilities that he
had. And in hindsight, looking back now, I can see that that
influenced my attitudes as well and we lived as a family
completely as if it was perfectly normal to have a permanent
tracheotomy, to have the bedroom set up like an intensive
care unit, to have oxygen cylinders on the verandah and to
live in a wheelchair and so on. And all the other things that
went with it. And when I think now, back, it was really very
abnormal to be living the way we were, but we pretended that
this was perfectly normal. And that was the way he coped
with it. 9 4
Others also tried to hide their condition and carry on as "normal"
even though there was a cost. This approach, learned in the polio
years, persisted in later life to reveal the denial and determination
that enabled polio sufferers to become polio survivors. A mother of
two recalls The tears I shed trying to get the washing done, trying to
cook the meals, trying to do those things for the children
and act as a "normal person", because it didn't show... they
don't see the brace on your back and I always wore slacks so
that I hid the caliper and people expect you to do everything
that a normal person does. And I'm afraid I did right
through until I packed up. All that a normal person that
had not had polio, I had done that and more. I pushed
myself to prove that I was able to do it, that I was capable. I
was not going to let it beat me. 9 5
You know I don't like people doing for me. I have the
community home care car coming to pick me up and they
want to open the door. I say to them "don't take my
independence away", and I think all polio people have this,
"we're going to do it". I've seen it in them. . . . where other
people will say "Oh, my arthritis is so bad", well we've got
arthritis too, osteoporosis too, but we don't tell people. They
say "How are you?" and we skip the answer. Ask them how
they are, or... If they ask me how I'm going I say "on my legs,
9 4 Interview G. p.60.
9 5 Interview H. p.69.
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but only Just". So polio people don't make a big issue. I
haven't found any of them that make a big issue.96

The most deeply rooted account of denial recounted by these
interviewees came from the family of a woman who was affected at
four years of age. Their shame at having polio in the family caused
them to cover over the fact through offering a variety of stories
about what happened. She recalls a changing understanding of
polio, and herself, over many years. The unwillingness of the
family to discuss the subject caused deep seated issues for her in
her adult life .
. . . my understandings around me having polio... changed over
time, because I'd initially . . . been told different things. One
was that I was born with it and the other . . that I got it when
I was four . .. in hospital having my adenoids out .
. . . sometimes I actually denied I'd had polio. but then when I
was. . . ten I had to go again for physiotherapy and so it
became obvious that . . . I had had polio ... At that stage my
mother told me that . . . I was born with it... I knew that
wasn't true, but. . . it seemed better . . . than having got it for
myself.
When I was about sixteen. . . I asked my mother again about
it, because it had come up somehow or other in conversation
and I realised that I hadn't been born with it, that I had
actually got it when I was in hospital.
I do know that it was never discussed; I mean it was never
talked about, except at really strange occasions like when I'd
go to buy shoes, my mother would always say, much to my
shame - which is sort of interesting now - that I'd had polio,
which explained . . . [why] the muscles had collapsed in one
foot . She would always say it and I used to beg her not to
say this to these salesmen - that I had polio. . . it's really
taken me a long time, and. . . it was only after the polio
program on TV9 7 that . . . she volunteered the information
about getting polio. I. . . knew unless it came from her I
wasn't going to get accurate information. If I asked her she

96 Interview H. p. 70.
9 7 ABC 1V Social History "TIME FRAME - Polio Days ", March 1997.
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would fudge it and I assume I know that because of past
experience, and because of these different messages.
. . . when she was talking about it she was very angry... about
it and said "I've always blamed the nurse" because her story
was that . . . my mother thinks that the damage to my leg was
caused by the nurse pulling my legs down when I went into
anaesthetic, because I was curled up in a ball. But she was
angry the whole time she was telling me about it.
None of my mother's story has any medical grounding. It's
just that from it you can work out what happened; that the
reason I was probably in hospital . .. was because of the
incredibly sore throat that I would have had from having
polio . . . When I came out of the anaesthetic I was
complaining about my leg aching and my mother said "that
was the first we'd known about it".. . Then this story came
out that when I had gone in under the anaesthetic .. . I had
been all curled up in a ball and they had had to straighten
me out and strap my leg. 9 s
I've always felt ashamed of it. It's taken me 40 years not to ...
I mentioned it in the first 35 years of my life to maybe one
other person, other than my friends at school. After that
experience I never mentioned it. And I would hide my foot,
which I'm doing now. I. .. always hide my foot.
The thing that is most memorable for me at the time was
fatigue. . . I was constantly tired, and I was never allowed to
say that I was tired. We lived at the top of the hill and...
would walk down to the shops, we would walk down to the
shops with my mother, and I.. . remember being so tired that
I just didn't know how I was ever going to get back, even as a
little child. I used to say to my mother "I'm tired, I'm tired"
and she used to say, "You can't say that". So I used to say
"'I'm tidy, I'm tidy". I was never allowed to be tired . . . That
fatigue is for me, the thread that runs through all my life,
and has been a really debilitating force for me . . . I link that
to the polio . . . the lack of treatment, the lack of being able to
rest, and to recover, and to recuperate, and to be treated
with sort of respect, in a way that a serious illness
demanded. 9 9

None of those interviewed referred to death from polio, though the
9 8 Interview C. pp.26-27.
99 Interview C. p.29.
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mortality rate was recorded during an epidemic, and deaths were
reported in the press. The argument from silence would suggest
that the deepest level of denial amongst polio survivors and their
families may have been reserved for the fear of death.
The will to overcome disablement

The stories of polio survivors witness to their strong determination
to overcome the limitations of their disability.

Susan Sontag

refers to the German philosopher Schopenhauer when she asserts
the power of the mind in overcoming the body -

"The will exhibits itself as organised body". . . Recovery from a
disease depends on the will assuming "dictatorial power in
order to subsume the rebellious forces" of that body. I oo
For many their discharge from hospital would be testimony enough

to their strength of will. But stubbornness, a heroic style in the
face of difficulties, overcompensation and, often, an outstanding

level of achievement, is common amongst polio survivors. IO I

While many drove themselves to reach the same level of
achievement as those living without a disability, high levels of
denial can also be found.

The following testimony from a

respiratory patient provides evidence of the medical culture that
prevailed in the 1 950s, and further evidence of fear and repugnance

shown towards the iron lung.

I must tell you another terrible thing that was done, because
it still concerns me. Owing to the imperfect understanding

I 00 Sontag, S. ( 1991 ). Illness as Metaphor, pp.44-45.
I O I A wide range of achievements is evident amongst this sample of interviews,
including "Citizen of the Year" and an AM.
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of muscular paralysis, there was a tendency to say that, if
you were taking too long to recover, you were becoming
psychologically dependent on, say, the ventilator. This is an
outrageous way of treating someone who is severely ill, and
of course, in my case, desperately desires to get out of such a
coffin-like machine. It is like a coffin - just the head
protrudes. And to help overcome this so-called psychological
dependence, they used to tum off the respirator at night.
When they did this, I promptly woke up and couldn't sleep.
So in the end I had to say to the physician in charge...
"look, it is unphysiological to interfere with someone's sleep,
who's exercising during the day. If the respirator is left on
during the night and I have a proper sleep, I am confident
that within another week I'll be free of the machine". So he
gave my instructions to the staff and they stopped turning
the respirator off during the night. A week later I was free of
the machine. But not free of the problem of recovery, by no
means.
The process of rehabilitation was long and arduous, but the
determinative moment is unambiguously recognised.
It took three months before I could lift my right arm off the
bed. My right arm was the most severely paralysed, because
that's the arm one uses in serving when playing tenn1s. 102
You see the severity of paralysis depends, at least partly, on
the amount of physical activity during the period the virus is
multiplying in the body, because it's easier for the virus to
get into the nerve terminals when they've been active.
The problem of rehabilitation is revealed when the day
comes and the patient, or subject, realises that he isn't
going to get much better unless he does something about
it himself. It's no good leaving it to physiotherapists to

wave your legs and arms around. You'll never get any
stronger doing that, only one's own efforts can lead to
recovery. Others can help, but they only help. No-one can
do it for you.
So the morning I realised that I wasn't going to get any
better unless I did a lot about it myself was the crucial
period in rehabilitation. I made it my ambition to get out

of hospital before a year had passed, and I think I
succeeded . . . the alternative is worse. I think that it is true

102 He had been playing tennis at the time of his febrile illness, consequently his

right arm was most severely affected.
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generally of people with severe polio paralysis - If they
recover it's through the determination to keep going and
make the most of what abilities are left. I 0 3

The mother of two who battled to recover sufficiently to be
discharged from hospital so that she could see her children again
was equally resolute . Repatriated to Holland with her husband,
who was a Dutch citizen in Australia during the conflict with
Indonesia, she was determined to appear to her relatives as if she
was able bodied.
I was determined I would have my photo taken in Holland
and I would put a pair of shoes on and hide the caliper, and
then, of course, we never thought we'd be able to come back
so quick and I'm on a ship with this jolly caliper again . . . and
I thought I can't let my mother and [ those who] were going
to be there to meet us [see me in this] so out went the
caliper - out the window for King Neptune and his flock,
because I had to walk without it, and I was determined to
hold myself erect and walk off that ship - but you know you
can't really.
The life that followed the return home continued to be marked by
the same expression of strong will. She kept moving, and living, as
if she had no disability and was rewarded, for a time, with the
appearance of being able bodied .
. . . we got a job on a farm . . . I had to take [my son] to school
three and a half miles a day, over a gravel road . . . I would
push the bike pedal with the right foot, but the left one
would only tap it as it got to the top, but I managed. . . I did
that for one year, summer and winter, but I knew I couldn't
do it the next year, because it was a man's bike and [my
daughter] had to go to school, so we went to Fairbrtdge
Farm and I worked as a cottage mother, with my husband . . .
I was still battling, but I kept going. I didn't give in. I've
never given in to the polio. And then I seemed as if I got over
I 0 3 Interview B. pp.20-2 1 . Emphasis added.
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Polio survivors in this sample were not deterred from the tasks of
giving birth to and raising a family and sharing the work of house
and sometimes farm. For some the choice was deliberately made
while others expected to continue as those before had done,
without any alternatives being brought forward for consideration.
A woman survivor who, after three years in hospital as a teenager,
returned to grow up and marry into the dairying district that was
her home said I don't know what was the normal situation and what wasn't
the normal situation. I just did what I wanted to do... I
know when we had our babies, like most people you carry
your baby around in your arm. I never found that good. I
always had to have baby sitting on my hip. Of course you
couldn't run after the little villains when they took off, but
basically I think the kids get to know what you can and can't
do, and they sort of compensate for things as well.
We had a dairy farm; we worked really hard at that and we
had our three children. I was helping him in the dairy and it
was very hard work. .. we were saying the other day "Isn't it
great that we don't have to do that now". It would be
freezing cold and pouring with rain, icy morning, you've got
to get three little kids organised and you'd go out - I always
did the calves and all that sort of thing - you'd be up to your
knees in water and it would be a real disaster.
I found it very, very hard, but it's not until now when I look
back on that... I didn't realise everybody didn't think the
same thing. I didn't realise everybody wasn't finding the
going as difficult. But it was very difficult for a while...
things that I can't do I find a different way of doing it. If I
can't do it one way, you can do it another way, so I can't
say that I've not done things because of polio. I o5
Other survivors who returned, particularly to farm work, were
I 04 Interview

H, pp.66-67.
1 05 Interview J, pp.88-89. Emphasis added.
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forced to find alternate ways of performing tasks because physical
strength would not allow them to continue as before. A farmer
was able to negotiate a reallocation of tasks .
. . . because I was in a partnership... my brothers were good,
they did the heavy work. I was able to do my bit I think, but
I did mostly ploughing up work and that sort of thing, where
they did the heavy bag lumping... We were in partnership
until 1 962 and then I was able to gradually - see when I went
home I was on crutches and calipers on both feet to keep my
foot up - but I was gradually able to work with using just a
walking stick. In fact, a lot of the time I didn't need a stick
at all. I only used a walking stick for long walks. I always
carried it with me on the truck, in case we had a breakdown
or something. I 0 6
The families of polio survivors required a similar strong sense of
determination, and sometimes this was tinged with deeper
emotions and a sense of the struggle being a spiritual matter. A
mother reflected I always knew - I don't know how I knew - that love would
win out. I... knew that one day it'd all be right and I don't
know what would be right, I don't know how it would be
right, but I just knew that whatever I did; I mean I never,
ever, for one minute gave up . . . something, some power
would keep me going. And I did and it worked out. 1 07
Not everyone was as able, or as willing, to reveal the way in which
they had made sense of their experience of polio.
Rehabilitation and after care

The occurrence of polio epidemics created a need for expanded
I 0 6 Interview K, p.93.
1 0 7 Interview A, p.14.
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rehabilitation selVices in Australia and gave impetus especially to
the development and professionalisation of physiotherapy and
massage. I 08 0 btaining sufficient trained staff to meet the new
demand was problematic, especially during an epidemic, as the
process of rehabilitation called for periods of intensive care
followed by a regular programme of after care. Those intelViewed
for this study remember being put in iron lungs, splints, and
receiving physiotherapy, hydrotherapy and massage as part of their
rehabilitation and after care. 1 09
The item most feared in connection with polio and polio
rehabilitation was the iron lung or tank. Those who required
respiratory treatment in a lung may not have sulVived without it,
but this did not diminish the horror it aroused, or the discomforts
it brought. And there is evidence to suggest that the nursing staff
themselves feared the iron lung due to the stringencies it imposed
on their work. An iron lung patient remembers playful attempts by
himself and others to ameliorate the situation .
. . . in those days too, the nurses were pretty scared too. That
was when they used to do their training in the hospital.
They would send the girl into a room full of three iron lungs
and of course they used to be scared out of their wits and we
didn't realise, of course, that they were frightened. They
tried hard to be self confident and sometimes we played a
trick on them. . . they were told that those lungs were
keeping us breathing and that if they stopped, we'd stop
breathing, and it was a bit scary for them - you know, about

1 0 8 Detailed accounts of these developments can be found in two so far
unpublished works; Martyr, P. ( 1994). The Professional Development of
Rehabilitation in Australia 1870-1981, PhD Thesis. History, University of Western
Australia, chapter 5, and Martyr, P. (1996). A History ofthe Victoria Hospital
(Infectious Diseases) ro the Royal Perth (Rehabllltatton) Hospital, 1893-1993. Perth,
chapter 5.
1 09 For example. interview K. p.92; I. p. 75; L, p.98.
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an eighteen or nineteen year old girl. On one occasion three
of us - I said ''You've got to watch me, I'm liable to choke". I
said "Philip over there, he's liable to have a flt" and there
was another guy, Alec "he might do something else" and I'd
give them the signal and we all started to perform, so the
poor girl Just put her head out the door, and yelled out
"Nurse". That's when we realised that they were so
frightened. But generally the nurses seemed to enjoy
working With us and of course the whole ward was full of
iron lungs at that period, that's when all the people in iron
lungs came. I believe there was about fifteen died. 1 1 0

The doctor who was a respiratory patient had strong feelings about
the experience I might say that being treated in an iron lung is a fate
almost worse than death. Total paralysis means total
dependence. In those days, that is 1953, patients were put
in the lung, as they called it - very few of them came out
alive. And the reason for that was the primitive treatment.
There were no measurements of anything to do with
respiration. Management was entirely based on clinical
Judgment, which is a very blunt weapon for anyone who is
totally paralysed and requires assisted ventilation.
It was only years later that I discovered... the man in the
tank respirator before me, died as a result of vomiting and
aspirating his stomach contents into his lungs...
. . . once you... were placed in an iron lung, it was miraculous
if you ever came out of it and survived the experience. I I I
And miracles did happen. Despite its horrors the iron lung allowed
many to achieve respiratory independence and return to as normal
a life as their recovery from paralysis would allow. 1 1 2 Of the three
who record being placed in an iron lung one, although mobile,
requires the respiratory support of an iron lung at night and has
1 1OInterview F. pp.50-51.
1 1 1 Interview B. p.17.
1 1 2 Public Health Department reports do not compare the number of deaths from
polio with the number who required iron lung treatment.
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recounts his own slow progress back to mobility after severe
paralysis in February 1956
.. . for the next two or three months it was pretty grtm . . . I
lost that much weight that I had bed sores on my elbows and
shoulders. They used to tum the head of the tank down so
all secretions would flow out from the lungs and, with the
head being down, you tend to slide up to the head of the
tank, and my shoulders would rub on the end of the tank.
So I had four bed sores, one on each shoulder and my
elbows, plus a carbuncle on my back. I think the thing that
saved me from dying was penicillin. I was gtven six hourly
injections of penicillin in my bottom, which was pretty much
skin and bone and that was pretty painful.
From then on it was just a matter first of all of trying to
learn to breathe. I couldn't breathe at all - I don't know how
long this was after, about two months I suppose - with
breathing exercises they used to open up the lid of the tank
and say "breathe", and you try and breathe, whatever muscle
you've got. You might go for about two or thee minutes and
that was it, just couldn't breathe at all. . . . it took months
and months to build up my breathing ... I can't be sure of
the exact time, but about four or five months I could breathe
for an hour or so, and that went on until about . .. August
... the first time they stood me up at the side of the bed. I
had sufficient power in my legs so I could lock my knees
[and) . .. stand. I said to the physio, "Can I tiy and walk?"
He said, ''Yes". I took about one step and that was it - I was
exhausted and they just put me straight back in the lung.
And then it was just really months and months of physio.
They couldn't work us really hard because our breathing was
that bad. You couldn't do any physical effort, because you'd
just get short of breath. On one occasion I was walking from
one room to the next, without a physio, and I got half way
and my breathing just packed up all together so they just
picked me up and put me straight back in the "tank", which
fixed things up of course. 1 1 4
The need for ongoing respiratoiy support added burdens which
those survivors had to contend with on a daily basis. The wife of
1 1 3 Interview
1 1 4 Interview

F.
F. p.50.
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the man who had respiratory difficulties and a high level of
residual paralysis revealed how demanding everyday life could be
Because of his breathing problems, his tracheotomy and so
on, it took about three hours for him to get his breathing
organised sufficiently to be able to leave the house in the
morning, so it took a lot of physio and suctioning, and so on
- a lot of which he did himself - to get things organised. You
couldn't ever get up and get dressed and go out. It took a lot
of time and different things.
We tried getting up earlier. It didn't make any difference.
He still wasn't ready until around the same time ... daylight
saving caused a problem, because he ended up being an hour
later for work, because he still couldn't get his chest
organised, even though he got up an hour earlier, it still
took that particular time of the day before he was rtght. 1 1 5
The amount of time it took to "get going" meant that, although he
had been present for the birth of their first child, when the second
child was born the circumstances were such that he was unable to
make the hospital in time.
Other forms of rehabilitative care were equally intrusive, absorbed
huge amounts of time, and placed great burdens on health services
and families alike. The parents of children too young to manage
themselves were taught how to maintain their after care regime.
The mother of a small boy records
.. . when he was sent home they told me that it was up to me
if he ever walked again. That was pretty horrendous stuff
you know. I had five hours a day of exercises to give him.. . I
had to go back to Princess Margaret three times a week to
see the physios there and they would show me what to do . . .
we didn't see friends, we didn't go out, our complete life
changed. We didn't do anything but help this lad... 1 1 6
1 1 5 Interview G. p.6 1.
1 1 6 Interview A, p.5. Original emphasis.
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Those able to self manage their recovery were required to do so. A
teenage girl was sent home for a break with a set of exercise
directions carefully written out by her physiotherapist. 1 1 7 Another
was required to practice her walking daily. Her family insisted she
do her exercises in the hallway of the house, while everyone else
was having dinner, due to the shame they felt over her polio. She
said,

"I was. . . separated, . . . so that no one would ask any

questions" . 1 1 8
A young boy spent two years in a general hospital and a further
year in an after care home, elected to stay on an extra year to
allow for his schooling. He said I was supposed to sleep in a splint, and I had regular
massage. It was called massage in those days, it probably
amounted more to physiotherapy . .. the people who applied
the massage were called masseurs or masseuses, because
they were all female. . . 1 1 9
Children were assisted with their education, and a different of
measures were relied upon to occupy them while in hospital.
Excursions ware also enjoyed by those able to participate. A
variety of programmes were in place at PMH during the late 1940s
and early 1950s as the following testimony reveals.
. . . we had our schoolwork to do in the daytime - well, for a
few hours - with [the teacher] who was at Princess Margaret.
She... was a small lady that used to buzz around and make
sure everybody was doing their reading. We had tables that
used to sit over you and came up to a height wh,ete you
1 1 7 Directions for Dorothy Shepherd, in the possession of the author.
1 1 8 Interview C, p.28.
1 1 9 Interview D. p.36.
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could put your books and things on. You couldn't do a lot
of writing because of the position you were in, but she used
to ask questions on what you'd read...

At Princess Margaret on a Saturday morning they had their
own little radio programme, where you could ask for
requests . . . When we got out to the Golden Age we had our
own schoolroom, which anyone who was able could go along
to ...
And there was ... a little green ambulance ... painted green
and on the side Princess Margaret Hospital for Children...
written on it. . . About once a week, evecyone used to get
loaded up and we'd go some place. The ones that were lying
down laid on the stretchers on the side and we'd go for a
picnic, or a morning out; we'd go to the circus; we went to a
few things at His Majesty's Theatre and we'd go down to
Fremantle. I remember one day we had morning tea on one
of the big boats at the Captain's table. Quite a lot of
outings. We'd go down to the beach. In the summer we
used to go down to Hamersley Pool and evecyone would have
their swim in the water, their exercises in the water instead
of being stuck at home. 120
The continuing uncertainties surrounding polio may be one reason
medical staff chose to improvise, or rely on old methods to achieve
a result. A mother of two recalls ... the doctor said " ... you're going to... have physio". So they
brought ... a physiotherapist, and she came with a car battecy
and connected it up to my legs and my arm and tried to get
the muscles to work again, but see they wouldn't. It didn't
do anything and doctor said "No, we'll have to tcy to get you
up, but you mustn't tcy to get out on your own". But can
you imagine a mother not tcying to get up on her feet? I got
out gradually, bit by bit, but it was an awful feeling. But I
was determined to get up and walk. It took a while and my
foot dragged, but I managed. As I left hospital I'd had a
collar made. I had a surgical corset made and I had a
Thomas splint made. It was one went that from the heel to
the hip and it didn't bend at the knee, they were straight
up. 1 2 1
1 20 Interview J, pp.86-87.
121 Interview H. pp.65-66.
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And a male survivor records that his doctor resorted to an
unorthodox method to assist his recovery.
I had completely lost the use of my bowels and bladder and I
was being catheterised all the time and the bladder part of it
was a concern, because of infection... the doctors came up
with the idea of injecting curare, which is what the Red
Indians used for tipping their arrows - muscle constricting
poison. They got the dose right. It didn't kill me . .. , They
told me it was what the Indians used to use on their arrow
tips to kill... whatever they wanted to catch for dinner ... that
was one of the treatments. 1 22
The impact of Post Polio Syndrome

Amongst the present cohort of polio survivors the coming of Post
Polio Syndrome has caused a complete reassessment of life and
contributed to them achieving a new identity. The onset of fresh
difficulties arising from the original destruction caused by polio
radically reshaped their vision of their past, and their future
prospects.

Because of the shock brought about by PPS their

stories are now available to us in a way they may not have been
prior to the 1 980s.
The identification of PPS came slowly. At first the difficulties
indicated by polio survivors were dismissed by their doctors as
being an element of the aging process.

But as evidence

accumulated from the cohort of polio survivors it reached a critical
mass of information that could no longer be ignored and in the
1 980s research commenced.

1 22

Interview K. p.92.
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In this sample responses to the news about PPS varied widely, even
within the same person's story, a reflection of their own
adjustment to new conditions.

For some it came as a relief,

because it put a name something that was going on but had no
diagnosis. For others relief only came later, after they had worked
through the evocation of their worst fears arising from the past
and projected into the future.

Some expressed the view that

handling PPS was more difficult than dealing with the than
original bout of polio because they knew their age was against
them.
The woman married to the man who was severely paralysed and
had respiratory difficulties testified that, from 1969, her husband ... was deteriorating from about ten years after I first knew
him... and for the next ten years he deteriorated quite
dramatically, and ended up in intensive care a number of
times. We heard whispers that something was going on with
post polio, but it was so rare that it couldn't possibly be
what was wrong with him... but we were looking for more
information. It wasn't until 1989 that we eventually found
it and realised that it was very significant to the problems
that he was having, but unfortunately he died two weeks
after we found this information. 1 2 3
PPS curtailed the career of the doctor who had polio. He described
the condition, and the discomfort it brought him.
I returned to an appointment at the University of New South
Wales... in September 1964. Except for a year at Harvard, I
remained there until the end of 1992, when because of
increasing weakness I had to resign - what's referred to as
the post polio syndrome, but really is the accelerated loss of
power that is partly aging and partly because one had lost a
lot of one's motor nerve cells. One is apparently more
1 23

Interview G. p.62.
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susceptible to the effects of aging, whatever that is, and for
this increasing weakness there is no treatment. You all get
weaker as you get older, but if you've had polio you get
weaker faster, and it's very trytng. 1 2 4

The farmer who returned to the land expressed real difficulties at
the coming of PPS, which he found more taxing than having to
deal with the ortginal polio.
The hardest part of rehabilitation was going downhill again,
not knowing what post polio syndrome was. That was
harder than getting polio.
For several years we used to come down to Busselton . .. for
our annual holiday... while the kiddies were young and
growing up. I found that each year going home was getting
harder. That was taking place .. . in the late 1970s and
certainly into the early 1980s, and I was coming to the
realisation ... that I wasn't looking forward to going to
another year's work. It was getting hard.
[ My wife ) was in her prime and enjoying life ... she enjoyed
farm life and had a social outlet with pottery and one thing
and another... That was the difficult part because [my wife I
was enjoying it so much and I was getting so I wasn't
enjoying it. And, of course, I was the one that took her there
in the first place . . .
But. .. because I was realising that it wasn't my age, i t was
just something was happening and I didn't know what. We
went to Perth and had an assessment, but this was before
post polio was known... although the doctor that assessed
me did refer to it, but I don't know whether she wasn' t
familiar with it... because no-one was, but she must have
been hearing something about it. Her assessment was that
she could find nothing... So, of course, you come away
feeling that you're giving up...
[My wife) and I went to a meeting up in Perth, where it was
explained, ... it was still only in the early stages. But... you
could see it was a terrific relief, not only to me, but people
around the hall... that it was... a load off your mind,
because you couldn't help but feel that you [ had been)
letting yourself down as well as everybody else.
1 2 4 InteIView B. p.24.
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That... was a bigger emotional strain than actually getting
polio... When I first got [ polio] I never believed I wouldn't get
right because I suppose at that stage in your life you can't
see why you shouldn't. But at the other end of the spectrum
you know that ... your age is against you and fighting back is
not going to be as easy. But we've learned to live with it,
because now that we know that it is a real complaint. The
first decision I had to make, of course, was about the farm...
It became increasingly obvious that I couldn't carry on, so
that was a major decision... a lot of heartache.... [ because]
our son was working on the farm and [my wife] was enjoying
it, and I was the odd man out.
It was probably the hardest decision of our lives. I wasn't a
very popular guy. 1 2 5
The view that knowledge about PPS was bad news is evident in the
testimony of another subject, this time a woman who felt it drew
her back to the horrors of the original, distasteful experience,
which kept her hospitalised for three years. Her transition, from
initial feelings of dismay through to recovery of the familiar spirit
of determination,

is

evident from her story.

.. . I'd been getting more tired and finding life a bit more
difficult, and... we knew they were having their meeting in
Bunbury... so we went along to see what all this was about.
I can honestly say that I felt worse finding out about post
polio than I did polio in the first place, because I had these
horrible visions of getting back to how I used to be before,
especially when one of the doctors said that people that were
between the age of ten and thirteen age group when they got
it, ones that took a long time to recover, were going to get
the worst of the post polio syndrome. I felt devastated,
honestly. I just didn't know what to do. It took me.. .
months. . . to actually get it into my head that... with what I
do, if I'm careful, I will not get back to that stage. But even
now sometimes, I something think "it can' t j ust be
happening - not again!" I think that ls worse that the first
time around. But I beat it the first time. It's not going to
get me the second, I can tell you. But now I can look at it
and think - if I have to do things differently again, and \{ I
1 25 Interview K, pp.93-94.
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get to the stage where I can't walk to do what I want to do I'm going to ride. He's still healthy - (points to husband) he can push me! . . . But I'm not going to sit home and let it
get me beat. If I want to go somewhere I'll do it. If I can't
walk, I'll ride. But it has taken . . . a long time to actually
think that way. 1 26
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Others were filled with the same sense of dread when the news
about PPS broke, 1 2 7 and some testify that it made them wony
about all their petty ailments, such as increased tiredness, 1 2 s
aches and pains. 1 29 The most dramatic sense of relief is evident in
the testimony of the survivor whose family coped with her original
polio by denying its existence.
When I first came in touch with literature about post polio,
that was a really profound experience. Because I was having
enormous pain with my foot and my leg when I walked, and I
was terrified by this. . . . It was to do with the fact that I'd
just started walking mornings and. . . would be in quite
considerable pain, and still am, if I don't tie my shoe up
properly, do all the right things.
So I just cried for about 3 days when I read this
literature, because it just made - I could make sense of
my life. I could make sense of the fatigue. I used to
complain about this the "psychic fatigue". I couldn't
describe it in any way except to say that "my soul was tired".
And I had always experienced it. So by getting this
literature. . . I understood that polio . . . was actually quite
serious. I'd always been taught to dismiss it, it was nothing.
"Don't make a fuss; don't make a fuss of her" . . . . I had to
reclaim my polio experience as something that had
happened, that had consequences. I [ had dealt with the]
psychological, but at this time I was dealing with the
physical. And so I had to almost relive my life and factor in
polio, all the way through . . . . That was a devastating
experience and that took me. . . two or three years to not cry
every time I heard the word Post Polio . . . every time I'd go to
1 2 6 Interview J, p.89.
1 2 7 In my own experience the news

aroused depression, fears for the future, and
worries about any kind of fatigue or aches and pains.
1 2 8 Interview L. p.100; E. p.47.
1 29 Interview D, p.39.
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ring [ the Post Polio Network] .. .I would just cry, I couldn't
talk. I'd have to hang up. I finally got their newsletter and I
just used to get it and cry, so I never actually got to read it
very much. It was like I had a different life that I'd denied
and never been able to acknowledge this incredible thing
that had happened in my life.. and had impacted on my
children.. on my ability to . . . raise them [as] their mother.
It was huge .. . having done that, I feel like I have reintegrated
polio back into my life, and now ... it's radically different in
that now . . . I factor that in. It has affected me. I do
experience fatigue. I do [have] inability to keep warm and I
do have pain in my foot and my leg. It's like I denied it all
those years as well, even though it had all these incredible
effects... [an] it profoundly affected my whole life. 1 30

The formation of the WA PPSG (Bunbury) and the WA PPN
(Perth)

A feature of PPS has been that it has generated a vast amount of
self-help amongst polio survivors, principally through the
formation of networks and support groups. Conferences, at which
updates of medical and other forms of professional information
are offered alongside opportunities for personal sharing, are now
held regularly in Australia and New Zealand, and other parts of the
world.
The first moves towards gaining support for polio survivors in
Western Australia was made by a group in the south west regional
town of Bunbury who, in June 1988, formed the Western
Australian Post Polio Support Group (WAPPSG).
The next year, in August 1989, the Perth based Western Australian
Post Polio Network (WAPPN) was commenced by the nurse who
1 30 Interview C, p.32. Emphasis added.

CHAPTER 9 : Memories of polio

414

married a polio survivor.
The first night we had the big meeting I got 110
questionnaires back from the 230-odd people that had
attended, which showed me that there were a lot of other
people having similar problems... and there was a need for
something to be done about it.
We've now got 1400 people that have had polio registered in
WA. Ninety percent of them are having further problems and
the research we're doing is coming up with a lot of answers
that is benefiting people. I really feel that I served an
apprenticeship during my [marriage] and it would be a waste
of that experience not to be putting it back into helping
people that I can help. 1 3 1
The two groups function separately and according to different
guidelines.

The WAPPSG offers monthly meetings at which

information is shared and for polio survivors offer support to one
another.
The WAPPN offers a regular clinic where polio survivors may have
their needs assessed, conducts some research, and provides
information for polio survivors.
Some political tensions exist between the two groups, but this is
limited by their different orientation and geographical base. Both
are lively and expanding groups which have met an important need
amongst polio survivors in Western Australia.
***

131

InteIView G, pp.62-63.
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CHAPTER 10: Conclusion

The title Fear, frustration and the will to overcome, emerged from
this research and accurately encapsulates many people's knowledge
and experience of polio. There are several layers to this histocy
and the presence of the disease in the community evoked varied
and ambiguous reactions. I have examined the discussion the
virus generated amongst members of the public, researchers,
health professionals and polio survivors, in order to draw
conclusions about the relationship between disease and society,
especially in Australia.
This thesis is a narrative social history- investigation of community
responses to poliomyelitis, and the impact of the disease on those
who experienced it, particularly during the epidemics that occurred
in Western Australia between 1938 and 1956. In this enquicy I
have been concerned with the relationship between memocy,
history- and polio and through this work I have attempted to allow
space to more voices than have previously been heard in the
official polio stocy Western Australia.
Until recent years there has been little ongoing discussion of polio.
The vaccination programme eliminated the public profile of the
disease, and it is evident that polio survivors were inducted into a
culture of denial in which there was little or no validation for
telling their stories. Many polio survivors have remained silent
about living with the consequences of the disease and more would
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have done so had not the late effect of polio itself revived their

memories. While many polio survivors won't go so far as to write
their story, a consequence of the emerging post-polio support
systems is that they are being asked to articulate their experience,
to doctors, support group workers, and their fellow polio survivors,
and the field is available for the researcher who is willing to enter
into it.
Reworking the collective memory of the polio era in Western
Australia in this way has allowed a richer narrative of this period
to begin to emerge. The reader, and future researchers may now be
able to see that there are many nuances to consider in this
history. The voice of polio survivors themselves have been left out
of the official record and within the context of this enquiry I have
endeavoured to allow them plenty of space to speak for themselves.
The commentary of the newspapers has largely been missing from
earlier accounts, and the archives themselves have warranted a
more thorough examination than they have previously had for this
purpose. The official history, as it existed in the form of Annual
Reports from the Public Health Department, and in books such as
that written by Snow, are bereft of the experience of the people
who suffered from polio and received support from medical and
health authorities. It is evident from my research that the official
version of the polio is very different from the one that is
remembered by polio survivors, and at times it is difficult to
reconcile the two. The "memory jolt" caused by the coming of Post
Polio Syndrome is only now being absorbed by polio survivors and
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historians. There is much more of the polio story to emerge, and
given the amount of material obtained through this small sample
of interviews, compared with the number of people there are with a
story to tell, there is plenty to occupy historians for some time to
come.
I began this research with the whole of Australia in view but the
abundance of material available led me to concentrate on Western
Australia. Limiting the scope in this way has meant the possible
loss of insights that may have been gained by being able to
examine the response to polio across different states, but where
possible I have made comparisons within Australia, and with New
Zealand, while chapters two and three give an international
context through the medical and social history of polio. If similar
resources on this subject are available for the rest of Australia, as
Anne Killlalea's work on Tasmania suggests they are, there is a
profitable field of research yet to be explored which could
eventually lead to a general history.
Fear, frustration and the will to overcome, encapsulates the

argument of this thesis. The opinion that polio was a disease
greatly feared in the community, mostly articulated by experts, has
been shown to be true in this case. Beginning with Dudley Snow's
assertion that "few diseases are capable of evoking as much human
emotion as polio", I I have shown that polio attracted a great deal
of fear, more than it may have deserved, when compared with other
diseases which had far higher mortality rates, such as diphtheria,
I Snow, D.R.J. { 1981). Progress, p.66.
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whooping cough, heart disease and cancer. It is evident that the
fear of polio was genuinely felt amongst the medical fraternity, and
that it was not confined to that group. From an early date, health
and medical experts in Australia spoke of polio in language which
reflected their fear of the disease, and expressed dismay that the
press drew attention to it in ways that exacerbated that fear in the
community. There is evidence that in Western Australia, and New
South Wales, health authorities attempted to curb the press in its
reporting of polio, in an effort to calm the community down. Such
actions have affected the history of polio, and the type story that
has survived in the public memory. But during the 1948 epidemic
in Western Australia the Public Health Department had to learn a
lesson the hard way. Its bumbling manner and its policies of
persuasion resulted in being severely criticised. The authorities
feared polio itself, and it is clear that they also feared the negative
criticism it could bring them from the public realm.
The power of polio to render a child disabled was an important
reason it was so feared. Being crippled was associated with being
worth less in the economic struggle for life, and it meant that the
polio survivor might have to face the prospect of life-long reliance
on the state for support. Evidence of stigmatisation and ostracism
experienced by polio survivors is a clear sign that disability, and
the polio that caused it, was greatly feared in the community.
Conversely the strong drive amongst polio survivors to overcome
their disability and enter the mainstream, often with the
encouragement of their doctors, also demonstrates the presence of
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that fear.

Lack of accurate information about the polio virus, particularly in
respect of its means of transmission, was a source of frustration
both for health experts and the community. Uncertainty led the
Public Health Department to impose a number of protection
measures, in the hope of casting the net wide enough to stop the
disease. The press and the public viewed the protection policies as
inconsistent and contradictory and the nature of the measures
themselves contributed to the level of fear and frustration
connected with polio.

The practice of imposing quarantine

restrictions on children while allowing adults to continue to travel
and mingle freely was an example of this inconsistency, as was the
recommended ban on the congregation of children from different
areas, while allowing picture theatres to remain open.

These

practices helped exaggerate the negative publicity polio received,
undermined confidence in the Public Health Department, as shown
by the cartoons of Saw and Davies and numerous letters to the
papers, and made the public frustrated and anxious.

Community

response to some of these policies was at times equivocal, but it is
evident from the call for bans on children entering WA from
interstate, reports of the Swan river being deserted during a
summer heat wave, the letters of protest concerning the proposed
YAL tour of country districts, and the letter from a mother who
complained that a known polio contact should have been
prevented from working on her husband's farm, that people
earnestly sought to avoid contact with the virus or its potential
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carriers and were frustrated by the way the Public Health

Department chose to respond to the epidemics. The public debate
that occurred in the lead up to the 1954 royal tour to Western
Australia revealed that people at all levels of government and
community were afraid of the consequences that might result from
the gathering of such large crowds, and some called for the tour to
be cancelled. Under the circumstances it was a bold act to allow
the tour to proceed, but it helped prove a point about the faecal
contamination theory of polio transmission. And so strong was
the desire to participate in this event, the public willingly
conformed to the protocols designed to ensure their own safety and
that of the royal couple.

Despite the shock of the "Cutter"

incident the fact that 97% of Western Australians consented to
have their children immunised with Salk vaccine.

Nearly all

resistance was overcome by a strong level of community acceptance
combined with a dread of the alternative.
If health experts were frustrated by the slow progress made in
understanding polio and finding a reliable prophylactic, they were
less impressed by the level of understanding of the disease abroad
in the community, as manifested in the weird and wonderful
suggestions members of the public offered them.

While the

response to these gestures was generally polite, and occasionally
some points were taken seriously, at heart they were treated with
disdain. The public were trespassing into a world where scientific
knowledge had become the technical preserve of an elite caste, and
it seems many had not read or understood the information about

CHAPTER 10: Conclusion

42 1

polio the experts had provided for them. Occasionally suggestions

received a severe rebuff, or were ignored entirely. Hints of how the
health experts really felt about them are gained from Snow's
outburst against the anti-immunisation movement, and in the
curt reply that some of the suggestions received from the
Commissioner. Health experts may have felt they kept the public
well informed but it is evident from the oral testimonies examined
here that ignorance of the facts remained amongst the medical
profession as much at the public. And for all their weaknesses,
the suggestions offered demonstrate how members of the
community continued to be concerned and involved in the search
for an answer to polio, and shared the frustration of not knowing
what to do for the best.
The will to overcome the ravages of epidemic polio is as noticeable
amongst medical and health experts as the remarkable
determination to overcome their disabilities is amongst polio
survivors. The search for a reliable vaccine is an international
story of the will to overcome polio, in which Australians, such as
Sir Macfarlane Burnet and Dame Jean Macnamara, have had a
significant part to play. The will to overcome polio in Australia is
also demonstrated by Bazeley's commitment to learn how to
produce Salk safely in this country, and the Commonwealth
government's approach to the mass immunisation of the
population.

These, along with Dudley Snow's careful and

ingenious planning, are but a few elements in what was widely
touted as the "war against polio". The implementation of the
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immunisation campaign, and the high level of public response to
it, is another indication that the defeat of polio was something
nearly all members of the community were resolved to accomplish.

The testimonies of the polio survivors have clearly shown that
amongst them there was an intense determination to triumph over
the devastating effects of the disease.

A similar strong

determination can be found in Sister Elizabeth Kenny, whose work
was damned by the Australian medical establishment. The heroic
representation of polio survivors in the press expressed another
side of the will to overcome polio, and gave encouragement through
showing some were already winning the battle.
The polio virus has not waged its war through Australian summers
since at least 1962 but many people have a polio story to tell.
There is a significant number of people who still live with the
effects of their contact with polio, as long as sixty years ago. The
emergence of Post Polio Syndrome has presented at least two new
challenges to be considered. In terms of changes to the present
needs of polio survivors it has faced them with important issues to
work through as they confront the increased pain, loss of muscle
strength and misunderstanding by the medical profession. And, as
has been shown here, it has sometimes meant that, for the first
time in their lives survivors have had to confront the pain of the
original impact of polio, and address the losses it brought, but
which have so often been denied or ignored in their drive to live a
normal life. As polio survivors affected by PPS are now required to
confront some painful changes, so there is a role for historians to
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rework and transmit the new history that emerges from this

profound jolt to the collective memory.

***
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ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEW RELEASE FORM
- PROJECT TITLE Fear, Frustration and the will to overcome:
a social history of polio in Western Australia
by
John B Smith

NAME..... . . . .... . . . .. . ............. ....... ..... . ... .... .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . ........... . . . .... . .
ADDRESS.. ..... . . .......... ........ .... .............. . . ................. ................. ..
TELEPHONE ... .... .. ........... . . ... ......... .... . . ........ . .. . . ......... . . ...............
I consent to the information that I give relating to my experience of
poliomyelitis, in interviews conducted by John Howard Smith for
the above project, being used, without personal reference, for the
purposes of research and publication.
I understand that the information gamed will assist the writing of
the history of the polio epidemics in Australia, and especially
Western Australia.
I also understand that any part of a research report, which is
placed in the Battye Library, or elsewhere, will be lodged there at
the discretion of the Doctoral Studies Committee of the Edith
Cowan University, and will be placed on restricted access.
Should the process of recollecting my experience of poliomyelitis
evoke emotional reactions that need to be addressed, I understand
that suitable professional help is available, at my expense, from
Susanne Howlett, The Wasley Institute, 563 William St, MT
LAWLEY WA 6050, TELEPHONE 328.3300.
SIGNED.. .............. . . . . ......... .................... ..... . .... ...... .................... .
WITNESSED. . .......... . . . ....... . ... ............ .... ............................ ........ .
DATE.......... .. . . . ........................ ........ ·............................ ............ . . .. . ........................... .
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- PROJECT TITLE
THE POLIOMYELITIS EPIDEMICS IN AUSTRALIA 1895-1962
with special reference to Western Australia
by
John H Smith

1. Name
2. Age
3. When did you have polio (When were you associated with
polio)?
4. Where did you live at that time?
5. How did you get polio? (How did the member of your family
get polio?)
6. Were you hospitalised - at what stage - how many times for how long?
7. How did having polio affect you (the member of your family)
physically?
8. What do you remember feeling about yourself:
- when you got polio?
- when you were admitted to hospital?
- when you were in hospital?
- when you were discharged?
9. What anxieties/ uncertainties do you remember feeling?
10. Once you had polio were certain forms of behaviour
expected of you?
11. What do you remember about how others regarded you - did
you feel included/ excluded?
12. How did having polio affect your relationship - with your
father, mother, siblings?
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13. How did you having polio affect the way your family
understood itself?
14. Did you or your family experience any ostracism because of
your polio?
15. What do you remember of how people felt about polio?
16. What myths/ legends / traditions do you remember were
associated with polio?
17. Was information about polio readily available?
18. What precautions or practices were recommended as safe
guards?
19. What forms of help or support were available?
20. How have you been able to make sense of your experiences?
***

